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Abstract
This thesis looks at literary responses to the Bomb as the greatest threat to 
humanity, examining English-language texts written between the destruction of 
Hiroshima and the break-up of the Soviet Union. Specifically, it investigates the 
representation of nuclear paranoia and the desert as a site of Cold War 
experience.
The Cold War security-state used discourse about the threat of the Bomb 
to inspire conformist paranoia among its citizens. However, excessive paranoia 
can lead to dissociation and non-conformity. Those in dissociative states 
commonly display pre-emptive tendencies, desiring to make their environment 
conform to their world-view. Accordingly, the Cold War citizen might wish for 
the Bomb to drop in order to escape their paranoia. 
Since the Bomb turns society into a wasteland, flight to the archetypal 
wasteland of the Sahara effectively precipitates nuclear-apocalypse. Free from 
the shadow of the Bomb, the desert can become the site of a society free of fear. 
By travelling from Jean Baudrillard's 'desert of the real' to the real desert, 
however, these citizens move from a place of paranoia to the birthplace of the 
Bomb. Their perception of the desert as a space outside society shows that they 
have not escaped society's constructs. The desert's disruption of these 
constructs, however, offers a perspective on their cultural formation and so a 
new narrative by which to live. 
The thesis examines texts which feature Westerners travelling to the 
African desert by Paul Bowles, Saul Bellow, Thomas Pynchon, Lawrence Durrell, 
Penelope Lively and Michael Ondaatje. It argues that the Bomb lurks in the 
unconsciousness of the writers and their protagonists, inducing the individual 
to travel. With this in mind, it investigates whether the age-old idea of flight to 
the desert can resolve the stand-off within the individual between the narratives 
imposed by society and those constructed through personal experience.
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Fiction and Travel in the Shadow of the Bomb, 1945–91
This thesis looks at literary responses to the Bomb as the greatest threat to 
humanity. To do so, it analyses fiction as part of the public discourse about the 
Bomb, and what Arthur Redding has called both a mechanism of and a threat to 
the hegemonic narrative of consensus in the first years of the atomic age.1 
Specifically, it examines English-language works featuring Westerners travelling 
to the African desert written between the first use of the Bomb in aggression, the 
attack on Hiroshima in 1945, and the break-up of the Soviet Union, completed in 
1991. After this event, the two ideological adversaries of the Cold War stepped 
back from their threats of mutual obliteration and, it can be argued, the Bomb 
lost its status as the principal danger to society (even if, as Jonathan Schell has 
pointed out, this shift in attitude is entirely mistaken).2
The subject of this thesis
The Bomb loomed over the collective and individual consciousness as the 
principal danger to the world throughout the second half of the twentieth 
century. When topical events pushed it off the front pages, it continued to hang 
in the air overhead, at the edge of one's peripheral vision, a Fat Man behaving 
like a black dog (of war). Even during the years of détente between the Free 
World and the communist bloc following the brinkmanship over Cuba in 1962, 
1 Arthur Redding, Turncoats, Traitors and Fellow Travelers: Culture and Politics of the Early  
Cold War (Jackson: UP of Mississippi, 2008), p. 6.
2 'It’s not until 1994 that we truly saw how fear of the Bomb had declined. Four years after the 
fall of the USSR, James Cameron exploded a nuke just in the background of True Lies [...] It is 
a moment that shocks for its casualness.' It seems that, for popular culture, an apocalyptic 




when headlines in the West were more concerned with the Civil Rights 
movement in America and the UK's bid for membership of the EEC, not to 
mention Vietnam and decolonisation, Frank Kermode still believed that 'the 
paradigms of apocalypse continue to lie under our ways of making sense of the 
world'.3 While Albert Einstein said the year after the destruction of Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki that '[t]he unleashed power of the atom has changed everything, 
save our modes of thinking, and thus we drift towards unparalleled disaster',4 it 
can be argued that it did change precisely these things. After all, the awareness 
of humanity's ability to destroy itself and the accompanying anxiety and 
paranoia have ricocheted around the chambers of our brains like radioactive 
shrapnel ever since. This is one of the central concerns of this thesis.
Although tensions rose and fell throughout the forty-odd years of the 
stand-off, the narratives which the atomic-superpowers broadcast to their 
societies consistently maintained a stark binary so value-laden that all choice 
was effectively removed. Media-projections, such as images of the mushroom 
cloud which came to emblematise both the atomic-threat and the State's atomic-
protection, fixed the world reductively, desiring to deny citizens the 
interpretative agency to arrive at their own understanding of the ideological 
confrontation. As Guy Debord says, such propaganda is the material form by 
reference of which ideology gains force and, in the words of Alan Nadel, the Cold 
War demonstrates 'the power of large cultural narratives to unify, codify, and 
contain – perhaps intimidate is the best word – the personal narratives of its 
population'.5 This diffusion of information throughout society replicated and 
exceeded, in both material and psychological terms, the proliferation of missiles 
on the front-line of the conflict which it was primarily intended to justify. The 
3 Frank Kermode, The Sense of an Ending: Studies in the Theory of Fiction with a New Epilogue  
(Oxford: Oxford UP, 1967), p. 28.
4 Quoted in Joseph Dewey, In a Dark Time: The Apocalyptic Temper in the American Novel of the  
Nuclear Age (West Lafayette: Purdue Research Foundation, 1990), p. 7.
5 Alan Nadel, Containment Culture: American Narratives, Postmodernism, and the Atomic Age  
(Durham: Duke UP, 1995), p. 4. Guy Debord, The Society of the Spectacle, trans. by Donald 
Nicholson-Smith (New York: Zone, 1994), chapter 9 (sections 212–21).
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Cold War enlisted not so much the sword of Damocles as the armour of El Cid.
Living under this cloud – the threat of annihilation and their own 
powerlessness in the face of it – citizens were both obliged to trust in the State's 
protection from its Cold War enemy and aware of the danger of being associated 
with that political power. This strange love of the security-state demanded, in 
Robert Jay Lifton's words, 'a suppression of terror that preserves the illusion of 
normality',6 a bipolar mindset to fit the bipolar world which both feared and 
loved the Bomb, a paranoia synonymous with patriotism and which was 
accordingly 'reposition[ed] from a psychological malady to a social condition'.7 
This produced in the West, to use Frances Stonor Saunders' phrase, 
'freedomism': 'where people think they are acting freely, where in fact they are 
bound to forces over which they have not control',8 the homeland become 
ideological reservation.
However, such an attempt at psychological containment was one war-game 
whose eventualities could not be predicted by simulated projections. While 
paranoia can be said to have induced citizens to conform to the State's project of 
defeating its enemy (to the extent that, Daniel Cordle proposes, it 'defines the 
period'),9 another effect of paranoia is dissociation. The dissociated individual 
rejects their ties to society,10 inhabiting a fantasy world in which an alternative 
reality is possible. In effect, then, paranoia can inspire political dissidence.11 
Even if the State could control the dissemination and interpretation of 
6 Quoted in Daniel Cordle, States of Suspense: The Nuclear Age, Postmodernism and United  
States Fiction and Prose (Manchester: Manchester UP, 2008), p. 66.
7 Alan Nadel, 'Fiction and the Cold War', in The Cambridge Companion to American Fiction  
After 1945, ed. by John N. Duvall (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2012), pp. 167–80 (p. 178).
8 Frances Stonor Saunders, Who Paid the Piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War (London: 
Granta, 1999), p. 5.
9 Cordle, p. 2.
10 Sam Vaknin, Mental Health and Psychology Dictionary  
<http://samvak.tripod.com/mentalhealthdictionary.html> [accessed 13 September 2015]
11 This thinking is based on ideas about trauma in Jessica Dubow, 'A Therapeutics of Exile: 
Isaiah Berlin, Liberal Pluralism and the Psyche of Assimilation', Environment and Planning 
A, 44 (2012), 2463–76 (p. 2470). 
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information in society,12 therefore, the very tensions by which it seeks to achieve 
its goals could undermine its campaign. Overwhelmed by paranoia, the citizen 
can reject the narrative necessitating the fight imposed by the State in favour of 
the individual impulse for flight. In Civilisation and its Discontents (1929), 
Sigmund Freud's argument suggests that the desire to travel is the expression of 
tension with one's home-society,13 and this thesis contends that the instances of 
travel which it examines can be read as the articulation and negotiation of such 
nuclear-paranoia.
As the period under discussion witnessed, those disillusioned with the 
narrative of the political hegemony turned their backs on mainstream society. 
Arguably, this occurred most obviously in the United States during the 1960s and 
'70s, when 'the globalizing rhetoric of containing communism could no longer 
sustain the contradiction between democratic professions of US anti-
imperialism, US extension of the colonialist-racialist legacy of France, and the 
unleashing of a US military steeped in the traditions of expansionist 
nationalism'.14 Many of those for whom the Cold War was effectively a civil war 
12 These are equally impossible. The brain cannot accept propaganda passively, since any 
stimulus acquires meaning only by being fragmented and reconstituted within the cerebral 
cortex. When images hit civilian retinas, these representations of lethal rods in metal cones 
smash into rod and cone photoreceptor cells, fragmenting through bipolar cells to ganglion 
cells which shoot them down the optic nerve into the cerebral cortex. As with any sensory 
stimulus, the information is replicated throughout different parts of the cortex which 
specialise in understanding different aspects of that information. See Michael O'Shea, The 
Brain: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2005), pp. 67ff.
Effectively, the brain deconstructs the world in order to construct meaning, thereby working 
against the intentions of the authority which disseminates propaganda (which, according to 
Baudrillard, has no meaning behind it). Like travel, therefore, the brain is subversive, even if 
it might well be biased towards the cultural influences which shape its perceptual framework.
13 Sigmund Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, trans. by Joan Riviere (London: Hogarth 
Press, 1972). 'The liberty of the individual is no gift of civilization […] The development of 
civilization imposes restrictions on it, and justice demands that no one shall escape those 
restrictions […] a desire for freedom may […] spring from the remains of their original 
personality, which is still untamed by civilization and may thus become the basis in them of 
hostility to civilization. The urge for freedom, therefore, is directed against particular forms 
and demands of civilization or against civilization altogether. It does not seem as though any 
influence could induce a man to change his nature into a termite's' (pp. 32–33).
14 Nikhil Pal Singh, 'Cold War Redux: On the “New Totalitarianism”', Radical History Review, 85 
(2003), 171–81 (p. 175).
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'within the selfsame western modernity'15 effected a physical distance from 
society, the canvas of the State's projections, to complement their ideological 
departure.16 As Roderick Nash writes, '[w]ilderness appealed to those bored or 
disgusted with man and his works'.17 Some opted for self-exile within the familiar 
world in an attempt to construct a counter-narrative which better spoke for 
them, such as Ken Kesey. Others sought to expose themselves to alternative ways 
of making sense of the world by travelling to non-aligned states which suggested 
a parity with their own non-aligned states. As Redding writes, the bid to secure 
freedom 'came to be seen as the defining and increasingly global struggle of the 
age',18 and not only outside the Free World. 
While it was hardly unprecedented for individuals to travel to other parts 
of the world in search of that which they felt their own society denied them, this 
practice accorded with the increasingly international experience of the average 
Western, particularly American, individual during the first decades of the 
atomic age. This shift occurred on account of not only the West's involvement in 
the overseas military campaigns of the Second World War and regional 'hot' wars 
(such as in Korea and Vietnam) and the advent of mass-tourism in the 1970s but 
also, closer to home, the proliferation of television from the 1950s onwards.19
15 Jodi Kim, Ends of Empire: Asian American Critique and the Cold War (Minneapolis: U of 
Minnesota P, 2010), p. 24, quoted in Steven Belletto and Daniel Grausam, 'Introduction: 
Culture and Cold Conflict', in American Literature and Culture in an Age of Cold War: A  
Critical Reassessment, ed. by Steven Belletto and Daniel Grausam (Iowa City: U of Iowa P, 
2012), pp. 1–14 (p. 7).
16 The paradox of the Cold War security-state is materialised at the border between the two 
hemispheres of the brain. The dissociated citizen's tensions are manifested physically in the 
hippocampus, which is the site of paranoia, navigation and the narratives which create our 
sense of self and the world. Paranoia is associated with a smaller-than-average hippocampus, 
while the hippocampus of someone who travels a lot and is adept at navigation is larger than 
average. See Simon Garfield, On the Map: Why the World Looks the Way It Does (London: 
Profile, 2012), pp. 411–12.
17 Roderick Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind (New Haven: Yale UP, 2001), p. 47.
18 Redding, p. 9.
19 Of course, television was also an important medium for the dissemination of conformist 
messages. In a world of replication (of images, missiles) and the manipulation of language for 
political ends (see Ann Douglas, 'Periodizing the American Century: Modernism, 
Postmodernism, and Postcolonialism in the Cold War Context', Modernism/Modernity, 5 
(1998), 71–98 (p. 81); and Nadel, Containment, p. 38 and p. 168), the compulsive replication of 
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Of the destinations which attracted those disillusioned with Western 
society, the desert exerted a particular pull. Needless to say, the desert has long 
been identified as a place of escape from society. Regarded as an empty quarter 
of the planet, it is a space which is up for grabs; in Zygmunt Bauman's words, 'the 
desert [is] nothingness waiting to become something'.20 It is the polar opposite of 
society with its aspirations for rationalism: a place of death, of madness, where 
people find gods, where mirages abound and confound. In Man in the Landscape:  
A Historical View of the Esthetics of Nature, Paul Shepard describes it thus:
[t]he desert is the environment of revelation, genetically and physiologically alien, 
sensorily austere, esthetically abstract, historically inimical […] To the desert go 
prophets and hermits; through deserts go pilgrims and exiles. Here the leaders of the 
great religions have sought the therapeutic and spiritual values of retreat, not to 
escape but to find reality.21 
In short, it is a place of ambiguity, disrupting unitary definitions and so binary 
oppositions, all certainties found to be written in sand. Inevitably, as reflected in 
a shared etymological root – the Latin ambigere – it is a place of wandering. 
Its reputation as a site of ‘revolutionary’ ideas of stateless nomadism and 
cathartic retreat is signalled during this era by the countercultural and artistic 
communities of Westerners which set down roots of greater or lesser robustness 
in one or another desert-space. To restrict an illustrative selection to well-known 
English-language writers who visited North Africa in the years immediately 
following the Second World War, Paul and Jane Bowles, William S. Burroughs, 
Truman Capote, Allen Ginsberg, Jack Kerouac, Joe Orton and Tennessee 
behaviours and neologisms observed in states of dissociative paranoia such as bipolar and 
borderline disorders and schizophrenia (see Vaknin, n.p.) can appear understandable counter-
strategies. As Alan Nadel has written, paranoia is produced by a surfeit of narrative 
('Paranoia, Terrorism, and the Fictional Condition of Knowledge', Contemporary Literature, 
43 (2002), 406–21 (p. 421)) and, in light of this, such tendencies can be seen as defensive 
mechanisms on the part of the individual to replace the confusion which arises from living in 
society with a coherent narrative of their own.
20 Zygmunt Bauman, 'From Pilgrim to Tourist – or a Short History of Identity', in Questions of  
Cultural Identity, ed. by Stuart Hall and Paul du Gay (London: Sage, 1996), pp. 18–36 (p. 21).
21 Paul Shepard, Man in the Landscape: A Historical View of the Esthetics of Nature (College 
Station: Texas A&M UP, 1991), pp. 43–44. 
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Williams spring readily to mind. The Sahara in which these individuals based 
themselves for anything between a couple of months and over fifty years is the 
archetypal desert in the Western imaginary, arguably on account of its historical 
significance to Europe combined with its exoticism, as well as its size, being the 
world's largest save for the frozen wastes of Antarctica with their quite distinct 
cultural associations. During the Cold War, all these factors tied in with the 
region's largely non-aligned status to cast it as a space outside the East–West 
bipolarity.
Travel to the desert is thus an ideal expression of ideological 
disidentification. Its perceived emptiness is the perfect alternative to a society 
over-inscribed with totalising Cold War projections (be they capitalist, 
communist or even countercultural). However, I would argue that this is only 
part of the significance of the desert for the disillusioned citizens of the atomic 
era.
Those in dissociative states commonly try to make their environment 
conform to their desires. These can include the desire to bring about that which 
is feared, since this would endorse the sufferer's sense of the world. Summarising 
the psychoanalyst Franz Alexander's article, 'The Bomb and the Human Psyche' 
(1949), Paul Boyer writes: 'Having contrived the means of his destruction, 
Alexander speculated, man might find irresistible the temptation to escape 
forever the stresses of the atomic age and subconsciously conclude that “a 
painless end” was preferable to “endless pain”'.22 In other words, those who 
disidentify with Cold War society on account of the tensions it generates might 
wish for the Bomb to drop.
As Jacques Derrida says, until it occurs, nuclear-apocalypse exists only in 
being written or talked about, invented, for all the reality of the weaponry and 
dread it inspires,23 and so our imagination is the present battleground of the 
22 Paul Boyer, By the Bomb's Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the  
Atomic Age (Chapel Hill and London: U of North Carolina P, 1994), p. 342.
23 Jacques Derrida, 'No Apocalypse, Not Now (Full Speed Ahead, Seven Missiles, Seven Missives)', 
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atomic confrontation between one state and another and between State and 
individual. In the same way that, as Michel Foucault maintains, discourse is a 
fundamental tool of control, 'narrative [i]s a technology of sanity'.24 While the 
individual cannot prevent the Bomb being launched or its effects, they have 
agency with regards to the effect of the Bomb before that moment, their sense of 
self and the world and thus how they live their life. By rejecting the hegemonic 
narrative of atomic antagonism, the individual sheds the double-consciousness – 
that one has to get on with everyday life while being aware that the Bomb could 
fall at any moment – which creates not so much what Robert Lifton identified as 
the 'double life' of Cold War experience as an atomic half-life of the split-self held 
hostage by the nuclear-state.25 By constructing an alternative narrative of their 
own, they can escape their paranoia, stop waiting for death and start to live.26 
This ambition is the central interest of the thesis which follows. 
While the paranoid Cold War state might contemplate launching a pre-
emptive strike in order to vanquish the enemy, therefore, the dissociative Cold 
War citizen might imaginatively launch a pre-emptive strike of their own in 
order to beat the Bomb. While Franz Alexander imagined humanity's drive for 
pre-emption leading to destruction, Erich Fromm advocated thus '[d]eveloping 
one's imagination, not as an escape from intolerable circumstances but as the 
anticipation of real possibilities, as a means to do away with intolerable 
circumstances'.27 By unconsciously calling down the apocalypse, the individual is 
able to imagine the unimaginable and assuage the anxiety which has arisen from 
trans. by Catherine Porter and Philip Lewis, Diacritics, 14 (1984), 20–31 (pp. 23–24). 
24 Daniel Grausam, '“It is Only a Statement of the Power of What Comes After”: Atomic Nostalgia 
and the Ends of Postmodernism', American Literary History, 24 (2012), 308–36 (p. 323).
25 Robert Jay Lifton and Richard A. Falk, Indefensible Weapons: The Political and Psychological  
Case Against Nuclearism (New York: Basic Books, 1982), p. 52.
26 Jonathan Schell writes that such a feeling of well-being is based on a denial of the reality of 
the nuclear-threat, and so is a kind of psychological sickness. However, since – in Bryan 
Taylor's words - '“realistic” nuclear discourses enforce passivity and inhibit reflexivity', it can 
be said that this denial signals a refusal to accept one's imposed fate. See Schell, The Fate of  
the Earth and The Abolition (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2000), p. 8, and Bryan C. Taylor, 'Nuclear 
Pictures and Metapictures', American Literary History, 9 (1997), 567–97 (p. 593).
27 Erich Fromm, To Have or to Be? (London: Jonathan Cape, 1978), p. 171.
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the constant anticipation of annihilation. This impulse for simulation mirrors 
the reason Stanley Kubrick gave for making Dr. Strangelove, or How I Learned to  
Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb (1964): 'It was very important to deal with this 
problem [nuclear war] dramatically because it’s the only social problem where 
there’s absolutely no chance for people to learn anything from experience'.28 
Just as the desert was a test-site for the atomic scientists, so it is for the 
dissenter: a crucible of experimentation in which to forge a new narrative to 
make the Bomb actual, confrontable and so psychologically containable and fuse 
the split-self into a whole. The Bomb can turn society into a desert, transmuting 
the Manhattan Project to New Mexico, and transforming Japanese cities into 
wastelands. Jonathan Schell registered the same correlation: 'Now we are on our 
way to work, walking through the city streets, but in a moment we may be 
standing on an empty plain under a darkened sky looking for the charred 
remnants of our children'.29 In response, the dissident, sensible to the decay of 
their half-life in what the philosopher Jean Baudrillard in 1981 called 'the desert 
of the real'30 – society over-inscribed with and indeed constructed by 
propagandic projections – might flee their unclear (sic) Cold War state (in both 
senses), unconsciously desiring to turn the desert into a society. 
Of course, the fact that the Sahara became increasingly non-aligned over 
the course of the period on account of decolonisation did not remove it from the 
Cold War contest, but quite the opposite. Not only was it vulnerable to fallout in 
the event of conflict, it was where the Bomb was tested when the French joined 
the club in 1960. Not only was it beholden to the atomic narratives broadcast by 
the superpowers, it had the potential to become the Ground Zero of their 
ideological confrontation, as demonstrated by the regions engulfed in its 'hot' 
wars. The further that the individual travelled from the Iron Curtain, the more 
28 Quoted in Stephen J. Whitfield, The Culture of the Cold War (Baltimore: John Hopkins UP, 
1991), p. 219.
29 Schell, p. 182.
30 Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, trans. by Sheila Faria Glaser (Ann Arbor: U of 
Michigan P, 1994), p. 1.
9
they might find themselves wrapped up in it, as the race for the moon 
confirmed.31 
In truth, the Sahara was located outside the ideological stand-off by the 
Western narrative of the desert. In a sense, then, those travellers who were 
disgruntled with the status quo were simply turning to older cultural constructs. 
This chimes with Baudrillard's view that the individual is contained within their 
socially constructed perceptual framework and lacks the agency to resist 
ideology and to arrive at alternative meanings. As the cultural geographer 
Graham Huggan writes, '[a] simulacrum of the world (or part of it) is produced 
through the participation of the intellect in the abstract reorganization of its 
“natural object”: the external environment. But this participation is never 
neutral' on account of 'the anterior presence of the West'.32 Contamination – 
cultural as much as radioactive– penetrates even the Sahara. Much of 
Baudrillard's work accordingly examines how protest and resistance is 
authorised, incorporated and co-opted by the symbolic system of capitalism and, 
in this way, the contradictions of Cold War society are contained. Paul Kubalek 
suggests that those who travel seek not difference but equivalence to the 
31 In the West, Russia was equated with the inscrutable, dangerous Orient. See Memoirs, 1925–50 
(1967) by George Kennan, the director of Secretary of State George Marshall's policy-planning 
staff during Truman's presidency (referenced in Nadel, Containment Culture, p. 31). 
Ultimately, the fantasy is society's narrative of itself as a site of certainties and of its Other 
(whether the communist state or the desert) as a place of hardship and madness in its effort 
to neutralise the possibility of its citizens defecting to the other side. As William Pietz states, 
'[t]he idea of totalitarianism is the theoretical anchor of cold war discourse' ('The 
“Postcolonialism” of Cold War Discourse', Social Text, 19/20 (1988), 55–75 (p. 55)). While the 
Western propaganda refers to fascist and communist totalitarianism, the Western security-
state can feel analogous for the individual citizen: it is similarly 'a lying world order' which 
similarly 'fabricate[s] reality' (Hannah Arendt, 'On the Nature of Totalitarianism', in Arendt:  
Essays in Understanding 1930–1954 – Uncollected and Unpublished Works by Hannah Arendt, 
ed. by Jerome Kohn (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1994), pp. 328–60 (p. 354)). Arendt writes that 
totalitarian tyranny turns the world into a 'desert of isolation and atomization' (p. 349), 
although '[t]he desert [of the real] in which these individual, fearfully atomized men move 
retains an image [of the real desert], though a distorted one, of that space which human 
freedom needs' (p. 344). 
32 Graham Huggan, 'Decolonizing the Map: Postcolonialism, Poststructuralism and the 
Cartographic Connection', in Interdisciplinary Measures: Literature and the Future of  
Postcolonial Studies, by Graham Huggan (Liverpool: Liverpool UP, 2008), pp. 21–33 (p. 25).
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familiar, that is, their home-society's narrative of difference.33 
However, the encountered desert cannot be directly equivalent to this 
expectation since no narrative can comprehensively contain experience. As 
Daniel Grausam points out, no one-sided model can ever effectively simulate the 
world.34 The desert – both fantasy and real – is different to Western society and 
so the narratives it can produce. (Indeed, Jonathan Schell notes that, for all the 
association between desert-spaces and the Bomb, in the event of a nuclear-
exchange America's deserts would not be targeted since they are uninhabited.)35 
Here, therefore, the West's rules are obliterated. The desert is not 
understandable and so it is undesirable: it is an empty space, a site of death. The 
simulation of wilderness in society results in the stimulation of bewilderness 
beyond it. As Edward Abbey says, it is a space of unconscious fear.36 It is a 
Baudrillardian singularity, that which lies outside the system brought within, 
but continuing to elude containment since it can never be definitively 
determined.37 Even if this reality is found to be lacking when weighed against 
one's cultural preconceptions and so dismissed,38 it disrupts the individual's 
33 Paul Kubalek, 'The Tourist Gaze', Chelsea College of Arts and Design MA Graphic Design 
Communications 2008, 1 <www.kubalek.at/download/KubalekPaul-MAGDC-
TheTouristGazeEssay_end.pdf> [accessed 30 May 2012]
34 Daniel Grausam, 'Games People Play: Metafiction, Defense Strategy, and the Cultures of 
Simulation', ELH, 78 (2011), 507–32 (pp. 517ff).
35 Schell, p. 59.
36 Edward Abbey, Desert Solitaire: A Season in the Wilderness (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1990), p. 191.
37 Jean Baudrillard, Impossible Exchange, trans. by Chris Turner (London: Verso, 2001), pp. 130–
31. For a concise explanation of this idea, see Paul Hegarty, Jean Baudrillard: Live Theory 
(London and New York: Continuum, 2004), pp. 161–63. In this sense it is a counterpart to the 
Bomb, an idea I will return to later in the thesis.
38 For example, the desert might appear as not authentically exotic (that is, disappointing when 
compared to the fantasy) or threatening (that is, simply too different). Such symbols of exotic 
difference are purveyed by the Western fantasy and so identified as authentic. Significantly, 
'authenticity' derives from the Latin authenticus, meaning 'coming from the author'. Of 
course, a narrative's author can be hidden – as Rem Koolhaas says, the authorless is 
authoritarian ('Junkspace', October, 100 (2002), 175–90 (p. 185)) – and this is how it derives its 
authority. Relevant here are two dominant theories behind the motive to travel, John Urry's 
one of difference and Dean MacCannell's of authenticity, the search in others' lives for the real 
denied by one's own society. See Urry, The Tourist Gaze (London: Sage, 1990) and MacCannell, 
The Tourist: A New Theory of the Leisure Class (London: Macmillan, 1976). MacCannell writes 
that the modernist mindset seeks authenticity or reality elsewhere (p. 3), a scenario which is 
11
interpretive passivity, the social narrative's authority. By thus defying 
conceptual frameworks, it throws into relief their constructed nature and the 
culturally informed interpretative process they construct which strives to 
contain the individual. In the face of the inflexible authoritarianism of 
hegemonic projections, therefore, the desert can all the more expose the 
certainties of Fortress America as mere Castles Bravos39 built on sand and 
inspire a dialogic construction of meaning better able to negotiate 
multiplicitous reality. 
Therefore, even while Baudrillard does not believe that travel can take us 
beyond the system, it is not correct to say that it does not have a value. Even 
before the Westerner arrives there, the desert is a meeting-place of the different 
cultures which abut and cross it, a space in which different ways of making sense 
of the world converge. Far from being empty or dead, it is full and alive, a space 
of alternative truths.40 Travel thus both facilitates and imbeds dissociation, 
creating a perspective with which the individual can more easily test society's 
projections of meaning against others (since it is not possible to test them 
against the world, given that experience is always mediated). 'When the system is 
imposed on cultures perceptibly different from that of the dominant', Huggan 
writes, inconsistencies 'are brought to light'.41 Accordingly, in the words of Peter 
Osborne, travel can produce 'a more emphatic apprehension of the world's 
independence, its physical otherness that culture never entirely absorbs – the 
strangeness and ecstasy of things'.42 
played out in the first two texts examined in this thesis; the protagonists of the others instead 
engage with their own constructedness, recognising the the real is subjective.
39 After the test-accident at this site in 1954, the idea of limited and survivable nuclear war gave 
way to the notion of nuclear war meaning the end of civilisation.
40 As T. E. Lawrence writes, in the desert 'the madness was very near, as I believe it would be 
near the man who could see things through the veils at once of two customs, two educations, 
two environments'. Seven Pillars of Wisdom (New York: Vintage, 2008), p. 30.
41 Huggan, discussing Said, p. 22.
42 Peter D. Osborne, Travelling Light: Photography, Travel and Visual Culture (Manchester: 
Manchester UP, 2000), p. 190.
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Faced with this singularity, the prospect it affords (like the Bomb) of the 
horizon of system, the dissident has the same choice as all travellers: they can 
either run from or run towards. Neither direction will take them to a reality or 
truth, since these are constructs of narrative. Each leads only to ambiguity. (It is 
worth noting that even the individual who chooses to retreat to the familiarity of 
social constructs is still affected by their experience of the desert, just as the 
Western metropole was influenced by its neo-colonial project.)43 
For Baudrillard, ambiguity has the potential to bring us to ourselves; in 
fact, it is the only means to do so. As the literary theorist Louis Montrose writes,
the very process of subjectively living the confrontations or contradictions within or 
among ideological formations makes it possible for us to experience facets of our own 
subjection at shifting internal distances – to read […] one fragment of our ideological 
inscription by means of another.44
The experience of ambiguity makes clear that we have a choice of two falsities, 
(hegemonic) simulation or (personal) illusion.45 The latter is an illusion of truth 
which counters the insubstantiality and hopelessness of a world of simulation; 
an illusion, but which includes the option of vital illusion, which is aware of its 
fictitious nature. This does not, in Baudrillard's view, give the individual agency 
to contest the system. Indeed, he is pessimistic about even the individual's 
ability to depart from the interpretive schema imposed by the hegemony. 
However, it is possible to draw an analogy between vital illusion and the cultural 
geographer Erik Cohen's concept of existential authenticity, which refers to the 
traveller's self-determination through a passage of conscious continual 
negotiation among different social narratives.46 These words of Denchu Jose 
Decino are instructive in this matter: 'Authenticity defines itself as lacking any 
43 Douglas, p. 78.
44 Louis Montrose, The Purpose of Playing: Shakespeare and the Cultural Politics of the  
Elizabethan Theatre (Chicago and London: U of Chicago P, 1996), p. 16 (emphasis in original).
45 Hegarty, p. 88.
46 Erik Cohen, '“Authenticity” in Tourism Studies: Aprés la Lutte', in Critical Debates in Tourism, 
ed. by Tej Vir Singh (Bristol, Buffalo and Toronto: Channel View Publications, 2012), pp. 250–
61 (p. 258).
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definition. It is a pathos of incessant change, as opposed to a passive 
subordination to one particular ethic'.47 Such an approach sketches what might 
be seen as a common ground between Baudrillard's pessimism and a more 
Gramscian relationship between the individual and ideology, and during its 
investigations this thesis is open to the possibility that one can thus step out 
from under the shadow of one's cultural preconceptions. After all, even within 
society, the individual's interpretation is not determined by mainstream culture, 
since they encounter alternative narratives and counter-cultures.
Either way, the Baudrillardian scholar Paul Hegarty argues that the hope 
inspired by our perceiving that there is an outside to the system and a self to 
which we can be brought which, the philosopher contends, is as much as we can 
aim for, is worth aiming for as an end in itself.48 This goal chimes with the 
interest of this thesis in the possibility of escaping nuclear-paranoia. In Letter  
Bomb: Nuclear Holocaust and the Exploding Word, Peter Schwenger calls hope 
'the prime instrument of change', without which 'the material world will never 
even enter into negotiation with human desire'.49 Reviewing Schwenger's work, 
Clair James expands on this point:
 With hope, even the destructive potential of nuclear weapons does not present a dead 
future for humans; rather, realization of these weapons' destructive potential acts like an 
explosion in our imaginations, presenting us with the impossibility of the future as we 
have imagined and created it in the present. This blockage leads to imagining new and 
different futures, and thus, to the possibility of a future at all.50
In this way, the ambiguous space of the desert might prove a stable foundation. 
As Grausam says, the atomic narrative cuts the individual off from the future.51 
47 Denchu Jose Decino, 'Brief Overview of the Sartrean Notion of Authenticity', in Sartre Online 
<www.oocities.org/sartresite/articles_ethics_1.html> [accessed 14 September 2015]
48 Hegarty, p. 88.
49 Peter Schwenger, Letter Bomb: Nuclear Holocaust and the Exploding Word (Baltimore: John 
Hopkins UP, 1992), p. 143.
50 Clair James, 'Book Reviews', Configurations, 2 (1994), 367–71 (p. 370).
51 See Daniel Grausam, On Endings: American Postmodern Fiction and the Cold War  
(Charlottesville: U of Virginia P, 2011).
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By pre-empting the Bomb, the individual rejects the atomic-death of society, 
which can only be anticipated since it will happen too quickly to be experienced 
and will leave no one behind to bear witness to it, and gives death a narrative, 
thereby gaining authorship over their lives. They create a future despite the 
cultural edict that there is none. As Cordle suggests, such an alternative 
projection of the world can destabilise and momentarily negate the real life of 
nuclear apprehension.52 In this way, the paranoid Cold War citizen might 
transform their distressing 'surfeit of narrative'53 into a harmonious synthesis. 
Unlike the pre-emptive strategies of the nuclear state, therefore, those of the 
dissatisfied citizen are not necessarily suicidal. By deserting society, they might 
find a place in which to cultivate a new life.
☼
This thesis argues that the state-sponsored nuclear threat and the accompanying 
demands on the individual which are associated with, but not restricted to, the 
Cold War lurk in the consciousness and unconsciousness of the writers and their 
protagonists as a tension with society which induces the individual to travel. No 
less than the Cold War's 'hot' wars, therefore, or flight to the desert, fiction can 
be '[a]n exercise in geographic and psychological displacement'54 to negotiate 
one's tensions. By examining this conflict in works of fiction, the thesis 
acknowledges another layer of tension in an era when narrative was the 
battleground. Not only do the tensions within and without the texts reflect and 
influence the other, but the narrative strategies which authors employed in 
response to the society in which they lived can be seen to mirror political 
discourse and atomic reality.
With this in mind, the thesis investigates whether these representations 
suggest that travel to the desert is a means to resolve the stand-off which exists 
within the individual – namely, the conflict between their cultural construction 
52 Cordle, p. 71.
53 Nadel, 'Paranoia', p. 421.
54 Douglas, p. 77.
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and their sentiments of dissent – by writing a new narrative. Conceived in this 
way, the desert embodies
[t]he notion of a 'Third Way' – or of a left-leaning, non-materialist politics that challenged 
Western capitalism without succumbing to the iniquities of Stalinism – [which] was a 
common pursuit of Western and Eastern bloc literatures. Stephen Spender's assertion [in 
The God that Failed], in 1949, 'that neither great power had the solution to the world's 
problems' was a direct assault on the choice between the two 'alternative ways of life' 
proposed by the Truman doctrine, and one that would have struck a chord with many 
writers around the world.55 
The novels examined do not necessarily deal explicitly with the Bomb. 
Nevertheless, I argue, in its absence it is present. As Derrida wrote in 1984, 'the 
hypothesis of a total nuclear war, […] or, if you prefer, […] a fantasy, […] 
conditions every discourse and all strategies'.56 The paranoid narrative can be 
hidden underground. In the same way, these texts do not necessarily reference 
the ideological confrontation in which the Bomb was deployed and which 
threatened total nuclear war, but were written in its shadow and so are read for 
the existential and psychological effect of the Bomb's potential for annihilation 
on the individual. Fundamentally, the thesis contends that the protagonists of 
the texts are trapped in the instant of the Bomb; even at the moment of victory 
over Japan, the American public knew that it was only a matter of time before 
another power acquired the technology to build a Bomb which could be dropped 
on them.57 Consequently, this research concerns itself primarily with the 
perennial conflict between the individual and society, and how this conflict is 
informed and complicated by underlying cultural constructs. These constructs – 
ideas of individual autonomy, society and its outside – are, of course, shaped by 
the historical moment in which they are referenced, negotiated and contested. 
55 Andrew Hammond, 'From Rhetoric to Rollback: Introductory Thoughts on Cold War Writing', 
in Cold War Literature: Writing the Global Conflict, ed. by Andrew Hammond (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2006), pp. 1–14 (p. 11).
56 Derrida, p. 23. The English translation was published before the French edition (see Futures:  
Of Jacques Derrida, ed. by Richard Rand (Stanford: Standford UP, 2001), p. 251 note 61).
57 Boyer, pp. 14–16.
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The politics and strategies which produced and mushroomed around the Bomb 
are necessary to understand the tensions.
Accordingly, Cold War scholarship provides a framework to talk about the 
tensions in the examined literature, and is supplemented by other influential 
thinking of the era, primarily that of Baudrillard. In this way, this research 
produces an investigation of a specific instance of the individual trying to carve 
freedom in the face of the State arrogating control while at the same time having 
application beyond its period of historical concern.
Methodology and theoretical perspectives
The thesis draws on a range of theoretical and critical perspectives in order to 
support my analysis of the nuclear-paranoia and deserts of the five novels. These 
include leading theorists in cultural geography and tourism studies on account 
of the experience of travel portrayed in the texts, and ideas from neuroscience 
which help explore the relationship between narrative and experience (or, more 
precisely, narrative which is imposed on the individual and narrative generated 
by the individual). I also apply Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari's concept of 
'becoming' as a resistance to the fixed identity dictated by the social hegemony.
The common concern of these different approaches is the stand-off 
between different projections of meaning which is played out across the 
individual. As is evident from the setting out of the field of study above, the work 
of Jean Baudrillard decisively informs the thesis' reading of the novels which 
follows. His most useful ideas in this regard date from the 1980s onwards, when 
he turned his attention from an explicit critique of Marxism to investigating the 
system of symbols and media which capitalism uses to preserve and extend 
itself. 
Central to this line of thinking is his hypothesis of simulacra outlined in 
his essay 'The Precession of Simulacra', which first appeared in French in 1981. 
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Baudrillard argues that the experienced world is now merely simulation, that is, 
a succession of images (of threats and difference, protection and conformity). 
There is no tangible reality or meaning behind them and so simulation is a 
system purely of forces and tensions, namely indeterminate structures and 
binaries58 which evade any attempts at assessment or valuation, without any 
centre which the individual can oppose. This is the 'desert of the real', experience 
dissociated from meaning.59 This dissociation in itself does not undermine the 
system, since the system is always indeterminate. Similarly, while the individual 
can try to resist this 'perfect crime', their resistance can be co-opted by the 
system to reinforce its dominance, in accordance with ideas which Baudrillard 
first developed in the 1970s when dismantling Marxism and structuralism. 
Bound up in the system's arrogation of interpretive agency is its exclusion 
of death – he deemed the United States effectively a death-free society60 – and 
consequent command over the individual's life and death which was at the heart 
of Cold War experience. Baudrillard writes that '[t]he nuclear is the apotheosis of 
simulation'.61 The Cold War constructed a reality it was simultaneously 
determined to prevent, its theory of deterrence maintaining that the very 
possibility of nuclear strikes made them impossible.62 The State imposes its 
command by promising to protect the individual from the threat of nuclear-
attack (which, of course, itself comes from the State), making the individual 
unavoidably indebted to the State. As Baudrillard states, the undetonated Bomb 
radiates a system of control.63 However, the individual can deprive the State of 
this power by mimicking the system's indeterminacy through effectively taking 
58 Jean Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange and Death, trans. by Iain Hamilton Grant (London: Sage, 
1993), p. 57.
59 Baudrillard, Simulacra, p. 1.
60 Jean Baudrillard, America (London and New York: Verso, 1988), pp. 43–44.
61 Baudrillard, Simulacra, p. 32. (This phrasing, which I feel is more effective, actually comes 
from the translation of this essay in Simulations, trans. by Paul Foss, Paul Patton and Philip 
Beitchman (New York: Semiotext(e), 1983), pp. 1–79 (p. 58).)
62 Baudrillard, Simulacra, pp. 32–33.
63 Baudrillard, Simulacra, p. 42.
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their own life,64 such as by pre-empting nuclear-apocalypse as I suggest occurs in 
the texts examined. This opposition is not absorbed by the system to becoming 
the Other by which it justifies itself, since the individual is rejecting the system's 
control not to reclaim life but throw it away. This does not push back against the 
system but undermines it, exposing the State's claims to protect as mere 
simulation, and not attempting to gain anything more. However, since the 
symbolic economy in which the relations between State and individual operate 
dictates that 'power […] resides in the act of giving without being given',65 to 
regain dominance the State must repay the individual in kind and destroy itself. 
Unsurprisingly, the system will not do this, and so reveals itself as 
untenable. The death which it (or, indeed, every closed system or fixed meaning) 
excludes remains at its heart.66 The Cold War system is ultimately undermined 
by the Bomb on which it founds itself, hence its instabilities inspire the 
individual's dissent. For Baudrillard, this glimpse of the limits of the system is 
enough. Since, as Derrida says, the Bomb which the individual fears is purely 
speculative, a propaganda of paranoia, I argue that this narrative of the system's 
shortcomings is a means to escape one's paranoia. My readings equate this 
horizon of the system, the site of death, with the desert. Baudrillard believes that 
the individual cannot escape the system of simulation; experience is always 
mediated by narrative-constructs (precluding 'Truth' or 'reality') and, 
accordingly, the thesis does not ask whether the individual can escape to the 
'real' desert but whether they can escape their cultural preconceptions to an 
alternative narrative. 
Influential Cold War criticism
Published in 2012, Steven Belletto and Daniel Grausam's American Literature  
64 Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange, p. 5.
65 Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange, p. 40.
66 Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange, p. 4.
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and Culture in an Age of Cold War: A Critical Reassessment begins with one of 
the best overviews of the development of Cold War literary studies and its recent 
areas and approaches of investigation. The authors duly credit Thomas Hill 
Schaub and Alan Nadel with the major works which established the field, 
agreeing with Adam Piette that Schaub's American Fiction in the Cold War (1991) 
'really launched Cold War literary criticism'.67 
This work demonstrates how fiction and criticism in the first decades 
following the Second World War reshaped and extended the liberal narrative in 
the light of the recently experienced horrors and the uncertainties then 
confronting America, as registered in the shift from positivist morality to 
sceptical ambiguity. Through close-readings, Schaub shows how the ahistorical 
individualism championed at the time ultimately reinforced Cold War polarities 
and conformism.68 Nadel provides a bedrock for my own project by examining 
how the containment strategy of this beleaguered Left, determined to counter 
the spread of communism around the world, pervaded American society and 
culture in an attempt to manufacture public consensus for anti-Soviet policies, 
as set out in Containment Culture: American Narratives, Postmodernism and the  
Atomic Age (1995). He details how, while books and films were enlisted in support 
of the hegemonic narrative, others engaged with it critically, and argues that the 
postmodernist ambiguity and irony of the 1960s was a reflection of the 
fragmentation of consensus around containment ideology in the face of its 
increasingly evident contradictions.
As Belletto and Grausam argue, these two studies have proved so 
influential that the perception of Cold War culture generally to be a culture of 
containment has coloured much subsequent work in the field.69 Strictly 
speaking, the idea of containment held sway only during the long 1950s (c.1946–
67 Belletto and Grausam, pp. 4–6. Adam Piette, The Literary Cold War: 1945 to Vietnam 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2009), p. 6.
68 For example, see Thomas Hill Schaub, American Fiction in the Cold War (Madison and 
London: U of Wisconsin P, 1991), pp. 22–23 and p. 81 respectively.
69 Belletto and Grausam, p. 5.
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c.1964) and, even then, as Douglas Field notes in his study of that period, its 
Manichaean worldview 'was increasingly adopted at [the] time when the very 
divisions were constantly threatening to collapse'.70 Nevertheless, Belletto and 
Grausam identify two alternative conceptualisations of Cold War culture 
informing scholarship since the turn of the millennium, namely a model of 
international integration, which regards the world as a potential network of 
alliances and opportunities, and the 'three worlds' concept which informed 
J.F.K.'s exhortation to win the hearts and minds of the non-aligned world in the 
place of the bipolar neo-imperialism of containment.71 The authors point out that 
original and interesting contributions to the field have recently been produced 
by flexibly drawing on elements of one or more of these frameworks.72 One 
example is Adam Piette's The Literary Cold War (2009), which employs 
everything from psychiatry to genetics to dig into the ways in which British and 
American writers negotiated the antagonisms which penetrated the furthest 
corners of the planet.
While the texts I analyse provide an insight into the thoughts of their 
protagonists, in my attempt to delve further into the cultural formation which 
frames their ideas and experiences, I draw on a number of other studies of Cold 
War experience. Jonathan Schell's comprehensive and admonitory The Fate of  
the Earth (1982) is a useful re-immersion in the consciousness of ever-present 
MADness, while Robert Jay Lifton's insights over three decades into the 
psychological shadow of the Bomb help forge numerous and, it is hoped, fruitful 
connections. 
Additionally, given the central concern with the power of imposed 
narratives, studies of the meanings of the mushroom cloud by Peggy Rosenthal 
and Peter Hales, Bryan Taylor's exploration of the relationship between images 
70 Douglas Field, 'Introduction', in American Cold War Culture, ed. by Douglas Field (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh UP, 2005), pp. 1–13 (p. 4).
71 Belletto and Grausam. pp. 6–7.
72 Belletto and Grausam, p. 8.
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and experience, and Paul Boyer's study of the influence of the Bomb in American 
public consciousness, By the Bomb's Early Light: American Thought and Culture  
at the Dawn of the Atomic Age (1985), are also recurring touchstones. As a 
consequence, I use the term 'simulation' alternately in both the pure 
Baudrillardian sense and the more-common meaning of a representation or 
reproduction which, mirroring the counterculture's mission to collapse 
ostensible distinctions, creates new ways of thinking. 
The research I present complements two studies published in 2008, 
extending some of the lines of thought they pursue. Arthur Redding's Turncoats,  
Traitors and Fellow Travelers: Culture and Politics of the Early Cold War looks at 
British and American writing and film of the long 1950s in a global context, 
asking how they 'variously accommodated, refused, refigured, or interrupted' the 
consensus narrative of freedom, founded on a binary opposition to communism 
framed in the language of containment.73 My thesis expands Redding's period of 
investigation to the end of the Cold War, and broadens the field from writers who 
considered their work to be politically and socially engaged in postwar America 
and the wider world (and so either tried to accommodate hegemonic discourses 
or formed what he calls a 'fugitive culture' of exile within or outside the West)74 
to feature those who regarded themselves as apolitical and so constitute a circle 
of covert cultural containment further removed from the epicentre of the Bomb. 
While all are nomads after a fashion at the time of writing or before (two expats, 
a son of immigrants, a stint of military service, two colonial upbringings), I 
approach their texts as the principal expressions of the flight compelled by their 
tensions with Western society.
My work also follows Daniel Cordle's States of Suspense: The Nuclear Age,  
Postmodernism and United States Fiction and Prose. This study looks at a range 
of American and British texts, with Cordle pointing out that this is only 
appropriate given the importance of Atlanticism in the period. His central idea 
73 Redding, p. 3.
74 Redding. pp. 4–5.
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is that, while previous Cold War literary criticism has examined fictional 
representations of nuclear armageddon, it has overlooked the portrayal of the 
'extended anticipation' of disaster75 which manifests as a 'subtly felt anxiety 
[which] permeates consciousness and culture, making itself felt unevenly and 
indirectly',76 which he considers defines the era.
With this in mind, Cordle rereads texts dealing with nuclear catastrophe 
for their depiction of anticipatory suspense, but also looks at texts which do not 
explicitly deal with the threat for 'the signatures of the nuclear presence in 
everyday life'.77 Accordingly, his work becomes an analysis of the 
political/personal duality of Cold War experience which casts a pall of 
meaninglessness over everyday life and, more broadly, the relationship between 
the hegemony and the individual in this historical moment and how, in the 
absence of nuclear abolition or annihilation, the individual can find a way to 
live. It is in this regard that the present project most closely aligns with his.
Where it differs, as in relation to Redding's book, is that it engages with 
novels in which the atomic spectre is arguably more covert, the writers' and 
protagonists' psychological displacement decidedly long-haul. Cordle observes 
that, while nature can be the site of annihilation, it also holds the promise of a 
future. My extended study of this trope consolidates the implication that nature 
can be a more constructive option than the domestic sphere78 for those wishing 
to escape the propaganda of paranoia. Furthermore, it suggests that the idea of 
flight to the desert, even if it is found to be ultimately flawed, has an advantage 
over the illusory comfort of the domestic-shelter of the readers' own experience 
on account of the hope which attends such aspirations, while being more 
tangible than the fanciful wish-fulfilment which is the portrayal of nuclear 
explosions.79 
75 Cordle, p. 2.
76 Cordle, p. 116.
77 Cordle, p. 1.
78 Cordle, pp. 33–34.
79 Cordle, pp. 126–27.
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My focus on the desert also allows me to approach the subject 
chronologically, whereas Cordle organises his study in terms of scale (home, city, 
planet). This enables him to make many interesting connections and lead his 
reader down unexpected paths, but I feel that the chronological progression I 
trace can contribute a dimension to his exploration by uncovering and analysing 
the evolution (or lack thereof) in the doubts and dilemmas concerning their 
relationship with official discourse and the threat of obliteration with which the 
dissident Western individual is confronted over the course of the Cold War.
Like other recent contributions to literary criticism on the atomic age, the 
current project employs different interpretive frameworks where they are of use 
without being beholden to any one of them. Most evidently, it draws on ideas 
associated with containment culture in its analysis of texts published even long 
after it was disrupted by public-awareness of its designs. This is because the 
focus is on the Western protagonist and their struggle to escape their cultural 
preconceptions of the world, and such cultural containment is a phenomenon 
which did not come to an end in the early 1960s, just as nuclear paranoia 
continued to exist throughout the period and, indeed, beyond. At its most basic 
level, the political policy's implication for the Westerner was, as Redding 
describes, 'a persistent and ubiquitous [on an increasingly global scale] psycho-
political apparatus […] designed to disarm, swallow up, and, most remarkably, 
render complicit oppositional discourses via a persuasive either/or logic' which 
'decisively pitted an abstract and often nebulous “freedom” against a demonized 
“totalitarian tyranny”'.80 Seen in cultural terms, containment underpins 
subsequent Cold War normative discourses which could equally be internalised 
by the individual, irrespective of the level of dissident dissonance to which they 
were also exposed. In the same way, nuances of the 1950s' 'three worlds' paradigm 
can be applied in a study of those seeking an alternative to the world they reject 
(which, in this historical instance, unconvincingly insisted that it comprised two 
distinct worlds in itself).
80 Redding, p. 3.
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Summary of chapters
The first section looks at the 1940s and 1950s, the period between the Bombing of 
Hiroshima and the first major anti-nuclear protests in the United States. At this 
time, the idea of conformity was promoted in American society as a domestic-
front of the national project to counter the further spread of communism. 
Following Freud's Civilisation and its Discontents (1929), the desire to travel can 
be seen as anti-social, while Foucault demonstrates in Madness and Civilisation 
(1961) that societies define certain anti-social elements as insane: to defect makes 
one defective. Like paranoia, with which it shares an Ancient Greek root, the 
cultural construct of madness is the product and producer of social consensus, 
and one which was particularly codified and reinforced in the United States over 
these decades. Furthermore, the age-old Western cultural imagining of the 
desert identifies it, by way of Old Testament ascetics, as a site of madness, and it 
is this idea which informs these two chapters' analysis of the Sahara 
encountered by the protagonists of two American texts. 
The opening chapter examines Paul Bowles' first novel, The Sheltering Sky  
(1949), which begins with the New Yorker Port Moresby arriving in Algeria. Port 
consciously identifies himself as a non-conformist and wishes to escape 
American society. He does not define which aspects of American society he 
rejects and only expresses an opposition to the 'mechanized age', which I relate 
to the atomic age then emerging through America's accomplishment. Once in 
North Africa, however, Port finds that the local people and the Sahara itself 
refuse to conform to his preconceptions of the desert and so prevent him from 
accessing his anticipated, but again undefined, life there. I read his tensions in 
this Saharan world as the result of the clash between his formative Western 
constructions (such as his maps and cultural expectations of the desert) and the 
actual North African environment which articulates alternative ways of making 
sense of the world. Ultimately, this conflict forces him to acknowledge the 
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American world-view he has always strived to reject but which nevertheless 
contains him. 
Port's wife, Kit, has always handled her tensions with American atomic 
society in other ways. The experience of the Sahara conversely leads her to reject 
all social constructs, so articulating a more-definitive non-conformity which 
society would designate as insanity, and with equally problematic results. 
Reading the novel in the context of Bowles' own self-exile in North Africa, I argue 
that it is a call for individuals to synthesise their society's imposed cultural, 
specifically atomic narratives and their own experiences in order to construct a 
world-view by which they can live.
I then turn to Saul Bellow's Henderson the Rain King (1958), whose 
eponymous protagonist is striving against a postwar America in his bid for 
spiritual fulfilment. Feeling under assault by materialist society, Eugene 
Henderson recognises the certainty of death all too clearly, but the consequent 
uncertainty of life deprives him of any perspective with which he might 
establish a meaning by which to live. He articulates the split-selfhood of the 
archetypal Cold War subject by regarding his non-conformity to pervading 
values through the framework of those values, and considers himself insane. 
Like Port Moresby, he seeks an uncontaminated life in the deserts of 
Africa. While the (fictional) desert he finds is very much a Westerner's fantasy of 
archetypal savagery, the diverse ideas he encounters there broaden his 
perspective on life. Among the first tribe he visits, the Arnewi, Henderson learns 
that Western social constructs are not universal and that other ways of living are 
possible. The second tribe, the Wariri, reflect the Freudian interests informing 
1950s American society, believing that mind and body shape one another, 
thereby undermining totalising contemporary social narratives constructed on 
unitary values and binary oppositions. By dint of this philosophy, Henderson is 
encouraged to pre-empt the possibility of death by internalising the perspective 
of a lion, a strategy which anticipates the thinking outlined in Deleuze and 
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Guattari's project to undermine the capitalist state, A Thousand Plateaus (1980). 
This idealism founders, however, but teaches him the need to discerningly 
appraise the bewildering range of competing world-views to which his 
dissatisfaction with mainstream American mass-culture has exposed him. 
Accordingly, he recognises what Bowles' characters do not. 
My analysis demonstrates that the novel's narrative unevenness, which 
previous critics have regarded as a flaw, performs Henderson's journey to 
revelation. Through my reading, this aspect of the text signals Henderson's 
concern with the politics of living in 1950s America and an attendant atomic 
significance which has been overlooked. The novel appeared at a time when, on 
account of Soviet repression in Eastern Europe, the communist threat was 
palpable but, simultaneously, the individual might experience tensions with the 
dictates of the Free World. By giving its readers an experience analogous to that 
of the self-questioning, questing hero, I suggest that the novel presents them 
with an isolated, observable and, consequently, instructive model of their own 
everyday struggles against Cold War society.
Bellow's first-person narrative serves as a bridge between the desert of The 
Sheltering Sky and that of the three works which follow. In Bowles' novel, the 
disembodied narrator allows the Sahara to exist as an external, objective world 
which the protagonists experience. It is an account of experience as it unfolds, as 
is Henderson, but in the latter the desert is clearly a product of its Western 
protagonist's psyche. The subsequent works examined in this thesis similarly 
present Saharas of the imagination: in V., it is an outright fantasy (since Stencil 
has never been there), while in The Avignon Quintet and Moon Tiger it is a 
construct based on memory. 
This change in the nature of the desert reflects a shift in its role between 
the first section (1945–60) and the following sections (1961–84 and 1985–91). In 
the first section, the novels examine the individual's conflict with a seemingly 
monolithic social conformity to dictates; in the remaining sections, the texts' 
27
thematic concern is the individual's negotiation of now-spurious political 
certainties. These later texts are metafictional, drawing attention to the 
constructed nature of fiction, which equally applies to society's dominant 
narratives, meaning and reality. As a result of the novelistic duplicities and 
tricks by which Cold War discourse sustained itself, and the consequent 
disruptions to that discourse, 'the act of literary fiction making became laden 
with political significance', as Steven Belletto has pointed out.81 These last three 
novels all deal explicitly with the Second World War, although not necessarily 
with the Bomb. While the increasing distance from the event might be one 
reason why these later works engage with the war, I would argue that the 
developing maturity of the atomic age, and particularly the growing 
disillusionment regarding this state of conflict which was potentially more 
terrible than that of 1939–45, required articulation through metaphor and found 
one in an era in which a grand narrative of right and wrong could still be 
perceived, for all the ambiguities of personal experience.
The second section concerns the decades between the rise of the American 
counterculture in the 1960s and Gorbachev's accession to the leadership of the 
Soviet Communist Party in 1985. The long-established Western cultural 
association of the desert as a place of death resonates through the texts 
examined here. After all, the prospect of annihilation dominated the popular 
imagination during the stand-off over Cuba at the beginning of this period. 
When the superpowers stepped back from the brink of atomic-war with the 
Partial Test Ban of 1963, death was merely removed to the Third World, where it 
flourished in the proliferation of hot wars. These hostilities helped usher in 
another death, namely that of Western, particularly American, public idealism 
and the narrative of capitalist liberalism's unambiguous moral superiority over 
communism. This disillusionment can be read in the following two novels which 
both concern individuals who negotiate the evidently fictitious nature of 
81 Steven Belletto, No Accident, Comrade: Chance and Design in Cold War American Narratives 
(Oxford: Oxford UP, 2012), p. 12.
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hegemonic ideological certainties by constructing alternative, subversive 
narratives of their own.
In Thomas Pynchon's V. (1963), the sense that the 'mechanized age' 
increasingly dehumanises people is metaphorised explicitly in the form of 
cyborg-monstrosities. The novel balances this state of affairs by showing that, 
while the protagonists of previous texts seek that which Cold War society denies 
them by travelling to the desert, the individual can equally escape their paranoia 
through metaphor. While the paranoid-schizoid-nomad Herbert Stencil's 
'memory' of nineteenth-century Egypt is unavoidably a product of atomic 
American society, it successfully indicates an outside to the overarching Cold 
War system. Alexandria and Cairo are Western constructs filled with European 
intrigue, but are being invaded by the desert, the site of a death counter to that 
written into the social contract of 1960s America. Here, the Sahara is the 
expression of Stencil's sub-state death-drive which he habitually articulates by 
dissociatively referring to himself in the third-person, acknowledging his 
obliteration through imposed subjecthood and pre-empting his annihilation by 
the Bomb. In his fantasy-desert, the political subject, unambiguously defined by 
the hegemony, becomes a multifaceted self through the succession of identities 
by which he inhabits his romance. Stencil's cast of characters might ultimately 
be contained by Western conventions but, like the embodied ambivalence that is 
V. herself, in performing Cold War strategies of control, it undermines the era's 
political certainties. By contrasting Stencil's modus operandi with that of the 
other principal character, Benny Profane, this chapter contends that, like 
Henderson, Pynchon's novel challenges the reader to construct fusion from 
confusion. In this way, it suggests that Stencil's desert-fantasy functions as a 
synecdoche of the text as a whole, a concentrated thematic load which explodes 
across the rest of the text, irradiating it with explicitly atomic significance.
At the heart of Lawrence Durrell's The Avignon Quintet (1974–85) is an 
Egyptian gnostic sect which attracts a group of Westerners who have become 
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disillusioned with the world they know as it engulfs itself in the Second World 
War. At this time of limbo for the powerless individual, the secret society fights a 
Manichaean war outside the official system and thereby vouchsafes and restores 
coherent meaning to the world. The members choose to live under the shadow of 
certain death, which will be delivered by one of their own. In this way, they defy 
orthodox society, which arrogates to itself the right to bestow and recall life, not 
least by the Bomb with which one of the brothers is involved in developing. 
Although gnosticism's inherent uncertainty distinguishes it from the 
hegemonic narratives of political certainty, like Pynchon's eponymous paradox it 
can become a creed which blinds the believer to its limitations in negotiating 
'the flying multiplicity of the real'. Throughout the work, Durrell presents 
various systems of interpreting the world (political, scientific, artistic) and the 
danger of retreating to any one such narrative. Most dramatically, he does this by 
concluding the first volume of the Quintet with the revelation that the 'reality' he 
has presented until now has been a fiction written by Aubrey Blanford, one of 
the characters who is disillusioned with the West. In the subsequent volumes, 
this character turns his back on Europe as it descends into war and travels to 
the Sahara, where he becomes the victim of a bomb dropped by the military 
powers claiming to protect him.
My analysis of the text argues that the Bomb pervades this story of the 
Second World War and that Durrell is using the horror of a past holocaust to 
negotiate the fears of a future one which, evidence shows, haunted him even in 
the years of détente between the signing of the Partial Test Ban and the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. By articulating non-Western ideas through a 
Western narrative-form, the Quintet takes the subject of this thesis beyond the 
American counterculture. Through this work, Durrell is attempting to fuse art 
and science in a humanist projection of quantum mechanics. Indeed, his 
characters can be seen to mimic matter and antimatter by crossing from one 
plain of existence to another. The presence of 'fictional' characters in the 'real' 
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world both replicates the self's struggle against the subjecthood imposed by 
society and underlines the need for the individual to fuse the different narratives 
with which the world tries to inscribe them in order to find harmony. 
The final section concerns the years between glasnost and the end of the 
Soviet Union. At this time of thaw between the West and the Eastern bloc which 
ushered in the so-called 'end of history', the novel under examination contests 
the origins of the Cold War era, forcing a rewriting of its atomic foundations 
from the standpoint of personal experience which undermines received rational-
universalist explanations of the status quo. A desert-heresy challenges the 
religion of history which author(ise)s the godlike power to destroy the world, 
demonstrating that no account of the past is unquestionable and that all such 
assertions are ultimately just written in sand.
Claudia Hampton, the protagonist of Penelope Lively's Moon Tiger (1987), 
travels to the Sahara of the Second World War not to escape British society, but 
to understand it. There, she falls in love, only for Tom to be killed at the Front. 
Claudia falls into a state of emotional limbo between life and death, which 
mirrors the stasis of the nascent Cold War, before her innate non-conformity 
eventually evolves into activism against nuclear-proliferation. The reader 
encounters her on her deathbed as she composes a tumultuous personal history 
which subverts orderly hegemonic accounts, emphasising '[t]he confection of 
fact and fantasy [which] is how we know the world'. Her fear of the Bomb 
irradiates her memories of the desert campaign but, rather than this 
undermining her project, Claudia uses the ambiguities of her experiences to 
dismantle the certainties of the postwar narrative which has strived to contain 
her ever since. While her own chronicle necessarily imposes her perspective on 
the people she has known, through it she demonstrates the importance of 
alternatives to official records. Her story, constituted by public history (related 
in the first-person) and personal experience (related in the third), enables her to 
live free of the imposed identities (wife, mother, bereaved) which make the world 
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meaningless to her.
Departing from existing readings of the novel, this chapter contends that 
all the characters' voices in the novel are Claudia's creation. Consequently, Tom's 
desert-diary, which serves as her anchor in the uncertain world of the atomic 
age, is her own active resistance to imposed narratives. I read the final scene of 
the novel as Claudia's authoring of her own death, to pre-empt being 'appallingly 
misrepresented' by others and effectively annihilated, as was Tom. By so doing, I 
argue, Claudia demonstrates that, while history might come to an end, life can 
nevertheless continue.
☼
This thesis sets out an investigation of nuclear paranoia and the desert as a site 
of Cold War experience and, on a broader level, the tension between narratives of 
self and society and between narrative and experience. It is original in the 
selection of texts it examines in relation to these themes as well as, when 
instructive, one another. Additionally, it comprises an extended study of the 
literary representation of the desert as an archetypal space simultaneously 
outside society and at the centre of the atomic age. By thus presenting a foil to 
the 'desert of the real' perceived by Baudrillard, the project's analysis looks 
beyond the media-images and consumerism which are most readily implicated 
in the philosopher's hypotheses to more fundamental ways of human meaning-
making.
My work contributes to knowledge by expanding the remit of existing 
studies of literature of the atomic age and its negotiation of paranoia, both in 
terms of the historical period of interest and with regard to the texts which fall 
under the shadow of the Bomb. In this sense and, given its focus on experience at 
an individual level, the thesis might more accurately be considered a study of 
atomic literature rather than a work of Cold War literary criticism. Beyond the 
concerns of that field of study, I suggest that this approach to texts which are not 
obviously irradiated by an atomic presence draws out hitherto overlooked 
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elements and qualities, and not solely those which respond to the threat of the 
Bomb. In this way, the project will ideally prompt a reassessment of certain texts 
previously considered insubstantial or unsuccessful which shines new light on 
their intentions and achievements. 
Lastly, the thesis contributes a practical application beyond its historical 
and atomic scope. By exploring how these texts express specific covert social 
tensions, it provides an example of how other tensions might be embedded in, 
and accordingly exhumed from texts which similarly might not be considered 
significant engagements with social discourse. Furthermore, since experience is 
constructed through narrative, this study of narrative is instructive beyond 
strictly literary concerns with regard to how individuals articulate their 
tensions with hegemony in times of terror.
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Section 1.
Insanity in the Sahara, 1945–60 
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Chapter 1.
Shunning Society While Craving Containment: 
Paul Bowles' The Sheltering Sky (1949)
In 1947, the Truman Doctrine outlined Washington's plans to contain the threat 
of communism influencing non-aligned states around the world. That same year, 
the USSR rejected American proposals for the UN to oversee the production of 
atomic-energy, establishing the conditions for the Cold War's arms-race. Thus 
began a period of American public apathy or uneasy acquiescence towards the 
Bomb (on humanitarian grounds or because a Soviet Bomb was inevitable)1 while 
conformity was valorised,2 creating a sense of consensus in support of the 
national cause.
As his country assumed the role of superpower in the post-war narrative, 
Paul Bowles left New York, never to regard it as home again. His wanderlust 
expressed misgivings about the America being shaped by the global situation 
and, equally, the global situation which America was helping to shape. A former 
member of the Communist Party, Bowles had become disillusioned with that 
doctrine too and, immersing himself in Morocco (with which he had fallen in 
love before the Second World War) and neighbouring Algeria, as well as the pages 
which would become his first novel, he sought to penetrate a space outside the 
bipolar world of the Cold War.
The Sheltering Sky was published in 1949, when the USSR's atomic 
ambitions were realised and NATO was founded. It continued to be a best-seller 
into 1950 as the alphabet of annihilation advanced with Truman's call for the H-
bomb and the two superpowers went to war over Korea. Evidently, this story of 
an American couple similarly turning their backs on the United States for the 
1 Paul Boyer, By the Bomb's Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the  
Atomic Age (Chapel Hill and London: U of North Carolina P, 1994), p. 352.
2 Alan Nadel, Containment Culture: American Narratives, Postmodernism, and the Atomic Age  
(Durham: Duke UP, 1995), p. 4.
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Sahara spoke to the American public at this time.
Port
Bowles' character, Port Moresby, sees North Africa as a place where he can 
escape 'the mechanized age'3 which has seen the Second World War and (as his 
wife, Kit, understands it) a cultural indistinctiveness imposed on the globe. 
While their landfall, the Algerian port of Oran, exhibits signs of the conflict, Port 
is confident that the Sahara to the south will 'withstand the malady longer' than 
the places they are leaving behind (12).
In fleeing this containment and/or annihilation, Port displays the 
narcissism which American psychiatrists increasingly reported in the years 
after 1945,4 for example in borderline personality disorder which they regarded 
as 'symptomatic of a widespread masculine crisis of identity'5 and is identified 
with his sense of uniqueness and drive to pursue his dreams, his lack of empathy 
towards Kit and inability to commit while needing her affirmation, as well as his 
feelings of persecution.6 The first page notes Port's conscious wish not 'to 
ascertain his position in time and space' (9), and this desire to break out of 
conventional spatial and temporal orderings is expressed through night-time 
explorations of the back-streets in the towns through which he travels. He hopes 
to penetrate a space beyond the mechanised age and find a different way of 
ordering the world: in short, a new world-order. Dissociative symptoms 
associated with narcissism are evoked by the text itself, not least the opening 
line ('He awoke, opened his eyes' (9)) and unremarked jumps-in-time (such as on 
page 145, which does not even coincide with a paragraph break) by which a 
3 Paul Bowles, The Sheltering Sky (London: Penguin, 2000), p. 11. All subsequent references to 
the novel will appear in the text in parentheses.
4 Boyer, p. xx.
5 Ann Douglas, 'Periodizing the American Century: Modernism, Postmodernism, and 
Postcolonialism in the Cold War Context', Modernism/Modernity, 5 (1998), 71–98 (note 40).
6 Sam Vaknin, Mental Health and Psychology Dictionary 
<http://samvak.tripod.com/mentalhealthdictionary.html> [accessed 13 September 2015]
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nothingness is silenced, undermining Western constructions of reality. 
Port consciously sets himself in opposition to the tourist, whom he sees as 
one who 'accepts his own civilization without question; not so the traveller, who 
compares it with the others, and rejects those elements he finds not to his liking' 
(11). This tourist is personified by the Lyles, two Australians with a distinctly 
colonial spirit and a 'great collection of maps, military and otherwise' (46) by 
which they follow an itinerary well trodden by European imperialists. 
Consequently, the guidebook Mrs Lyle is writing cannot but be a transcription of 
the symbols on her maps which construct her preconceptions of the Sahara as 
alternately 'wretched' (41) and 'picturesque' (69).
In truth, Port is not so very different, because he is trying to plot his 
escape by using the constructs of the world he is fleeing. The first time he is 
described, he is identified as an American 'folding up some large multicoloured 
maps he had spread out on the table a moment ago' (10). The significance of this 
introduction can be illustrated by the map most commonly used in American 
textbooks and newspapers at the time Bowles was writing and so the 'standard' 
image of the world in the US (Figure 1). Although Port consciously rejects this 
world-order, such totalising constructions so underpin experience that they may 
not be recognised as cultural. 
Arguably, the most noticeable feature of the world across which Port is 
travelling is that North America is huge relative to the other landmasses. The 
African continent, while positioned centrally (in keeping with Eurocentric 
cartographic convention), is consequently diminished in importance. 
Furthermore, its latitudinal foreshortening privileges the Saharan region over 
the south, thus presenting the continent as principally deserted. Martin Lewis 
and Kären Wigen argue that this projection, which was disseminated 
throughout the non-aligned world after the war, reflects and reinforces Western, 
particularly American, triumphalism.7 As Jean Baudrillard theorises, the model 
7 Martin W. Lewis and Kären E. Wigen, The Myth of Continents: A Critique of Metageography 
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Figure 1: The Miller Cylindrical projection.8 
generates the real.9 In his analysis of Borges' 'On Exactitude in Science', 
Baudrillard argues that the map is not simulation, since it is an attempt to 
represent reality rather than replace it.10 However, a map is a political device to 
create a new reality, and so a simulation. Maps impose consensus which in turn 
legitimises them.11 They impose themselves on the world, containing it.
The maps Port follows in Algeria would be topographical projections, 
(Oakland: U of California P, 1997), pp. 189–190.
8 Source: Aquarius.net – Next Generation Mapping 
<www.mgaqua.net/AquaDoc/Projections/img/Miller%20Cylindrical.jpg> [accessed 10 
February 2012]
9 When Bowles first arrived in Morocco, the Ministry of Information advised him against 
travelling around the country, and to ask the Ministry what he wanted to know about it. (Oleg 
Kerensky, 'Aspects of Self: A Bowles Collage', Twentieth Century Literature, 32 (1986), 259–300 
(p. 266)).
10 Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, trans. by Sheila Faria Glaser (Ann Arbor: U of 
Michigan P, 1994), p. 1.
11 In the introduction to The Postmodern Condition, Jean-François Lyotard finds fault with 
Jürgen Habermas' argument that, after the death of metanarrative, legitimacy now lies in 
consensus obtained through discussion in society. 'Such consensus,' Lyotard believes, 'does 
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which are primarily drawn up for military purposes.12 It can thus be said that, 
without realising it, he is following in the footsteps of the first major American 
ground-offensive of the Second World War, the 1942–43 North African campaign. 
Port might think he is going off-grid but, in truth, he is still thinking inside the 
boxes by which the Western superpower divides and rules the world. He is 
equally contained by the temporal axis of the mechanised age, since his flight 
necessarily conforms to the local bus schedules. He might regard Algeria's desert 
and people as existing outside time (141) but he is here thanks to the mechanised 
age and is necessarily contained by its world-order. His journey repeatedly 
coincides with that of the Lyles who, owning a car, are freer than he. 
Consequently, Port is all the more eager to travel south to find an untouched 
Sahara, a simulacrum of the Cold War world's polar-opposite.
Port imagines he can access this desert through the local women, 
primarily a Berber called Marhnia he encounters soon after his arrival in Algeria 
and an unnamed dancer later in his journey. As Marhnia serves tea, she tells 
Port a tale of three dancing-girls who dream of having tea in the Sahara. They are 
guided by desire alone, without external reference-points, and die in the attempt. 
It appears that she is warning Port of his own idealism, and the disappointment 
or worse which awaits him. However, Port cannot understand her words, 
dismissing them as 'expressionless sounds' (26). Bowles' transliterations of 
Arabic terms to describe the landscape ('The wind, straight from the south, blew 
across the barren mountains that were invisible ahead of him, over the vast flat 
sebkha to the edges of the town' (19)) reference the other world-order of the 
Sahara, opening up the potential for new relations with it and a new 
violence to the heterogeneity of language games' (Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern 
Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. by Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi 
(Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1984), p. xxv). Similarly, the consensus on maps' legitimacy 
does violence to the heterogeneity of semiotic constructs, of which cartographic symbols are 
examples.
12 Daniel Dorling and David Fairbairn, Mapping: Ways of Representing the World (Harlow: 
Pearson Education, 1997), p. 99.
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understanding of America,13 but Port regards language as an impediment to 
accessing Marhnia's essence: he 'was intrigued by the girl, but the language 
barrier annoyed him' (28). He thus silences her agency, containing her competing 
world-order within Orientalist fantasy. Furthermore, 'he was even more irritated 
by the fact that [the translator] Smaïl and she could converse together in his 
presence' (28): this local man is an obstacle even harder to dismiss. Smaïl's 
eventual departure indeed silences Marhnia, but she now tries to steal Port's 
wallet, attacking the system which identifies him with power, and he flees.
Such experiences hint that Port's cultural preconceptions do not fit the 
desert and are as dependent on one's location as are the familiar constellations 
which adorn its night-sky. Indeed, at one point he senses this fact as a spatial 
construct of the heavens: 
'You know,' said Port, and his voice sounded unreal, as voices are likely to do after a long 
pause in an utterly silent spot, 'the sky here's very strange. I often have the sensation 
when I look at it that it's a solid thing up there, protecting us from what's behind.'
Kit shuddered slightly as she said: 'From what's behind?'
'Yes.'
'But what is behind?' Her voice was very small.
'Nothing, I suppose. Just darkness. Absolute night.' (79)
The metaphor is apt since, at this time, the sky did shelter Americans such as 
Port: the United States alone had command of it in the dawning atomic age and 
this protection enables Port to travel. This sky is another of his maps, a 
projection of Western signs to contain the void of understanding that is the 
Saharan Other. It is similarly insubstantial, its solidity undermined by his 
perception, acquired in Algeria, of what lies beyond (but it would be equally 
undermined for Bowles' readers by the inevitability of a Soviet Bomb). 
Consequently, '[s]ince the day he and Kit had [contemplated the sky] he 
13 Brian T. Edwards, 'Sheltering Screens: Paul Bowles and Foreign Relations', American Literary 
History, 17 (2005), 307–34 (p. 318).
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had felt a definite desire to strengthen the sentimental bonds between them. 
Slowly it was assuming an enormous importance to him […] here in this distant 
and unconnected part of the world, the longing for closer ties with her was 
proving stronger than the fear [of emotional responsibility]' (82). The 
nothingness tearing the map in which he has wrapped himself is thus analogous 
to the outside of the system theorised by Baudrillard, fear of which the system 
uses to bolster its own legitimacy. While Port rejects conventional signs of 
conformity to the American world-order, his similarly troubled relationship with 
Kit (her femininity associated with the domestic frontier of the Cold War) 
extends it over him as he travels. When he explores the night-time back-streets 
of Oran, he grounds himself by constructing the shelter of her gaze:
a faint vision began to haunt his mind. It was Kit, seated by the open window, filing her 
nails and looking out over the town […] unconsciously he felt himself the protagonist, 
Kit the spectator. The validity of his existence at that moment was predicated on the 
assumption that she had not moved (18).
In reality, their wish to reconcile is frequently contained behind the doors of 
their separate hotel rooms as much as their fears. While Algeria provides a space 
free of American social impositions which encourage conformity, the void of 
familiar cultural constructs means the couple have nowhere to place themselves 
in relation to one another. Shifting desert sands destabilise Western identity: 
their marital status is questioned (179) at the moment that they dare to chart a 
path out of their conjugal desert, just as the Lyles are repeatedly identified as 
English. Equally, neither Port nor Kit commands the agency to reconcile. In this 
undefined space, each necessarily uses the other as the binary-opposite by which 
to define the self, mirroring 'the close intimacy and secret yearning structuring 
the relations between the two superpowers'.14 Port's non-conformity is 
constructed in opposition to Kit's conformity, her Sartrean being to his 
nothingness. When Port betrays Kit with Marhnia, 'he found himself imagining 
that Kit was a silent onlooker' (31). The non-aligned world becomes the site of 
14 Adam Piette, The Literary Cold War: 1945 to Vietnam (Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2009), p. 144.
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confrontation by which each side defines itself. They frequently question the 
other's sanity ('You think my complaint is mental' (130); 'have you lost your 
mind?' (138)) in order to establish a rational hegemony of the self, but 
simultaneously evoke the Mutually Assured Destruction of their relationship.
Throughout the novel, binaries are disrupted by third parties: the 
husband-and-wife dynamic is always disrupted by Tunner or the environment; 
Kit and Belqassim by other Touaregs; and the American and Australian pleasure-
seekers by French officers and colonised Algerians. Such explosion of dualities – 
their collapse or fragmentation into trios – undermines the United States' 
singularity of purpose in the Cold War.15
As Johannes Bertens writes, Bowles' stories were concerned with 
‘attempts to belong, to find meaning in relationships with others. They usually 
pivot on the tension that arises when an attempt to make serious contact meets 
with resistance, offered either by those with whom the protagonist wants to 
belong or, paradoxically, by the protagonist himself'.16 Port resists his marriage 
because its capacity to provide shelter is infused with the annihilation of the self 
and so his ambivalence regarding his identification with the marital-unit echoes 
his relationship with the atomic-hegemony he seeks to leave behind which 
demands the subsumation of the self to a group-identity.17 Port is prepared to 
countenance only a superficial association with each: 'We've never managed, 
either one of us, to get all the way into life', he tells Kit. 'We're hanging on to the 
outside for all we're worth, convinced we're going to fall off at the next bump' 
(79).
The next significant opportunity Port has to penetrate the Saharan world-
15 See Alan Nadel, 'Fiction and the Cold War', in The Cambridge Companion to American Fiction  
After 1945, ed. by John N. Duvall (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2012), pp. 167–80 (p. 178).
16 Johannes Willem Bertens, The Fiction of Paul Bowles (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1979), p. 192, 
quoted in Linda W. Wagner, 'Paul Bowles and the Characterization of Women', Critique:  
Studies in Contemporary Fiction, 27 (1985), 15–24 (p. 15).
17 Robert Jay Lifton notes that this ambivalence is displayed by individuals diagnosed with 
certain psychiatric problems. See Robert Jay Lifton, 'The Image of "The End of the World": A 
Psychohistorical View', Michigan Quarterly Review, 24 (1985), 70–90 (pp. 80–81).
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order is when he encounters a dancer in Aïn Krorfa. Her silence means that, 
unlike Marhnia, she does not speak back to the world-order which protects him. 
Her strange bearing and beauty further reduces her agency by making her less 
'workaday' and 'present' than other women he has encountered (including Kit 
and Marhnia) (107). As she performs, Port's gaze maps her, defining her 
comprehensively:
In front of the musicians in the middle of the floor a girl was dancing, if indeed the
motions she made could properly be called a dance. She held a cane in her two hands, 
behind her head, and her movements were confined to her agile neck and shoulders. The 
motions, graceful and of an impudence verging on the comic, were a perfect translation 
into visual terms of the strident and wily sounds of the music. What moved him [Port], 
however, was not the dance itself so much as the strangely detached, somnambulistic 
expression of the girl. Her smile was fixed, and, one might have added, her mind as well, 
as if upon some subject so remote that only she knew of its existence. There was a 
supremely impersonal disdain in the unseeing eyes and the curve of the placid lips. The 
longer he watched, the more fascinating the face became; it was a mask of perfect 
proportions, whose beauty accrued less from the configuration of features than from the 
meaning that was implicit in their expression – meaning or the withholding of it. For 
what emotion lay behind the face it was impossible to tell. It was as if she were saying: 'A 
dance is being done. I do not dance because I am not here. But it is my dance.' When the 
piece drew to its conclusion and the music had stopped, she stood still for a moment, 
then slowly lowered the cane from behind her head, and tapping vaguely on the floor a 
few times, turned and spoke to one of the musicians. Her remarkable expression had not 
changed in any respect (108).
The dancer, however, then disrupts Port's strategy of containment: 'all at once 
the realization came to him that the girl was blind. The knowledge hit him like 
an electric shock; he felt his heart leap ahead and his head grow suddenly hot' 
(108). Rather than being threatening, however, this further authenticates her 
Otherness, since Port identifies it as a weakness, allowing him to contain her as a 
'prisoner' who would be 'grateful to him' (110–11). He identifies the meaning he 
perceives behind her surface-expression as the essence he seeks, which he now 
calls 'love itself' (110) but, by labelling her face a mask (108), he makes it a blank 
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sheet on which to map his own desire. It is Ground Zero, emptied of humanity by 
Western logic. Simultaneously, it becomes a screen behind which the unnamed 
woman can shelter herself akin to her performance: she is indeed not present, 
and so not obliged to negotiate her identity in the (mechanised) world. Her 
indifference resists containment – to her, Port's words would be 'expressionless 
sounds', her blindness would blank any visual signs he might give – even before 
she disappears into the night. Again, his fantasy is disrupted. 
However, as Book Two begins, the breakdown of his desert-simulation, as 
well as the fact that he is culturally contained by the West, impose increasingly 
on his portrayal and, ultimately, his consciousness. He has previously rejected 
the sign of his socially imposed identity ('I'm not going to carry a passport to 
existence around with me, to prove I have the right to be here!' (74)) but, when 
the narrative now shifts to the concerns of a French colonial officer, Port enters 
this hegemonic space as 'the American' reporting that he has lost his identity-
document, and worse: 'ever since I discovered that my passport was gone, I've felt 
only half alive […] it's a very depressing thing in a place like this to have no proof 
of who you are' (126–27). Port’s sense of self is shot through, in the manner of a 
stick of rock, with the world-order he finds so unpalatable. His model 
degenerates on exposure to the real when the officer convinces Port that his 
suspicion of the hotel-owner is wrong (127). Port's identity has been stolen by the 
degenerate Westerner Eric Lyle, and is rescued by Tunner, who emblematises 
American nationality as emphatically as does the passport. 
For all that the officer represents the Western world-order, Port realises 
that he engages more dialogically with the desert and its people than he himself 
does. Port tries to blank the local French military presence and so Algeria's 
contingency with global politics, which is analogous to 'the “state of self-enclosed 
delusion” by which Americans were collectively blotting out the atomic-reality, 
[about which Lewis Mumford] wrote in 1950, [concluding] that if it appeared in a 
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single individual it would demand psychiatric treatment'.18 The grounding which 
Kit provides, on which he has relied since perceiving the fragility of the 
sheltering sky, is revealed to be as insubstantial as that construct; after all, it is 
an outlier of the same hegemony, merely dressed in the fatigues of a freedom-
fighter. Now that Port cannot contain his experiences in clichés (which, as Adam 
Piette writes, are a form of cultural propaganda),19 the workings of the Western 
conventions which order them are exposed. He has not noticed that his desert is 
contained by a Western framework because he is also inside that frame. 
Furthermore, he has brought that frame with him. He consequently contains any 
challenge he could present to the status quo. Taking his leave of the officer, Port 
heads back to his hotel:
As he walked along the hot road to the walls of Bou Noura he kept his head down, seeing 
nothing but the dust and the thousands of small sharp stones. He did not look up 
because he knew how senseless the landscape would appear. It takes energy to invest life 
with meaning, and at present this energy was lacking. He knew how things could stand 
bare, their essence having retreated on all sides to beyond the horizon, as if impelled by a 
sinister centrifugal force. He did not want to face the intense sky, too blue to be real, 
above his head, the ribbed pink canyon walls that lay on all sides in the distance, the 
pyramidal town itself on its rocks, or the dark spots of oasis below. They were there, and 
they should have pleased his eye, but he did not have the strength to relate them, either 
to each other or to himself; he could not bring them into any focus beyond the visual. So 
he would not look at them (127). 
Port is unable to relate to the desert because he cannot understand it. 
Effectively, he has not left the map, but this map is now being torn by the 
desert's stones like Borges' simulation. Bereft of the grounding of the desert and 
rejecting that of his nation-state, Port is the archetypal Cold War subject as 
identified by Alan Nadel as one with a perverse inability to speak truthfully their 
orientation about anything.20 Port concludes: 'I always imagine that somehow I'll 
18 Boyer, p. 282.
19 Adam Piette, Imagination at War: British Fiction and Poetry 1939–1945 (London and 
Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995), pp. 11–12.
20 Nadel, Containment Culture, p. 88.
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be able to penetrate to the interior of somewhere. Usually I get just about to the 
suburbs and get lost. I don't think there is any interior to get to any more' (133, 
emphasis in original). Rather than denying North Africa agency or legitimacy, 
Port is acknowledging that he himself has none. Perhaps surprisingly, this aligns 
him with President Truman's logic that Otherness cannot be penetrated, only 
contained.21 No dialogue with the Other is possible. Without a totalising 
hegemonic narrative to follow, Port is in a position of weakness. Truth is a 
product of social consensus, which Port flees. By believing in an Orientalist 
narrative ostensibly transcending the system, Port cannot relate to the world.
The landscape was there, and more than ever he felt he could not reach it. The rocks and 
the sky were everywhere, ready to absolve him, but as always he carried the obstacle 
within him. He would have said that as he looked at them, the rocks and the sky ceased 
being themselves, that in the act of passing into his unconsciousness, they became 
impure (134).
While his narcissism has previously contained the world ('my world's not 
humanity's world. It's the world as I see it' (74)), Port comes to realise that it and 
he are different, and he will not find the untouched desert he seeks.22
This desert is never defined except that it is not the mechanised world he 
knows. Port has travelled the world (10) looking for his 'preconceived idea' (134) 
made real. This essence or authenticity, which Dean MacCannell argues is the 
drive behind leisure-travel23 is necessarily constructed through the identification 
of (comprehensible) signs and the absence of others. Port does not seek 
Otherness, therefore, but equivalence to Orientalist fantasy,24 a complementary 
21 Douglas, note 11.
22 Effectively, his map has worn through. As Grausam points out, no one-sided model can ever 
successfully simulate reality (Daniel Grausam, 'Games People Play: Metafiction, Defense 
Strategy, and the Cultures of Simulation', ELH, 78 (2011), 507–32 (p. 521)). For the struggle 
between the physical desert and Port's imaginative projections on to it, see also Alexa Weik 
von Mossner, 'Encountering the Sahara: Embodiment, Emotion and Material Agency in Paul 
Bowles' The Sheltering Sky', Interdisciplinary Studies in Literature and Environment, 20 
(2013), 219–38.
23 See Dean MacCannell, The Tourist: A New Theory of the Leisure Class (London: Macmillan, 
1976).
24 See Edward Said, Orientalism: Western Perceptions of the Orient (New Delhi: Penguin, 2001).
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opposite to atomic-society contained within it. This constructed authenticity25 is 
thus difference from everyday experience, which is what John Urry's seminal 
work The Tourist Gaze contends is the prime motive for travel.26 Accordingly, 
when the desirable is located elsewhere, it is often indeterminate:
Port spent the next two days trying assiduously to gather information about El Ga'a [the 
next town]. It was astonishing how little the people of Bou Noura knew about the place. 
Everyone seemed in agreement that it was a large city – always it was spoken of with a 
certain respect – that it was far away, that the climate was warmer, that the prices high. 
Beyond this, no one appeared able to give any description of it, not even the men who had 
been there (134).
Port realises 'that he really wanted to know nothing about El Ga'a beyond the 
fact that it was isolated and unfrequented […] He determined not to mention the 
town to the Lieutenant, for fear of losing his preconceived idea of it' (134). He 
wants to protect his model from the real. (However, his misgiving about the 
officer is itself a model, and is undermined when the soldier provides a suitably 
exotic portrait of the town (136).) Eventually, Port and Kit arrive in El Ga'a:
Outside in the dust was the disorder of Africa, but for the first time without any visible 
sign of European influence, so that the scene had a purity which had been lacking in the 
other towns, an unexpected quality of being complete which dissipated the feeling of 
chaos. Even Port [who is sick at the time] noticed the unified aspect of the place. “It's 
wonderful here,” he said […] (149).
However, he blanks the local man helping them, denying him agency. In the same 
way as his maps, Port upholds his world-order by imposing 'a reductionist 
control that strips contact with the web of life from the experience of place',27 
painting the landscape as familiar friend or familiar foe, silencing threats and 
filling conceptual blank spaces. Entering a tea-house, he notes '[i]t looked festive, 
and it exhilarated him to see it; certainly he had no feeling that it was a vicious 
25 This term comes from Erik Cohen, '“Authenticity” in Tourism Studies: Aprés la Lutte', in 
Critical Debates in Tourism, ed. by Tej Vir Singh (Bristol, Buffalo and Toronto: Channel View 
Publications, 2012), pp. 250–61 (pp. 255–56).
26 John Urry, The Tourist Gaze (London: Sage, 1990), p. 10.
27 This evocative phrase comes from Doug Aberley's Boundaries of Home: Mapping for Local  
Empowerment (Vancouver: New Society, 1993), p. 1, quoted in Dorling and Fairbairn, p. 141.
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place, even though at first he tried hard to see it as such' (106). 
The cultural cartographer Brian Harley calls the blank spaces on a map 
'silent spaces' to emphasise that the lack of information is not a result of 
insufficient data but a conscious omission by the map-making authority. These 
are 'silences which arise from deliberate policies of secrecy and censorship' as 
well as  
more indeterminate silences rooted in often hidden procedures or rules. These rules, it 
can be argued, are a sort of subconscious mentalité that mediates the knowledge 
contained in maps in order to maintain the political status quo and the power of the 
state.28 
Consequently, 'silences should be regarded as positive statements and not as 
merely passive gaps in the flow of language. [They are] something more than the 
mere absence of something else […] silence should be seen as an “active human 
performance”. Silence can reveal as much as it conceals'.29 Port has silenced the 
Sahara because he fears its silence, that is, the void in his understanding it 
comprises. 
Contrary to maps' totalising dictates, Marhnia's tale aspires to inspire 
individual agency in the form of dialogue, negotiation, to reach a more 
comprehensive understanding of experience and the Other. Port is blind to this, 
seeking the security of certainties. As Michael Hofmann writes in his 
introduction, the novel 'is not a confrontation between two civilizations or two 
ways of being [but] incomprehension, the impossibility of communication’.30 
Baudrillard argues that we should keep the Other as Other rather than try to 
relate them to the self through degrees of difference.31 The desert is outside the 
hegemonic Cold War order which enables Port to be in Algeria. In order to 
28 J. B. Harley, 'Silences and Secrecy: The Hidden Agenda of Cartography in Early Modern 
Europe', Imago Mundi, 40 (1988), 57–76 (p. 57); italics in original.
29 Harley, p. 58.
30 Michael Hofmann, 'Introduction', in The Sheltering Sky, by Paul Bowles (London: Penguin, 
2000), pp. vii–xiv (pp. xii–xiii).
31 Paul Hegarty, Jean Baudrillard: Live Theory (London and New York: Continuum, 2004), p. 119.
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communicate with the locals, Port and Kit use French, a third language but not a 
third linguistic space: like Washington, they are extending French colonial 
policy. There is no space on his maps for the real desert, or to meet its people as 
equals. Port measures the desert against the Western narrative about it, and 
finds the reality lacking. Hegemonic constructs shape his experience, hence his 
opposition of 'the absurd trivialities which filled the day and the serious 
business of putting words on paper' (159): the model generates the real.  
The maps which help to construct this order select elements of experience 
and deselect others, and Port's self-identification as a traveller suggests he is no 
different. He compares his civilisation with others and rejects elements not to 
his liking, thereby dismissing undesirable elements of American society but not 
acquiring benefits from elsewhere. This is not the experiment in cultural 
comparison that Brian Edwards suggests32 but a strategy of deterrence. Port is 
running from the United States without running towards anywhere else.
As Adam Piette writes, '[d]eviance from this normative pressure is itself 
psychologically controlled by being labelled as neurotic; or more specifically as 
conspiratorial paranoia'.33 Following Baudrillard, it can be said that labelling 
Port in this way contains any threat he presents.34 Indeed, the year The 
Sheltering Sky appeared also saw the sixth edition of the World Health 
Organization's International Statistical Classification of Diseases, which 
included mental disorders for the first time. At this time, borderline disorder 
was called psychopathy, 'an admittedly imprecise term used to designate a 
person beyond the reach of society's values, one who failed to internalise the 
norms of social behavior'.35 A common symptom was the tendency to blame 'the 
world' for one's misfortunes and so try to preempt (real or imaginary) threats by 
32 Edwards, pp. 316–17.
33 Piette, Cold War, p. 15.
34 Douglas Kellner, 'Some Reflections on Baudrillard's “On Disappearance”', in Baudrillard Now: 
Current Perspectives in Baudrillard Studies, ed. by Ryan Bishop (Cambridge and Malden: 
Polity, 2009), pp. 154–58 (p. 155).
35 Douglas, p. 80.
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making the environment conform to one's needs.36 
For Port, the trip to the Sahara is a defence against mechanised American 
society. The Bomb exists and so apocalypse is already playing out in the 
imagination to inspire a bunker-mentality such as he exhibits. In this artificial 
environment he hopes to create a new life, a personal reality to counter toxic 
Cold War unreality. 
Simultaneously, his expedition is a socially conformist simulation 
projecting the American world-order on to non-aligned Algeria, a space 
ostensibly free of the impositions of the mechanised age.37 After all, Port seeks to 
escape the horrors of mechanised warfare in the North African arena. Equally, 
they travel here on the proviso that 'it was near Spain and Italy, and they could 
always cross over if it failed to work out' (11). In this way, while Port thinks he is 
cleansing himself of the taint of society, he is decontaminating society of his own 
noxious self.38 Additionally, Orientalist preconceptions contain all three 
Americans from the Sahara's true Otherness (Port, Kit and Tunner all feel they 
exist in a different world to the locals: see pages 17, 65 and 206 respectively). The 
wanderlust is a deterrence-strategy to prevent conflict. Ultimately, Port and 
American society are fighting on the same side. The fact that he wants to forget 
the mechanised age means that he has not forgotten it. He is a part of it, and vice 
versa but, as Nadel points out, individuals always considers themselves Other in 
the face of cultural narratives.39 When he sets up the opposition between his 
'own poor hopelessly isolated self' and the rest of humanity, he is expressing the 
tenets of American exceptionalism. However, Tunner's conflicting assertion 
36 Vaknin, n.p.
37 Port is anxious for hegemonic protection, wondering whether he should heed travel-warnings 
on the radio (84). His trip is a simulation, like the Cold War, projecting a situation which 
cannot come about (see Jonathan Schell, The Fate of the Earth and The Abolition (Stanford: 
Stanford UP, 2000), p. 202).
38 Cleansing society of oneself in line with an internalised ideology is discussed in Michel 
Foucault, Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason, trans. by 
Richard Howard (London and New York: Routledge, 2001).
39 Nadel makes this point throughout Containment Culture; see also his conclusion, pp. 297ff.
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('humanity is you') parallels the belief that the world desires to be Free like the 
West (74, emphasis in original). Whatever he does, Port remains within the 
system.
Tellingly, the only time that Port acknowledges the recent war's presence 
in Algeria is when he approvingly notes that it has destroyed any tourist-
infrastructure (84). His desire for freedom is an American value much older than 
the fearful valorisation of conformity of the late 1940s. His flight makes him all 
the more American, as hinted by references to the desert as wilderness (128, 201) 
and to his ancestors who were pioneers (84). Such evocations of the American 
Frontier introduce certainty to a time of uncertainty: as Edwards says, the 
American public would be attracted to a new frontier against communism, a new 
myth to forge national identity.40 Port is trying to access a (Western myth of the) 
past here but, since, as Paul Boyer writes, the Bomb bisected history,41 his retreat 
only brings him up against the moment of the Bomb's becoming. While being a 
founding myth of the nation, the frontier was also the destination of those 
unwilling to conform to the status quo and so mirrors the geographic and 
psychological displacement of Cold War tensions to the margins,42 as would soon 
be witnessed in Korea. Port's flight to a better world anticipates the diaspora of 
the Point Four program announced the year the novel was published, the 
neocolonialism which the American public largely supported which replaced the 
United States' support for French colonialism which was largely unpopular.43 
Like Port, the businessmen taking part in this 'soft' counter-offensive to 
communist influence sought to make the world more like the American self. As 
the epigraph to Book One says, '[e]ach man’s destiny is personal only insofar as it 
may happen to resemble what is already in his memory'.
Port flees before he can be reunited with his identity-papers by Tunner, so 
40 Edwards, p. 316.
41 Boyer, p. 280.
42 Douglas, p. 77.
43 Edwards, p. 321.
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closely identified with protective American society, and contracts typhoid which 
threatens the only thing he has left, his physical self. He is taken to a room in 
Sbâ under the auspices of the local French officer. However, the sheet stretched 
across its window is little protection from a desert which does not conform to 
the hegemonic world-order (161). Bedridden, Port consciously tries to find his 
way back to Kit (172), his source of comfort from the first page ('he could hear his 
wife […] and this sound now comforted him' (9)). He tells her: 'All these years I've 
been living for you. I didn't know it, and now I do' (173). His non-conformity is 
predicated on, and so essentially for, his grounded wife. He knows that she 
cannot protect him from the nothingness, but he must hold on to something. 
Any port in a storm. As the novel opens, the waking Port feels that he has come 
back from 'non-being' to somewhere 'in time and space', and so an identity and 
the attendant 'infinite sadness at the core of his consciousness' (9). This journey 
is, terrifyingly, inverted on his deathbed.
His delirious decline is narrated in four sections, the first of which 
conveys the key elements of his belated realisation:
Sometimes he spoke aloud but […] it seemed rather to hold back the natural development 
of the ideas […] he was never sure whether they had been resolved in the right words. 
Words were much more alive and more difficult to handle, now […] Less and less he used 
them in his thinking […] There was […] always new territory and the peril increased 
constantly. Slowly, pitilessly, the number of dimensions was lessening. There were fewer 
directions in which to move. It was not a clear process, there was nothing definite about 
it so that he could say: 'Now up is gone.' Yet he had witnessed occasions when two 
different dimensions had deliberately, spitefully, merged their identities (177–78).
Port dismisses semantic models of protection from the void imposed by the 
system he rejects and finds only uncertainty, a dangerous fusion of binary-
distinctions. Words are arbitrary, akin to the cartographic symbols which can 
impose a frontier on the desert, but without language he is lost. 
In the manner of the dancers, he charts his course by desire alone, 
without external reference-points, and loses his way in the world. In their final 
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conversation, Port tells Kit that he is alone and afraid (173). His solitary and 
drawn-out death-throes contrast with the unwitnessed mass-annihilation 
promised by the system he has left behind, but which equally provides a place in 
the world.44
[T]he centre! Sometimes it was gigantic, painful, raw and false, it extended from one side 
of creation to the other, there was no telling where it was; it was everywhere. And 
sometimes it would disappear, and the other centre, the true one, the tiny burning black 
point, would be there in its place […] distant. And each centre he called 'That'. He knew 
one from the other, and which was the true […] even though he hated them both – and he 
knew that the one which was only there was the true one, while the other was wrong, 
wrong, wrong (177–78, emphasis in original).
As the French officer says, in the desert, 'all your philosophic systems crumble' 
(201): all distinctions depend on where one stands. Port recognises that the 
American and Saharan systems of meaning are separate to him ('that' rather 
than 'this'). The individual is always Other in the face of cultural narratives ('It 
was an existence of exile from the world' (178)) and this Otherness has always 
been Port's totalising doctrine. There are no definite distinctions between 
atomic-energy and atomic-weapons,45 so he has rejected them all. However, he 
needs to identify with a system of meaning and knows that the former better fits 
his self, culturally influenced as it is. The very cultural contingency of the States' 
Cold War certainties makes them essential for the American he is. Contained as 
he is by this world-order, he can never break through to the desert's Otherness. 
Without an over-arching narrative, Port floats away. There is a stand-off between 
his imagined desert and the real Sahara, and the only thing that can break it is 
the Bomb, which defies containment because, while the outside of the system 
cannot be articulated through social constructs, the Bomb is merely a construct 
and also the end of constructs.46 Model and real, system and outside, death and 
44 See Grausam's comments on the community-spirit 'of mass and instantaneous death', Daniel 
Grausam, '“It is Only a Statement of the Power of What Comes After”: Atomic Nostalgia and 
the Ends of Postmodernism', American Literary History, 24 (2012), 308–36 (p. 310).
45 Nadel, Containment Culture, p. 23.
46 '[W]hile the potential consequences of nuclear weapons defy discourse, it is only through 
discourse that the weapons acquire their value and utility' (Taylor, p. 568).
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life fuse into the living-death which is the lot of the Cold War subject and which 
cannot be escaped, so acceptance of which can bring a peace of sorts. Port 
realises this at the moment of his death:
The supreme moment, high about the desert, when the two elements, blood and 
excrement, long kept apart, merge. A black star appears, a point of darkness in the night 
sky's clarity. Point of darkness and gateway to repose. Reach out, pierce the fine fabric of 
the sheltering sky, take repose (188).
Kit
The first thing the reader learns about Kit is that she is not interested in looking 
at Port's maps and, when the conversation turns to his recent dream, she does 
not want to discuss that either (10–11). This reluctance is contextualised by the 
novel's introductory portrait of her, which paints a dependent paranoiac 
bombarded by omens and ever-afraid of 'vengeance from above' (34).47 She is 
Nadel's archetypal citizen of the age; when someone endorses her fears, 
'[l]ogically she should not have found [it] reassuring, but the fact that he agreed 
with her she found deliciously comforting' (169). Kit has failed to find a sense of 
safety in the contemporary national project of 'extensive “domestic revival” […] 
with [which] women's return to homemaking and housework [was] discursively 
linked – at a time of communist infiltration, nuclear contamination and civil 
defence planning – with the act of securing the family from the outside world'48 
and so looks to her nomadic husband to provide a mobile security for her. '[T]he 
war between reason and atavism' which rages within her (34) compels her to 
avoid his maps and unconscious, since to engage with them would risk revealing 
the constructs of and, indeed, deconstructing the protection in which she places 
her faith. Indeed, while Port deselects those elements of the world he finds 
47 Vaknin, n.p.
48 Andrew Hammond, 'From Rhetoric to Rollback: Introductory Thoughts on Cold War Writing', 
in Cold War Literature: Writing the Global Conflict, ed. by Andrew Hammond (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2006), pp. 1–14 (p. 10).
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undesirable, she says: 'I'm not sure I don't feel that it's wrong to try to escape 
[them]' (77).
While he is her port of safety, she provides a mobile grounding to the 
egocentric cause of this man who problematises the idea of home so important 
to American society (10). As she says in Bou Noura, 'It'd be abnormal if I were to 
adapt myself too quickly to all this. After all, I'm still an American' (128). 
Cultural distinctions are crucial to her peace-of-mind (12); indeed, she would 
have preferred to visit 'any small country with boundaries' over the Sahara (140), 
and was persuaded only by Port's careful selection of images (84). Socially 
conformist, it is apt that, when she betrays Port, it is with the all-American 
Tunner on a train, a mechanised projectile akin to the all-American Bomb. This 
moment of weakness aside, she identifies with her protector ('her sense of guilt 
expressed itself in allegiance; she could not go out into the street because 
Tunner was there and she would appear to be choosing sides. Suddenly she, too, 
wished Tunner were not with them. She would feel much freer in expressing her 
own preferences' (89)). When she is alone with Port, however, she gives her 
tensions free-rein (105) and so mirrors his different relationships with the 
atomic-hegemony when in the States and abroad.
When Port is gravely ill, Kit becomes terrified of leaving the present 
behind: 
there was never any knowing or any certitude; the time to come always had more than 
one possible direction. One could not even give up hope. The wind would blow, the sand 
would settle, and in some as yet unforeseen manner time would bring about a change 
which could only be terrifying, since it would not be a continuation of the present (165). 
With her shelter obliterated, she desires what Daniel Grausam calls the 
'compressed presentness' of the Cold War subject.49 She lives the fixed 
temporality of a map which can only shatter on contact with the world. Kit feels 
a 'ghastly dread' at 'having attained a new depth of solitude' (174) and considers 
49 Grausam, 'Atomic Nostalgia', p. 315.
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giving Tunner command of her life ('What delight, not to be responsible […] She 
realized the absurdity of still hoping to attain such a state permanently, but the 
hope would not leave her' (185)). However, immediately after discovering her 
husband's corpse, 'deeper than the empty region which was her consciousness, 
in an obscure and innermost part of her mind, an idea must already have been in 
gestation' to escape the impotent world-order he superseded, now represented by 
Tunner and the French colonial apparatus (190).
The 'startling narrative rupture'50 of Port's death shatters Kit's shelter, and 
so the domesticity which defines her. It collapses the binary underpinning 
nuclear-family-values and threatens a melancholic fusion which could destroy 
society. Without his non-conformity, her complementary conformity is revealed 
as her performance of an imposed containment. She feels conventional temporal 
orderings fall away (189). Her first display of agency expresses not a support to 
society but a threat.
Kit flees with the help of a shopkeeper who, being Jewish, similarly evades 
identification with a nation-state. Alone at the margins of the town, she feels she 
enters a timeless space. She dismisses her disciplinarian superego as mere habit 
and strips off her clothes, rejecting society's rational economy of signs and value, 
to become her unidentified self akin to the symbolic51 which, being ambivalent, 
resists value, enabling her to access a joy lying 'just behind things' (199). 
Baudrillard argues that the symbolic is pure loss,52 which is what Judith Butler 
theorises is the basis of identity: 
the self only becomes a self on the condition that it has suffered […] a loss which is 
suspended and provisionally resolved through a melancholic incorporation of some 
'Other'. That 'Other' installed in the self thus establishes the permanent incapacity of the 
'self' to achieve self-identity; […] the disruption of the Other at the heart of the self is the 
50 Edwards, p. 325.
51 Jean Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange and Death, trans. by Iain Hamilton Grant (London: Sage, 
1993), p. 95. For a discussion of these ideas, see Hegarty, p. 36.
52 Jean Baudrillard, For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign, trans. by Charles Levin 
(St Louis: Telos, 1981), p. 161. See also Hegarty, p. 37.
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very condition of the self's possibility.53 
This Other is the hegemonic system which imposes its protection on the self. 
The model generates the real: society projects its signs on to her self in order to 
construct the Kit which others perceive. By undressing and bathing, she rejects 
this identification.
Becoming symbolic (that is, performing symbolic exchange) can at most 
only indicate the horizon of the outside of the system,54 but it shows that Kit is 
not her social identity. She thus exceeds Port's project of being a traveller, an 
identity constructed on selective memory or containment of his consciousness. 
It can be imagined that this rejection of society comes more easily to her, since 
society has always contained her with a submissive identity, whereas Port, being 
a man, was able to believe that he was independent. Her act corresponds to 
Bowles' own experience of being in the Sahara, where
even memory disappears; nothing is left but your own breathing and the sound of your 
heart beating. A strange, and by no means pleasant, process of reintegration begins 
inside you, and you have the choice of fighting against it, and insisting on remaining the 
person you have always been, or letting it take its course. For no one who has stayed in 
the Sahara for a while is quite the same as when he came.55
Whereas Port seeks to escape the world by deselecting his experiences of it, she 
does so by silencing its narrative about her. 
When Kit wakes in the desert at the opening of Book Three, she 
suppresses her memory of Port's death. This fits Port's archetypal American who 
rejects suffering (17), but she simultaneously rejects the social protection from 
her anxieties. However, while she has defected from Western society, Kit still 
needs protection from the world and demands it of a passing Touareg caravan 
53 Judith Butler, 'Imitation and Gender Insubordination', in The Lesbian and Gay Studies  
Reader, ed. by Henry Abelove, Michèle Aina Barale and David M. Halperin (New York and 
London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 307–20 (pp. 316–17).
54 Hegarty, p. 33.
55 Paul Bowles, 'Baptism of Solitude', in Their Heads are Green and Their Hands are Blue: Scenes  
from the Non-Christian World, by Paul Bowles (New York and London: HarperCollins, 2006), 
pp. 133–48 (p. 134).
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(216). 
The Touareg resist the nation-state model of such importance in the post-
war world, specifically Algerian society being contested by Westernising 
America and Arabising Egypt.56 This indifference undermines Cold War 
identity.57 Their culture cannot be translated into the Western economy of signs 
and values. For all that she has tried to strip herself of social signs, Kit cannot 
rid herself of her white body and the incongruity is arguably enhanced when the 
trader, Belqassim, buries her disruptive Western clothes in the sand and dresses 
her as a Touareg. The excess of signs which she thus displays means that she 
performs across social distinctions, undermining them in an act of 
Baudrillardian seduction.58 Like symbolic exchange, seduction cannot escape the 
system but, Paul Hegarty argues, provides a more effective challenge.59
The small society of the caravan – Kit, Belqassim and another trader – 
necessitates that she be socially identified: she becomes Belqassim's woman 
(much as Port ultimately identified himself as her man), winning his protection 
in return for her exotic white body. That this shelter is different to that of Port is 
evident in the predominantly sexual nature of the relationship. This, in turn, 
suggests the vulnerability of the American world-order to external influences, 
most obviously communism, the national project to contain which was equated 
with the containment of not only gender roles but also sexuality.60 This dynamic 
transforms the 'African' Other from a wilderness to be conquered or a resource 
to be mined (such as for raw material for the Bomb)61 into a viable alternative 
world-order, a competing system, which simultaneously destabilises the Western 
self.
Kit does not bother to learn Belqassim's language, since language's total 
56 Edwards, p. 308.
57 Edwards, pp. 319ff.
58 Hegarty, pp. 72ff.
59 Hegarty, p. 70.
60 Nadel, Containment Culture, p. 6.
61 See Douglas, pp. 77–78.
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signification is antithetical to the symbolic.62 Since language results from a lack 
(and creates one, since something is always left out), to speak would be to 
countenance a lack which the symbolic's resistance to value does not recognise. 
All sign-systems are simulations of reality; all certainties, the maps which 
project them and the nation-states they create, are castles built on sand. Not 
only are words insubstantial, but the conceptual structures they build are 
culturally contingent, making dialogue with the Other impossible ('even had they 
had a language in common, he never could understand her' (220)). 
On arrival in Belqassim's home-town, Kit's incongruity can only be 
contained by regendering her as a man and identifying her as insane (225). Even 
then, her need for protection is undermined by Belqassim’s social obligations of 
work and his wives. She learns, as in America, to ask no questions, this time with 
the help of soporific drugs. When her female body betrays her (230), she realises 
she is being poisoned: again, a protective order has failed her and she flees. 
Disillusioned, 'she ha[s] no feeling of being anywhere, of being anyone' (242). Be 
that as it may, passers-by (mis)identify her on the basis of her Touareg dress. 
These fit her as badly as did the nation-states which the later independence 
movements mapped on to the Touaregs' desert, and she disrupts the identity 
they impose by her inability to speak Arabic (243). The crowd tries to read her 
confused cultural markers and mistake her for a French colonial in disguise. Out 
of context, signs are as worthless as the thousand franc note in her hand, but she 
is nonetheless contained: seduction remains within the system.
Since she cannot but interact with the world on the level of her body, Kit 
seeks another local man's protection by sleeping with him (250). When this fails, 
she is, like Port, instinctively drawn to the protective order which identifies her 
white-bodied self least problematically: that of the West. She sends a telegram, 
presumably to Tunner, but immediately regrets it. Silence, the rejection of any 
culture's signs is her strategy to escape containment. 'Now that she had betrayed 
62 Baudrillard, For a Critique, p. 161. See also Hegarty, p. 37.
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herself, established contact with the other side, [she must flee]. They would spare 
no effort in seeking her out, they would pry open the wall she had built and force 
her to look at what she had buried there' (246). For all that she tells herself that 
the Touareg life she has fled is only a 'ridiculous game' (238), she is unmoored (in 
more senses than one). She deserts the valise containing her American identity-
papers and make-up (with which she performs her Western social identity, and 
which she treasured while in Touareg society). 
However, as the consular-official says, 'nothing really ever gets lost' in the 
Sahara (254), and she is claimed for the United States. Kit, in contrast, feels that 
'[e]verything’s lost' (254); having rejected social distinctions she soils herself 
(252). When she responds to his queries, '[t]he sound of such a sentence coming 
from her own lips struck her as unbelievably ridiculous, and she began to laugh' 
(250). Away from American society and the impositions by which it creates 
consensus, Kit sees the contingency on which words' authority rests.63 Non-
conformity is defined by the system as deviancy, such as insanity. Therefore, 
while 'Cold war-speak, like cold war military activity, was a form of extreme 
displacement, language split off from visible reality', someone who 'apparently 
met no inner resistance in the act of uttering and maintaining what the world 
held to be untruth' can be identified as psychopathic.64 The American Handbook 
of Psychiatry describes a psychopath as 'an instance of linguistic asphasia or 
“semantic personality disorder,” able to speak fluently and coherently but 
emotionally so cut off from what he says that “speech in this disorder, however 
well formulated, has no meaning and is not language at all”'.65 Cold War language 
establishes distinctions which shatter on contact with the world, exposing the 
difference between narrative and experience, model and real. Accordingly, Kit 
rejects them. However, if she had learned the Touareg language she might have 
63 See Nadel, Containment Culture, p. 167. This authority is exposed as a Barthean myth, having 
no referent, but functioning as if it did in order to preserve the status quo.
64 Douglas, p. 81.
65 Douglas, note 40, quoting Hervey M. Cleckley, American Handbook of Psychiatry, 2 vols (New 
York: Basic Books, 1959), I, p. 585.
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appreciated that, in the Sahara where linguistic borders are porous, individuals 
like Belqassim synthesise the different identities available to him in the service 
of the self.66
Significantly, the official thinks that she looks like a 'partially 
Europeanized' local (253), which implies an imposed identity rather than an 
integral self. Escorted back to Oran, Kit does not 'know definitely whether or not 
she had been here before' (255): in the same way as Heraclitus' river-crosser, she 
cannot revisit the city since she is now different.
From Port's sense of uncontained existence with which it opens, the novel 
deposits its reader at the limitations of the restrictive West and in the character 
of Kit, dis-illusioned to the myth of protective authority, the dream is brought 
into the harsh light of day. The bedlam of rush-hour shows the incongruity of the 
Western world-order imposed on North Africa. Like all colonial hybrids in the 
text, it is corrupted and corrupting. Having come to question one hegemonic 
narrative, Kit is unconvinced by any, her need for total security preventing her 
from practising the double-think essential to the Cold War citizen. Rejecting the 
shelter of social containment, she fragments; shedding the burden of social 
responsibility, she is without external reference-points, unanchored. The novel 
ends with: 'At the edge of the Arab quarter the car, still loaded with people, made 
a wide U-turn and stopped; it was the end of the line' (256). For the Western 
world-order, beyond lies nothing ('[t]he Sahara's a small place, really' (255)). The 
tram-line maps Oran as a coherent entity, defining the city (and so also the 
66 Like a national border, language connects but also divides people. Its usefulness is 
undermined repeatedly in the novel (Arabic and Port's native English are equally useless since 
he cannot use either). Words and thought are patterned, restricted, not True (17). At one point, 
a local man uses Arabic when he does not know the French, turning facts into nonsense (132). 
Words and people mutually shape one another and, while words create a place to stand in the 
world, people must be careful of the weight they put on them. Simultaneously, silence 
destabilises, as evidenced by the ‘famous silence of the Sahara’ (161, 201). Ultimately, the world 
is slippery (locals see things, but refuse to believe them (201)). Like the three dancing-girls (30) 
trying to see Targuis' house, Port is aimless, lacking a reference-point. The individual needs 
reference-points such as language or maps (despite locals' misgivings, the towns which the 
Americans have found on their maps appear out of the desert in the end (83, 134)), irrespective 
of how slippery these are, too. 
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desert), screening the uncontainable beyond. This official 'line' is undermined by 
Kit's experience standing there, which reveals the indigenous settlement 
existing outside the colonial system. Here, she steps off the map. By escaping 
society's interpreting and appropriating gaze, Kit cleanses herself of signs and 
turns her whiteness into blankness. Just as she feels that the Otherness of 
typhoid obliterates Port's humanity (that is, his identity) (171), the Ground Zero 
of the desert annihilates her own. In this way, she becomes a singularity, which 
alone exceeds societies' process of stripping the self of self-being.67 Whereas the 
symbolic is a loss which (like the seductive) challenges the system to contain it, 
singularity is a nothing (that which lies outside the system) within simulation 
but eluding it because it can never be identified, that is, real-ise its becoming. 
Unlike Port, when Kit awakes she knows immediately where she is, but feels that 
it is 'good merely to lie there, to exist and ask no questions' (215); she is content 
with 'the mere certitude of being alive' (9). Port always seeks to fulfil his desire, 
mirroring the atomic-state's pursuit of its goals and simulation's drive for total 
control; fulfilment, however, precludes further becoming, and so is death.68 In 
contrast, singularity is reducible only to itself69 and, unable to be related to 
anything else, without external reference-points, must be accepted on its own 
terms. It is, in short, a show-stopper and, indeed, Kit now stops the novel.
In this way, she becomes the equal of the desert which haunts the Western 
imaginary, itself a singularity in the wild threat it presents, the sublime clash 
between reason and fantasy it inspires. On encountering an Orientalist tableau 
of fierce-looking veiled men on camels, Kit thrills at the fact that the desert 
67 Jean Baudrillard, Impossible Exchange, trans. by Chris Turner (London: Verso, 2001), p. 131. 
See also Hegarty, pp. 161–63. Arthur Redding discusses the 'process of becoming' to which Port 
and Kit are subjected and by which they are unavoidably open to the 'potentially productive 
or destructive' randomness of the universe which undermines notions of fixed identity 
(Turncoats, Traitors and Fellow Travelers: Culture and Politics of the Early Cold War  
(Jackson: UP of Mississippi, 2008), p. 122).
68 Jean Baudrillard, The Intelligence of Evil or the Lucidity Pact, trans. by Chris Turner (Oxford: 
Berg, 2005), p. 212. This is discussed in John Phillips, 'Humanity's End', in Baudrillard Now:  
Current Perspectives in Baudrillard Studies, ed. by Ryan Bishop (Cambridge and Malden: 
Polity, 2009), pp. 159–71 (p. 159). 
69 Jean Baudrillard, Impossible Exchange, p. 130.
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brings her into contact with 'such people in the Atomic Age' (147). By extension, 
she becomes the equal of the Bomb – also a singularity in that it is always 
becoming, its threat always forming – and so can counter the fears which 
contain her.70 Just as Port, despite his resistance to the American system, 
ultimately realises that the system's contingency on its reception by the Free 
World does not undermine its necessity, Kit, for all her submission, comes to 
perceive that its necessity does not refute its contingency.
The Potential of a Marriage
The Sheltering Sky emerged from a crucial moment before what Edwards 
considers America's supremacist attitudes were consolidated.71 Not only does it 
disrupt the binary constructs of the Cold War, it rejects the neocolonial/anti-
imperial polarity72 which would similarly contain it within the system. In this 
way, it suggests the possibility for engagement across cultural distinctions which 
offers a ‘counterpoint to the forms of containment being consolidated on the 
home front’.73
Bowles recognised that a totalising world-order does not fit the world. 
Accordingly, the reference-points he chose were mobile: the people around him, 
whose cultures he accessed through a dialogic synthesis of Moghrebi, Spanish 
and French to avoid their being contained through neocolonial Arabic.74 He 
established himself in Tangier, an international zone which disrupted a bipolar 
70 '[I]t is only through discourse that the weapons acquire their value and utility' (Taylor, p. 568), 
meaning that 'by continual de-construction of the word [we will] avoid the destruction of the 
world' (David Dowling, Fictions of Nuclear Disaster (Iowa City: U of Iowa P, 1987), p. 208, 
quoted in Taylor, p. 569). In this sense, while Port is destroyed by the Bomb, Kit destroys the 
Bomb, that is, the nuclear-paranoia by which the Cold War hegemony contains her. By 
discarding language, however, she loses her agency and self: evidently, beyond providing the 
nomenclature, the Bomb is a necessary feature of life in the atomic age.
71 Edwards, p. 307.
72 Edwards, pp. 307–08.
73 Edwards, p. 309.
74 See Jeffrey Bailey, 'The Art of Fiction LXVII: Paul Bowles', in Conversations with Paul Bowles, 
ed. by Gena Dagel Caponi (Jackson: UP of Mississippi, 1993), pp. 111–34 (p. 133).
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world-view and, Edwards contends, challenged the idea of national identity.75 It 
remained as such until 1961 but, even in 1992, Iain Finlayson opens his biography 
of the city with the perception that 'Morocco is not Africa [...] Tangier is not 
Morocco'.76 In this in-between 'place of diasporic convergences',77 Bowles found a 
third-space, in which he could set his cultural preconceptions and experiences 
in dialogue with the world-orders of North Africa. 
Distinct from the other, unmechanised space which Port seeks, this space 
is anticipated by the Jewish shopkeeper who pragmatically accommodates local 
culture while retaining his identity and, arguably, by Tunner when he forsakes 
his useless DDT-cannister (96) and wraps himself in a burnous to find Kit (184). 
Similarly, the Touareg negotiate the desert, navigating by the sun and stars, 
adjusting their hours of travel according to the changing circumstances. They 
draw on the benefits of Algerian society, such as its trading opportunities, 
without allowing it to dictate their relationship to the Sahara. They live by the 
belief, 'kiss the hand you cannot sever', wisdom from which Port could have 
benefited. Just as Port and Kit comprise one another's Other, so do they stand in 
opposition to Bowles, and so it is perhaps inevitable that they should not survive 
the novel. The lack of closure might be read as analogous to deterrence-ideology's 
denial of death. Like Port, the Cold War subject might conform without knowing 
it; like Kit, they might be dead without realising. Both decontaminate society of 
their potential threat, defusing it in the desert which is, of course, an atomic 
test-site. However, the (non-)ending can also be read as marking the limits of 
narrative: as the tram pulls up at the edge of the Western world-order and the 
reader prepares to step off, back into the world which perhaps now appears 
unsatisfactory, Bowles simply sounds the alarm of too extreme a reaction either 
way. 
75 Edwards, p. 314.
76 Iain Finlayson, Tangier: City of the Dream (London: Flamingo, 1993), p. 1.
77 Edwards, p. 308.
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Bowles asserted that ‘[s]ecurity is a false concept’;78 as Andrew Martino 
says, his work concerns the fear not of the Other but of the loss of the self.79 This 
self is preserved only through split-subjecthood and negotiation with the world. 
Home will always be hazardous, as Kit senses (33), but not having one is more so. 
Shifting individuals in a shifting world, with only insubstantial signs at their 
disposal, must accept some restrictions (such as national identity) in order to 
have the security of a system which provides them with a place to stand. It is 
only through being contained that the self can interact with the world.
The individual is unavoidably a fusion of hegemonic narrative and 
personal experience, but is also Other in the face of official narratives. Outside 
one's formative society, its constructs are disrupted, their contingency exposed, 
offering the chance to edge closer to the other centre which Port perceives on his 
deathbed. Accordingly, Bowles hoped to construct a personal reality that was 
more real than the unreality of Cold War America within Tangier's unreality.80 
The city had been 'touched by fewer of the negative aspects of contemporary 
[mechanised] civilization than most cities of its size'; it was unpredictable and 
did not conform to the familiar order.81 For Bowles, it was always 'a magic place'82 
which kept people’s minds in a state of healthy, personalised anarchy,83 that is, 
uncontained. 
While Port desires to draw a line to separate the mechanised world of the 
American and Soviet Bombs and himself, as on a map, this third-space is 
necessarily an internal construct. Bowles critiqued American politics and 
78 Daniel Halpern, 'Interview with Paul Bowles', in Conversations with Paul Bowles, ed. by Gena 
Dagel Caponi (Jackson: UP of Mississippi, 1993), pp. 86–101 (p. 91).
79 Andrew Martino, 'The Vanishing Point: The Dis-Integration of Female Identity in Paul 
Bowles's The Sheltering Sky', South Atlantic Review, 71 (2006), 87–114 (p. 92).
80 Gary M. Cuiba, 'Review of An Invisible Spectator: A Biography of Paul Bowles by Christopher 
Sawyer-Lauçanno', American Literature, 62 (1990), 358–59 (p. 359).
81 Quoted in Kerensky, p. 269.
82 Michael Spindler, 'The Prism of Estrangement: Placing the Fiction of Paul Bowles', 
Australasian Journal of American Studies, 8 (1989), 35–45 (p. 35).
83 John Bernard Myers, 'Aspects of Self: A Bowles Collage', Twentieth Century Literature, 32 
(1986), 284–86 (p. 285).
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culture, but not the United States itself,84 always careful not to burn any bridges 
in case he ever wanted to return (indeed, for many years he lived in an 
apartment, always full of Moroccan writers and musicians, located opposite the 
United States' embassy). He said:
I did not choose to live in Tangier permanently; it happened [...] I grew lazy and put off 
departure [...] Thus if I am here now, it is only because I was still here when I realized to 
what an extent the world had worsened, and that I no longer wanted to travel.85
He was aware of his Western cultural construction: 'The interested observer, 
remarked Bowles, required “a strong streak of infantilism” in his nature to come 
even partly to terms with the fascination of Tangier which partially consisted in 
“an element of make-believe in the native life as seen from without (which is the 
only viewpoint from which we can ever see it, no matter how many years we may 
remain)”'.86 The writer Iain Finlayson, who knew Bowles, argues that, for the 
novelist, Tangier was a window through which he could perceive another 
actuality without fully participating in it – total exposure would be destructive, 
but the observer could remain relatively intact while being moved and touched 
by the unfamiliar.87 This archetypal outsider said he did not know if he was 
running from or running to.88 Perhaps it was rather the case that he was doing 
neither. In this third-space, Bowles found a place in which to stand. Remaining 
stationary did not mean that he had succumbed to the state of simply being 
which enticed Port, because the world he established around him was constantly 
changing. In this way, away from America but in a position to keep an eye on it, 
84 Edwards, p. 310.
85 Finlayson, pp. 178–79. Bowles never ruled out the idea of moving elsewhere (including back to 
the States) but, in the event, it was to be his home until his death in the final year of the 
century.
86 Finlayson, p. 10. Similarly, Bowles' friend, Richard H. Goldstone, notes that 'while no 
American can truly and fully penetrate the Arab world, he can, at the very least, be enveloped 
by it' ('Aspects of Self: A Bowles Collage', Twentieth Century Literature, 32 (1986), 274–79 (p. 
279)). The writer was also conscious that his continued residency was dependent on the 
whims of the Moroccan state; see Paul Bowles, 'Bowles et Choukri: Le Temps de la Polémique', 
Les Nouvelles du Nord, 28 February 1997, pp. 6–7, quoted in Edwards, p. 312.
87 Finlayson, p. 161.
88 Regina Weinreich, 'Aspects of Self: A Bowles Collage', Twentieth Century Literature, 32 (1986), 
267–74 (p. 270).
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Bowles was able to construct his own shelter.
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Chapter 2.
Self-Sovereignty and the Containment of Death:
Saul Bellow's Henderson the Rain King (1958) 
On 22nd May 1957, at the time Saul Bellow was working on Henderson the Rain  
King, an American B-36 accidentally dropped an H-Bomb on farmland near 
Albuquerque. Needless to say, the device did not detonate and the incident was 
successfully kept from public attention by official omission and misinformation 
until 1986. Nevertheless, this event underlines the fact that the Bomb, with its 
indivisible protection and threat, was even closer to the heart of American 
society than its citizens knew.
Critics tend to read Henderson in the context of the consumerist culture 
of 1950s America,1 and as an expression of the anti-rationalistic thinking of the 
'Freudian Fifties'.2 Consequently, it is seen as a bildungsroman about a man in 
middle-age straining against a materialist society which fails to provide him 
with spiritual fulfilment. It is generally considered an uneven work which does 
not number among the author's best. Robert Kiernan and Bruce Michelson,3 
however, argue that the book's unevenness is an integral part of its design, since 
it mirrors the title character's experience. This present examination will 
contend that it can be further recuperated when read in relation to the political 
duplicity which dominated much government activity in these years. 
Accordingly, it will draw on ideas developed in Gilles Deleuze and Félix 
Guattari's tract to undermine the capitalist state, A Thousand Plateaus,4 to link 
1 See Orville Prescott, 'Books of the Times', New York Times, 23 February 1959 
<www.nytimes.com/books/97/05/25/reviews/bellow-henderson.html> [accessed 20 July 2012]; 
and Daina Miniotaite, 'Human Quest in Saul Bellow's Novels Henderson the Rain King and The 
Adventures of Augie March', Eger Journal of English Studies, 5 (2005), 111–19 (p. 113).
2 See, particularly, Robert F. Kiernan, Saul Bellow (New York: Continuum, 1989).
3 Bruce Michelson, 'The Idea of Henderson', Twentieth Century Literature, 27 (1981), 209–24 (pp. 
315ff).
4 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. 
by Brian Massumi (London: Continuum, 2004).
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the novel's concerns about US domestic consumerist superficiality with the 
story's implications about Washington's political and cultural penetration of the 
non-aligned world. The writers' thinking about the interrelations between 
human and animal is explicitly relevant to Henderson's key experience of 
Otherness during his African tour and contributes to a more compelling 
interpretation of Bellow's work.
Conformity
As the Wariri king, Dahfu, tells the title character of the novel, '[f]ear is a ruler of 
mankind'.5 Henderson was written at a time when the US was fearful not only of 
the Soviet Union and its spreading influence around the world but also of a 
communist infiltration of American society. While it can be argued that this 
paranoia had reached its peak in the early years of the decade, the fear (and 
damage) of association was far from forgotten6 and the desire to be seen as 
promoting 'American' values stronger than ever, not least in the nation's cultural 
spheres. Writers avoided engaging with the central political issues of the day, 
such as the Bomb and, like the rest of the populace, looked to established 
authority for guidance.7 As Alan Nadel notes, Bellow drew on Twain's A 
Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court (1889) for his fish-out-of-water tale.8 
5 Saul Bellow, Henderson the Rain King (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1959), p. 258. All 
subsequent references to the novel will appear in the text in parentheses.
6 'America would struggle to exorcize the demons McCarthy had raised for years to come', 
Frances Stonor Saunders, Who Paid the Piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War (London: 
Granta, 1999), p. 211. See also Douglas Field, 'Introduction', in American Cold War Culture, ed. 
by Douglas Field (Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2005), pp. 1–13 (p. 7) regarding Truman's Loyalty 
Program of the 1950s which made it possible for American citizens to be disloyal not only 
through membership of communist organisations but also through association with 
members. 
7 See, for example, Stonor Saunders, p. 410.
8 Alan Nadel, 'Fiction and the Cold War', in The Cambridge Companion to American Fiction  
After 1945, ed. by John N. Duvall (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2012), pp. 167–80 (p. 169). 
Speaking more broadly, the novel harks back to fundamental quest-tales. In his Hero with a  
Thousand Faces, Joseph Campbell draws on Jung to argue that, after the individual has 
devoted the first half of their life to establishing themselves in society, they must then turn to 
realising their inner potential and find a fusion between this self and the world if they are to 
69
Propaganda packaged conformity in easy-to-swallow pieces: such-and-such small 
act in one's everyday life would ultimately enable victory over communism. 
However, this in itself produced a sense of unease, as the homogeneity inspired 
by the Nifty Fifties' nascent mass-culture could be equated in the equally 
Freudian Fifties with the uniformity of communism.9 It was a society 
simultaneously at ease and unable to take its eye off itself for a moment.10 
As David Stevenson says, Henderson's bid for individual agency is 
undermined by the materialist and conformist forces of 1950s American society.11 
However, it can be argued that it is negated more specifically by the Bomb. While 
Bellow's protagonist recognises that death is a lone certainty in an absurd world, 
the uncertain nature of his life until then robs him of any standpoint he can take 
towards it. After the horrors of the Second World War and now the ever-present 
threat of the Bomb, Norman Mailer wrote that 'our psyche itself was subjected to 
the intolerable anxiety that death being causeless, life was causeless as well'.12 
Henderson's narrative reflects this erosion of cause and effect, the first chapters 
repeatedly promising to explain his reasons for going to Africa, but being 
diverted along other narrative paths. His picaresque, helter-skelter 
consciousness is a home-made bomb which explodes the causal logic at the 
foundation of the State's rationally constructed narrative of the nation's 
rationally constructed life.
This uncertainty and the perverse inability to speak truthfully one's 
be fulfilled. After the decay of his half-life, as detailed in his bodily breakdown beneath the 
African sun, Henderson's experiences 'initiat[e] the start of (adult) life', as Baudrillard 
contends (Jean Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange and Death, trans. by Iain Hamilton Grant 
(London: Sage, 1993), pp. 131–32; phrasing comes from Paul Hegarty, Jean Baudrillard: Live 
Theory (London and New York: Continuum, 2004), p. 43). See Joseph Campbell, The Hero With 
a Thousand Faces (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1968).
9 See Stonor Saunders, p. 249; Thomas Hill Schaub, American Fiction in the Cold War (Madison 
and London: U of Wisconsin P, 1991), p. 17.
10 Stonor Saunders, pp. 191–92.
11 David. L. Stevenson, 'The Activists', Daedalus, 92 (1963), 238–49 (p. 240).
12 Norman Mailer, Advertisements for Myself (New York: G. P. Putnam’s and Sons, 1959), p. 338, 
quoted in Nadel, 'Fiction', p. 170.
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orientation about anything are elemental conditions of the atomic-subject.13 In 
this way, Henderson, rather than the conformists around him, embodies the true 
dynamics of the age. This ambivalence or split-selfhood is captured in his desire, 
voiced silently as 'I want'. Such volition is based on the ability to choose between 
the meaningless and the meaningful, but Nadel writes that such distinctions 
were razed in the Hiroshima blast as safety collapsed into danger and survival 
became random not causal.14 It is because of this that Henderson's inner-mantra, 
as simple as it is, is also unappeasable. Consequently, he decides that he must be 
mad (25) and unfit to live in society: 
I could just hear people back home saying, as at a party for instance, 'The big Henderson
finally got his. What, didn't you hear? He went to Africa and disappeared in the interior. 
He probably bullied some natives and they stabbed him. Good riddance to bad rubbish […] 
I guess he knew he was a lunatic and despised people for letting him get away with 
murder' (196, italics in original). 
His journey to Africa can be seen as a Foucauldian purging of society of the taint 
of the self. As Nadel points out, 'sanity merely indicates conformity to a set of 
norms'.15 Henderson's predicament is that, again in Nadel's words, he is torn 
between the desire for inner identity and the demands of social identification.16 
He consolidates the former by his flight from American society (to Africa), but 
this then means that it is an identity of the weak, or at least the ineffective 
fantasist. 
The containment culture of 1950s America worked to turn individuals' 
spirited opposition into an apathetic sense of powerlessness, directing their 
attention and tension towards other targets.17 At home, Henderson takes his 
frustration out on his tenants' cat, the timber he cuts, his father's violin and his 
13 Alan Nadel, Containment Culture: American Narratives, Postmodernism, and the Atomic Age  
(Durham: Duke UP, 1995), p. 88.
14 Nadel, Containment Culture, pp. 58–59.
15 Nadel, Containment Culture, p. 71.
16 Nadel, 'Fiction', p. 170.
17 Paul Boyer, By the Bomb's Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the  
Atomic Age (Chapel Hill and London: U of North Carolina P, 1994), pp. 338ff.
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wife, which are mere proxies for this lack of focus or meaning at the core of his 
being. According to Jean Baudrillard, the unconsciousness is always structured 
around and predicated on a lack, which he identifies as death.18 However, the 
Bomb substitutes for this lack, the simulation of 1950s society packaging the 
threat of death as something which can be countered, but only by absolute trust 
in and loyalty to the State. In this way, death and desire are contained within the 
hegemonic system and so, rather than threatening it, actively work to promote 
the status quo. As Henderson realises, 
the grown man mainly dreads [the world]. And why? Because of death. So he arranges to 
have himself abducted like a child. So what happens will not be his fault. And who is this 
kidnapper – this gypsy? It is the strangeness of life – a thing that makes death more 
remote, as in childhood (84). 
Consequently, while he feels that his only access to reality is death ('We 
hate death, we fear death, but when you get right down to cases, there's nothing 
like it' (89)), Henderson's reaction to his neighbour's prone corpse is both 
reverent and reticent: '[n]ot knowing what else to do, I wrote a note DO NOT 
DISTURB and pinned it to the old lady's skirt' (39). Immured by the popular 
commodity-culture authorised by the Cold War state as he is, any rare glimpses 
of reality he catches are both sacrosanct and scary. As Arthur Schlesinger says, 
'[t]he eternal awareness of choice can drive the weak to the point where the 
simplest decision becomes a nightmare. Most men prefer to flee choice, to flee 
anxiety, to flee freedom'.19 
While Henderson is incapable of action, he is equally incapable of the 
requisite faith in the State. After all, he fought in the Second World War in the 
belief that the Germans were the enemy and the Soviets were his allies. Now his 
government impresses upon him the reverse, along with a new material comfort 
as if to bolster the moral rightness of the new dynamic. As Henderson 
18 Hegarty, p. 19.
19 Arthur Schlesinger, Jr, The Vital Center: The Politics of Freedom (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 
1949), p. 52, quoted in Schaub, p. 187.
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acknowledges, 'ideas make people untruthful. Yes, they frequently lead them into 
lies' (245). He is dispossessed by all the possessions which are his burdensome 
birthright as well as his cultural claim, having also inherited a spirit which does 
not fit this materialistic society. (His dentures, for example, are a commodity at 
odds with the spirit which drives him into situations where they break.) At this 
time, Erich Fromm's observation of his adopted home's consumerist culture led 
him to develop his idea of the 'marketing character' and the ultimatum 'to have 
or to be'.20 Henderson is aware of the lack of a lack: he wants to want: 
when I tried to suppress [the voice] it got even stronger. It only said one thing, I want, I  
want!
And I would ask, 'What do you want?'
But this was all it would ever tell me. It never said a thing except I want, I want, I want! 
(24, emphasis in original).
He is also incapable of faith in the religious sense, which became bound 
up with the lot of the Free World at this time when a 1954 act of Congress 
incorporated the words 'under God' into US citizens' pledge of allegiance to their 
country.21 Two years later, 'in God we trust' became the nation's official motto,22 
but Henderson was hardly the only person decrying the primacy of the material 
over the spiritual in the US.23 Consequently, to stay in this fraudulent society will 
destroy him, whether the Bomb drops or not. 'Death will annihilate you and 
nothing will remain, and there will be nothing left but junk. Because nothing 
will have been and so nothing will be left. While something still is – now! For the 
sake of all, get out' (40). Drawing on Baudrillardian theory, Paul Hegarty argues 
that '[t]hose who hope to leave commercialization behind are so alienated they 
20 Erich Fromm, To Have or to Be? (London: Jonathan Cape, 1978), p. 148.
21 Nadel, 'Fiction', p. 168.
22 Stonor Saunders, p. 280. On the penny, this motto arcs over Abraham Lincoln's head in a 
rainbow-trajectory. While Honest Abe the Liberator broke down the differences between black 
and white, 'Liberty' is here behind him, as if he has moved past that possibility, facing a future 
of uncertainty. This lifeblood of the American nation is thus marked with hope, but 
simultaneously disseminates a sense of paranoia (hence the need to trust in God).
23 For example, Dwight Macdonald, 'America! America!', Dissent, 5 (1958), 313–23, as cited in 
Stonor Saunders, p. 316.
73
think an authentic world exists that would be better than the spectacle (which 
has lost its autonomous existence)'.24 Indeed, it is the superpower's culture of 
simulation which provides Henderson with the opportunity to flee. Before this, 
however, Henderson's domestic circumstances also express the tensions of Cold 
War America.
Domestic discontent
Henderson has been a soldier (and, as far as the reader can tell, a good one), but 
this mentality forged by society ill fits civil-society: it now seems absurd, which 
perhaps explains why Henderson's recollections of active-service always return, 
self-demeaningly, to an incident when he was publicly stripped naked and 
deloused. '[M]ilitary service had dictated conformity to a set of social conditions 
almost antithetical to those in postwar American, which valorized the nuclear 
family […] and promoted assemblyline workers and middle-management 
employees as the appropriate models for manhood'.25 Several texts during and 
about the 1950s, Nadel notes, posit a male-identity antithetical to domesticity 
and only fully expressed through escape.26 For him, the conflict between male-
identity and social identification across a gendered spectrum thus located the 
female firmly in the home. However, this rigid heteronormativity is undermined 
by Henderson's relationship with his second wife, Lily. 
Lily adheres to the social dictates of being a home-maker and mother in 
complete financial dependence on her husband, yet within the framework of that 
outward conformity she succeeds in disrupting his masculine identity by 
fighting with him and frequently having her own way in the face of his threats of 
physical violence to reassert his domestic supremacy. She is a woman in need of 
a protector while clearly able to stand on her own two feet, the wife of multiple 
24 Hegarty, p. 78.
25 Nadel, 'Fiction', p. 171.
26 Nadel, 'Fiction', p. 170.
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marriages. She is also, apparently, the daughter of a mother simultaneously alive 
and dead (which, in the light of the Bomb, can be seen as a truth which holds for 
them all), a spectre resurrected only in speech like the Bomb. These lies cut 
through the lie of unproblematic atomic-protection disseminated by the 
hegemony. The inversion of this gendered culture by his wife's nature forces the 
inwardly sensitive Henderson to occupy a conventional masculinity: it is in his 
relations to her that he most closely conforms to social expectations of his 
gender. 
Nadel argues that such instabilities at the foundation of the gendered 
narrative of postwar life undermine the authority of both American men and 
women.27 However, the first-person perspective on this conflict reveals the falsity 
of the domestic harmony which was to be the basis for the Free World's victory 
over the Soviet bloc. In this way, the narrative's demonstration of how 
Henderson's subjecthood can be split between male and masculine and the 
fusion of female and forceful in Lily reveals the instability underlying normative 
society. People are more than one-dimensional canvases waiting to be filled with 
the propagandic ideals promulgated by the State. Individuals can exceed their 
social roles, can be non-aligned to the profiles in which the State tries to capture 
them by the flash of an A-Bomb. Equally, just as conventional ideas of masculine 
and feminine are compromised in the marriage, the social roles of daughter and 
mother collapse around their child who steals a baby and hides it in a wardrobe, 
while Henderson's other children merge into one another in his mind, thereby 
undermining the stability of the 1950s nuclear-family.
As discussed above, Henderson represents the patriarchal norm in order 
to drive Lily back to the position of the feminine Other. The political and 
personal contradictions being simultaneously nurtured and neutralised in the 
marital stand-off exposes tensions around the identification of reality (36). For 
example, he contrasts what he considers to be her naïve notions of goodness and 
27 Nadel, Containment Culture, p. 6.
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reality with the reality of death he encounters in Africa (150). Reality, as Jacques 
Derrida writes, is 'the encompassing institution of the nuclear age, constructed 
by the fable, on the basis of an event that has never happened'.28 For Henderson, 
as already discussed, the only reality in a shadowy life of commodified 
domesticity lived out beneath the Bomb is the reality of death. By opposing Lily, 
however, he is forcing himself to support the system which denies death but, 
incapable as he is of doing so, is left stranded and, in his own words, insane ('in 
an age of madness, to expect to be untouched by madness is a form of madness. 
But the pursuit of sanity can be a form of madness, too' (25)). It is from within 
his insanity that he tries to reason with Lily, a woman constructing herself from 
contradictions. Ultimately, therefore, neither husband nor wife are on 
sufficiently solid ground to be the last one standing since, now that the reality of 
death has mutated into the death of reality, any appeal to truth 'presumes truth 
as something arrived at through the interaction of social and rhetorical 
contract',29 and so is reliant entirely on norms and consensus ('few people are 
sane […] slavery has never really been abolished […] what do I fight for? Hell, for 
the truth' (124)). Consequently, by going to Africa, Henderson is not only 
escaping from, he is also travelling to. I will discuss the African desert which 
Henderson first enters is a socially authorised fantasy of socially constructed 
clichés. However, in removing himself from a situation of confrontation between 
the State's propagandic projection of meaning and his desire for significance, 
there arises the possibility of calming his angst and exposing him to other 
political projections of meaning, which might allow him to engage with the 
world in a new way. 
28 Jacques Derrida, 'No Apocalypse, Not Now (Full Speed Ahead, Seven Missiles, Seven Missives)', 
trans. by Catherine Porter and Philip Lewis, Diacritics, 14 (1984), 20–31 (p. 23).
29 Nadel, Containment Culture, p. 83.
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'Africa'
Although Henderson seeks the reality which superficial American society denies 
him, the 'Africa' he experiences is a stereotypical projection of the savage Dark 
Continent, its desert a clichéd fantasy of his cultural formation and its attendant 
desire for difference (which is itself a product of the West).30 As Eusebio 
Rodrigues details, Bellow draws on a wide range of material to create his 'Africa' 
and the societies Henderson encounters there.31 While the few indications of the 
location of the Hinchagara plateau suggest that it is in East Africa (the sea being 
accessed through Kenyan ports and the route to Europe lying through 
Khartoum), Bellow built up his fantasy with details and events from places as far 
away as West Africa in order to create the archetypal primitivist 'Africa' such as 
might be formulated by a resident of 1950s America: an unforgiving desert-world 
dotted with the straw huts of naked black people. For Henderson, 'Africa' is the 
site of knowledge (54) and simple happiness, where people are happy with their 
lot when in their home-society even though he was not happy in his ('We can't 
allow ourselves to lie down […] But [the Arnewi queen] had given up such 
notions, there was no anxious care in her, and she was sustained' (79)). 
Henderson is thus an appropriate subject for this thesis; indeed, since its 'Africa' 
is so subjective, it provides a particularly clear expression of the themes being 
examined. 
Henderson's fantasy-Africa is a site of antiquity ('I felt I was entering the 
past – the real past, no history or junk like that. The prehuman past' (46)). While 
this is a common trope for the cradle of humanity, this temporal distinction 
expresses the US' image of itself at the time. Having won the Second World War, 
it saw itself in a position to shape the world to its own desires. The first nation to 
develop the Bomb, it was at the vanguard of human achievement and, 
accordingly, those parts of the globe which did not align themselves with either 
30 See Edward Said, Orientalism: Western Perceptions of the Orient (New Delhi: Penguin, 2001) 
and John Urry, The Tourist Gaze (London: Sage, 1990).
31 Eusebio L. Rodrigues, 'Bellow's Africa', American Literature, 43 (1971), 242–56.
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side of the atomic-binary and which in 1956 had begun to call themselves the 
Third World were relegated to the past. Non-America was history; Hiroshima 
resembled an ancient ruin as if, at the event of the Bomb, Progress had turned 
tail and sought safety in the stone age. For those like Henderson who had 
discovered that the uncertainties of freedom have 'brought with it frustration 
rather than fulfillment' (sic),32 this was a past which promised to be free of the 
tensions which had arisen out of America's stratospheric progress, Bowles' 
'mechanized age'. (Significantly, Henderson recalls a time in his youth when, in 
conflict with his father, he expended his anger by cutting up old motor-cars at a 
scrap-yard (337).)
The opportunity to travel to Africa comes courtesy of Henderson's fellow-
millionaire, Charlie. He has packaged the continent as a honeymoon-experience, 
during which time he will film the wildlife, thereby technologically and socially 
containing Africa for the West while effectively remaining safely contained 
within American society himself: 'The expedition that Charlie organized had all 
new equipment and was modern in every respect. We had a portable generator, a 
shower, and hot water' (42). In this way, Charlie embodies the hunter-spirit, now 
armed with twentieth-century corporate-backing. Hunting, which Henderson 
considers 'a strange way to relate to nature' (94), is an acquisitive drive 
predicated on the rational containment of the globe for one's colonial interests 
('geography […] it's one of those bossy ideas according to which, if you locate a 
place, there's nothing more to be said about it' (55)). Even after Henderson leaves 
his friend in order to see the 'real Africa', his perceptions still clearly remain on 
the far side of the Atlantic, picturing himself travelling among 'in the farthest 
African mountains – damn it, they couldn't be much farther!' (87). Africa is a 
backdrop ('isn't that a picture?' (47)) to his centre-stage American protagonist: he 
understands it through references to the West (the Bible (116) and Gordon's last 
stand at Khartoum (118)). This is not surprising, since his dreams of exotic 
adventure are based on the courageous feats of Arctic explorers he has read 
32 Schlesinger, p. 52, quoted in Schaub, p. 187.
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about at home, which perpetuate the pioneer-myth of taking nature in hand and 
so support the status quo as surely as the pilgrims' village does in Moon Tiger. 
The upshot, however, is that Henderson considers that his troubled self is more 
fantastic than the wilderness around him (114).
Nevertheless, the strangeness of his environment ('The mountains were 
naked, and often snakelike in their forms [while the thatch] seemed like feathers, 
and yet heavy – like heavy feathers' (46–47)) augments its difference and suggests 
he is in a place where familiar rules do not apply. Swaddled in this new illusion 
of exoticism which replaces the artificiality of American society, Henderson's 
inner-voice of desire is at last silenced. He is thus travelling away from society's 
impositions ('my object in coming here was to leave certain things behind' (45)) 
but, in doing so, is falling back on his cultural formation, for all that he sheds 
many of his social signifiers (44) and, with them, he believes, the fierceness 
which characterised his relations with society (49). This is evident in his outrage 
that the indignities he faces are being visited on an American citizen ('I react to 
police questioning. Especially as an American citizen. In this primitive place. It 
made my hackles go up' (131)). Baudrillard argues, and The Sheltering Sky 
suggests, that there is no way outside one's cultural preconceptions and, in the 
same vein, Henderson's attempts to understand his environment and hosts are 
but simulations of an authenticity authenticated by its difference to American 
society. This difference, Baudrillard maintains, is purely a means to contain true 
alterity within the binary world-view of the self,33 that is, casting alterity as an 
oppositional Other to the self and thereby aligned through degrees of similarity. 
In this way, while the construct of self/Other imposes difference (such as the 
gender norms on which the 1950s nuclear-family is founded), it also implies 
sameness where none might exist. 
While Henderson is disappointed that the Arnewi prince, Itelo, speaks 
English, since this taints the exoticism of the tribe to the Westerner (even 
33 Hegarty, pp. 117ff.
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though, without it, the tribe would be wholly alterous, outside the binary of 
self/not-self predicated on difference, and he would not have any means to access 
the alternative it might offer him), he still regards the US overseas education 
programme which instructed Itelo as purely benevolent. The American's 
reaction implies he believes that any ills which result are the product of the 
natives' misappropriation of it:
I had long ago realized how much American education was spread through the Middle 
East. The Young Turks, and Enver Pasha himself, if I am not mistaken, studied in 
American schools – though how they got from 'The Village Blacksmith' and 'sweet Alice 
and laughing Allegra' to wars and plots and massacres would make an interesting topic 
(63). 
For all his conscious opposition to American society, Henderson has 
internalised the double-think by which Cold War America's activities are 
maintained. He does not see the parallels between the natives' perversion of 
Western policy and the Arnewis' unique world-view which suggest that cultural 
influence, whether Western or communist, radiates through societies in ways 
which can never be predicted or controlled.
Henderson's first reaction when faced with the Other is the same as when 
he is confronted by Lily: he occupies a position of orthodoxy. When he arrives at 
the Arnewi court his offerings are trivial commodities (73) representative of the 
mass-produced culture he describes as a pestilence (40, 280), thereby making 
explicit the analogy between the perceived ills of his society and the plague of 
frogs being visited on his hosts which their traditions forbid them from 
eradicating. Henderson complains that '[m]y soul is like a pawn shop' (81) and yet 
fails to appreciate the true worth of the dowry which the besotted Princess 
Mtalba offers him. This wealth, while no less comprised of material possessions, 
derives its value from how the clothes and jewels augment her royal being: the 
dowry is a means to make her person more prized (97). Henderson rejects the 
display even though, he says, 'I realised as the night and the dancing wore on 
that this was enchantment. This was poetry, which I should allow to reach me, to 
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penetrate the practical task of demolishing the frogs in the cistern' (98). On one 
level he understands that, rather than compartmentalising it from his mission 
as he does, he should allow the spirit of the moment to inform his outlook on the 
world and so his resolve to purge life of its afflictions. However, this does not 
penetrate his mentality, and proves his undoing when his next host proposes a 
wager and Henderson overlooks the significance of the immaterial prize at stake 
and, on losing the bet, he is obliged to extend his stay with the tribe.
The Arnewi present a tableau of pitiable helplessness beseeching 
American intervention, to which he responds by playing to the full the part he 
has reluctantly inherited, as if his geographical and cultural displacement has 
displaced his own sense of self. He asserts that the US is technologically superior 
to the tribe but that he is a poor representative of it:
I felt singularly ashamed of not being a doctor – or maybe it was a shame at coming all 
this way and then having so little to contribute. All the ingenuity and development and 
coordination that it takes to bring a fellow so quickly and so deep into the African 
interior! And then – he is the wrong fellow! (77–78)
This tension is also evident when he first encounters Itelo: 'I thought he might 
be looking for trouble, sizing me up as if I were some kind of human mushroom, 
imposing in size but not hard to knock over' (52). Not only is he highlighting the 
difference between the power of the culture he unavoidably represents and his 
individual self; he also expresses his own disdain for the fungal emblem with 
which that culture has come to identify itself.34 
Nevertheless, the American believes that he can help the Arnewi. In 
return for his service, as 'one of those mutual-aid deals' (87), he hopes that they 
will help him find meaning in life but also teach him how to whistle with his 
fingers in the corners of his mouth. While he does not seek the material gain 
which drives Western society, a whistle can be a means to command, and so his 
desire mirrors the US' neo-imperialist motivation when distributing aid and 
34 See Peggy Rosenthal, 'The Nuclear Mushroom Cloud as Cultural Image', American Literary 
History, 3 (1991), 63–92.
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expertise throughout the Third World, as it had under the Point Four program. 
The tribe's servility elicits his altruism, for which he expects further service.
His notion that Africa is the site of superior knowledge is undermined by 
the tribe's behaviour regarding the frogs but his totalising preconceptions 
contain the discrepancy, and enforces his hosts' exotic difference and neediness 
('I figured that these Arnewi, no exception to the rules, had developed unevenly; 
they might have the wisdom of life, but when it came to frogs they were helpless' 
(87)). In truth, the Arnewi, as docile as their beloved cows, are no less effective 
against the world as Henderson is in his own home-place. This shows that the 
problem with which he grapples is not exclusive to 1950s America, but instead 
concerns people's relationships with their societies' norms: 'the world, the world 
as a whole, the entire world, had set itself against life and was opposed to it' (132). 
While Henderson recognises this on one level ('Society is what beats me' (49)), he 
thinks at this stage that the solution is to flee his society into a fantasy of its 
construction.
In leaving his home and confronting the superstitions and foundational 
problems of the Third World, therefore, Henderson is spreading America's values 
more diligently than he realises. He builds the bomb which he will use against 
the frogs from the casing of his flash-light (an appropriate weapon against the 
dark places of the earth) and the gunpowder from his Magnum, which he bought 
after having read about the model in 'Life or Look' (94). The workings of the 
device are based on plans reproduced in an article about a foiled terrorist attack 
which 'appeared in the News or Mirror' (102). In helping the 'Africans', Henderson 
is taking his cue from the US media which not only disseminates Washington's 
Cold War ideology, but actively constructs the world which demands the nation's 
overseas intervention. By printing the bomb-designs of the would-be terrorist (a 
man, like Henderson, in conflict with society, being a 'fellow who had quarreled 
with the electric company and was bent on revenge' (102)), the press have 
commodified his power, simultaneously containing and diffusing it, usurping 
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the primacy of the original. In this way, the State's monopoly on death is 
preserved while society's fear of death, and so its propensity to be harnessed, is 
augmented.
Nevertheless, Henderson champions his lone-pioneer status ('I thought 
then I could have made a better bomb at home but of course I had the advantage 
on my side of officers' training in the infantry school where there had been a 
certain amount of guerilla instruction. However, even a factory-made grenade 
might have failed' (103)), tapping into the founding American myth without 
realising it has been colonised by the military-industrial complex. At the 
moment of its execution, his bomb becomes 'the torch of liberty in New York 
harbour' (107). The subsequent explosion 'might not have been Hiroshima, but it 
was enough of a gush for me' (108). This is an apt by-word for his achievement, as 
the jubilation is swiftly replaced by the horror of what he has unleashed, much 
as the celebratory mood of the American public at the war's end was quickly 
overtaken by the fear of an atomic-future (as detailed by Paul Boyer).35 The 
unravelling of Henderson's self-directed assault on this new frontier suggests not 
only that attempts to influence the global scene can be disastrous but that the 
American gung-ho spirit has now been comprehensively co-opted by the State. 
The expression of this self has become monopolised by Washington with its 
death-dealing, mass-produced Bomb and any individualistic examples of the 
bravura which won the West and was hoped would win the war against 
communism, such as is born of Henderson's frustration, is directed away from it. 
In the African desert, however, events are free from the propagandic narrative by 
which the State directs interpretation of them (as anticipated by the tribe's term 
'Bittahness' (75), a linguistic false-friend since it is a form of respect). 
Consequently, Henderson's intervention, which unwittingly destroys the tribe's 
water-source, is an unmediated disaster demonstrating that, firstly, Western 
rational constructs and the reality they create do not hold universally (thereby 
upending the principles behind American foreign policy) and that, secondly, 
35 Boyer, pp. 14–16.
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effect is inarguably related to cause (thereby undermining the narrative which 
justifies all Cold War strategising).
Like Port in The Sheltering Sky, Henderson unavoidably proliferates 
American ideals. He needs to be aware of his preconceptions if he is to resist 
effectively the American norms which deny him happiness. While he later says 
'travel is advisable. And believe me, the world is a mind. Travel is mental travel. I 
had always suspected this. What we call reality is nothing but pedantry' (167), 
this is insufficient: now that 'Africa' has disappointed him by refusing to fit his 
desires, his inner-voice returns. After his failure with the frogs, he wishes that he 
had turned back into the desert when he had first met the Arnewi (49). However, 
wandering in the wilderness would not help him, since he would only be circling 
his own subjectivity. Henderson needs a different society to challenge him and 
give him a perspective which will allow him to distinguish his cultural 
conditioning from his personal values.
His preconceptions are further undermined when he enters the land of 
the Wariri, who are markedly less subservient than the Arnewi, and so it is here 
that Henderson can truly begin to change. This tribe's relationship with its gods 
disrupts the material/spiritual binary which holds true elsewhere (even though 
the Arnewis' attitude to nature, as represented by their cattle, is the antithesis of 
America's, they are just as enslaved by their worldly wealth as are Henderson's 
neighbours). The idols are the possessions of the tribe, but simultaneously watch 
over it, which mirrors the purported relationship between the State and the 
American citizen. Witnessing the tribesmen fail to move the idol which 
represents the goddess Mummah in the rain-making ceremony, Henderson feels 
compelled to step forward and accomplish the feat, thus shouldering the burden 
of both social ritual and material possessions in his impulsive desire to act on 
the world: 'So inflamed was my wish to do something. For I saw something I 
could do. Let these Wariri whom so far […] I didn't care for – let them be worse 
than the sons of Sodom and Gomorrah combined, I still couldn't pass up this 
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opportunity to do, to distinguish myself' (186). The ability to act implies the 
rightness of the act. However, the American's strength is commodified by the 
Africans, inverting the neo-imperialist reality.
Becoming Deleuzian
Since the assertive Wariri contravene Henderson's self/Other preconceptions of 
Africa, he can either try to exoticise them (thereby installing them within a 
bipolar view of the world) or seek a connection with them: 'I thought his 
wrinkled stare, the stern vein of his forehead, and those complex fields of skin 
about his eyes must signify (even here, where all Africa was burning like oceans 
of green oil under the absolute and extended sky) what they would have signified 
back in New York, namely, deep thought' (251). His entry-point into Wariri 
society is King Dahfu, whose Western education makes him accessible, less a 
truly alterous Other than an African elder brother. Both men are philosophically 
on the margins of their respective societies, evading expectations, resisting their 
respective containment cultures. As Deleuze and Guattari write, 'the man of war 
[…] is external to families and States, insofar as he upsets filiations and 
classifications. The war machine is always exterior to the State, even when the 
State uses it, appropriates it'.36 They are not fixed by the definitions of 
subjecthood which society seeks to impose but instead define themselves 
through shifting connections which go against the grain; they 'break with 
identity, which is always the identity of the majority, in favor of difference as yet 
unactualized'.37 The king accepts the incompatibilities which the world contains 
('it is not up to me […] to make the world consistent' (208)), the different 
economies of meaning-making as exemplified by the Western scientific-literature 
he reads co-existing with his tribe's maggot–lion–king dynamic which governs 
his life. He does not seek a master-narrative by which to understand the world, 
36 Deleuze and Guattari, pp. 267–68.
37 Todd May, Gilles Deleuze: An Introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2005), p. 150.
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but instead seeks to form a workable consensus of ostensible contradictions. 
Consequently, he is a hybrid who threatens his society's foundation of binary 
difference, fusing the totalising aspect of Western science with the equally 
totalising traditions maintained by the Wariri court in order to create a new 
energy.
The African king thus complements Henderson in a way not dissimilar to 
Lily. Likewise, the women in Africa do not represent a strict alterity. While, in 
Orientalist fashion, Henderson is simultaneously fascinated and unnerved by 
Dahfu's many wives, they constitute not an unimaginable alterity but a danger 
he imagines all too well. He baulks at the idea of assuming the king's domestic 
role, not from fear of miscegenation but because he doubts that he could meet 
their demands. It is the parity of the not-self rather than the strangeness of 
alterity which confounds the Western gaze. The manner in which they are both 
attractive and threatening thus enacts a Cold War rather than an Orientalist 
dynamic.
Consequently, Henderson only approaches alterity through his 
encounters with the lioness Atti which Dahfu keeps beneath the palace.38 Away 
from the incessant impositions of meaning on which the Cold War state 
operates, Henderson can voluntarily consider a new philosophy: 'Yes, I thought, I 
believed I could change; I was willing to overcome my old self; yes, to do that a 
man had to adopt some new standard; he must even force himself into a part; 
maybe he must deceive himself a while, until it begins to take' (297–98). By 
accepting the danger of entering the lioness' cell in the hope that he will walk 
out a stronger man, he is pre-empting death and thereby enacts the central 
interest of this thesis, that is, the protagonists' desire to travel to the desert to 
unconsciously pre-empt nuclear-annihilation and reclaim their life. It is in the 
38 His pact with Atti is predicated on an alliance with Dahfu, a fellow-outsider for all that he is 
king: 'In order to produce werewolves in your own family it is not enough to resemble a wolf, 
or to live like a wolf: the pact with the Devil must be coupled with an alliance with another 
family […] There is an entire politics of becomings-animal […] which is elaborated in […] 
minoritarian groups, or groups that are oppressed, prohibited, in revolt, or always on the 
fringe of recognized institutions' (Deleuze and Guattari, p. 272). 
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presence of the deadly animal that he experiences the death of a part of himself, 
forcing his ego to open up. Through the wilderness, the most inhuman and 
extreme form of the Other is experienced.39
His preconceptions begin to fall away and Henderson believes he can 
access reality. Whereas the previous, fleeting encounter with the reality of death 
bewildered him, now he is forced to contemplate it and honour his conviction: 
'So what if reality may be terrible? It's better than what we've got' (105). His 
exposure to Atti, which so jars with his formation in a culture which so 
diligently contains and excludes death, inspires him to consider whether 'every 
guy has his own Africa.' He continues, '[t]his is not to say, however, that I think 
the world exists for my sake. No, I really believe in reality. That's a known fact' 
(275–76): he still holds to an objective, external reality.
Dahfu's training programme is built on the idea that experience of the 
lioness can change a person on a fundamental level. This is because, he argues, 
imagination and body shape one another, with 'the flesh influencing the mind, 
the mind influencing the flesh, back again to the mind, back once more to the 
flesh' (236). Indeed, experiences alter the brain's pattern of gene-expression.40 
Furthermore, '[h]e told me, over and over again, that the cortex not only received 
impressions from the extremities and the senses but sent back orders and 
directives' (238). The cerebral cortex, rather than being a passive recipient of 
external stimuli conveyed through the senses, fuses them with existing 
understanding in order to construct an interpretation of the present moment. 
The surgeon and journalist Atul Gawande has noted that only twenty percent of 
the fibres leading to the brain's primary visual cortex come from the retina, with 
the other eighty percent coming from other parts of the brain, such as those 
which govern memory. He cites the leading British neuropsychologist Richard 
39 This idea is based on a point made in Yeo Sun Park, 'Modernity and the Politics of Place-
Experience in D. H. Lawrence’s Novels With Parallel Readings of Arnold Bennett, Giovanni 
Verga, Patrick White and Gregorio López y Fuentes' (unpublished doctoral thesis, University 
of Sheffield, 2012), p. 92.
40 Michael O'Shea, The Brain: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2005), p. 98.
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Gregory when he suggests that this might mean that visual perception is 
comprised of over ninety percent memory and less than ten percent sensory 
nerve-signals.41 Put another way, the optic nerve does not have anything like 
enough bandwidth to carry all the information that a person 'sees', so vision 
must primarily come from within. In short, the brain conflates the culturally 
constructed binary of nature and nurture to create something aligned to neither 
and to change the individual in defiance of imposed oppositional definitions. 
'Body and face are secretly painted by the spirit of man, working though the 
cortex and brain ventricles three and four, which direct the flow of vital energy 
all over' (268). Narratives of cause and effect are thus disrupted. This is not 
contradicted by the idea that everthing originates in the brain (237) since, while 
experience always precedes interpretation, it is also necessarily predicated on it, 
too.  
Society suppresses the fact that the individual and their environment 
enact a two-way influence, championing cultural constructs at the expense of 
stimuli. This can be seen in the attempts of the king's uncle, Horko, to contain 
the tradition of the royal lion within totemism. It is also why Henderson has 
always sought a meaning for his life in his father's books (where, ironically, he 
finds only money) and in his violin, outside of himself, thereby allowing himself 
to be dictated by social authority. 'When I started to read something about 
France, I realized I didn't know anything about Rome, which came first, and then 
Greece, and then Egypt, going backward all the time to the primitive abyss. As a 
matter of fact, I didn't know enough to read one single book' (244). The only 
books he is able to read are medical texts which focus on the self, the necessary 
basis for one's world-view from a phenomenological perspective. Under Dahfu's 
tutelage, Henderson struggles with the (Western) scientific literature he is given, 
but does again find some interest in medical tracts: 'Most of these articles had to 
do with the relation between body and brain, and they especially emphasized 
41 Atul Gawande, 'The Itch', New Yorker, 30 June 2008, n.p. 
<www.newyorker.com/magazine/2008/06/30/the-itch> [accessed 23 July 2013]
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posture, confusions between right and left, and various exaggerations and 
deformities of sensation', which can be equated respectively with how one 
positions oneself with regards society, one's politics and fear or paranoia. 'Thus', 
he continues, 'a fellow with a normal leg might be convinced that he had the leg 
of an elephant' (246): suggestive influence (such as propaganda) is everything, 
since values dictate reality, the model generates the real.
Henderson is encouraged to internalise the perspective of Atti the lioness: 
'try to distinguish the states that are given and the states that are made. Observe 
that Atti is all lion. Does not take issue with the inherent. Is one hundred 
percent within the given' (263). This is the foundation of an alternative to the 
external, purportedly objective truth of the one nation under God; as Dahfu says, 
'[w]hat a Christian might feel in Saint Sophia's church […] I absorb from lion' 
(260). Dahfu's philosophy is a means to 'transcend external resemblances to 
arrive at internal homologies', which is how Deleuze and Guattari outline their 
concept of becoming-animal in A Thousand Plateaus.42 Becoming-animal 
involves dialogue with nature, learning from it and adapting oneself to what it 
offers. This contrasts with, on the one hand, Cold Warriors' desire to harness 
nature for their own ends and Henderson's commoditisation of his pigs and, on 
the other, the Arnewis' subservience to their cows. By refusing to pit nature 
against culture, becoming-animal undermines the Cold War's 'reversal of 
evolutionary modes by which intellectual prowess replaces brute force'43 – 
becoming-animal works across the system, since opposition can be incorporated 
into the status quo as its legitimating Other – allowing for alterity free from the 
reductiveness of binary opposition. One does not slip over to the other side of a 
binary but positions oneself in no-man's-land, a betrayal of one's socially 
constructed sense of self rather than a defection.44 'Becoming is not to imitate or 
42 Deleuze and Guattari, p. 260, italics in original.
43 Nadel, Containment Culture, p. 55.
44 This is analogous to Baudrillard's idea of symbolic exchange, also operating in the divide, but 
Deleuze and Guattari's thinking seems more apt here given my use of their idea of becoming-
animal.
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identify with something or someone […] becoming is to extract particles 
between which one establishes the relations of movement and rest, speed and 
slowness that are closest to what one is becoming, and through which one 
becomes'.45 It collapses the binary into the divide to reveal 'a proximity “that 
makes it impossible to say where the boundary between the human and the 
animal lies”'.46 While the duplicity of the Cold War state, emblematised by the 
Bomb which is a source of both hope and horror, is consciously contradictory in 
order to conceal certain truths and create others, becoming-animal is a 
revelatory fusion of all.
Becoming-other offers Henderson a means to improve his lot which 
society denies him.47 The patriarchal status quo has granted him a position of 
power which he cannot refuse but is equally unable to inhabit. Lily, on the other 
hand, flits between the various social personae (the damsel-in-distress, the 
firebrand) which are projected on to her (but which fail to contain her) in order 
to get what she wants from society. Thus through Baudrillardian seduction she 
can express her social excess, and as a result the marriage exposes the 
meaninglessness of society's constructed gender-differences. Similarly, 
Henderson's guide Romilayu always uses the pronoun 'him', even when he is 
talking about a female, and the fact that this does not hinder his meaning 
demonstrates how these social signifiers are unconnected to the individuals they 
45 Deleuze and Guattari, p. 300, italics in original.
46 Deleuze and Guattari, p. 301. 'The painter and musician do not imitate the animal, they 
become-animal at the same time as the animal becomes what they willed' (Deleuze and 
Guattari, p. 336). 
47 This mirrors the idea of the Cold War as the opportunity to create an integrated network of 
cooperation between countries, rather than a situation demanding hegemonic containment. 
See Christina Klein, Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945–61 
(Berkeley: U of California P, 2003), p. 41, cited in Steven Belletto and Daniel Grausam, 
'Introduction: Culture and Cold Conflict', in American Literature and Culture in an Age of  
Cold War: A Critical Reassessment, ed. by Steven Belletto and Daniel Grausam (Iowa City: U of 
Iowa P, 2012), pp. 1–14 (p. 6). Eric Strand writes that the creative possibilities of such a 
globalised approach after the Second World War enabled an attack on conformist mores at the 
height of the Cold War (Eric Strand, 'Lighting Out For the Global Territory: Postwar Revisions 
of Cultural Anthropology and Jewish American Identity in Bellow’s Henderson the Rain King', 
ELH, 80 (2013), 287–316).
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try to contain in (and thereby erase from) discourse. Henderson associates 
English with the containment of emotions ('I would never have thought that 
people who spoke English would have been capable of carrying on so 
emotionally' (51)) and animals (the Arnewi 'have more than fifty terms just to 
describe the various shapes of the horns […] hundreds of words for the facial 
expressions of cattle and a whole language of cow behavior [while] a pig [such as 
Henderson keeps] is basically a career animal […] and therefore doesn't require a 
separate vocabulary' (56)). This is why the first exercise in becoming-animal 
centres on him learning to roar.
By changing his name to Leo Henderson, he articulates the way in which 
he exceeds the role which society expects him to play (and in this way becoming-
animal is analogous to Baudrillard's symbolic exchange). After all, he wants to 
live at peace with and in American society. As Deleuze and Guattari write, 'the 
self is only a threshold, a door, a becoming between two multiplicities',48 which 
contrasts with Cold War ideology which denies change or external realities. This 
constant becoming is the reality of the self and produces nothing but itself.49 It is 
a question of being true to one's values, and Dahfu identifies Henderson's 
guiding values when he tells him that suffering is the closest he has got to 
worship (303–04). Given that Henderson is 'monstrously proud' of his capacity 
for suffering, it can be interpreted as his form of celebration of or communion 
with the world. This is his challenge to society: it achieves nothing beyond the 
challenge of being Other to the suffering demanded by the State (as codified in 
Cold War dictates, propaganda and civil drills).
48 Deleuze and Guattari, p. 275.
49 Deleuze and Guattari, p. 262
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Dahfu's defeat and Henderson's homecoming 
The Wariri king, Dahfu, has to capture the lion which is the reincarnation of his 
father in order to consolidate his right-to-rule.50 When it is reported that the lion 
in question is close to the village, he sets out to contain it in a corral in order to 
bring it back to the palace dungeon on which his power is literally founded. 
Henderson accompanies him and, his fear compounded by his long-standing 
tropical fever, says that 'I had a feeling that I had found, in midair, a changing 
point between matter and light' (301). This is his personal fission, triggering an 
alchemical transformation within his understanding of the world. At this 
moment, the advancing reality of the deadly lion explodes the socially 
constructed reality he has always maintained. He sees, even if he does not 
understand, that reality exceeds one's values. Nature is not unequivocally good 
or bad and these values are imposed on it by the culture of those who try to 
control it, whether they be Cold Warriors wielding the Bomb or African 
tribesmen harrying a bestial embodiment of kingship.51 
Consequently, it is Henderson's values which create his two epiphanies in 
the novel. Vexed as he is when he encounters the octopus in the French 
acquarium (19), it becomes a multi-armed figure of death. Similarly, he watches 
the dawn light creep up the wall of an Arnewi hut (100ff) when he is full of 
optimism, which accordingly transforms it into a beacon of hope.
However, for all his talk of embracing reality, in the heat of the hunt 
Henderson seeks safety in familiar social constructions. He relates that 'within 
the rising blare of the horns and the constant running of the drums […] I said, 
50 Contrary to the atomic-society of the West, 'death can no longer establish itself as end or 
agency' (Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange, p. 131).
51 Later, Henderson wonders,
Perhaps I had learned from lions after all, and not the grace and power of movement 
that Dahfu had got out of his rearing among them, but the more cruel aspect of the 
lion, according to my shorter and shallower experience (316). 
Henderson has questioned why mankind would want to learn from a ferocious lion (307), but 
its benefit is evident in his snarl as he launches his pre-emptive strike on his enemies (324). 
For a discussion of how the symbolic must be submitted to, rather than controlled, see 
Hegarty, p. 33.
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“Your Highness, did I ever show you these pictures of my wife and children?” I 
started to look for them in the bulky wallet' (302). Although he claims that he 
does this to comfort his friend, it is clear from his nervousness that he is trying 
to distract himself from the coming danger; despite his atheism, he even prays 
(307). However, these illusions are inadequate to protect him from reality: 
I then tried to tell myself because of the clearness of those enraged eyes that only visions 
ever got to be so hyperactual. But it was no vision. The snarling of this animal was indeed 
the voice of death. And I thought how I had boasted to my dear Lily how I loved reality. 'I 
love it more than you do,' I had said. But oh, unreality! Unreality, unreality! That has been 
my scheme for a troubled but eternal life. But now I was blasted away from this practice 
by the throat of the lion (307).
The ferocious quarry they finally corner is a 'real' lion, not the former-
king-as-simulation, and Dahfu is exposed to the reality of death. As he dies, he 
reveals that Henderson, being the tribe's rain king, will automatically ascend to 
the throne and that he engineered the American's investiture in that role 
precisely so that his successor would continue to resist the ambitions of the 
court-faction led by his uncle. The king has previously explained how he believes 
suffering is perpetuated in the world – in a manner evoking the Cold War 
mindset ('man cannot keep still under the blows […] All wish to rid themselves 
and free themselves and cast the blow upon others. And this I conceive of as the 
earthly dominion' (213)) – but that noble individuals must strive not to pass on 
their fear to others. Now it is clear that he has fallen short of his ideals or, rather, 
that his philosophy has failed to accommodate political realities. Once again, the 
problems of Henderson's hosts show that the cause and solution of the 
individual's frustration do not lie with any particular society but with one's 
relations to social systems.
Henderson laments the worldly corruption of his friend and believes that, 
because of this, '[i]t could be time we were blown off this earth' (316). Ultimately, 
Dahfu's deceit is more insidious to the American than is Horko's overt 
manoeuvring, just as a communist fifth-column within the US was more feared 
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than Soviet-gains in the Third World. Nadel outlines the scenario that, in order 
to win the Cold War, one side must relinquish its traits and become like the 
Other in order to make that Other the same as itself.52 Such thinking upholds 
binary opposites, for all the porosity which betrays their constructed nature. 
Dahfu adheres to this axiom in that he seeks unalloyed freedom: for all its 
emphasis on fusion, his philosophy is totalising rather than dialogic. The tribal 
infighting is thus a confrontation between two authoritarian yet interdependent 
powers, each unsure of the other's strength. In attempting mastery over the 
Other, Dahfu succeeds only in a betrayal of the self. His admission of political 
machination reveals him to be more different to Henderson than the American 
had believed. Paradoxically, Henderson thus realises that the Wariri are less 
different to American society than he had thought.
At the start of the novel, Henderson regards 1950s American society to be 
as incompatible with his sense of self as is nuclear war. He believes that his state 
of non-alignment can only be realised through self-containment, and so flees 
from society. This, however, is as impossible as Dahfu's conviction that he can be 
non-aligned by embracing everything is deluded. The world is incoherent and 
self-contradictory and, as a result, any attempts to fuse its different elements 
can be dangerous. Since it is not rational, the world – and particularly the Cold 
War world – in its entirety cannot be rationally accepted. In trying to harmonise 
competing systems of understanding the world, Dahfu, like Conrad's Kurtz, 
comes effectively to believe anything, which means that he ultimately believes 
nothing. This is the far end of the spectrum from the American consumer's 
inability to choose, as described by Schlesinger above, and yet equally removes 
one's agency. Additionally, rationalism has led to communism. The true, pioneer-
spirited American Way must involve finding a means to live in the world which 
is true to one's self.
Dahfu argued that everthing originates in the brain – thought it could 
52 Nadel, Containment Culture, p. 159.
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encompass all – which perhaps was the reason he ignored the dangers of the 
court, to his peril. However, the fact that everything begins in the brain 
emphasises rather than overrules the fact that the individual is always informed 
by understanding of past experience. Looking back on his life, Henderson 
realises that, at every instance, '[s]omething deep already was inscribed on me. 
In the end, I wonder if Dahfu would have found this out for himself' (339). In 
short, as he says, '[w]hen you get right down to it, a fellow can't predict what he 
will pick up in the form of influence' (316).
When we first meet Henderson, he feels himself to be Other in the face of 
America's cultural narrative, thus destroying its East–West binary. He is his own 
worst enemy: the self is not Other but alterous. The citizen is never fixed, instead 
being always a processual merging of the myths designated self and Other, 
between which good and bad are not divided cleanly. Nuclear-society demands 
that it be homogeneous, that it is natural only for like to be with like. It removes 
ambiguity, such as that surrounding the Bomb. However, the 'unnatural act' of 
fission on which the nuclear-state is founded necessarily involves dissimilar 
elements, and so the myth founders. Henderson comes to accept that he is 
unavoidably contaminated by society; it has had a founding influence in the 
formation of his self, and so he cannot reject it.
It is impossible to be pure lion, that is, to achieve the pure potential of 
social desubjectification. However, Deleuze and Guattari stress that its 
impossibility is an integral part of authentic becoming-animal. In this failure, 
one attains awareness of one's excess to social definitions.53 Consequently, while 
cultural preconceptions are unavoidable, they need not be an obstacle provided 
one discerns cultural consensus from personal truths. The immanence of failure 
to becoming-animal does not make it mere simulation, however. Becoming-
animal is more than mere totemism, which is what the Wariri elite hope to 
reduce it to by installing Henderson as a puppet-king and recuperating his 
53 This is paralleled in Baudrillard, Impossible Exchange, trans. by Chris Turner (London: Verso, 
2001), pp. 61–62 and p. 83, and discussed in Hegarty, p. 88.
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threatening marginality within their system.54 It is real in the sense that it 
effects a change in Henderson. Becoming-animal is what Baudrillard calls a 
radical illusion, that is, an originary illusion which provides the individual with 
a foundation for living (with Truth recognised to be impossible, truths become 
possible). Radical illusions, occuring within simulation, cannot access the 
reality which lies outside society's constructs but, by existing in the divide, 
allude to it and thus bring it within one's awareness.55
Henderson now realises that, if a man can be lion while maintaining the 
outward appearance of a man, it is possible for him to live in society while 
remaining non-conformist to it. He must cultivate a cautious approach to life 
which takes into account both the spiritual and the worldly, the individual and 
the collective. As he earlier realised, but did not heed:
The world of facts is real, all right, and not to be altered. The physical is all there, and it 
belongs to science. But then there is the noumenal department, and there we create and 
create and create. As we tread our overanxious ways, we think we know what is real. And 
I was telling the truth [about reality] to Lily after a fashion. I knew it better, all right, but 
I knew it because it was mine – filled, flowing, and floating with my own resemblances; as 
hers was with her resemblances. Oh, what a revelation! Truth spoke to me (167, emphasis 
in original).
He must therefore weigh up the competing meanings of the world he encounters 
but, furthermore and crucially, he must also weigh up his own meaning-making 
system – to appraise his very appraisal – in order to be truly dialogic. In the past, 
he weighed up the competing ideologies of the American Way and communism, 
rejecting the latter, but then turned to the Western value-system through which 
he had viewed this choice and also found it lacking. This was not a third way but 
a politics as totalising as those he rejected because it left him with nothing, and 
this is not the answer ('I prayed and I prayed, “Oh, you…Something,” I said, “you 
54 See Hegarty, p. 32. As Deleuze and Guattari write, '[t]he Church has always […] reintegrated 
anchorites into the toned-down image of a series of saints whose only remaining relation to 
animals is strangely familiar, domestic' (Deleuze and Guattari, p. 273). 
55 Hegarty, p. 33. For a concise explanation of radical illusion, see Hegarty, p. 46 note 10.
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Something because of whom there is not Nothing”' (253)). In contrast to the 
binaries of Nadel's premise, Frances Stonor Saunders quotes Harold Rosenberg's 
feeling that 'revolutions in the twentieth century are for freedom and socialism 
[…] a realistic politics is essential, a politics which would get rid once and for all 
of the fraud of freedom versus socialism'.56 Henderson must fuse nature and 
nurture at every level of his interpretation of the world; as he says, 'Reality is 
you' (123, emphasis in original).
He has previously felt frustrated by the sense that his potential is 
unfulfilled and that he is still in the process of becoming complete: 'Being people 
have all the breaks. Becoming people are very unlucky, always in a tizzy […] 
Enough! Enough! Time to have Become. Time to Be! Burst the spirit's sleep. Wake 
up, America!' (160). Now he realises that being is not the arrival at a state of 
passive completeness but of always learning. As he says, '[e]verybody changes. 
Change is ordained. Changes must come' (270). His ambivalence towards 1950s 
American society is not a cause for anguish but a legitimate philosophy of life.57 
'What is real is the becoming itself, the block of becoming, not the supposedly 
fixed terms through which that which becomes passes'.58 This is why the corpse 
with which Henderson and Romilayu are billeted on their first night in the 
Wariri village, for all that it embodies reality, is so unimpressive: 'the dead man 
in his silence sen[t] a message to me such as, “Here, man, is your being, which 
you think so terrific.” And just as silently I replied, “Oh, be quiet, dead man, for 
Christ's sake”' (137).59 In the attempt there is failing, but in failing there is hope: 
'This is the sense in which becoming is the process of desire',60 which is how it 
56 Stonor Saunders, p. 414; italics in original.
57 Jean Baudrillard, For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign, trans. by Charles Levin 
(St Louis: Telos, 1981), pp. 150 – 54. See also Hegarty, p. 27.
58 Deleuze and Guattari, p. 262.
59 On Baudrillard's argument that 'being' is death, see The Intelligence of Evil or the Lucidity  
Pact, trans. by Chris Turner (Oxford: Berg, 2005), p. 212. For a discussion, see John Phillips, 
'Humanity's End', in Baudrillard Now: Current Perspectives in Baudrillard Studies, ed. by 
Ryan Bishop (Cambridge and Malden: Polity, 2009), pp. 159–71 (p. 159).
60 Deleuze and Guattari, pp. 300–01. For an explanation of the value which Baudrillard ascribes 
to hope, see Hegarty, p. 88.
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will answer Henderson's inner-voice calling 'I want'. In this way, Henderson's 
understanding comes to correspond with the phrase in his father's library which 
so stirred him: 'The forgiveness of sins is perpetual and righteousness first is not 
required' (3). 
Rather than constantly rejecting or passively accepting his lot, like Paul 
Bowles he must actively create a home for himself. Since 'it's love that makes 
reality reality' (286), providing as it does a stable sense of self, contentment and 
self-possession, he figures that 'I therefore might as well be at home where my 
wife loves me. And even if she only seemed to love me, that too was better than 
nothing. Either way, I had tender feelings toward her' (328–29) which are 
something he can grasp and build a life on. This is the radical illusion which he 
needs. His desire to live ('I want') has been insufficient, because it is purely 
internal to him and so has left him with a lack. He has required something 
external to himself, which is why he will find happiness not in his 'Africa' but 
back home in alienating, self-contradictory American society. People are happy 
in their home-society, as he appreciated when at the Arnewi court, but only on 
the condition that they are not comprehensively contained by it. By choosing to 
build his life around Lily and her possibly illusory love for him, Henderson 
'presumes an external authority for truth'.61 
They make us think we crave more and more illusions. Why, I don't crave illusions at all. 
They say, Think big. Well, that's boloney of course, another business slogan. But 
greatness! That's another thing altogether […] I don't mean pride or throwing your 
weight around. But the universe itself being put into us, it calls out for scope. The 
eternal is bonded onto us. It calls out for its share. This is why guys can't bear to be so 
cheap (318).
Such recourse to transcendant Truth was the strategy of American 
liberals now forsaking rationalism, with its associations with communism,62 
61 Nadel, Containment Culture, p. 83.
62 Schaub, pp. 21–22; see also Stonor Saunders, pp. 247–48. Stonor Saunders quotes a 1972 New 
Yorker article by Senator William Fulbright: 'Like medieval theologians, we had a philosophy 
that explained everything to us in advance, and everything that did not fit could be readily 
identified as a fraud or a lie or an illusion' (p. 212).
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exchanging the idealistic humanism embodied by The Sheltering Sky's Port for 
Henderson's pragmatism, thereby relieving them of their responsibility for a 
global moral-crusade. Henderson with his Establishment, essentially 
conservative, ancestry but disillusioned with what society has become, embodies 
the ambivalence of the new liberalism of the postwar years. 
Seen in this light, the novel's unevenness replicates Henderson's 
experience of having to weigh up diverse components in order to discern 
meaning. As Kiernan and Michelson believe, its form complements its purpose. 
By negotiating conflicting information by means of double-think, constructing 
fusion from confusion, the reader enacts the daily duty of the citizen of 1950s 
America having to contend with official misinformation. The Cold War's 
propaganda campaign (bolstered by the co-optation of popular writers) obliged 
the individual to contain authorised contradictions and satisfy their need for 
truth when none was forthcoming. As Derek Maus says, since 'the extreme 
propagandization of language during the cold war drastically destabilized [even] 
the semantic and semiotic values of words',63 it was necessary to construct one's 
own narrative of life.
Through the radical illusion of domestic stability, Henderson can 
construct a coherent alternative for himself in the face of nuclear-society's 
rampant materialism. The novel's form evokes this through its use of first-person 
narrative. This device creates form for formlessness, as Thomas Hill Schaub 
says,64 and so a hero of Henderson. However, Schaub argues that the first-
person's 'dialectic of consciousness' merely gives the illusion of preserving an 
individual's 'inside otherness' amidst social-conformity, and that it ultimately 
amounts to political acquiescence.65 This thesis, on the other hand, argues that it 
is in fact impossible to escape the nuclear age and accordingly concerns itself 
63 Derek C. Maus, Unvarnishing Reality: Subversive Russian and American Cold War Satire  
(Columbia: U of South Carolina P, 2011), p. 2.
64 Schaub, p. 73.
65 Schaub, p. 81.
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with the possibility of escaping nuclear-paranoia. Given that the threat of the 
Bomb to American society is a fantasy,66 it asserts that the first-person voice is a 
(vital) illusion against illusion: supple, pragmatic dialogue versus ungainly, 
idealistic totalitarianism.67 In this way, the first-person 'illusion' is effectively 
subversive in conformist society: it refuses to pass its fear on to others. 
Furthermore, Henderson does not believe that he is alone on this matter:
All the major tasks and the big conquests were done before my time. That left the 
biggest problem of all, which was to encounter death […] Millions of Americans have 
gone forth since the war to redeem the present and discover the future […] there are guys 
exactly like me in India and in China and South America and all over the place […] And 
it's the destiny of my generation of Americans to go out in the world and try to find the 
wisdom of life […] I wouldn't agree to the death of my soul (276–77). 
He baulks against the denial of the spiritual which American society effects, and 
goes out in search of the death which his culture strives to contain. As 
Baudrillard writes, 
Initiation takes the form of symbolic death, acceptance of and into the realm of the dead 
[…] on the one hand, he has been with the dead, and is now back; on the other, this 
means that the dead are accessible, and have a vital role in initiating the start of (adult) 
life.68
While the African desert he first enters is a socially authorised pressure-valve 
for his frustration, his initiation into a realm beyond such cultural constructs 
enables him to find what he seeks. This death is not rationalised and remains 
ambivalent. Much like the octopus in the French aquarium, or the Krishna 
whom Oppenheimer recalled while witnessing the Trinity test, Henderson now 
embodies death, the destroyer of worlds or, at least, societies.
66 See, for example, Derrida, p. 24.
67 According to Baudrillard, a vital illusion is an individual's philosophy for living which 
acknowledges that there is more to the world than it can encompass. The opposite is an 
objective illusion, such as the totalising dictates of the paranoid nuclear-state. A succinct 
explanation appears in Hegarty, pp. 83–84.
68 Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange, p. 132; for a lucid discussion, see Hegarty, p. 43.
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In The Sheltering Sky, Port was confronted with one atomic-superpower, 
and so sought to oppose it, only to realise on his deathbed that his opposition 
served to reinforce the ideological monolith. Henderson the 1950s citizen, on the 
other hand, is witness to the competing monopolistic doctrines of equally deadly 
atomic-adversaries, and recognises that truth is a product of ideology. 
Consequently, while he challenges the US nuclear-deterrent's promise of 
ideological immortality ('the absence of death alone permits our exchange of 
values'),69 it is a challenge which asks for nothing more than its own existence. 
Henderson notes that '[a] fellow may do many a crazy thing, and as long as he 
has no theory about it we forgive him. But if there happens to be a theory behind 
his actions everybody is down on him' (276). As a result, whereas Port was 
destroyed, Henderson is permitted to return home. By dint of its own existence 
within him, his challenge betrays the fact that there are more things in heaven 
and earth than are dreamt of in the State's philosophy. It recalls the process 
which initiated the hegemonic system70 by affirming the alterous reality of 
death, and thereby wrestles back the narrative of death from the nuclear-armed 
State. The truth he constructs for himself, his radical illusion, creates a 
coherency for his life. His perception of the meaninglessness of American society 
is then contained within form and given a meaning: what he took to be a lack of 
meaning is in fact unfixed, self-contradictory meaning, which complements his 
own state. (After all, even great figures of Western science such as Curie and 
Kepler entertained irrational beliefs – heresies in the post-Enlightenment world 
– alongside their celebrated research (269).)
The bomb which Henderson threw at the frogs is thus the first stage in a 
chain reaction which explodes his cultural preconceptions. From the moment 
that he destroys the Arnewis' reservoir and, with it, the illusion of the universal 
application of Western constructions of reality, a maelstrom has engulfed his 
self. After Dahfu's death, as Romilayu and he flee across the desert, Henderson is 
69 Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange, p. 154; again, see Hegarty p. 43.
70 Hegarty, p. 41.
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delirious with fever and so not of sane mind, unconscious and so not rational. 
'All so-called initiatory journeys include […] thresholds and doors where 
becoming itself becomes'.71 Bearing in mind Heidegger's idea of the threshold as 
the drawing together of two (permanently) discrete elements, this transitional 
episode can be seen as the process of Henderson's self finding an equilibrium 
between all that he now knows in order to remain true to himself once he is back 
in American society. As he recovers, Henderson keeps the African lion cub he is 
taking back to the US alongside his American passport and dollars within his 
helmet (327). This has been his constant protection against the tropical sun, the 
carapace within which he has preserved himself intact against the ravages of 
Africa. It has now become the crucible in which his Western social attributes can 
fuse with his fledgling African influences.
The fact that the reality he has experienced exceeds Western cultural 
constructions is evident in Henderson's incoherent letter to Lily about his time 
in Africa (280ff). Once again, the form is complemented by the content: he sees 
the contingency of the cultural values which creates the world for each person: 
'Here they don't know what tourists are, and therefore I'm not a tourist. There 
was a woman who told her friend, “Last year we went around the world. This 
year I think we're going somewhere else”' (282). 
Henderson now has confidence in his own experience and understanding 
of the world, rather than looking to cultural constructs for guidance. 
Accordingly, he writes to his wife that '“I am giving up the violin. I guess I will 
never reach my objective through it,” to raise my spirit from the earth, to leave  
the body of this death' (284, italics in original). His preconceptions and his 
perceptions have now become distinct, and he is able to see the world free of the 
meanings which American society imposes on it. People are like the clouds he 
passes over on his flight back to the US, 'not abiding realities' (333), ambivalent, 
not liable to be boxed into neat definitions as the State would like. He observes 
71 Deleuze and Guattari, p. 274.
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that the '[o]ther passengers were reading. Personally, I can't see that. How can 
you sit in a plane and be so indifferent? Of course, they weren't coming from mid-
Africa like me; they weren't discontinuous with civilization' (333). Equally, he is 
not drawn to the birthplaces of Western civilisation – Athens, Rome – or the 
vanguard of European culture – Paris, London – through which his journey takes 
him.
When the aeroplane lands in Newfoundland to refuel, Henderson has 
finally reached the setting of his childhood dreams inspired by books of Arctic 
exploration which shaped his desire for escape. While he wrote to Lily that 'I  
don't think I would have found what I was looking for there' (282, italics in 
original), his situation is now different as he carries what he seeks within 
himself. Whereas the Pole would formerly have been a blank canvas on to which 
he would have unwittingly projected his cultural preconceptions, the tundra 
around him is a clean slate. The sense of new beginnings is reinforced by the 
presence of his young companion, an orphaned American who has grown up in 
Persia. He is thus the product of mechanised, petrochemical imperialism, but he 
'doesn't speak English at all' (335), and so, for all that he is informed by past 
experience ('Two smoothly gray eyes moved at me, greatly expanded into the 
whites – new to life altogether. They had that new luster. With it they had 
ancient power, too. You could never convince me that this was for the first time' 
(339, emphasis in original)), represents the potential of being oneself free of 
social impositions. The two of them rush out on to the virgin snow, on their own 
terms, much to Henderson's relish.
Conclusion
Viewing the novel in relation to Cold War containment not only confirms it as a 
key text in this current investigation but also gives it a resonance which 
previous critics have found lacking. While Boyer suggests that writers – naming 
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Bellow in particular – remained silent on the matter of the Bomb because it 
could not be described,72 this chapter suggests that the author did address this 
issue hidden at the heart of American life at that time in a correspondingly (if 
arguably unfortunate, though understandable) covert manner.73 With this in 
mind, the Twain story which Bellow uses for inspiration appears less as an 
established model to which to conform as a solid base firmly embedded in US 
culture from which to launch a critique.
72 Boyer, pp. 250ff.
73 Of course, at the same time as Henderson's trip overseas in order to find a means to express 
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Chapter 3. 
Decolonising the Metaphor: Thomas Pynchon's V. (1963) 
Arguably, the most significant political events in the twentieth century were not 
battles between liberal democracy and totalitarianism but the decolonisation 
associated primarily with the 1960s. In the face of this, and the declaration of 
political non-alignment at the 1956 Bandung Convention by those now 
identifying themselves as the Third World, the West and the Soviet Union sought 
to ensure their influence over these states to prevent them falling to the other 
side.
Concurrent with these events, the American public enjoyed 
unprecedented improvements in their living-standards as rising disposable-
income was serviced by technological advances which provided an ever-
increasing range of commodities. The fact that this consumerism, in addition to 
augmenting individual comfort, comprised a home-front in the fight against 
communism only implicated it more tightly in the success of the American 
Century.
However, from the 1950s, contention stemming from political 
conservatism threatened this brave new world. Coddled with commodities – Guy 
Debord's ideology become material – citizens were expected to consume the 
national narrative rather than appropriate the signifying potential of these 
playthings of progress to produce meanings of their own. They were colonised by 
the hegemonic narrative of freedom. As James Baldwin said in 1963, the year 
Thomas Pynchon's V. was published, '[a]ll of the western nations [are] caught in a 
lie, the lie of their pretended humanism; this means that their history has no 
moral justification, and the west has no moral authority'.1 
Indeed, many technological advances which benefited society were the 
product of military initiatives. Among the ranks of mass-produced commodities, 
1 James Baldwin, No Name in the Street (New York: Dial Press, 1972), p. 85.
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therefore, the Bomb was the ultimate, their origin and final line of defence if 
they failed to hold off the Red Threat.2 As with civilian-technology, so with its 
psychology: Oppenheimer's toy colonised the brain with not only fear of 
radiation (which led to the ban on above-ground atomic-tests in 1963) but 
apocalypse: as Daniel Ellsberg says, like an unfired gun, the Bomb is constantly 
in use.3 This is what Paul Boyer calls 'nuclear-consciousness'. This 'myth [of the 
Bomb] has become a physical part of everyone's brain and is now acting as a 
strong unifying force'.4 It colonises the brain, mutating its understanding of the 
world, mass-producing Cold War citizens. 
The diverse strains of disillusionment came to be seen in the early 1960s 
as a counterculture5 whose ideological dissent was Port Moresby's fears and 
Eugene Henderson's dissatisfaction made prevalent. At this time, Pynchon was 
combining a number of his early short stories in his writing of V., a novel of 
unreliable narratives, voids of meaning and the sinister face of Cold War techno-
culture.
V.'s two narrative-threads each follow a Westerner, Benny Profane and 
Herbert Stencil, denied a voice by a colonising narrative of total contentment. 
This hegemonic discourse has usurped virtu (that is, interpersonal 
2 Through their purchases, the mass-produced consumer-citizen extends agency over the 
communist-Other-as-object while conceding agency to the objects they buy. For how mass-
culture is associated with totalitarianism, see Thomas Hill Schaub, American Fiction in the  
Cold War (Madison and London: U of Wisconsin P, 1991), p. 17. Erich Fromm argues that the 
West's remnant of democracy is doomed to yield to technocratic fascism in a society of well-
fed, unthinking robots: precisely what it fears when it speaks of communism and which, 
dehumanised, will not baulk at using the Bomb (To Have or To Be? (London: Jonathan Cape, 
1978), pp. 180–81 and p. 197). The Bomb makes objects of us all and, as Fausto in V. points out, 
the inanimate is subject to the law of physics (Thomas Pynchon, V. (London: Picador, 1975), p. 
321. All subsequent references to the novel will appear in the main text in parentheses).
3 Quoted in Noam Chomsky, 'Why National Security Has Nothing to Do With Security', 
TomDispatch.com, 5 August 2014 <www.tomdispatch.com/blog/175877> [accessed 15 February 
2015]
4 J. O. Tate, 'A Note on “Convergence”', Pynchon Notes, 15 (1984), 80–82 (p. 80) 
<www.ham.miamioh.edu/krafftjm/pn/pn015.pdf> [accessed 10 November 2014]
5 Consciousness of a broad movement arguably formed in the wake of the crack-down on 
student-protesters outside a HUAC session in San Francisco in May 1960 and with the Women 
Strike for Peace march in November 1961.
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communication) as the producer of meaning and so, being consuming-subalterns 
inevitably non-aligned with it, they find their world of 1956 to be meaningless. 
Profane acknowledges only the physical or profane and sees the world as subject 
to chaos, while Stencil believes in an underlying reason for the world being as it 
is which, once found, will assuage his torment. Both have internalised the 
colonising narrative which objectifies people. However, both experience the 
tensions resulting from their natures being excessive to normative dictates, and 
express this wariness of the self as paranoia of the Other (whether animate or 
inanimate). They insulate themselves from the world with what Jean Baudrillard 
calls objective (that is, totalising) illusion in their autocratic 'white halls [of the] 
brain' (53), which empties their universes of meaning. They might expose the 
falsities of the world but, like Vheissu, the sovereignty they carve out is a hermit-
state as untenable as the felucca which Sidney's skipper recalls being painted 
even as it was sinking (460).
The conformist Stencil begins with a stencil (derivative of hegemonic 
discourse) and fills the space within his universe with narrative which, thus 
determined, cannot but lead to the Bomb. If the world is ultimately chaotic, as 
he fears, self-restraint means nothing and the Bomb will be used; he exists in a 
depopulated desert-narrative where meaning-making collisions are impossible, 
which is both refuge from and the result of this reality. Profane, conversely, 
begins with himself and works outwards, demarcating the limits of his universe 
by the edges of the objects which oppress him. He thus holes himself up in a 
bunker to protect himself from collisions.
Both avoid relationships, Stencil to avoid the Bomb which would destroy 
the meaning he is constructing and Profane to avoid anything meaningful which 
the Bomb could destroy. In this way, both are 'schizoid', Robert Lifton noting 
that schizophrenics are ambivalent towards relationships since they are infused 
with the threat of annihilation. Thus cut off, however, psychic death is
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ubiquitous.6 Erich Fromm's term for schizoid is 'marketing character' and he 
defines it as a person without an authentic self whose relations with Others are 
so insubstantial that they flee both self and Other to exist in their own 
universes, apathetic about threats to society such as nuclear war.7
My discussion will focus primarily on Stencil, since he metaphorises the 
void in which he lives as a literal desert as a challenge to the colonising narrative 
of the Cold War state, and so more clearly exemplifies the central concerns of 
this thesis.
Stencil, his mother and V.
It can be inferred that Stencil's 'schizoid' mindset is a result of his never having 
known his mother, either first-hand or as communicated by his (now-deceased) 
father, the British spy Sidney (52). Without this virtu, Stencil lacks a stable 
foundational identity. He pores over his father's diaries and the testimonies of 
Sidney's associates, convinced their words speak of a coherent force beyond the 
arbitrary personal and political affairs of a past age: an international conspiracy 
behind everyday experience, central to which is V. whom, it is inferred, is his 
mother. By piecing together these references, Stencil hopes to excavate a 
foundational narrative for himself.8 Memory (including constructed memory) is 
radioactive, lingering long after the material experience, encoding our identities 
at an essential level.
Sidney also contemplates the maternal, musing after the First World War 
that, following the absolute monarchy of the age of the Father and the mob-rule 
of that of the Son, the coming age of the Holy Spirit might be that of the mother 
6 Robert Jay Lifton, 'The Image of “The End of the World”: A Psychohistorical View', Michigan 
Quarterly Review, 24 (1985), 70–90 (pp. 81–82).
7 Fromm, To Have, p. 151 and pp. 148–49.
8 V. is what Baudrillard calls a 'radical illusion', an originary illusion which, in hindsight, is 
seen to grant the possibility of truth (Paul Hegarty, Jean Baudrillard: Life Theory (London: 
Continuum, 2004), p. 46 note 10). Such a narrative creates 'facts' – which Baudrillard terms 
'theories' – and so replicates simulation without being it.
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(472). '[E]mbodying a feminine principle' (209), it is an age of fusion: of the Left 
and Right ('[t]he street and the hothouse […] in V. were resolved' (487)), and of 
atoms. It defies the unitary classifications on which reason is constructed. 
Baudrillard writes that the real (man/life) is always haunted by the imaginary 
(woman/death) which lies outside the system. The symbolic resolves these 
separate events in the social act of exchange,9 but such exchange is prevented by 
capitalism, which is why Stencil is obliged to find his own means of expression. 
The empirical certainties which replaced alternative narratives are shown 
to be founded on 'a sub-atomic realm where laws are mocked [and the] search for 
[truth] seems to demonstrate how perilously empiricism verges on magic'.10 As 
Jacques Derrida notes, the Bomb fuses science and belief, as there is no truth. 
The New York Times summarises the thoughts of Derrick de Kerkhove, the acting 
director of the McLuhan Program in Culture and Technology in 1984, thus: 'the 
bomb has become a modern myth, holding a power over the culture's thinking 
previously held by religion'.11 As the Bad Priest of 1940s Malta whose clerical garb 
conceals a technological marvel, V. is a false faith arisen (over the New Mexico 
desert) in the absence of any true belief (Fausto says that the world, or rather the 
West, would have to be exorcised in order to free Stencil of V. (450–51)). Similarly, 
Victoria's perversion of Catholicism, by which the men she seduces become 
substitutes for the absent Christ (167), illustrates the danger of distorting others 
in the service of a self-serving supposedly external narrative.
The Bomb breaks down binary-oppositions such as those between the 
meaningful and meaningless, safety and danger, a house and a thoroughfare, as 
9 Jean Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange and Death, trans. by Iain Hamilton Grant (London: Sage, 
1993), p. 133.
10 John Updike, 'The Talk of the Town', New Yorker, 9 December 1967, p. 51, quoted in Jon 
Michaud, 'Updike, J.F.K., and the Umbrella Man', New Yorker, 22 November 2011 
<www.newyorker.com/books/double-take/updike-j-f-k-and-the-umbrella-man> [accessed 30 
August 2014]
11 Tate, p. 80. Jacques Derrida, 'No Apocalypse, Not Now (Full Speed Ahead, Seven Missiles, 
Seven Missives)', trans. by Catherine Porter and Philip Lewis, Diacritics, 14 (1984), 20–31 (p. 6).
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Nadel details.12 V. similarly collapses distinctions on which society grounds 
itself, merging nature and techno-culture, blurring good and evil, destroying the 
logic of cause and effect. The nuclear-gaze prohibits ambiguity for the sake of 
national security, but the difference between atomic-fuel and atomic-weapons is 
invisible.13 The journalist Dwight Macdonald writes: 'Atomic Fission is something 
in which Good and Evil are so closely intertwined that it is hard to see how the 
Good can be extracted and the Evil thrown away'.14 As Jonathan Schell writes at 
the start of his book, modern physics' violation of common sense ushers in the 
postmodern era of ontological uncertainty.15 The shift from the epistemological 
uncertainty of the modernist era to the ontological uncertainty of the 
postmodern is evident in the different attitudes of Stencil père and fils: the 
former believes that '[n]ow and again events would fall into ominous patterns' 
(480), whereas the latter feels that '[e]vents seem to be ordered into an ominous 
logic' (449). The son is of a generation forced to deal with the death of Victoria 
and Victorian certainties, as well as the problems which both these certainties 
and their death create. Sidney, living in the transition between the two eras, 
knows that a spy must always feel at home (481), but the sense of home eludes 
him (476). The old certainties are now dead, but the technology which supported 
them endure (hence the unrest at the Maltese docks (467)).
This age depends on the paradox that the Bomb both is and is not being 
used simultaneously as decreed by MAD, analogous to superposition in quantum 
physics, when a particle both does and does not exist.16 The Cold War everyday is 
12 Alan Nadel, Containment Culture: American Narratives, Postmodernism, and the Atomic Age  
(Durham: Duke UP, 1995), p. 59.
13 Nadel, pp. 23–24.
14 Quoted in Paul Boyer, By the Bomb's Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn  
of the Atomic Age (Chapel Hill and London: U of North Carolina P, 1994), p. 234.
15 Jonathan Schell, The Fate of the Earth and The Abolition (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2000), pp. 9–
10.
16 The Cold War is an age of simulation, built as it is against the eventuality of an event which 
must not be allowed to occur. In a 'daisy chain of victimizers and victims' (49), V. is both, as is 
the State and the dissident Westerner who travels to the Third World, or Mondaugen who 
leaves the corrupt society in which he is complicit for the desert (278–79).
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founded on the irrational; after all, on witnessing his creation, the father of the 
Bomb sought to ground himself by evoking ancient Eastern gods. Stencil believes 
that the world is the result of either conspiracy or chaos, but does not consider it 
being both.
The age of the mother, thus demanding dialogic negotiation, is the age of 
metaphor. Metaphors are less restrictive than nouns while being more tangible 
than narratives, having more potential than either and foregrounding the 
distinction between sign and signifier, making the consumer the producer of 
meaning. Nouns (even proper nouns) are ultimately abstract labels17 and only 
live and aquire morality in narrative. Conversely, narrative reshapes and 
subsumes facts (that is, relabels nouns) to make experience meaningful.18 In V., 
people are defined as things which absorb X-rays (284), demonstrating how an 
object-noun can be colonised by narrative. Totalising hegemonic discourse 
attempts to root '[t]he rationality of the sign […] in its exclusion and 
annihilation of all symbolic ambivalence on behalf of a fixed and equational 
structure'.19 Metaphors such as the Bomb and V. are object-nouns invested with 
an inherent narrative of the narratively uncontainable, the real outside the 
system which is also at the heart of everyday life, this fusion creating energy 
which is both life-giving and destructive, flicking a V-sign at hegemonic dictates. 
Metaphor enables the Cold War citizen's split-subjectivity by which they live 
everyday life even as the Bomb hangs over them.20 
17 The dead Mélanie is merely a chaos of objects, without meaning (414).
18 For example, in the Florence episode, young Godolphin is rechristened by the authorities as 
Gadrulfi, the name of a revolutionary, to tie him to their suspicion that he is involved in 
subversive activities. Godolphin in turn displays 'the honest concern and bewilderment of any 
English tourist confronted with a happening outside the ken of his Baedeker' (190).
19 Jean Baudrillard, For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign, trans. by Charles Levin 
(St Louis: Telos, 1981), p. 149.
20 For all its totalising dictates, the hegemony harnesses the ambivalence of the Bomb: 
Khrushchev claimed that it was not an offensive weapon (Elie Abel, The Missiles of October:  
The Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis 1962 (London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1966), p. 166). Equally, 
the US conducted a military-exercise (Philbriglex-62) in the Caribbean in October 1962 against 
a dictator called Ortsac (Abel, p. 97), an inversion of and metaphor for 'Castro' constructed 
from familiar elemental particles knocked out of order, demonstrating how strange the world 
becomes with a shift in perspective. See Baudrillard's discussion of the power of anagrams in 
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V. speaks in many tongues, with snatches of French, German, Italian and 
Spanish making their appearance. 'Yo-yo' – the image used to evoke Profane's 
wanderings up and down the east coast, but equally descriptive of Stencil's quest 
through time and space – might thus be a pun on the Spanish pronunciation of 
the first-person singular, representing the condition of the split-self,21 each self 
set at an oblique angle to the other in a V. V is the degree to which an individual 
can sway to align with the world and still retain their integrity ('Above all,' 
Robert Lifton writes, 'we all live a double life').22 The confusable pronunciation of 
the letters V and B in standard Spanish places the Bomb front-and-centre of the 
novel, the eponymous full-stop signalling the abbreviation. After all, the V-2 was 
the direct ancestor of the missile which carries the nuclear-load (Tate, p. 81); 
since simulation inverts model and copy (and the Bomb destroys causality), V(-2) 
is indeed the product of the Bomb. We cannot speak of it and must find new ways 
to approach and contain it: rather than the Bomb, Pynchon speaks of V., the 
floating signifier23 of the ultimate referent (the annihilation which, Derrida 
writes, lies behind all expression), to expose the constructed nature of its 
certainties. Of course, this strategy simultaneously avoids it, mirroring Stencil's 
ambivalence towards finding V. 
Stencil is a conformist, seeking meaning in causal narrative. Other 
protagonists examined in this thesis internalise the hegemonic narrative, but 
Stencil alone identifies with it. As Alan Nadel notes, from the end of the Second 
World War until the burgeoning of the counterculture, conformity was generally 
regarded as a positive trait in American society.24 Stencil's myth has been 
cultivated over this period and so weathered the turbulence of the 1950s to 
chapter 6 of Symbolic Exchange and Death.
21 Adam Piette, conversation.
22 Robert Jay Lifton and Peter A. Falk, Indefensible Weapons: The Political and Psychological  
Case Against Nuclearism (New York: Basic Books), p. 52.
23 Timothy Gilmore, '“How Pleasant to Watch Nothing”: Narrativity and Desire in V.', Orbit:  
Writing Around Pynchon, 1 (2012), 1–27 (p. 19) <www.pynchon.net/owap/article/view/14> 
[accessed 20 August 2014]
24 Nadel, p. 4.
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which the hegemony responded by demanding of its public rational objectivity. 
The concept of truth which Stencil seeks is itself ideological and so reinforces 
Cold War dictates.25 Fromm argues that the twentieth-century Westerner is 
naturally inclined to conservatism since consumption encourages passivity and 
the victory of liberalism has produced individuals anxious at the prospect of 
freedom, as exemplified by their uncertainty when confronted by the mass of 
commodities available.26 Stencil's construction of a conspiracy articulates a 
denial of reality common among Cold War citizens which, Schell posits, extends 
from the Bomb outwards to all lesser ills encountered (an attitude which is 
perhaps emblematised in V.'s glass eye).27 However, his personal narrative 
oscillates situationally between identification with and alienation from the 
hegemonic order, hence his tensions. 
Stencil seeks comfort in the Establishment of his father's era but, like the 
latter, finds its narrative at odds with experience. Abandoning it would leave him 
with nothing, however, so he naturalises his ambivalence by appropriating the 
cloak-and-dagger element of that Establishment (62). 
Uncertainty is the state of the Cold War citizen,28 which is why the 
enriched core of Stencil's narrative-of-self is a metaphor, V. Metaphor 
25 Schaub, pp. 22–23.
26 Fromm, To Have, p. 177; see also his Escape from Freedom (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1941). 
In Fatal Strategies (London: Pluto, 1999), Baudrillard discusses the triumph of the object 
through the uncontrolled, irrational growth of production. In the face of this 'cool' 
catastrophe, people succumb to inertia (see Douglas Kellner, 'Jean Baudrillard (1929–2007): A 
Critical Overview', in Baudrillard Now: Current Perspectives in Baudrillard Studies, ed. by 
Ryan Bishop (Cambridge and Malden: Polity, 2009), pp. 17–27 (pp. 21–22)). Mondaugen, living 
under a siege analogous to the Cold War, feels desperation 'but without any clear reason, for 
here after all was abundance not depression, luxury not a daily struggle for life' (250). The 
horror of the Bomb forced passivity (and comfort-consumption) on the public: they flopped 
rather than flipped (293). As for freedom, the Florence intrigue poses a twisted form of Liberty 
incarnate (211) which might be equated with V. The Free World compromised its professed 
values through its avowed willingness to use the Bomb, and so effectively perished without 
even pressing the button.
27 See Schell, p. 152. '[I]f atomic fear were sustained long enough, people would simply stop 
confronting it by dimming their capacity to respond to the evidence of their senses' (Boyer, p. 
282).
28 Nadel, p. 88.
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foregrounds the floating-nature of all signifiers and consequent inadequacy of 
any narrative to contain the world, and is witness to possibility and uncertainty. 
Hegemonic attempts to fix a unitary value to metaphor are like so many metal 
stakes being driven through living tissue: the flesh tears, the metal corrodes, and 
an unyielding monstrosity results.29 
Stencil's search propels him imaginatively and physically between the US, 
the Old World and the cradle of humanity, from a space choking on mass-
produced repetitions of the present to a place overdetermined by countless 
layers of history. This narrative-thread predominantly comprises historical 
episodes of global political-brinkmanship from the twilight of the Victorian 
epoch to the height of the Second World War which witness apparent 
manifestations of V., scenarios which always rehearse the loss of virtu. As John 
Updike wrote regarding the theories which blossomed after the Kennedy 
assassination in the year of V.'s publication:
We wonder whether a genuine mystery is being concealed here or whether any similar 
scrutiny of a minute section of time and space would yield similar strangenesses – gaps, 
inconsistencies, warps, and bubbles in the surface of circumstance. Perhaps, as with the 
elements of matter, investigation passes a threshold of common sense and enters a sub-
atomic realm where laws are mocked, […] and where a rough kind of averaging out must 
substitute for absolute truth. The […] search for [truth] seems to demonstrate how 
perilously empiricism verges on magic.30 
Stencil's compulsion to chronicle repeatedly these dynamics and tensions 
resembles the affliction among survivors of trauma who 'find themselves forced 
to relive it over and over again', which psychiatrists Warren Kinston and Rachel 
Rosser term 'tormenting memory'. Referencing Robert Lifton's work on the 
survivors of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, they note that such 
people must 'absorb the losses and “sacrifice with a sense of special mission”' and 
29 Which, like the increasingly robotic V., is the opposite of Deleuze's image of complete 
potential, the body without organs. See Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand 
Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. by Brian Massumi (London: Continuum, 
2004), for example, p. 34.
30 John Updike, quoted in Michaud.
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consequently often perceive clandestine larger forces operating through the 
event.31
Thus Stencil, deprived of his mother and, by extension, meaning, strives to 
perceive a reason for her absence. The fact his quest began in 1945 (54) equates it 
with the melancholia which forms the Cold War state (in both senses of the 
word). Conformist, he has faith in hegemonic narrative but, because meaning is 
fused with his mother, he cannot accept her loss and cure his melancholia, so 
flees to a past where both exist. Fleeing from the horizon of meaning, his 
mindset is a (nuclear-)wasteland inhospitable to the communication which 
would otherwise cultivate it: the Bomb breaks the thread which connects one 
person's gaze to another's (94), the yo-yo string which chapter 13's title declares a 
state of mind. Like one of the Florentine conspirators, outside the world's 
communion Stencil finds 'the soil arid, or the sun unfriendly, the air tainted' 
(203).
Stencil is marked by, in Lifton's words, 
an indelible imprint of death immersion which has formed the basis of a permanent 
encounter with death, a fear of annihilation of Self and individual identity along with the 
sense of having virtually experienced the annihilation; the destruction of the […] context 
of one's existence and so of one's being-in-the-world, and replacement of the natural order 
of living and dying with an unnatural order of death-dominated life.32 
This melancholia is evinced by not only the hegemonic projection of the absent-
Other (in the self's own unlikeness)33 on to the receptive surface of the Iron 
Curtain, but also the political posturing which follows a script written in a 
31 Warren Kinston and Rachel Rosser, 'Disaster: Effects on Mental and Physical State', Journal 
of Psychosomatic Research, 18 (1974), 437–56 (p. 433, p. 448 and p. 443 respectively).
32 Quoted in Kinston and Rosser, p. 447.
33 In Gilmore's words, V.'s radical alterity (p. 19). The mother is not other to the infant before the 
mirror-stage; now absent, she is made other by the myth of V. which Stencil sets up as a 
reflection of himself and by which he acknowledges his own Otherness in relation to 
hegemonic dictates. The alligator with the apparent death-wish (146) and the crash-test 
dummies which can sustain increasingly serious wounds (285–86) are also canvases for the 
self's projection of the death-drive inherent in the Cold War Other, as is Victoria's belief that 
people have doubles (199) through some form of fission or quantum entanglement since the 
double affects the original.
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bygone era. Conscious that his youthful self failed to communicate with his 
father (63), Stencil obsessively recalls the values of the past he has failed to 
honour; tormenting memory compels sufferers to 'submit to [their dead 
relatives'] moral arbitration'.34 The Cold War world is no less an orphan than he, 
since the Bomb severed history,35 exploding established organising narratives, 
disinheriting the individual of the values which orientate the sense of self, 
leaving them a yo-yo without yarn. The real is over,36 and the origins of the 
consequent personal and geopolitical malaises alike can be traced back to the 
colonial twilight of the Victorian age: for Stencil, the maternal void and his 
remaining source of virtu running dry; for the Cold War, the schism between the 
political left and right. '[T]he 1890s were, in a number of respects, a starting 
point for reigns and events that were to have a crucial bearing on the twentieth 
century'.37 History does not represent but create, nostalgic for meaning (that is, 
authentic lived-experience) and the real.
The Egyptian episode: deserts, dissidents and death
In chapter 3, Stencil narrativises a detail in his father's diaries concerning an 
intrigue among European agents in colonial Egypt. Structurally and 
thematically, this chapter is a synecdoche for the novel. Of all Stencil's temporal 
34 Kinston and Rosser, p. 447.
35 See Boyer, p. 133 and p. 280.
36 Ann Douglas argues that, from 1945 until the early 1960s, there was an outside to the system, a 
place where protest against the Cold War hegemony was meaningful and consequential (Ann 
Douglas, 'Periodizing the American Century: Modernism, Postmodernism, and 
Postcolonialism in the Cold War Context', Modernism/Modernity, 5 (1998), 71–98 (p. 84)). 
However, with the evaporation of the Red Scare by the early sixties (Stephen J. Whitfield, The 
Culture of the Cold War (Baltimore: John Hopkins UP, 1991), p. 237) which had gone a long way 
to encouraging conformity, and the mass-decolonisation of the sixties and seventies which 
brought not independence but neocolonialism, the possibility of resistance radically reduced. 
Anthony Appiah calls the period from the mid-1960s one of '“post-optimism” when, in Masao 
Miyoshi's words, "the return to 'authenticity' [was] a closed route"' (Douglas, p. 84). To 
Whitfield it seems that the American public was now more keen to uphold capitalism than 
democracy (Whitfield, pp. 237–38).
37 Robert Wolfson and John Laver, Years of Change: Europe 1890–1945 (London: Hodder and 
Stoughton, 1996), p. 2.
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yo-yoing, this first takes the reader farthest from the present moment, to the 
Orient of 1898, and demands most of them to keep pace with the narratorial 
point-of-view as Stencil disperses it among a number of perspectives on the 
margins of the event, individuals who are denied a voice by the Western 
hegemony. In these ways, the chapter evokes an overt sense of the dislocation felt 
by all the characters in the face of Cold War dictates. 
Stencil and the Sahara
Just as he articulates the distance between 'Stencil' and self by his self-relegation 
to the third-person, Stencil removes the Otherness of Western society to the 
strangeness of the East. In this chapter, Stencil metaphorises the void of virtu 
within him, the nuclear-desert of the real created by the ultimate referent and 
cornerstone of the age and, in keeping with Cold War simulation, inverts it into 
an equally inhospitable desert around him. This desert is the space of death (84) 
and, voiceless (83), the negation of the subject. It is also, however, the domain of 
Truth (85) and so is the realm of the real. The desert presents us with that which 
the system denies, because metaphors always contain an absence. The Saharan 
sun burns through the surface-narrative of Western constructions of meaning to 
expose the destabilising real within, the nothingness which undermines the 
rational basis of hegemonic-control and which was extant at Hiroshima's 
Ground Zero after the exothermic blast of Western logic had displaced 
humanity.38 As one of the characters, Gebrail, says, '[t]he desert was prophesy 
enough of the Last Day' and is associated with the Mahdi (84), a messenger of 
divine will and so a counterpart to the Bomb. Gebrail also believes that the angel 
Asrafil will kill the human race and bring it back to life, suggesting a real-world 
disconnect in pursuit of paradise which mirrors the Cold War logic that the 
38 In Civilisation and its Discontents, Freud makes the case that the balance between man's 
animal-instincts and his reason has tipped in favour of the latter, revealing it to be the more 
dangerous. While instinct has a sense of self-preservation, reason can entertain thoughts of 
self-extinction (Sigmund Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, trans. by Joan Riviere 
(London: Hogarth Press, 1972)). See Schell's particularly relevant reading of this, pp. 155–56.
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Bomb can solve the State's problems, albeit by killing everyone in the process.
The desert thus represents more than that which the prescribed daily life 
of the Cold War citizen admits. The debased interpersonal communication 
evident here is a result of the shadow of annihilation: Schell argues that 
relationships during the Cold War were unstable because people demanded each 
moment to produce more experience than it otherwise would39 as if civil-society 
really was benefiting from the promise of nuclear-fusion. This parallels people's 
expectations of travel as an access to heightened existence which, while a 
symptom of the capitalist nature of modern travel, expresses the desire to gorge 
oneself on life in the face of death. 
Within the desert lie Alexandria and Cairo, hybrid supranational enclaves 
(71), dialogic spaces of alternative narratives which cannot but interact with the 
invading desert-emptiness and colonising European intrigue alike. This is why 
the subalterns can regard themselves as the 'automata' (70) of the touristic 
tableau. Of course, this self-reflexivity might alternatively reflect that they are 
Stencil's creations; for the question of whether he colonises their viewpoints, see 
the next section of this chapter. In addition to using the Third World as the site 
of their hot wars, the superpowers sought to co-opt it and re-establish the 
binary-division by which the self constructs itself which the non-aligned states 
undermined. Similarly, in V. Vheissu's globe-spanning infrastructure is in danger 
of being harnessed to serve hegemonic interests (the post-war world cannot 
afford to allow Vheissu free-rein, that is, political dissent (248–49)). The secret-
state's underground potential mirrors the sewers which shelter New York's 
insane pacifists (120). Beyond the novel, the empty spaces beneath the desert 
which have always provided refuge for those fleeing society became in 1963 sites 
where society's most powerful weapon was perfected, the cradle of resistance 
mutating, in the radioactive atmosphere of inversion, into the crucible of 
control. The US' interest in certain African states was primarily because of their 
39 Schell, p. 159.
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minerals, such as the Congo's uranium which was the main source of the Bombs 
dropped on Japan, but Douglas argues that American's neocolonial acquisitions 
and global links also influenced the homeland.40 
Within these cities in turn is the fifth-column, Victoria (promoting the 
inhumanity of the hegemonic discourse, and also being Catholic (72)): each space 
or narrative contains destabilising elements, since, as Markus Peterseil says, the 
problem with knowledge is that it always relies on other knowledge.41 One's 
understanding of the world is thus like a series of Russian dolls. Pynchon notes 
in the Paris chapter that the West on the eve of the First World War associated 
Russia with the Orient on account of her suspected desire to 'overthrow Western 
civilization' (412). 'V.'s natural habitat [is] the state of siege' (62) and she embodies 
therefore the dangerous artifice of hegemonic discourse and the challenge to it.42 
She is like the Bomb whose existence justifies the Cold War state while 
undermining it, since MAD dictates it will never be used: both one thing and its 
opposite, like a quantum-superposition.
The cosmopolitan cafés, embassy and train-line shield Stencil's imagined 
Westerners from the alternative narrative of the Egyptian delta and the death-
drive of the desert (78). They are the means with which the colonised individual, 
identifying with techno-culture, projects a veneer of order ('the surface, the 
dream-street' (147)) on to the nothingness at the heart of hegemonic constructs. 
This plane is as much as one can know: the point of contact between the 
individual and the world, the surface of the self, as meagre as the membranes of 
the balloons so adored by Yusef.43 With nothing behind it, this surface can only 
reflect. It is the mirror Slavoj Žižek identifies as the surface which presents to us 
40 Douglas, pp. 77–78.
41 Markus Peterseil, 'A Game Theoretical Approach to the Early Fiction of Thomas R. Pynchon' 
(unpublished MA dissertation, University of Vienna, 2010), p.93. This is evident in the fact that 
the meaning of the radio-signals Mondaugen receives is ultimately meaningless (278). 
42 Marcel Cornis-Pope, Narrative Innovation and Cultural Rewriting in the Cold War and After  
(New York: Palgrave, 2001), p. 116.
43 Of course, this is equally true of Stencil's narrative, which cannot contain the desert. The 
cities' spaces and the train are the point-of-contact with the vast alterity. Rubbing up against 
one another, the Vs of desert and delta are mutually defining.
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the simulacra of hyperreality,44 confronting the individual with the Lacanian 
Imaginary of the shiny metallic casing of the annihilation which constructs the 
Cold War subject (the casing is curved and so the reflected self distorted: the self-
as-Other), on to which one projects the paranoid awareness of this nothingness, 
one's dissidence, one's Otherness. Just as Mélanie fetishises herself in mirrors to 
see herself through the frame of another's desire (chapter 14), the individual who 
identifies with the reflection is complicit in their colonisation by hegemonic 
discourse. If one does not follow this line, one is out-of-line. However, this line is 
also a life-line since, without it, one is adrift in either a chaos of object-nouns cut 
out of their context (Profane's earthy paranoia of tangibility) or conspiracy-
narratives disregarding their constituent parts (Stencil's light-headed paranoia 
of abstraction). Stencil's historical recreations are a counter-hyperreality, which 
is why they articulate Cold War concerns: politics, paranoia, and machines 
pursuing apocalyptic ends.45 This is why Bongo-Shaftsbury is revealed to be a 
robot on the train, the border of virtu and dictate. The intrigue in which the 
spies entangle themselves is just one more puny plot staked out against the 
hulking meaninglessness, a yarn along which atomic-shuttles fly to weave 
isolated fragments (commodity-objects, objectified people, nouns) into a 
sheltering narrative to hold back the void.
A recurrent example of just such a sheltering narrative is the Baedeker 
guide. The novel references the epitomic title on Egypt, the country which 
hosted the first commodified experience of the cultural Other and so was 
foundational for the West's perception of the rest. It 'does not admit of private 
44 '[W]here does that empty surface come from, that cold, neutral screen which opens up the 
space for possible projections? That is to say, if men are to project on to the mirror their 
narcissistic ideal, the mute mirror-surface must already be there. This surface functions as a 
kind of “black hole” in reality, as a limit whose Beyond is inaccessible', Slavoj Žižek, The 
Metastases of Enjoyment: On Women and Causality (London and New York: Verso, 2005), p. 91. 
This limit is, on the one side, the nothingness or barrier of the desert in the Western 
imagination. On the other, it is the limit of the Bomb. Where the two meet is the event-
horizon where the individual can escape nuclear-paranoia.
45 Boyer notes that, from the 1960s onwards, the nuclear-deterrence strategy's complex, esoteric 
nature was comforting to the public (Boyer, p. 358), so it is understandable that Stencil would 
wish to emulate it. 
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interpretation' (408–09) and so suppresses the multiplicitous potential – the 
dissenting narratives – of Westerners and non-Westerners alike, imposing 
preconceptions, determining routes and interpretations, precluding dialogic 
engagement between them. It encourages voyeuristic disassociation, which 
objectifies the Other, and prevents de Certeauean play, far less any glimpse of the 
Baudrillardian outside of the system.46 Seen in this light, it is hardly surprising 
that Eugene Fodor was in the OSS, the wartime precursor to CIA and CIA agents 
posed as writers for his publication during the Cold War.47 With a guide, travel is 
a socially endorsed pressure-valve for the individual's tensions with the 
hegemony.48
Two characters, however, succeed in travelling beyond such colonising 
narratives and gaining the horizon of the familiar where they can grasp the 
limits of the hegemonic simulation and peel it back (in a V) to look beyond. In 
chapter 7, the Venezuelan revolutionary known as the Gaucho is dismissive of a 
painting in the Uffizi, '[t]he whole surface of [which] seemed to move, to be 
flooded with colour and motion' (209), which obsesses his associates. He muses 
that '[p]erhaps [political struggle] is all a mockery, and the only condition we can 
ever bring to men a mockery of liberty, of dignity' (211). After all, as another 
character notes, there is no via del Paradiso (201), suggesting that the only 
paradise is the canvas, which is ultimately 'a dream of annihilation' (210).49 
46 Stencil's fantasy is not a space outside the system but a socially endorsed outlet for dissenting 
tensions. The third impersonation, Max, passes himself off as a tourist hampered by a 
'malfunction in Cook's machinery' (71). His targets see him as part of the automata of the 
tourist-experience, but allow themselves to be used in turn like a machine. The tourist's 
seeming transgression of social norms is the opposite: by helping the con-man, they are in the 
service of not virtu but its opposite, since Max is an example of the decay of humanity. One 
can be a different person, here; 'Baedeker land' is a space of socially authorised multiplicity. 
The superficiality of the tourist is itself an authenticity since there is no surface/interior 
dichotomy. The spies, in disguise, lack this authenticity: Max perceives that they are posing as 
tourists (74), meaning that they have depth and so duplicity.
47 Frances Stonor Saunders, Who Paid the Piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War (London: 
Granta, 1999), p. 35 and p. 247.
48 Similarly, the children's emulation of Davy Crockett's desire for the Frontier which Winsome 
witnesses (219) constitutes not an escape from but an enforcement of social dictates.
49 As Walter Benjamin says in 'The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction': 'the 
adjustment of reality to the masses and of the masses to reality is a process of unlimited 
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 While the South American subversive is prepared to stare this dream in 
the face, in the same chapter it is the dream which confronts another character. 
Having encountered Victoria, the cartographer Godolphin recounts his flight 
from his paranoia of life's meaninglessness, glimpsed in the lost world of 
Vheissu. He initially tries to escape despair by organising the world into 'neat 
hollow squares' (171).50 As Tony Tanner says,
[i]t is one of the most enduring of all human dreams (or needs) to feel that we live among 
geometry. Rather than confront shapeless space we introduce lines and angles into it. 
Surrounded by the desert, man builds a pyramid. That would be another way of saying 
what V. is all about.51 
On to the hegemony's uncompromising binary of sand and sky (as Baudrillard 
argues, monopolistic power is bipolar), Man stencils an artful wedge of living-
expression which acknowledges and so pre-empts death. The inversion of this 
pyramid is V.52 
Godolphin then travels to the South Pole for a moment of motionless away 
from the bombardment of colonising discourse (205). With society's protective 
shield burned away, he finds himself exposed to 'a dream of annihilation' (206). 
The sight of a Vheissuvian spider-monkey under the ice suggests a network of 
scope' (Illuminations, trans. by Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken, 2007), pp. 217–51 (p223).
50 Contrary to Baudrillard's analysis of Borges' 'On Exactitude in Science', the map is simulation, 
since it is not an attempt to represent reality but a political device to replace it (just because 
reality is always mediated, reality and the map are not one and the same). Consequently, the 
hegemony is going to war over mere fictions. Jean-François Lyotard maintains that the 
fixation on surface results from the uncertainty whether anything more profound, such as 
ethics, is any longer possible: society has abnegated its responsibilities to itself, having 
perfected missiles at the expense of missives. In the postmodern age, we are all tourists who 
desire to range wide rather than deep (184). See Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, 
trans. by Sheila Faria Glaser (Ann Arbor: U of Michigan P, 1994), p. 1, and Jean-François 
Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. by Geoff Bennington and 
Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1984), p. xvii.
51 Tony Tanner, 'Patterns and Paranoia or Caries and Cabals', Salmagundi, 15 (1971), 78–99 (p. 
95).
52 On the subject of pyramids, as J. Kerry Grant notes, the Petrie whom Bongo-Shaftsbury 
mentions began his research into the origins of the units of measurement in 1880 (J. Kerry 
Grant, A Companion to V. (Athens, GA: U of Georgia P, 2001), p. 49). The year of V.'s birth, 
therefore, marked the start of a project to quantify, contain and demythologise the 
foundations of an ancient power which presented a rival to the current hegemony. For the 
bipolar nature of monopoly, see Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange, pp. 68–69.
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passages which literally undermine the British imperial-project of constructing 
cultural divisions.53 The monkey is 'rainbow-coloured' (205–06), and so reflects 
the whole spectrum: it is only surface, a manifestation of absence. Indeed, it is 
not even necessary for it to exist ('it was not what I saw or believed I saw that in 
the end is important. It is what I thought. What truth I came to' (206)), since it 
has been scampering through the 'network of white halls in his own brain' (53) 
for years. The frozen wastes of the motionless Pole reflect the stasis of the Cold 
War in which two competing totalising-discourses make certainty impossible 
and, in the face of which, the individual cannot but be a dissenter (in 
Godolphin's words, '[e]veryone has an Antarctic' (249)). Without an insulating 
narrative, the individual will freeze beneath the starless night-sky of the desert – 
tropical or polar – which, Gebrail believes, betrays the 'great lie' that is 
civilisation (85). 
Subaltern voices
The dusty death of the desert is countered by water, similarly shifting, 
ambiguous and destructive to the mechanics of power. It is as malleable as 
metaphor, uncontainable as consciousness. In V., water operates in a way similar 
to music, which is equally soaring but structured, transcendent yet technical 
(for example, 195). At the climax of the Paris episode, the opera's closing 
crescendo is 'like fragments of a Bomb [as it] blasted out [then] hung, subsided' 
(414), forming a musical mushroom cloud. Its recurring appearance in V. signals 
the significance of subjectivity and the battle between alternative narratives and 
hegemonic discourse.54 
53 Cornis-Pope, p. 113.
54 Rains marks Sidney's landfall on Malta which proves so fateful and fatal (456), even if the civil-
unrest there which threatens a chain reaction of political crises is dampened by a downpour 
(478). The Venezuelan vice-consul to Florence notes approaching rain-clouds while fretting 
over revolutionary elements seeking to overthrow the status quo (177) while, in the Paris 
chapter, the storm whose approach has been repeatedly referenced finally breaks 'in Mélanie's 
rainy eyes' just as she abandons her subjectivity for good and becomes the inanimate object 
she has simulated (413).
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Early in chapter 3, rain falls on Alexandria: 'Low places in the square 
filled, the usual random sets of criss-crossing concentric circles moved across 
them' (66). Timothy Gilmore draws on Jacques Lacan's immixture of subjects to 
interpret this image as representing individuals' 'universes' of awareness.55 He 
also relates the description of the rain with Sidney's first-principles: '[He] had 
decided long ago that no Situation had any objective reality: it only existed in the 
minds of those who happened to be in on it at any specific moment' (189). The 
spy understands that each individual lives in their simulation or metaphor of 
reality and that their organising-narrative is inadequate to the consequent 
multiplicity of the world.56 Gilmore argues that meaning is only produced in the 
collisions between individual universes, while Peter Abernethy equates the 
chaos of the world in Pynchon with the uniformity of the hegemonic narrative.57 
Given this uniformity, these universes cannot be subject to Newtonian laws 
Most inventively, the Florence episode connects the awareness of selfhood more closely to 
the circles on the water: the choreography of Victoria's umbrella when encountering 
Godolphins père and fils betrays a constant play of proffering and concealment of her 
knowledge in order to elicit information and manipulate others. When she asks old 
Godolphin about his faith, '[s]he was gazing at the rim of her parasol' (169), with an eye on the 
limits of her subjectivity; when he replies candidly, '[s]he had been gazing at him. The parasol 
leaned against the bench, its handle hidden in the wet grass' (170), concealing the centre of her 
subjecthood, suggesting her duplicity and the fact that this interpersonal communication will 
not save Godolphin. Sensing he has betrayed himself, he flings his cigar – the flame of 
selfhood – into the wet grass (172) before fleeing the police and 'the pool of light they'd trapped 
him in' (185). His son is arrested and loses his brolly along with his agency (175) while, when 
Victoria moves to seduce the younger man, it is noted that she 'dug the point of her parasol 
into the ground' (200) to anchor herself and take control of the situation. In contrast to all 
this self-assertion, Profane follows the flow of water through New York's sewer-system with 
characteristic randomness (chapter 5), while Stencil's discovery of V.'s death is an 'accident to 
shatter the surface of this stagnant pool and send all the mosquitoes of hope zinging away to 
the exterior night' (345).
55 Gilmore, p. 11.
56 The Cold War was an age of simulation since both the détente and the continued existence of 
mankind was based on a scenario which could not be allowed to happen. See Baudrillard, 
Simulacra, p. 34 for Baudrillard's reading of deterrence as a simulation of war. It should be 
noted that simulation has not taken over from a real, because the real is how things appear 
and so has always been a product of mediation (which is, for a man like Sidney, the source of 
one's potential). See John Phillips, 'Humanity's End', in Baudrillard Now: Current  
Perspectives in Baudrillard Studies, ed. by Ryan Bishop (Cambridge and Malden: Polity, 2009), 
pp. 159–71 (p. 165).
57 Gilmore, p. 11. Peter L. Abernethy, 'Entropy in Pynchon's The Crying of Lot 49', Critique:  
Studies in Modern Fiction, 14 (1972), 18–33 (p. 19).
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which dictate that bodies move from areas of high density to areas of low, but 
rather the chance of quantum physics. (Of course, as Paul Hegarty points out, 
chance is a construct which absolves us of responsibility).58 Thus is selfhood 
one's foundation and foil.59 We cannot experience another's universe,60 but we 
can acknowledge it. Stencil, deprived of a source of foundational virtu, is 
uncertain of the nature and limits of his universe and cannot distinguish self 
and non-self, perceiving only a uniform third-personhood: the desert that is his 
life is empty even of himself and, consequently, no meaning is possible. Self-
relegation to third-personhood makes him always absent: he is not 'Stencil', but 
neither is he any of the alternatives he adopts ('“Stencil” appear[s] as only one 
among a repertoire of identities' (62), the State-constructed subject projected on 
the State-denied individual).61 He has no place to stand and express his 
multiplicity, so practises Baudrillardian impossible exchange on himself by 
fragmenting it (naturalising it for his conformist mindset which holds to the 
unitary values of hegemonic discourse) across the impersonations of chapter 3, 
allowing him to size himself up against an Other and so construct a sense of 
self.62 
His nonconformity is thus removed to socially and politically marginal 
figures. In this way, what the hegemony disregards as objects (Baudrillard's label 
58 Hegarty, p. 79.
59 The sinister cyborg Bongo-Shaftsbury says: 'The moment you forget yourself enough to admit 
another's humanity [you have lowered your guard]' (81). As Pynchon writes, the act of love and 
death are one (410). The US nuclear-weapons complex is a 'closed system'; the nuclear-state 
proliferates inanimate culture but does not allow the influence to pass in the other direction 
(see Brian C. Taylor, 'Nuclear Pictures and Metapictures', American Literary History, 9 (1997), 
567–97 (p. 575)).
60 For example, even though Mondaugen is privy to the small circle of the Bondel's song (279), its 
meaning is impenetrable.
61 Pynchon references 'Sartre's thesis that we are all impersonating an identity' in a 
conversation among his New York drop-outs (130). When the action moves to the office of his 
dentist-philosopher, he describes the tooth, with its inanimate enamel protecting the living 
pulp (153), in a manner which evokes the ego and Self but also the paraphernalia of consumer-
culture with which individuals separate themselves from others.
62 For Stencil's conformist mindset, the impersonations are a means of escape but, since they 
are dissident, also put him in the position of being caught. This is expressed by the events in 
the Uffizi's 'ritratti diversi' (literally, 'different portraits') gallery in the Florence chapter (210).
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for subalterns) become subjects, consumers of meaning producers. Spoken for by 
hegemonic discourse, they exist outside it, as what Baudrillard calls the 
symbolic. The hegemony's system of binary values recuperates their ambivalence 
as a negative, but their resistance appears in 'gaps, inconsistencies, warps' in its 
narrative.63 Since, as discomfort concerning Hiroshima and Nagasaki receded 
from public-consciousness, scientists' roles shifted from 'prophets of doom 
coming out of the desert' to the cornerstones of society,64 the associates of the 
desert to whom Stencil gives agency also relocate to the centre, bearing the 
shape of the symbolic, alluding to the unpresentable, making its horizon 
perceptible.65 This is the disruption of symbolic exchange: if 'this “always lost” 
aspect [of the symbolic] takes primacy over the possible revolutionary use value, 
then we can approach symbolic exchange as being precisely in the divide, in the 
relation, a non-place that is not “outside” as part of a binary distinction, and 
therefore capable of disruption'.66 In this way, the individual can escape the logic 
of capitalism, production, rationality.67 This is the danger inherent to colonisers' 
attempts to remake the Other as the self, which Stencil emulates for his own 
ends by drawing on familiar representations of the Orient.68 
Ronald Cooley argues that these impersonations are a form of 
colonisation and, indeed, it can be said that, by creating this semblance of 
multiplicity, Stencil enforces his perspective, just as Cold War America sought to 
63 'NSC 68, the top-secret document adopted by President Truman's National Security Council in 
1950 and not declassified until the 1970s, contained the plan for the stepped-up militarization 
of the cold war that would be used to justify the Korean and Vietnam wars. NSC 68 became, in 
the words of one historian, the “most famous unread paper of its era”, intensely interpreted in 
the Soviet Union as well as the United States. The unseen document was teased out of the 
events it engendered, then used to read them. Figuring out what you don't see by what you do 
see, or almost see, calculating events by what could, but doesn't, happen, was integral to the 
the early nuclear era's doctrine of (over) preparedness' (Douglas, p. 76).
64 J. Robert Oppenheimer, quoted in Boyer, p. 74.
65 Lyotard, p. 81.
66 Hegarty, p. 33, emphasis in original.
67 Kellner, p. 20.
68 'Attempts in the cold war to replicate the quintessential colonialist move – that of making the 
Other the Same – had to be performed in the name of anti-imperialism (or “democracy”)', 
Nadel, p. 202, emphasis in original.
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spread its influence by installing democracies around the world.69 Colonised by 
the hegemony, Stencil has internalised its narrative of progress: we come from 
the past, the site of foundational meaning, but our true home is the future, 
making the past the preserve of the perverse non-Westerner or childish proto-
Westerner. As Nadel says, difference is eliminated when the Westerner ostensibly 
rejects Western values and masters those of the East in order to make the East 
like the West.70
However, Cooley's argument does not take into account the fact that the 
coloniser does not try to become the colonised. Indeed, the second 
impersonation, Yusuf, espouses an anarchic philosophy in opposition to 
Stencil's own need for order. For all his conformist desire, Stencil is – among his 
many facets – 'clownish' (61) with an aptitude for a carnivalesque inversion of 
supposedly integral and discrete values (within the safety of his storytelling). 
Overlooked by the hegemony, these subalterns share his orphanhood but, 
equally, he experiences their colonised status. As Henry Adams says, history is 
man's constructing the world to suit his values and, in the desert, Stencil creates 
a society of his own choosing not in the interests of control but in a misguided 
attempt at virtu. Furthermore, while Cooley cautions that, for all that these 
colonised-Others appear humanised, they are merely Stencil's riffs on imperialist 
clichés,71 their rounded characterisation and interiority relative to Stencil and 
Profane72 exposes their artificiality. Stencil's intention is to humanise not his 
fantasies but their creator. He plays within hegemonic social constructions, after 
Michel de Certeau. Stencil applies the hegemonic stencil to his desires, but fills it 
with colours of his own choosing. 
69 Nadel, p. 7; see also p. 202. For Cooley's interpretation, see Ronald W. Cooley, 'The Hothouse or 
the Street: Imperialism and Narrative in Pynchon's V.', Modern Fiction Studies, 39 (1993), 307–
25 (p. 317).
70 Nadel, p. 159.
71 Cooley, p. 312.
72 '[T]he contemporary episodes are full of characters that have succumbed to the tourist 
mentality of contentment with the skin and, thus, to the insulated life of post-WWII 
capitalism, protected within illusion from the real' (Gilmore, p. 10).
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An individual's consciousness is less a circle, as suggested by the rain in 
Alexandria, than the wedge of what they can see in front of them, the limits of 
torchlight, a sweep of a radar. This is an empty V, suggesting that an individual's 
perspective ultimately reveals nothing on its own. Narrative forms the rest, 
shaping the universe which surrounds them and effectively separating them 
from other people. The circle of their claimed universe is thus not the reach of 
their consciousness but the range of their missiles, and the expanding ring on 
the water the blast which is produced when they mistake their subjectivity for 
objectivity. The flip-side is that the expanding circle also resembles the prospect 
of the missile falling on the citizen's head, which delimits their universe. 
However, if they step aside and so break free from the confines of their static 
perspective, this same circle becomes a V (the tip of the ICBM in profile). This 
allows the object-noun of the missile to create a new narrative: that is to say, it 
acquires the potential of a metaphor.
In an attempt to break out of his subjective view during his fictionalised 
Egyptian episode, Stencil resorts to a multiplicity of subjectivity: eight wedges 
which together form a complete circle of consciousness (as Baudrillard argues, 
simulation cannot be fought with truth and must be exceeded). Crucially, even 
then he acknowledges that there is more to the world beyond his own horizons. 
For example, the fifth perspective, Gebrail, is a farmer driven into Cairo by the 
encroaching desert and lives on a street 'not on any guidebook's map' (83). It is 
underground; being excluded from hegemonic narrative, it is fiction and – 
'[s]ince fiction is creation, as opposed to history’s recreation, its vision is 
undistorted' – hence true.73 This detail does not romanticise the unmapped 
73 Quote comes from Peterseil, p. 87. Secretary of State Dean Acheson maintained that it was 
necessary to 'bludgeon the mass mind [with something] clearer than truth' (Douglas, p. 76). 
Douglas records that, '[i]n 1953, in yet another top secret document, a group of defense 
advisers urged Eisenhower to adopt "a national program of deception and concealment from 
the American public"' (Douglas, pp. 76–77). Taylor notes that, because of this secrecy, 
information would reach the public by unofficial means and knowledge would be based on 
representations, metaphors, simulacra replacing the unobtainable original, none totally 
trustworthy but valuable for the very fact of their duplicity (their doubling of the secret which 
allowed that secret to be known of, if not known). Accordingly, hearsay becomes history, that 
is, 'truth' (Taylor, p. 584). As Derrida says in 'No Apocalypse, Not Now', '“[r]eality”, let's say the 
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spaces of an inscrutable Orient but acknowledges that there is a world beyond 
Western eyes and minds and narratives. Gilmore writes that narrative 'contains 
the real'74 and, indeed, it does: it includes and restricts. Gebrail's 'street is so 
narrow hardly a man's shadow can pass' (83), thereby forcing the individual to be 
aware of their subjectivity, obliging them to be dialogic with the Other and their 
own Otherness. The former farmer associates himself on account of his name 
with the desert which destroyed his livelihood (83)75 and, fittingly, he regards the 
people he taxis through Cairo with an inhuman eye, seeing only fares (84). A 
bitter outsider, he is shut out of the life of the city76 and so for him it 'is only the 
desert […] in disguise' (83). For him, there is 'no hostility in the desert' (82): being 
totalising, it can only be amoral. In contrast, he sees Islam (that is, a social 
consensus on meaning) as nothingness (83); by pronouncing the death of 
narrative, he declares the death of his own ability to construct meaning in 
society's eyes.
Even when Stencil acknowledges that there is more to the world than he 
can know, 'a rough kind of averaging out must [as Updike says] substitute for 
absolute truth': a unitary perspective on a situation is as impossible as the mind-
bending vistas of Escher.77 To appear natural, it must be cunningly constructed; 
to seem trustworthy, it must cheat. Indeed, while hegemonic dictates authorise a 
stable objective perspective, such a view is impossible because the brain arrives 
encompassing institution of the nuclear age, is constructed by the fable, on the basis of an 
event that has never happened (except in fantasy, and that is not nothing at all)' (Derrida, p. 
5). 
74 Gilmore, p. 8.
75 Although, as Pynchon has since noted, his wordplay between Gebrail and 'gebel' is based on a 
mistranslation from Arabic. Albert Rolls, 'The Two V.s of Thomas Pynchon, Or From 
Lippincott to Jonathan Cape and Beyond', Orbit: Writing Around Pynchon, 1 (2012) 
<www.pynchon.net/articles/10.7766/orbit.v1.1.33> [accessed 18 August 2014]
76 It is ironic that the hegemony's totalising discourse omits him since, by association with his 
Biblical and Quranic namesake, Gebrail is a source of totalising testimony. Totalising and 
dialogic discourse, or what Baudrillard calls objective and vital illusion, can be equated with 
Nadel's notion of spiritual and forensic testimony: spiritual testimony presumes an external 
authority for truth, while forensic presumes truth as something arrived at through the 
interaction of social and rhetorical contract (Nadel, p. 83).
77 M. C. Escher was born the year of Stencil's Egyptian escapade and so is an equally fitting 
emblem for the impossible world-view of totalising twentieth-century political discourse.
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at meaning through dialogic processes. Not only does the distance between a 
person's eyes oblige one to synthesise two different streams of information but, 
once this information has passed along the optic-nerve, the visual cortex does 
not passively receive it but actively constructs meaning from it. We see a 
metaphor or narrative, not the experience of tangible objects or nouns. 
Accordingly, chapter 3's final impersonation is a disembodied gaze. Stencil's 
exercise of drawing on personal accounts for authority, which simulates the 
construction of hegemonic narrative, thus exposes its artifice. It is 
simultaneously 'history' for the reader and sifts through their fingers.
However, perhaps he should not be criticised for failing to cross the 
horizon of the system. Not only is this for Baudrillard the best that one can hope 
for but, if Stencil were to cross it, he would then contain the outside within 
narrative, defining the Other in relation to the self, objectifying them as Other 
rather than acknowledging their discrete difference.78 Ann Douglas writes that, 
'[b]y cold war logic, the unknowable can only be contained, never penetrated, an 
attitude that was itself a precursor to postmodernism proper'. Elizabeth 
Campbell regards the impersonations as one more example of Stencil's strategy 
of approach-and-avoid.79 However, since Stencil (and, presumably, his father) was 
not there, a subjective account is more honest, that is, truthful. By approaching 
and avoiding this crucial event, Stencil preserves it.
A space outside, within Stencil's narrative
Other protagonists examined in this thesis travel to the real desert in search of a 
symbolic one which enables them to pre-empt metaphorically the apocalypse 
78 Hegarty, p. 119. As Baudrillard says, naming something converts it into a concept, and so 
removes it ('On Disappearance', in Jean Baudrillard: Fatal Theories, ed. by David B. Clarke, 
Marcus A. Doel, William Merrin and Richard G. Smith (London and New York: Routledge, 
2009), pp. 24–29 (p. 25)).
79 Douglas, note 11. Elizabeth A. Campbell, 'Metaphor and V.: Metaphysics in the Mirror', 
Pynchon Notes, 22–23 (1988), 57–69 (p. 63) <www.ham.miamioh.edu/krafftjm/pn/pn022.pdf> 
[accessed 10 November 2014]
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and reclaim their lives. Paul Bowles believed that the idea of a displaced person 
arose only following the Second World War.80 This casts the concept as a reaction 
by the Cold War mindset, with its need for clear compartmentalisation, to the 
ambiguous reality of the world expressed by Caravaggio in The English Patient: 
'The trouble with all of us is we are where we shouldn't be'.81 In chapter 3, Max 
imagines a nightmarish crowd of such displaced people, surrounding him in 
concentric rings (72), this fallout bringing to mind the destruction of a Bomb-
blast:
every beggar, vagrant, exile-by-choice and peregrine-at-large in Alex […] This whole hard-
up population might soon begin to drift in […] It would go on, into tomorrow, the next 
day, the next: they would keep calling for waiters in the same cheery voices to bring more 
chairs […] every chair in the Fink would be in use, spreading out from this table in rings, 
like a tree trunk or rain puddle. And when the Fink's chairs ran out the harassed waiters 
would have to begin bringing more in from next door and down the street and then the 
next block, the next quarter; the seated beggars would overflow into the street, it would 
swell and swell […] How would it end? How could it? (71–72)
Indeed, the Cold War's desire for things to be in their place is ironic given the age 
was founded on the physics which recognised the unmoored qualities of 
quantum particles. 
In contrast, Stencil is already living in a metaphorical desert and travels 
to the real desert in his imagination, likewise to contemplate death explicitly. 
The absence which is V. exposes the meaninglessness of the hegemonic narrative, 
including the death which is supposedly in the service of ideological victory. V.'s 
ungraspable death-drive runs counter to that written into the social contract of 
1960s America, the Other or outside of the system which so attracts it. Stencil's 
myth of V., including the lack which is exposed through Gebrail's perspective, is 
what Baudrillard calls the challenge of the counter-gift, which takes the form of 
death since only through a voluntary 'immediate death of sacrifice' can the 'slow 
80 Irving Malin, 'Aspects of Self: A Bowles Collage', Twentieth Century Literature, 32 (1986), 293–
300 (p. 298).
81 Michael Ondaatje, The English Patient (London: Bloomsbury, 1992), p. 122.
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death' of labour meted out by the system be overcome.82 By bringing death back 
into society, society crumbles because 'it has been systematically excluded in 
order to found the unitary logic that is the attribution of value and binary 
opposition'.83 
Through his historical recreations, Stencil experiences, without actually 
dying, a meaningful death, a symbolic act which rids death of the indifferent 
negativity ascribed to it by capitalist society. Society's material comfort removes 
death and so also life.84 The individual death of V. inspires virtu (awakening 
Fausto from his lethargy to bestow the last rites) and her dismantling signals 
the destruction of the false faith. In line with Ryan Bishop's thinking, this death 
can perhaps save us from the living-death of constantly imminent global nuclear-
obliteration.85 
Stencil's extra-systemic death-drive is also expressed through his self-
relegation to third-personhood. As Michael Ondaatje says in The English Patient, 
'death means you are in the third person'. Stencil is, in R. D. Laing's words, 
'becoming dead in order not to die'. He splits into self and Other; as Lifton says, 
schizophrenics see themselves as dead inhabitants of a lifeless world and so this 
can be seen as a pre-emptive strategy against the fear of nuclear-annihilation. 
For Stencil, the Bomb at the heart of the political system destroys all meaning, 
and he inhabits the magic realism of the colonised subject grappling with the 
surreal demands of an alien authority. Third-personhood reiterates and subverts 
hegemonic discourse: the hegemony infantilises him, denies him a voice, so he 
behaves like an infant, denying the coherent authority claimed by the first-
82 Baudrillard, Symbolic Death, pp. 36–40; italics in original.
83 Hegarty's words (p. 42, emphasis in original) summarising Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange, p. 
133.
84 See, Jean Baudrillard, America (London and New York: Verso, 1988), p. 43. For a discussion, see 
Ryan Bishop, 'Baudrillard, Death and Cold War Theory', in Baudrillard Now: Current  
Perspectives in Baudrillard Studies, ed. by Ryan Bishop (Cambridge and Malden: Polity, 2009), 
pp. 47–71 (p. 69). We merely survive, mindlessly consuming like the shopping-mall zombies in 
George A. Romero's Dawn of the Dead (Laurel Group, 1978).
85 Bishop, p. 69.
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person point-of-view.86 He teases apart the social dictates and personal self-
construction in a V, exposing the myth of individual freedom, that the sign and 
self are one, resisting hegemonic desire to fix consciousness into a form. He 
denotes his erasure by imposed subjecthood and expresses his socio-political 
disassociation: 'Stencil' is as much a floating signifier as, for example, 'Red'. 
Stencil's use of the third-person is duplicitous and so the enemy of American 
society, but his split-subjecthood is the product of official Western duplicity. 
Simultaneously, of course, this 'dislocation of identity' (62) contributes to the 
dehumanisation of discourse. It is a means 'to involve himself less in the chase, 
to put off some part of the pain' (62), to exploit the distance between signifier 
and referent and abnegate his authorship of V., mirroring the State's strategy to 
relegate the nuclear-threat to the natural order. For example, as Peter Hales says, 
through its dissemination of images of the mushroom cloud, the State 'bridged a 
previous gap between what was human and what was natural – the atom bomb 
became a man-made marvel of nature, and thereby the question of responsibility 
for the effects of the explosion became slippery'.87
Additionally, Stencil naturalises his non-conformism to his conformist 
self by displacing his actions on to his father: becoming dead is better than going 
Red.88 Furthermore, a sufferer of tormenting memory feels that 'by living as if 
dead, I take the place of the dead and give them life',89 and so Stencil escapes to 
the past. While the hegemony objectifies the individual, denying their interiority, 
he objectifies himself to distance himself from his unconscious, where the ever-
present threat of annihilation lies. The fact that everyone whom Stencil 
86 Schaub, p. 86. Ondaatje, p. 247. Robert Lifton examines R. D. Laing's work on schizophrenia in 
'Image', pp. 80–82. The quote from Laing comes from The Divided Self (Baltimore: Penguin, 
1965), p.23, and appears in Lifton, 'Image', p. 80.
87 Peter B. Hales, 'The Atomic Sublime', American Studies, 32 (1991), 5–31 (p. 10). In chapter 9, 
Mondaugen comes across a mechanical model of the solar-system (239) which suggests that it 
is part of the natural order for daily existence to be constructed on subaltern-labour. Of 
course, Updike's words can be read both ways, suggesting that the West's control is founded 
precariously on an 'irrational' native workforce. 
88 Schell, p. xxxvii.
89 Robert Lifton, quoted in Kinston and Rosser, p. 447.
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encounters accepts this practice is testimony to the general recognition of the 
untrustworthy age. After all, during the Cold War, a declared state-of-war did not 
seem like war but, equally, the assured state-of-safety did not feel safe. 
The spy-games of chapter 3 also bring death within the system. Lepsius' 
instructions to the barmaid Hanna foster a collision of universes, disrupting her 
own narrative (89). In the tourist-simulation of the bierhalle where surface is 
authentic identity (a colleague 'was finally let go because she didn't look German 
enough' (88)), Hanna begins to see in a new way and the world as corrupt ('Was it 
a change in the light, or were the skins of the others actually beginning to show 
the blotches of disease?' (90)). Most significantly, she perceives an irremovable 
stain on the plate she holds (90). This mark is the opposite of the irridescent 
monkey (since it absorbs everything) and the mirror which presents to us 
simulacra: it is the real, the nothingness which swallows the surface-illusion of 
the system, the radioactive decay whose symbol she sees: 'Roughly triangular, it 
extended from an apex near the center to a base an inch or so from the edge […] 
the stain disappeared [and then] flickered twice in and out of existence'(90). This
thrice-appearing V recalls the sign for radiation, with the eponymous full-stop 
transferred to the centre: 
Figure 2: International radioactive trefoil symbol.90
90 Source: Paul Sherman, 'Radioactive Symbol Page', WPClipart 
<www.wpclipart.com/page_frames/full_page_signs/radioactive_symbol_page.png.html> 
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What Hanna imagines are Pentecostal tongues hovering over her clientele (92) 
does not facilitate interpersonal communication but misunderstanding and war, 
and so is really a nuclear-firestorm raining down on the conspiratorial crowd.
The predilection of Mildred, Victoria's younger sister, with the inanimate 
world of fossils (68) suggests that virtu is acquired through social-nurture to 
adulthood and so is unnatural. After all, in Lacan's mirror the child sees not 
themselves but a separate object, meaning that decadence is a return to this 
natural state. A lack of humanity is the cause and result of the world's problems. 
The infantilised Cold War subject and the ultimate object meet in V., and the fact 
that their natures are interchangeable results in her fragmentation. 
If objectification of others is natural, the British agent Porpentine's 
humanity is not: his sunburnt skin manifests his perversity which, it is 
suggested, reaches his core ('The sun hadn't stopped with this poor fellow's face, 
it had gone on into the brain' (87)). Being a metaphor like V., it works both ways, 
also showing how damaged Porpentine is by the world: his fragmenting skin falls 
like ash (86) as if he were a victim of the Bomb. While the decadence against 
which he strives is a falling-away from the human (405),91 his desire for 
interpersonal connection is melancholic and so a 'falling apart'92 expressed by 
not only his skin but also his plummet when attempting to straddle the corner 
(that is, two prospects) of the hotel to construct an overarching perspective (86). 
His futile battle against an inhumane world is underlined by the climax to his 
story playing out in a theatre, a space of surfaces and simulation. By this stage, 
his sunburnt face is unrecognisable, so changed is he from his former identity as 
a duplicitous spy. At the moment of his fatal encounter with his Other, he is 
[accessed 10 November 2014] The symbol was devised at the University of California Radiation 
Laboratory in Berkeley in 1946. Nels Garden, the head of the Health Chemistry Group there, 
said that it was 'supposed to represent activity radiating from an atom'. In this way, it 
represents the unseen reality behind the everyday which Hanna comes to perceive. See Paul 
Frame, 'Radiation Warning Symbol (Trefoil)', Oak Ridge Associated Universities 
<www.orau.org/ptp/articlesstories/radwarnsymbstory.htm> [accessed 20 December 2015]
91 See Fromm, To Have, p. 177 for how consumption leads not only to a passive, fragmented life 
but compels the individual to flee from themselves and other people.
92 Lifton, 'Image', p. 79.
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overtaken by harsh reality as epitomised by the Bomb's destructiveness and 
exemplified by V., here adorned with aestheticised, trivialised fire-balls of 
inverted annihilation: 'Light from outside […] falls through a single window […] 
a monochrome orange. Shadows become more opaque. The air between seems to 
thicken with an indeterminate color, though it is probably orange. Then a girl in 
a flowered dress comes down the hall' (93–94). Bongo-Shaftsbury, the 
mechanised assassin, attacks him with 'flames [which] are colored a brighter 
orange than the sun' (93), while the sinister Lepsius (whose slightness signals a 
new order of warfare not dependent on brute physicality) loses the spectacles 
(94) which resemble those worn by the developers and casual spectators of 
atomic-tests, suggesting that this conflict will leave no victors. David Cowart 
points out that the opera being performed, Manon Lescaut, features an act of 
misguided chivalry, which fact reinforces Porpentine's own fate93 but equally 
demonstrates how individuals are influenced by narratives (just as Victoria was 
raised on 'wonderful yarns' of colonial objectification (73)).94 
Death annihilates at the physical as well as psychological level95 and 
Stencil resists this by incorporating objects into V.'s body. However, objects 
cannot compensate for his absent mother, since the two are not interchangeable, 
factory-line products and V.'s mutation expresses metonymically techno-
narrative's colonisation of humanity (in both senses).96 The Bomb is the 
technological ultimate and, through the 'nuclear-consciousness' (Boyer) it 
manufactures (evident in Updike's words), the ultimate referent. As a result, the 
93 David Cowart, Thomas Pynchon: The Art of Allusion (Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1980), 
p. 68, quoted in Grant, Companion, p. 60.
94 In V., culture is seen to imbue us with 'phony nostalgia' (156), and it becomes difficult to 
distinguish between hegemonic and individual narratives. In his youth, Sidney perceived 
social-progress because he was enjoying personal advancement: the individual is a fusion of 
social and personal narratives (460–61).
95 Kinston and Rosser, p. 448.
96 That said, V. is both the Western colonising mindset and the challenge to it, and so her 
becoming-machine eliminates the difference between animate and inanimate when she 
rejects human-values and masters those of machines: only when she makes herself machine 
can she make machine human. This logic is based on Nadel, p. 159.
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personal and global melancholia converge, as in the V which signifies them. The 
manifest-absence of the mother in an age of perceived meaninglessness – 
inverted to the elusive-presence of the robotic V. in an era of perceived meaning 
– is testimony to the covert-existence of the Bomb.
The more the twentieth century plays out, the more V.'s artificiality 
manifests physically, mirroring the 'unnatural acts' necessary in engineering 
atomic-fission,97 reflecting the ever-greater reliance on technology of an 
increasingly dehumanised society. The designers of the precursors to ICBMs, the 
V-1 and V-2, incorporated as many components of a human pilot as were needed 
for the missiles to guide themselves.98 Conversely, Hiroshima-survivor Michihiko 
Hachiya recalls observing her fellow-citizens moving like automatons amid the 
desolation. Between the two, Lifton records schizophrenics referring to 
themselves as mechanical toys. This ambivalence concerning machines, our 
simultaneous saviours and slayers, is reflected by V.'s ambiguity.99 Chapter 3 
anticipates V.'s robotic-nature in the imperial-agent Bongo-Shaftsbury working 
to promote a narrative which objectifies the Other while himself being a slave to 
discourse (80), the hegemony colonising his person.100 Such technological 
advances in turn make the hegemony more effective, and so machine-code 
replaces interpersonal communication, the explosion of the inanimate rewiring 
the brain, rewriting relations between people. 
97 Nadel, p. 23.
98 Kenneth Kupsch, 'Finding V.', Twentieth Century Literature: A Scholarly and Critical Journal, 
44 (1998), 428–46 (p. 438).
99 The two world wars shattered the Enlightenment's belief in reason and progress. After 
Hiroshima, science is still the means to perfection, but there is ambivalence towards it (see 
Schell, p. 10). Schell refers to Hachiya's account on pp. 42–43, and the Lifton comes from 
Lifton, 'Image', pp. 79–80.
100 Baudrillard writes that '[f]or the system of political economy, the ideal type of body is the 
robot. The robot is the accomplished model of the functional “liberation” of the body as labour 
power' (Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange, p. 114, emphasis in original). The subject is 
completely determined by the system, becoming, effectively, a simulation of the State's ideal 
subject. The hegemony strives to contain nature with culture: in chapter 14, Mélanie is 'a 
chaos of flesh' who must be clothed in order to fit into a narrative of desire, and this clothing 
ultimately screws her (see also 400). 
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Just as a 'fetish enables the male to “re-create” the missing phallus of the 
woman, the lack of which grounds his fear of castration',101 the Bomb enables the 
West to re-create the Soviet-Other in its own image, easing its fears. This Bomb 
destroys the logic of cause and effect and so its victim becomes the aggressor, 
that is, a bipolar complement. While the female might then choose to perform 
the male's fetish across herself, trying to become the inanimate object which the 
male desires102 – the fetish becoming the means of communication in exchange 
bereft of virtu103 – the USSR arms itself, thus identifying with the Bomb to 
attract the West's attention. The fetish replaces the Other, leaving them out in 
the cold and, since one loves the double of oneself, one must also be an object.104 
There are no more people, only the Bomb, making war acceptable (the 'Kingdom 
of Death is served by fetish-constructions' (411)).105
A succession of apocalypses
The Egyptian tale, V.'s first historical episode, is driven by the imperialist stand-
off at Fashoda in 1898 'which will spread in all directions to engulf the world' 
(85). In his introduction to Slow Learner, Pynchon writes that such instances of 
'apocalyptic showdown' reference '[o]ur common nightmare The Bomb […] There 
was never anything subliminal about [this]', he continues, since nuclear-
paranoia 'was bad enough in '59 and is much worse now [1985], as the level of 
101 Sigmund Freud, 'Fetishism (1927)', Miscellaneous Papers, 1888–1938, 5 vols (London: Hogarth, 
1950), V, pp. 198–204 (p. 199) 
<http://portfolio.newschool.edu/thisisnotanobject/files/2015/03/Freud-Fetishism-1927-
2b52v1u.pdf> [accessed 7 June 2015]. For a discussion of this, see Hanjo Berressem, 'V. in Love 
– From the “Other Scene” to the “New Scene”', Pynchon Notes, 18–19 (1986), 5–28 (p. 8) 
<www.ham.miamioh.edu/krafftjm/pn/pn018.pdf> [accessed 10 November 2014]
102 Jacques Lacan, 'The Signification of the Phallus', in Écrits, trans. by Bruce Fink (New York and 
London: Norton, 2006), pp. 582–83. See Berressem, p. 10.
103 Here, politics is for men what marriage is for women (88–89), that is, a means of virtu. 
Porpentine discusses these subjects with Victoria before he goes to his death (93).
104 Berressem, p. 14.
105 On account of the Bomb, war becomes impossible, but simulation (that is, narrative) makes 
violence more likely, as evident in the proliferation of hot wars (Baudrillard, Simulacra, pp. 
32–33).
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danger has continued to grow'.106 The Fashoda crisis is V.'s coming-of-age, since 
Victoria was born in 1880. When Stencil attains his own maturity in 1919, his 
father dies, as does the 'cultural arrogance and imperialist confidence'107 which 
were casualties of the First World War. Pynchon himself turned eighteen in 1955, 
which is the year the novel opens and is portrayed as overrun with materialistic 
decadence.108 Each of these personal milestones bequeaths a loss of humanity 
which leads to the brink of nuclear-armageddon on which the novel ends.
The Fashoda incident mirrors the Suez Crisis of Stencil's day, which comes 
to the fore in the final chapters. As discussed above, Stencil's account reflects 
and amplifies his own non-alignment with hegemonic dictates. While the reader 
knows that the world survived these 'foretastes of Armageddon' (155), the crises 
are always elsewhere and unresolved and so perhaps cannot be contained by 
narrative. Suez did not bring apocalypse but, consequently, is just yet another 
metaphor for it. Apocalypse, like the desert and the real, remains uncontained. 
We survived, only to come up against the nothingness behind the sheltering sky 
of our (my, your, the State's, Pynchon's) stories, beyond the domain of myths 
such as those protective ICBMs, the reflected projections of ourselves we wish to 
believe are real. As Nadel says, all history is mere rhetoric apart from the event of 
nuclear-apocalypse, which cannot be experienced beforehand and so is 
unavoidably rhetorical while pushing the individual up against the real.109 
Fashoda and Suez are simulacra of one another, two facing mirrors presenting 
an endless atomic assembly-line of crises which produces not reassurance of our 
perpetuity but the inescapability of our perversity. 
The two mirrors meet – the tormenting memory of past trauma collides 
106 Thomas Pynchon, Slow Learner: Early Stories (London: Jonathan Cape, 1985), p. 18.
107 Gilmore, p. 17.
108 As said above, the circles on the water resemble an ICBM falling on one's head, but if the 
individual flees their position in society in order to gain a new perspective the missile appears 
as a V. The same two forms can be ascribed the breast-shaped beer-taps in the Sailor's Grave 
which equate the servicemen with children (12) and so also the dreams of annihilation of the 
(rational) Self that are drunkeness and infantilisation.
109 Nadel, p. 46.
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with the paranoia of nuclear-apocalypse – forming a mould (or stencil) for the 
Cold War subject. This is why the clues about V. proliferate in sync with 
technology, and why Stencil is effectively alone in the world: there is no space for 
him to stand and see the reflection110 which would allow him to construct an 
Other. After all, since the world is now comprised of abstractions (such as 
screens) which collapse the distance necessary to distinguish subject from 
object, neither any longer exist, leaving only death.111 This can be seen as a good 
thing, since America's post-war social contract of material comfort has 
threatened the existence of even death itself. Schell goes on to argue that death, 
now reflected, threatens itself: since the Bomb kills all life, it also kills death.112 
Whatever the case, Stencil's tormenting memory, projected into the future, lays 
down a narrative for him to follow. Seeking a post-apocalyptic future, the 
dissenter truly desires a pre-atomic past. This is why the Westerner – modernist 
(Stencil) or postmodernist (the counterculture) – explores the non-West, where 
'olden days' are imagined to persist.113
Stencil constructs meaning through repetition, not only in the historical 
scenarios which replay the same themes, but by writing a seemingly pregnant 
phrase over and over (449). Cooley argues that repetition is degeneration, 
echoing Baudrillard's thoughts on simulation. Indeed, Stencil's revival of his 
father's spy-craft for his own ends (62) – turning its objects into tools for mean 
tasks – mirrors how the promise of atomic-power was undermined114 and so the 
atomic-decay on which the Cold War West is founded. Just as Stencil replays the 
110 '[T]he excess of destructive power abolishes both “any space for warfare” and “the possibility 
of spectacle” (because there would be no vantage point from which to view a nuclear war)'; 
Daniel Cordle discussing Baudrillard's Fatal Strategies ('Beyond the Apocalypse of Closure: 
Nuclear Anxiety in Postmodern Literature of the United States', in Cold War Literature:  
Writing the Global Conflict, ed. by Andrew Hammond (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), 63–77 (p. 
65)).
111 Bishop, p. 56.
112 Schell, pp. 113ff.
113 Kjell Olsen, 'Staged Authenticity: A Grande Idée?', in Critical Debates in Tourism, ed. by Tej 
Vir Singh (Bristol, Buffalo and Toronto: Channel View Publications, 2012), pp. 261–65 (p. 262).
114 The flip-side of this is the justification of wrongdoing in the service of an ultimate good, such 
as the use of the Bomb or, in chapter 3, Goodfellow's plan to bomb the Irish embassy (91).
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past to connect with his parents, the melancholic nuclear-hegemony repeats the 
folly of historical stand-offs and skirmishes (in hot wars) in its attempt to 
connect with its Other (namely, the citizens it rushes to protect, as well as the 
Soviets). In Slow Learner, Pynchon describes what Stencil attempts through his 
myth of V.:
[e]xcept for that succession of the criminally insane who have enjoyed power since 1945, 
including the power to do something about it, most of the rest of us poor sheep have 
always been stuck with simple, standard fear. I think we have all tried to deal with this 
slow escalation of our helplessness and terror in the few ways open to us, from not 
thinking about it to going crazy from it. Somewhere on this spectrum of impotence is 
writing fiction about it – occasionally, as here, offset to a more colorful time and place.115 
However, this is itself only a Cold War way of thinking; the authority upon which 
national narratives depend derives not from a substantive body of reasons but, 
like any form of cliché, from mechanical and mindless repetition.116 It is 
repetition of hegemonic narrative (ultimately as meaningful as the sferics which 
Mondaugen pursues across the African plains in chapter 9) which is 
degenerative, a narrative which includes the apocalyptic-threat of every new 
crisis. After all, the fact we have achieved the ability to destroy ourselves is mad: 
that we have attempted to do so not once, but repeatedly, perhaps infers a logic, 
but not sense. As Schell writes, conformity to logic can be inhuman, as evinced 
by the extremes of totalitarianism, including communism.117 
This idea is evinced in the structure, content and significance of the 
historical chapters. If, for a moment, we buck Pynchon's project by regarding 
them in chronological order, these chapters demonstrate a trend towards 
increasingly detached, and so increasingly easy, murder: in 1898, the victim is 
shot from the length of a corridor; the following year witnesses the violence of 
the mob; in 1913, the individual is killed by machine and in 1922 the colonial-
machine commits genocide from afar (attracting sight-seers as did the Bomb-
115 Pynchon, Slow Learner, pp. 18–19.
116 Nadel, p. 173.
117 Schell, p. xxvi.
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tests (276)); all of which culminates in the fully mechanised war of 1943's aerial-
bombardments. As Raymond Olderman writes, 'V. is the essential nature of our 
century, pointing always toward our haunting communal "dream of 
annihilation"'.118 V. indicates where mankind is heading: down. We rise but, like 
the sea-spout which V. seems to harness for her homicidal ends on the final page, 
the peak of our achievements marks the point at which we have the farthest to 
fall. In this way we are all like Benny Profane (a combination of a benzedrine-
high and the humble earth).119 The mushroom cloud falls in on itself to sterile 
wastes below. Accordingly, the first expression of Stencil's paranoid melancholia 
takes place safely removed from his Western life, but in cities dangerously 
encroached by the archetypal desert of the Western imagination. 
On the individual level, while tormenting memory is distressing, 'it seems 
often to be curative in that the feelings of extreme distress associated with the 
event are gradually extinguished'.120 While Stencil's historical reconstructions 
provide him with 'little information or power that can be put to constructive 
use',121 their non-chronological ordering in the face of progressive history in 
which ends justify means122 suggests that new criteria should be adopted to 
appraise them. After all, given his mindset, Stencil cannot improve his lot; 
attaining his goal would be a falling-back into inanimation. He can only avoid his 
paranoia. The quest is the destination he seeks, his search for identity is identity 
itself (he is 'He Who Looks for V.' (226)). Tormenting memory is a constructive 
means of approaching and avoiding death. It causes Stencil to acknowledge, if 
not collide with, other universes such as those of Gebrail and Fausto. 
118 Raymond M. Olderman, Beyond the Waste Land: A Study of the American Novel in the  
Nineteen-Sixties (New Haven: Yale UP, 1972), p. 128.
119 Peterseil, p. 72.
120 Kinston and Rosser, p. 433.
121 Peterseil, p. 44.
122 As Michel de Certeau writes, 'chronology becomes […] a way of banishing from the realm of 
knowledge the principle of death or of passing (or of metaphor)' (Michel de Certeau, 
Heterologies: Discourse on the Other, trans. by Brian Massumi (Minneapolis and London: U of 
Minnesota P, 1986) p. 216, quoted in Nadel, p. 42).
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As Tanner says, Stencil acquires animation, not life123 because, colonised 
by the hegemony, he objectifies himself and so denies himself interiority 
(imperialism and its attendant decadence being a psychiatric disorder (461)). He 
is totalising – dictatorial, not dialogic – and so animation, rather than life, is as 
much as he can attain. As Peterseil writes, '[i]n each of the episodes the result is 
the same. But through the quest Stencil moves away from inertia and sleep; and 
through the quest he gains personality, a personality, if only by first giving 
himself [that is, the subjecthood imposed by his time and place] up altogether'.124 
Movement through pursuit of V. and the resultant collisions with others (real or 
imagined) grants him glimpses of the horizon of the hegemonic system (even if it 
abuts only his own (hyper-)reality) which, according to Baudrillard, is the most 
one can hope for in the present day.125 Stencil's historical yo-yoing powers a 
dynamo which drags him out of his sleep ('Before 1945 he had been slothful, 
accepting sleep as one of life's major blessings […] He didn't particularly care to 
wake; but realized that if he didn't he would soon be sleeping alone' (54)). Egypt 
is the first of his flights into self-creation: he is fragmented and reborn, like 
Osiris, in the desert. Just as the Bomb lies behind social narrative,126 chapter 3 
lies behind Stencil's own. This exemplary narrative is the most unstable of 
Stencil's historical fantasies but, by exposing its own unreliability, is the most 
reliable (replicating the practice of those who sought to bolster their credentials 
for honesty in the eyes of the HUAC by detailing their past dishonesty) and so the 
most virtu-ous. In this way, Stencil resists totalising discourse and, while no 
subsequent historical chapter achieves this, chapter 3 informs our 
understanding of all which follows. If the fact that his resistance is entirely in 
123 Tony Tanner, 'V. and V-2', in Pynchon: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. by Edward Mendelson 
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1978), pp. 16–55 (p. 55).
124 Peterseil, p. 80; emphasis in original.
125 'The very definition of the real is that of which it is possible to provide an equivalent  
reproduction […] the real is not only that which can be reproduced, but that which is always  
already reproduced: the hyper-real.' (Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange, p. 73; emphasis in 
original).
126 The grotesque deformities presented at Schoenmaker's plastic-surgery clinic (102) could be 
the ailments of radiation-victims.
144
his head suggests it is ineffective (a myth, in Barthes' definition, being an empty 
sign and so merely an assurance of truthfulness),127 our evaluative criteria are 
wrong.
With his own narrative to follow, Stencil can ignore the hegemonic 
discourse which both has created the Bomb and promises protection from it. His 
history does not attack the system directly, because then it would be subsumed 
within the system as the Other, but recalls the narrative on which the facts of 
discourse are founded, and so stresses the possibility of it not existing.128 He 
appropriates and plays with the tools of hegemonic discourse, shifting the focus 
from the ultimate object to individuals. 
Events of importance occur in the individual's everyday life, not on the 
field of apocalyptic showdown, as foregrounded by each historical episode. As 
Victoria's name suggests, the personal is political and vice versa. Egypt, the site 
of encounter between Porpentine's empathy and budding inhumanity, the reader 
and V. (if not the imperial powers), is witness to the initiation of the chain 
reaction of annihilation which today creates the desert of the real enfolding 
Stencil and Profane. A sense of dislocation results only if the individual allows 
themselves to be colonised by hegemonic narrative. Alternative narratives 
construct different criteria of meaning ('[t]ruth or falsity don't apply' to the 
folklore of the sewers beneath the conventional New York (120)). It is a new myth, 
not 'born from fear of thunder, dreams, astonishment at how the crops kept 
dying after harvest and coming up again every spring' (142), a metaphor for 
'something which should have existed but did not' (158). People can play. 
127 See Nadel, p. 78. For his discussion of testifying before HUAC, see p.82.
128 Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange, pp. 36ff.
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From Apocalypse to revelation: 
Stencil and existential authenticity
Even if the hegemonic discourse does not accommodate his animate, 
multiplicitous nature, Stencil places more faith in narrative than experience. He 
consequently devotes himself to the idea of a secret plot which makes life 
meaningful, even when the facts suggest otherwise. Experience makes 
inescapable the awareness (445) that his own narrative equally fails to fit the 
world129 but, simultaneously, he cannot allow himself to acknowledge this. This 
tension produces his habitual strategy of approach-and-avoid130 which becomes 
both the consequence and cause of his living in a metaphorical empty desert. 
The Cold War citizen practises a dual-subjectivity through double-think, which 
constantly shuttles back and forth between hegemonic discourse and personal 
experience in order to live everyday life while aware that the Bomb might drop. 
In this way, the individual produces a dialogic-narrative which is ambivalent 
about both; in other words, as McClintic advises, they 'keep cool, but care' (366). 
Stencil, in contrast, must limit his yo-yoing to the domain of narrative, that is, 
within his universe. He moves ever towards and away from V., believing that this 
yo-yoing reference-point is leading him through life but, in truth, reeling it in 
and out himself and thereby constructing a space in which to live.131 He tells his 
stories to himself alone and so they inspire no dialogue: he dictates his world, 
behaving like the hegemony which harvests its subjects' narratives to give 
129 Profane also has moments of awareness that his self-narrative of persecution is not the whole 
story: he tells Rachel that he is incapable of love, but in a phony voice so as to undermine 
himself (370). Like Stencil, he realises that his and the world's substance lie beyond everyday 
codes: 'Anything you have to talk about isn't real' (383).
130 Douglas writes that Freudian 'proponents or examples of self-scrutiny and the darkness such 
scrutiny reveals, were at their peak of popularity in the US in the first two decades of the cold 
war. I have come to see this vogue […] as a symptom of a final reluctance among Americans at 
this time either fully to undertake the task of self-knowledge or to abandon it once and for all' 
(Douglas, p. 81). On a broader level, the description that the book opens in ''55 and more or less 
peacetime' (218) reflects that the Cold War was an age of approach-and-avoid, to be appraised 
by criteria different from the unitary values proclaimed by the hegemony.
131 The ostensible randomness of a yo-yo is betrayed by the business-operation built on it evinced 
by the company-name Yoyodyne, which produces 'toys' and 'gadgets' (227), nicknames for the 
Bomb.
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authority to its own,132 like the weapons-complex instigating a one-way flow of 
raw materials in pursuit of its policy. 
Stencil's myth of V. is analogous to the Cold War's Other or the Victorian 
imperialists' savage. Such totalising, unyielding narratives function like objects. 
For example, Foppl's experiences in colonial south-west Africa reveal how past 
ideologies decay into logic, mere codes of the system (273).133 These constructions 
(such as adopted by Bongo-Shaftsbury and Max) become prosthetic identifying-
signs, no less than Esther's nose, and weigh down the individual and fix them 
into inanimation. V., like the counterculture around it, makes it evident that we 
are cyborgs, amalgams of nature and technology, the narratives constructed by 
ourselves and others. We are metaphors, multiplicitous, ambivalent, both 
natural and unnatural, real and intangible, reassuring and restrictive, and by 
incorporating such fixed elements we do ourselves damage. (After all, V. is an 
amalgam of earlier stories, but they have been greatly revised in order to fit the 
whole.) All are dictatorial constructs of alterity to define the self ('correction – 
along all dimensions: social, political, emotional – entails retreat to a diametric 
opposite rather than any reasonable search for a golden mean' (103)).134 Since he 
seeks a secret narrative, Stencil disregards Updike's distinction between the 
logical everyday and hidden illogical and is concerned with only a hidden logic. 
For example, when he sees a newspaper, Stencil reads only the headlines (387) 
and does not engage with the detail. As Pynchon writes, '[p]eople read what news 
they wanted to and each accordingly built his own rathouse of history's rags and 
straws' (while in the case of people of influence, '[d]oubtless their private version 
132 Nadel, p. 3 and p. 38.
133 For an overview of the links between German colonialism in South West Africa and the neo-
liberal hegemony of the Cold War, with reference to the thinking of Hannah Arendt, see Nikhil 
Pal Singh, 'Cold War Redux: On the “New Totalitarianism”', Radical History Review, 85 (2003), 
171–81 (p. 174).
134 Consequently, the Gaucho's revolution, even though it is founded on seemingly tangible 
nouns, is fated to be undermined by the narrative they bear ('The conflict was simple: we 
wanted liberty, the didn't want us to have it. Liberty or slavery, […] two words only. It needed 
none of your extra phrases, your tracts, none of your moralizing, no essays on political justice. 
We knew where we stood' (162)).
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of history showed up in action') (225). Indeed, given the choice between 
considered accounts and extempore remarks, 'Stencil would rather depend on 
the imperfect vision of humans for his history. Somehow government reports, 
bar graphs, mass movements are too treacherous' (388), being (ironically) too 
fixed for his wishes, which in this case are to construct his own narrative of V. 
On Malta he does not heed even the headlines, so completely does he need to 
avoid the world (448). 
This falling-away or retreat from the world is decadence (405). While 
Robert Golden writes that '[d]ecadence is to be seen for what it is, but decadence 
is better than its alternative – death',135 being a self-contained universe, a vacuum 
of virtu, decadence is a form of death, too. Simulation makes violence more 
likely,136 and such a metaphorical depopulated-wasteland makes a literal one all 
the more likely. This is why Fausto argues that the individual needs to 'retreat 
from retreat' (317).
Stencil has had a 'long suspicion' that his V.-narrative 'add[s] up only to 
the recurrence of an initial and a few dead objects' (445). It cannot be 
meaningful, because meaning comes from communication (as Fausto points out 
(318)) and, he is thus surrounded only by objects. As he himself postulates, '[i]t 
may be that Stencil has been lonely and needs something for company' (55). It is 
therefore unsurprising that he seeks company but, self-confined to his universe, 
must necessarily create a society, evident in the impersonations of chapter 3. 
They are ultimately inanimate and his narrative remains non-dialogic 
irrespective of Gebrail's presence, since allusion to another's universe does not 
constitute collision. His society is actually just a mob which acts without 
engaging, 'like tourism' (471). These shortcomings compel Stencil to draft in the 
disembodied eighth viewpoint in order to pretend that his story references an 
authority external to his subjectivity (Nadel's 'spiritual' authority). 
135 Robert E. Golden, 'Mass Man and Modernism: Violence in Pynchon's V.', Critique: Studies in 
Modern Fiction, 14 (1972), 5–17 (p. 10). 
136 Baudrillard, Simulacra, pp. 32–33.
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Stencil's policy of self-delusion encounters its greatest challenge in Malta, 
the site of his father's death and the last contact with V. and so the frightening, 
dark truth which he strives to avoid (62). Here, the apocalyptic 'imagery of break-
down, revenge, bitterness and continuous strife'137 which afflicts the sufferer of 
tormenting memory and challenges their quest to find meaning comes to a head. 
The island is described as 'Fortune's wheel. Spin as it might the basic 
arrangement was constant. Stroboscopic effects could change the apparent 
number of spokes; direction could change; but the hub still held the spokes in 
place and the meeting-place of the spokes still defined the hub' (338). Whereas 
chapter 3's impersonations invest Stencil's universe with V-vistas, giving him a 
make-believe objectivity, Malta's V-spokes bombard him with multiple truths 
('[n]o history, all history at once…' (484)) and so preclude any. Malta is 'alienated 
from any history in which cause precedes effect' (489), a space of chance with no 
overarching narrative. 
Stencil realises he has approached V.'s death too closely to avoid the 
probability that she is no longer possibility: the fact of her demise disrupts his 
fiction, her noun his narrative, for all his sustained efforts at keeping it beyond 
the horizon of his universe. The effect is similar to the Bomb, until now unused 
and so effectively metaphorical (although no less ensuring peace) being used, 
becoming real and thus exploding the double-think on which the citizen 
constructs their daily life. To collide with his Other (dead or alive) would destroy 
his sense-of-self. He would no longer be 'He Who Looks for V.' and, presumably, 
fall back into inanimate lethargy. As Baudrillard says, 'the human race owes its 
becoming (and perhaps even its survival) entirely to the fact that it had no end 
in itself, and certainly not that of becoming what it is (of fulfilling itself, 
identifying with itself)'.138 By identifying as 'He Who Looks for V.', existing always 
in the present tense, Stencil is forever becoming, thus exposing and disrupting 
137 Kinston and Rosser, p. 448.
138 Jean Baudrillard, The Intelligence of Evil or the Lucidity Pact, trans. by Chris Turner (Oxford: 
Berg, 2005), p. 212.
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the nuclear-state's drive for completion of its Manichaean simulation and so 
total control.139 His continuing storytelling is a counter-gift, ensuring exchange 
and circulation counter to capitalism and its consumer-products which tear 
through society like shrapnel of the Bomb from which they originate. By always 
searching for fulfilment, Stencil remains uncontained, indeterminate potential. 
His shuttling is a dynamo which keeps him from being inanimate.140 The 
fearsome alterity of the goal which falls within his grasp on Malta propels him to 
prolong his quest, just as the threat of nuclear war prolongs peace. Stencil's 
consequent pursuit of something which 'will do for the frayed end of another 
clue' (451–52) at the end of the novel embodies 'the rationality of irrationality', 
his adherence to a logic without reason echoing the mindset which Herman 
Kahn proposed the Cold Warrior needed to feign in order to pursue the narrative 
of nuclear-brinkmanship founded on the possibility of launching a nuclear-
attack.141 
Stencil's quest is thus cyclical and insulates him against the 
meaninglessness to which Godolphin was exposed. It is a rhythmic mantra 
which inspires thinking of a different order (like the sferics which so obsess 
Mondaugen and keep him above the moral decay of the villa) and asks that 
success is measured by criteria other than the rational values of the hegemony. 
139 Phillips, p. 170.
140 Similarly, J.F.K.'s authority was dependent on managing just a distance from the Bay of Pigs. 
When it came to the failed operation, he had to be both involved and not involved, like a 
quantum particle which is simultaneously present and absent. He had to relate to it 
rhizomatically, constantly approaching and avoiding the matter. As Nadel says, his continuing 
authority over the country following the fiasco rested on his not having authority over the 
operation (Nadel, p. 191). This is an example of how double-think was demanded by the 
hegemony of its citizens and was not simply an individual, subversive strategy for daily 
survival. Pynchon replicates this mental-contortionism in the story of the Bad Priest so that 
Paola can be identified as V.'s daughter (341): either she is the priest's child, as implied, in 
which case she is not V.'s, or she is V.'s child, in which case her parentage would not be known 
or relevant to this episode. The clergyman is not the female principle, and yet they are 
associated, meaning that we both know and do not know that Paola is V.'s daughter and tie 
these crucial strands of the novel together through double-think. Like mother, like daughter, 
like lineage: when Paola abandons a disguise, Roony asks her: 'Is that what you are, something 
we can look at and see whatever we want?' (350).
141 Schell, p. 204.
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Stencil thus approaches and avoids both the meaning and meaninglessness of 
words, what Derrida considers 'the inevitable play of absence and presence that 
establishes and undermines the apparent solidity of the “proper” (propre), this 
being identity in the shape of the self, the same or the truth'.142 Baudrillard 
makes the point that only ambiguity has the potential to bring us to ourselves, 
and awareness of this makes it clear that we have a choice of two falsities, 
(hegemonic) simulation or (personal) illusion.143 However, this includes the 
option of vital illusion, which is aware of its fictitious nature. Given that the aim 
is to escape paranoia (since one cannot escape the Bomb), this achieves the goal. 
In this way, Stencil finds an organising-narrative which accommodates his 
multiplicity.
Significantly, Pynchon's example of an organising-narrative in the 
Baedeker undermines the notion of unquestionable authority which the 
hegemony claims for itself. While the publication was a crucial aid to the 
touristic mobilisation of the middle classes which might be regarded as the 
pinnacle of the imperial project, the Egyptian episode, as Gilmore notes, takes 
place at a time when it could be predicted that England would lose her 
colonies.144 Furthermore, being a tourist guidebook it is inescapably a site where 
notions of truth are contested. Early debates in tourism studies (inspired 
particularly by the 1960s' counterculture's prominent appropriation of non-
Western philosophies, and Western ideas of such), such as pursued by Dean 
McCannell in The Tourist, ask whether tourists seek authenticity (as opposed to, 
for example, novelty), and whether it is attainable. Recent interventions start 
from the principle that the individual constructs a postmodern 'emergent' (Tej 
Vir Singh) or 'existential authenticity' (Erik Cohen), an identity which is 
assumed temporarily (and perhaps concurrently with others) and fosters 
connections to the group or groups with which the individual wishes at that 
142 Hegarty, p. 75, italics in original.
143 Hegarty, p. 88.
144 Gilmore, p. 17.
151
moment to associate.145 This makes them 'merely' tourists of experience, but the 
discipline stresses their self-reflexivity with regard to their construction of 
subjectivity and dialogic-negotiation with organising narratives. In other words, 
they have the depth which Max lacks but the spies around him possess.
Existential authenticity acknowledges that its reference-point is a myth, 
that is, nothing 'very permanent, only a temporary interest, a spur-of-the-
moment tumescence, […] rickety and transient' (142), shuttling between 
alternative discourses, colliding with others and, in this way, steering a course 
through life. It avoids the rigidity of a hegemonic stencil and allows the animate 
(the self excessive to normative dictates) to breathe; the traveller might carry a 
Baedeker, but dips in and out of it at will. By recognising that any narrative is 
only a metaphor for the world,146 it embraces both Updike's orderly everyday and 
the hidden chaos since, after all, the latter (experience) does not disrupt the 
former but is its foundation, and the former (narrative) is only surface. These 
personal myths ensure that the citizen is not an object authenticated by 
totalising dictates, but a self-constructing individual. 
From Apocalypse to revelation: 
Profane, the poet Fausto and Pentecost
Profane, on the other hand, has been successfully colonised by the hegemony. 
For all that he sets himself against Cold War America's obsession with 
(controllable) objects, he objectifies himself through the label 'schlemihl' (147), 
thereby claiming a fixed nature, and so his victimhood is total. His perception of 
'a world of things that had to be watched out for' (384) freezes him in stasis, 
145 See Tej Vir Singh, 'Introduction', in Critical Debates in Tourism, ed. by Tej Vir Singh (Bristol, 
Buffalo and Toronto: Channel View Publications, 2012), pp. 1–26 (p. 18) and Erik Cohen, 
'Authenticity and Commodization in Tourism', Annals of Tourism Research, 15 (1988), 371–86. 
Also Dean MacCannell, The Tourist: A New Theory of the Leisure Class (London: Macmillan, 
1976).
146 Fausto describes the Maltese children's war-game as a metaphor to veil the world. He makes 
the point that everyone knows its fictitious nature, but that it nevertheless helps the children 
cope with reality (331). 
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inanimate for all his geographic yo-yoing. This static literalisation replaces the 
symbolic flow of any meaning-making narrative and is symptomatic of 
schizophrenics:147 lacking a binding meaning, he feels disassembled, which only 
adds to the erosion of meaning since he is not a machine (40). Little wonder then 
that, when he adopts an alias ('Sfacimento'), he identifies with decay (140). The 
self-effacing Profane ultimately sets more store in an unperceived narrative than 
his own experience, which is why he believes that he has learned nothing from 
life (454), and so equally he has no space to exist: he 'wondered if he had a 
compulsion to suicide. It seemed sometimes that he put himself deliberately in 
the way of hostile objects, as if he were looking to get schlimazzeled out of 
existence' (24).
Stefan Mattessich argues that Profane's 'nomadism' – his interest in 
objects (analogous to Stencil's interest in 'peripheral history') – prevents him 
from being colonised by hegemonic simulation.148 On the social, practical level, 
this is verbiage, and an example of the Cold War mentality described by Boyer 
which turns any potential opposition into an apathetic sense of powerlessness, 
causing individuals to suppress their anxiety and focus on more-controllable 
superfluities.149 On the personal level – which is the concern here since, while 
one cannot escape the Bomb, one can try to escape one's paranoia – Profane's 
obsession is a narrative which creates a space to breath within official dictates. 
In the face of the apocalyptic threats which he is expected to get exercised 
about, therefore, Profane's apathy becomes a Baudrillardian source of hope.150 
Stencil's strategy of dwelling on history makes him faithful to the dead but, since 
his historical episodes replace history, his narrative is likewise 'a way of 
147 Lifton, 'Image', p. 86.
148 Stefan Mattessich, Lines of Flight: Discursive Time and Countercultural Desire in the Work of  
Thomas Pynchon (Durham and London: Duke UP, 2002), p. 40.
149 Boyer, pp. 338ff.
150 See Baudrillard, America, p. 44 and, for a discussion of this idea, Bishop, p. 69. Just as Stencil 
observes Gebrail from afar, as a passive spectator Profane hopes that the people around him 
find meaning in one another (214). 
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forgetting'.151 Through his historical narrative, he accesses meaning which, being 
exclusive to an ostensibly more-meaningful past, enables him to live.152 
Ultimately, he is yo-yoing between the death which is inherent to the system and 
that which is excluded from it and, in this way, his chosen illusion trumps 
hegemonic simulation. Their similarity is expressed by the fraternal care they 
both exhibit for V.'s daughter. 
In the gauntlet of Cold War dictates which foster nuclear-paranoia, 
Profane ducks the level at which the unreliable hegemonic narrative operates 
and grounds himself on solid objects, while Stencil leaps over the mass of objects 
with which the hegemony bombards him in search of an overarching control. 
Both are colonised by hegemonic discourse because it is flexible, like a metaphor, 
containing both the objects and the overarching narrative. The space in which 
they play is contained within the hegemonic discourse, and so their freedom is 
(only) that celebrated by the slave-logic of de Certeau.
Both strategies aid day-to-day existence, therefore, but both, in their 
intransigence, cause tension. After all, just as Stencil's totalising plot is 
meaningless (meaning everything, it means nothing), the meaninglessness which 
Profane professes is ultimately no less a plot. Both are V.'s sons, promoting 
design and chance respectively, converging and diverging in a V, at different 
angles of self-absorption. They each separately represent what Tanner calls 'the 
two extreme and intolerable possibilities', plot (narrative) and chaos 
(experience).153
151 Lyotard, p. xii.
152 '[O]n the one hand, he has been with the dead, and is now back; on the other, this means that 
the dead are accessible, and have a vital role in initiating the start of (adult) life'; this is 
Hegarty's summarising of Baudrillard's ideas in the section 'The Exchange of Death in the 
Primitive Order' (Symbolic Exchange, pp. 131–32; Hegarty, p. 43).
153 Tony Tanner, Thomas Pynchon (London and New York: Methuen, 1982), p. 47. Fromm writes of 
the common division between the cerebral and emotional in people (and names Einstein, 
Szilard and Oppenheimer as examples of remarkable individuals who have overcome this 
binary). It might be argued that Profane is an example of the latter, while it is clear that 
Stencil represents the emotionally stunted, naïve former who is easily taken in by conspiracy 
theories (Fromm, To Have, p. 150).
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That said, there is a qualitative distinction between the two, because 
Stencil alone consciously seizes on a narrative by which to live, even if he is not 
conscious that he is constructing it. Profane's unfocused nomadism is a socially 
endorsed pressure-valve, like that adopted by Cook's tourists, while Stencil's 
organising-narrative is closer to existential authenticity (although not as close as 
Fausto's, discussed below).
The individual needs to constantly shuttle between narrative and 
experience, and so double-thinking rather than embracing one or trying to 
encompass both simultaneously in an 'intolerable double vision' (468). Rather 
than focussing on either objects or narrative, they must take both and turn them 
into metaphors. In this way they can construct a myth which heeds the 
hegemony but is not beholden to it. In this way they can explode the ostensible 
singularity of purposes and beliefs espoused by Cold War dictates and live.154
Fausto recognises the tensions resultant from such strategies. He is a poet 
and so by definition one who questions hegemonic dictates, plays with them, and 
treats them for the metaphors they are. He writes that 'in dream there are two 
worlds: the street and under the street. One is the kingdom of death and one of 
life. And how can a poet live without exploring the other kingdom, even if only as 
a kind of tourist?' (325). For him, the street is the space of the death-drive (330) 
and life occurs below the surface. He recognises the need to yo-yo between the 
alternatives and harness the 'dynamic uncertainty' which is V. (278). Stencil is a 
tourist in chapter 3 when he observes in the sketch of Gebrail that there is more 
to the world than his construct of meaning but does not engage with it.155 For 
154 The schizo-ethic, such as described by Deleuze and Guattari, is not revolutionary but a way to 
survive under capitalism; similar to this is Lyotard's idea of 'the dissolution of the self into a 
host of networks and relations, of contradictory codes and interfering messages' (Lyotard, pp. 
xviii–xix).
155 This lack of engagement is crucial. Depending on how V. is read, Sidney's thoughts might also 
be Stencil's creation. In this case, the older man's perception that the Situation is a fiction is 
simply another means for Stencil to express his ambivalence to totalising discourse. However, 
if the insights contained in Fausto's diaries are also Stencil's work, the reader would have to 
ask why Stencil would remain so stubbornly self-deluding. This lack of engagement means 
that Stencil is just a passive tourist, observing alternative ways of meaning-making which are 
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Fausto, this is better than nothing and, for Baudrillard, the most for which we 
can hope.
For Fausto, there is no harm in being inspired by such illusion as Stencil's 
stories (or art (209) or the belief in invincibility, 'on the strength of [which] 
delusion Malta survived' the Second World War (325)). Indeed, he understands 
that the poet has 'the task of living in a universe of things which simply are, and 
cloaking that innate mindlessness with comfortable and pious metaphor so that 
the “practical” half of humanity may continue in the Great Lie' (326) that those 
objects combine into a narrative of meaning. However, to truly live, it is 
necessary to recognise illusion for what it is.156 To accept illusion as total – to be 
beholden to one's Baedeker – is to succumb to comforting immersion in 
unconsciousness, as of a machine. Thus asleep on its watch, mankind is in 
danger of slumping on to the nuclear-button. The individual must shuttle 
rhizomatically between narratives (and between these and experience), to make 
these metaphors their own, that is, (vital) illusion rather than simulation. Such 
dialogue results in true virtu: when Fausto offers the last rites to save V.'s soul, 
he moves from inanimation to animation, much as Stencil has done through his 
myth, but Fausto's subsequent life has the benefit of self-awareness of his 
constructions. He identifies his construct of the self as fiction and acknowledges 
the limits of his wedge-of-consciousness and so the need for dialogue with what 
for him unacceptably lacking in certainty. 
One factor which suggests that Fausto's confession is another of Stencil's impersonations 
is the discrepancy of its dating. It is noted that Paola has been silent for eight months about 
Sidney's involvement with her family, which she must have learned from Fausto's account 
(345). However, the confession is dated August 1956, which is when Stencil reads it. It appears 
that the confession is a narrative Stencil has constructed to accommodate the noun that is 
Paola.
156 Stencil wants a narrative which accommodates V.'s organic and robotic elements alike . The 
Maltese children steal V.'s inanimate parts only (Campbell, p. 61), that is, the artificial, 
constructed, the symbolic, leaving the real. They know the reality of war (that is, the code of 
the system), but still practise virtu, not plunder, valuing interpersonal relations, tactile for 
playthings, able to hope for a better world. Their make-believe thus echoes the spy-games of 
Sidney's era: they double-think truths, which is necessary to live in the world. As Max 
perceives in chapter 3, pretending (that is, vital illusion) implies depth; Stencil lacks this: his 
circle of awareness is horizontal (a 'stagnant pool' (345)).
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lies beyond it. As Foppl recognises, '[c]ommunity may have been the only 
solution possible against such an assertion of the Inanimate' (272). 
This self-aware openness and flexibility is existential authenticity: when 
Fausto says that the meaning he took from V.'s death-cries was not merely the 
meaning he wanted to hear (344), he is choosing what is meaningful, and 
believing it to be authentic. By recognising hegemonic discourse to be a floating 
metaphor, the individual can choose to make it an alternative narrative which 
accommodates their multiplicity, a shock-absorber to experience, the means to 
escape their paranoia. 
The hegemonic narrative that is the 'great lie' tries to permit certain 
things and prevent others; it creates the protection, and so threat, of the Bomb, 
but alternative narratives are the means to annihilate and escape this threat.157 
Just as Stencil creates his own in his conspiracy-theory (and Profane in his 
literalisation), so does Pynchon in V. Equally, just as Stencil's stories approach 
and avoid the truth about V., Pynchon approaches and avoids the conclusion of 
his own story (that we need to practise a balance between Profane and Stencil) 
by shuttling between the two story-lines, keeping ambivalence alive, the reader 
awake, the conclusion always in the process of becoming.158 
There is a danger in shuttling between the two extreme possibilities in 
dialogic double-think, as evinced by Godolphin who cannot heed the gap without 
succumbing to paralysis and falling in. As Tanner says, 'Apocalypse does not 
guarantee Pentecost':159 to travel outside the space of the hegemony, to put the 
Baedeker aside, is to give oneself up to ambivalence and both the possibility and 
uncertainty this entails. As Kit in The Sheltering Sky finds, once you disbelieve 
157 David Dowling: 'The power of the bomb is ruled by the power of the word, and only by 
continual de-construction of the word will we avoid the destruction of the world' (Fictions of  
Nuclear Disaster (Iowa City: U of Iowa P, 1987), p. 208).
158 This was equally central to political-brinkmanship. The year before V.'s publication, 
Khrushchev sent technology to Cuba, but baulked risking US-engagement which would oblige 
him to respond with an escalated retaliation and so ordered his ships to stand off short of the 
blockade. 
159 Tanner, Thomas Pynchon, p. 54; emphasis in original.
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society's illusions, you are in danger of not believing your own. However, 
Tanner's caution – about, essentially, going to the desert, the true home of V., the 
space which reveals all signs' floating nature and so bestows revelation or 
insanity – overlooks the point that the individual can, if they choose, decide 
what constitutes revelation or insanity by choosing the criteria by which to 
define them. The real ultimatum revolves around not revelation or insanity, 
then, but whether the individual chooses this flexibility. Fausto does, but 
Profane and Stencil overlook this opportunity, which is hardly surprising since 
volition is dependent on the ability to differentiate the meaningful from the 
meaningless, which distinction was exploded at Hiroshima.160 Consequently, it is 
left to a robot to ask: 'Has it occurred to you there may be no more standards for 
crazy or sane[…]?' (295). As Nadel writes, 'sanity merely indicates conformity to a 
set of norms'161 yet, in the words of Nietzsche which Kinston uses for an epigraph: 
'Things can be so bad that to be sane is insane'.
The gap into which Godolphin falls actually aids the poet-citizen to 
construct their own myth and live an existentially authentic life. Gilmore notes 
that chapter 3 offers the reader no choice but to side with the narrative while 
being denied any agency162 and in this way it replicates the position of the Cold 
War citizen. However, the switches and gaps (which both replicate hegemonic 
narrative and express Stencil's multiplicity) in the narrative destabilise it, 
forcing the reader to engage dialogically in order to construct an acceptable 
meaning. In this way, chapter 3 functions in the manner of the desert, and is a 
synecdoche for the novel. Campbell says that V.'s significance is constructed by 
the voyeuristic reader,163 assembling the objects presented (the different 
viewpoints, V.'s manifestations) into a narrative. This includes threading the 
historical chapters, presented in non-chronological order, into a meaningful 
160 Nadel, p. 59.
161 Nadel, p. 71.
162 Gilmore, p. 9.
163 Campbell, p. 65.
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narrative. The reader must forsake the conventional stencil and use criteria 
other than linearity (the Bomb destroys causality and 'alters our understanding 
of time and space, cause and effect').164 Similarly, Fausto's history has '[n]o 
continuity. No logic' (331) and he sees life as perhaps 'a successive rejection of 
personalities' (306) which are co-opted by hegemonic narrative into 'the fiction 
of continuity, the fiction of cause and effect, the fiction of humanized history 
endowed with “reason”' (306). He understands that life is largely accident (320–
21) without any coherent meaning to it. This pulling-together is, and constructs, 
V. Since the reader is necessarily active, Campbell's choice of adjective is 
questionable; the reader is voyeuristic only in the sense that a spy is voyeuristic. 
The reader must be a poet, constructing a metaphor to make the world 
meaningful. Just as Stencil constructs his myth of V. from details in his father's 
diaries, the reader must construct the meaning of V.
The physical desert is constantly shifting, making its meaning unstable, 
while the objects which comprise it can turn out to be mirages. It foregrounds 
the fact that narrative and the world are unconnected, and that signs are just 
metaphors. Like the desert, the citizen must be an outsider within.
164 Nadel, p. 54.
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Chapter 4.
Suicide of the Citizen As the Death of the System: 
Lawrence Durrell's The Avignon Quintet (1974–85)
Mortality was arguably Lawrence Durrell's most abiding interest, a theme he 
returned to again and again. Throughout his life, he asserted that people were 
dying without having lived and it was necessary to kill oneself in order to be 
reborn into freedom.1 He wanted to write a novel about these ideas since at least 
1944 and this finally came to fruition in The Avignon Quintet.2 As this chapter 
will show, the Cold War's atomic stand-off provided a context in which his beliefs 
gained credible shape, even if he looked to the preceding war in order to 
narrativise them. The work explores death as the node in the relationship 
between the individual and authority and this, inevitably, encompasses the death 
of the individual in war waged by authority, whether as combatant or civilian 
casualty. Additionally, it examines the suicide of the individual as a response to 
that authority. By arguing that suicide reflects Westerners' fear of the Bomb and 
the collective-suicide of the Cold War,3 I want to suggest how the text is much 
more of a response to the global political situation of the time than has been 
considered.
When Durrell began writing Monsieur or The Prince of Darkness in late 
1972,4 the Bomb had for some years arguably receded from the forefront of the 
1 Gordon Bowker, Through the Dark Labyrinth: A Biography of Lawrence Durrell (London: 
Pimlico, 1998), p. 78 and p. 88.
2 Bowker, p. 165. The Avignon Quintet is:
Monsieur or The Prince of Darkness (1974)
Livia or Buried Alive (1978)
Constance or Solitary Pleasures (1982)
Sebastian or Ruling Passions (1983)
Quinx or The Ripper's Tale (1985).
3 For a broad-ranging discussion on related ideas, see Daniel Grausam, On Endings: American 
Postmodern Fiction and the Cold War (Charlottesville: U of Virginia P, 2011), particularly the 
introduction.
4 Bowker, p. 349.
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Western consciousness. Following the confrontation over Cuba, the Partial Test 
Ban Treaty of 1963 had seen a relaxation of tensions between East and West 
which initiated the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty at the end of that decade. 
That said, atomic war and the effects of atomic-testing5 remained on Durrell's 
mind, as suggested by his nickname for the cleaning-lady who tidied around the 
manuscript with speed and efficacy: 'la bombe atomique'.6 Simultaneously, the 
New Left movement in Western Europe questioned, increasingly vociferously, 
the stand-off and its consequent hot wars around the globe. As the erosion of the 
moral certainties underpinning the East–West confrontation progressed, states 
were obliged to develop new strategies to legitimise their actions in the eyes of 
their peoples. 
The many suicides in the Quintet are either active or reactive in response 
to the ideologies by which authority tries to govern the individual. In this sense, 
they are all political acts and all might be termed acts of mental illness by 
society. The text's instances of self-slaughter, as emotive as that label suggests, 
and irrespective of any logic behind them, are reactive. Occasions of what I shall 
call suicide-by-proxy, contrastingly, are rationalised auto-euthanasia and, I will 
suggest, tie in with the central interest of this thesis.
My examination largely follows the course of the novels but privileges 
their thematic concerns over their progression from first page to last. As it is, 
the text is structured as a non-linear continuum of mutually balancing poetic 
associations rather than a chronological work, its five-novel structure (conceived 
only after Durrell had begun Monsieur) inspired by his studies into gnostic and 
Eastern philosophies.7 The Quintet is five discrete constituents and so is 
5 Bowker, p. 172 and p. 306. Tellingly, while cancer is not one of the maladies which Durrell 
commonly prescribes his characters, the close of the Quintet sees Sabine – arguably the most 
dissident of the characters, not so much because she is an aristocratic Oxbridge scholar who 
has embraced gipsy-society and its wisdom, but because her transgression between the 
different levels of reality in the work is alone never acknowledged – is riddled with the disease 
(1352).
6 Bowker, p. 354.
7 Bowker, p. 352. This is notwithstanding the fact that, as Bowker notes, the overall form was 
devised after the completion of Monsieur (Bowker, p. 409). Durrell long pre-empted the 
161
sufficiently 'various that it can afford to be contradictory even as regards itself'.8 
Its poetic structure belongs to the realm of unreason, where ideas are related by 
way of what Durrell considered a higher plane of reality9 and signals his ever-
greater immersion into such interests in the years after he had written The 
Alexandria Quartet which, while steeped in esoteric wisdom, was structured 
around the three spatial and one temporal dimensions upon which Western 
empirical understanding is founded. Even more so than in his Quartet, the 
Quintet is peopled not so much by characters as voices for his wide-ranging 
ideas. That is not to say that none of his protagonists develop over the course of 
the series: Constance, arguably the central figure, does evolve in consciousness, 
particularly in the final two books, as I will discuss. 
Nevertheless, the text contests binary notions of self and Other, 
presenting people as multiplicities lacking coherent, stable identities (85; 280; as 
Sutcliffe says, '[t]he human psyche is almost infinitely various – so various that 
counterculture's interest in Eastern philosophy, reading extensively in this field and 
admiring Rilke for being 'perhaps the first bridging of eastern and western philosophy in 
European literature' (Bowker, p. 135). Additionally, in 1950 Durrell became interested in the 
metaphysical writings of Francis J. Mott, who warned of apocalypse and urged people to join 
his Society of Life to avert it (Bowker, pp. 200–01).
8 Lawrence Durrell, The Avignon Quintet: Monsieur, Livia, Constance, Sebastian, Quinx 
(London: Faber and Faber, 1992), p. 335. All subsequent references to the work will appear in 
the text in parentheses.
9 Bowker, p. 150. Durrell argued that logic was inadequate in explaining the world. Akkad notes 
that people 'refuse to accept the findings of direct intuition. They want what they call proof. 
What is that but a slavish belief in causality and determinism, which in our new age we regard 
as provisional and subject to scale' (195). Accordingly, the initiation-ritual is designed to 
convey a 'significance which one cannot render clear by words, a deep symbolic significance of 
something which by-passed causality' (122). Bruce realises that meaning is 'being conveyed to 
me as a sense impression, and not being made rationally explicit in order not to indulge my 
natural faculty of ratiocination' (118) and that 'through this experience with Akkad and his 
sect that I at last managed to gain a foothold in that part of reality which was probably my 
own inner self' (118). The gnostics thus reflect the consequences of the Bomb, which 'alters our 
understanding of time and space, cause and effect' (Alan Nadel, Containment Culture:  
American Narratives, Postmodernism, and the Atomic Age (Durham: Duke UP, 1995), p. 54). 
The Quintet, too, accommodates the common-sense-defying findings of quantum 
physics, avoiding causal explanation for creative balance (Bowker, p. 191), the irrational 
progression of its poetic prose resisting the determinism of the age (Bowker, p. 345). As it 
says, '[s]ometimes the terror of the pure meaninglessness of things seized [Blanford] by the 
hair – for there was no reason for things to be the way they are […] Ah, the mind-numbing 
ineptness of the rational man with his formulations! Defeated always by the flying 
multiplicity of the real. “Ordinary life” – is there such a thing?' (1260, emphasis in original). 
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it can afford to be contradictory even as regards itself' (335)) and promoting the 
idea of fusion (693). At times, the different levels of reality in the Quintet 
intertwine, with one invading the other to result in fusion which is both creative 
and confusing. Durrell called it a literary expression of the quantum physics 
which created the Bomb but which effectively violates common sense.10 In Quinx 
this idea becomes explicitly political: 'all people are slowly becoming the same 
person, and […] all countries are merging into one country, one world' (1192). 
(The flipside to this – the B-side of the A-bomb, so to speak – is that, as the 
second Sylvie says, '[t]o be a whole person discountenance[s] all nature' (1165).)
For example, Constance and her sister Livia possess opposing 
personalities: blonde Constance studies Eros, while dark-haired Livia reads de 
Sade. At the same time, by sharing a brother and a lover, and pursuing their 
quests for meaning in life through devotion to influential Austrians (Freud and 
Hitler respectively), the sisters constitute a single split-selfhood which mirrors 
the paranoid citizen and their melancholic bipolar world in (Cold) wartime. The 
split-self they form in turn comprises one half of a binary with their brother, 
Hilary the Resistance-fighter, and of another with their lover, Blanford the 
apolitical individualist. The sisters form two nodes or sides of a triangle with 
each of these men, and these triangles map on to the two central, equally 
tortured and incestuous triumvirates in Monsieur.11 The idea of the trinity is thus 
10 Jonathan Schell, The Fate of the Earth and The Abolition (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2000), pp. 9–
10.
11 The final chapter of Monsieur reveals that everything which has preceded it is the work of the 
novelist Blanford. The following four volumes follow Blanford and his friends in the 'real' 
world. These books also include a couple of his creations who cross from one plane to the 
reality, a fiction one moment and a fact the next, mimicking quantum duality by which an 
entity can behave as a particle or a wave. 
Incidentally, Blanford's novel (the full title of which is Le Monsieur) is not the 
first book of the Quintet (Monsieur or The Prince of Darkness), with or without its final 
chapter, which introduces Blanford. This is evident when the second book, Livia, and its 
sequels feature quotes which did not appear in its prequel, and Constance is alive when his 
novel is published, whereas in the first volume she (albeit unidentified) is already dead when 
he completes his manuscript. (The subtitle of Durrell's novel, The Prince of Darkness, is the 
name of a work by Sutcliffe, Blanford's creation who enters the world his author inhabits.) 
Nevertheless, the two Monsieurs are evidently a close reflection of one another, so the 
characters in the book-within-Durrell's-first-book can be read as reflections of others in the 
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the core around which the Quintet is structured, as it was front-and-centre of the 
atomic-weapons programme which overshadowed Durrell's world, on account of 
the code-name which Oppenheimer gave the first test ('Trinity' at Alamogordo on 
16th July, 1945). Like the avant-garde ménages, this label undermines the bipolar 
conception of the world which was sponsoring his project. Sutcliffe writes: the 
'unity of the three children as a total self [a]gainst the traditional duality figure 
of our cosmology [is] a gnostic notion' (212). In this way, Durrell's characters, 
Oppenheimer's designation and the quantum physics which both author and 
scientist used comprise a final trinity which deconstructs the binary-
oppositions fundamental to the world-order in which they operated.
Incidentally, Oppenheimer's choice is believed to be a reference to John 
Donne's sonnet 'Batter my heart, three-person'd God', which he came to admire 
under the influence of his one-time lover Jean Tatlock. Tatlock was a psychiatrist 
and, in this capacity, can be seen to have a counterpart in Constance; being also 
politically subversive (a member of the American Communist Party), she 
functions as a model for the other half of Constance's split-self, Livia (a French 
member of the National Socialists). In this regard, Affad can be read as 
Oppenheimer's double, since he is involved in the development of the Bomb as 
well as being subversive (not only in the eyes of orthodox society but also his 
own underground sect, which brings him before a committee-hearing to hear 
him plead his loyalty). Livia has her own ambitious proponent of the Bomb in 
Smirgel, her one-time Nazi lover who countenances wrongdoing in pursuit of 
ultimate good: the end justifies the means. Suffering from depression and under 
state-surveillance, Tatlock committed suicide, as does Livia when she has 
become disillusioned with the Nazi creed and fears she is under observation. 
Read this way, Livia becomes a suicide-proxy for her sister. This is not, however, 
the manner of proxy which is practised by the sect and this is only right since, 
firstly, Constance is not a gnostic and, secondly, the sect is found to fall short in 
its struggle with the world when Affad is murdered.
subsequent four.
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The Quintet's key suicides
(1) Piers' suicide – by proxy?
The Quintet begins with news of Piers' death – presumably by his own hand – in 
a hotel in 1970s Avignon, which brings his friend and brother-in-law, Bruce, from 
his position at the British Embassy in Prague to make the necessary 
arrangements while privately searching for an explanation. Although Bruce has 
come down from the cold of the Communist Bloc, it is clear that the political 
concerns which govern his life originate in these warmer latitudes, and the ice 
which has built up in the river flowing below the city's walls (12) suggests that 
this is a world equally in the grip of ideological confrontation. As his train 
speeds through Provence, he begins his story by accounting for '[t]he Bruce that 
I was, and the Bruce I become as I jot down these words' (5), as if standing before 
a modern-day Inquisition. The identity he claims is but 'an echo of far-off 
certainties which had taken no account of the revenges of time' (6); his current 
state the result not only of his friend's death but also of the conflicted age in 
which he remains. He tries 'to objectify his thoughts and emotions by treating 
them as one would in a novel' (6), articulating a split-subjecthood which strives 
to contain the feelings of his everyday life in deference to the overarching 
political narrative.12 This strategy, he concedes, 'didn't really work' (6), but he 
goes on to reflect on the similarities of his situation and that of his double who 
exists in his friend Sutcliffe's novel who is rushing to the bedside of a dying man 
who wishes to disclose important information. By drawing on this fictional 
reality, Bruce momentarily brings Piers back to life and, anticipating the wisdom 
his alternative self will receive, rescues himself from the uncertainties of a 
frozen age which condemns him to perpetual half-death.
Piers was a member of an Egyptian gnostic brotherhood who believe that 
12 Several characters in the Quintet explicitly anticipate the split-subjecthood of the Cold War 
citizen. The Greek-Alexandrian who comes to collect Mnemidis from the clinic tells Contance 
that his people 'see the world in a different way […] we see things with your eyes. But we also 
see their way. A split-vision. Of course a lot has to do with simple definitions' (1068).
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the world is in the throes of an existential struggle between two irreconcilable 
powers: that of good and evil. It believes that life is ruled by the Prince of 
Darkness. 'What sort of God could have built this malefic machine of 
destruction, of self-immolation?' (135), asks Akkad (the mystic in Monsieur based 
on the other novels' Affad), referring to the 'death-desiring culture' (215) of the 
age in a manner evocative of its epitomic Bomb. The members believe they 
inhabit a world of fictions, 'masks and caricatures of reality with names, mere 
labels' (117), a distinctly Baudrillardian perspective. Simulation cannot be fought 
with truth and must be exceeded,13 and the gnostics seek to exceed the world of 
darkness by 'pre-empt[ing its] death by voluntary suicide' (913) or 'auto-
annihilation' (135). As Akkad says, 
[t]he refusal to conform to the laws of this inferior demon leads insensibly on towards 
death But [sic] then death… What is it after all? It is nothing. It is not enough! We will all 
die. Yet to the pure gnostic soul the open gesture of refusal is necessary (137). 
Those brothers eligible for ritual suicide are 'the mature who have tasted the 
world to the full' (142) and so go to their self-elected self-exile from the world in a 
state of triumph. These desert-sages take control over their mortality to show 
that control is possible, rejecting identity as participants in materialist society 
immersed in its fantasy-projections of certainty (140)14 like the dissociated 
Westerner who figuratively kills their socio-political self by travelling to the 
desert.  
However, as the mob-justice following the Nazis' withdrawal from Avignon 
makes clear (760), an individual living under an imposed authority can choose 
only collaboration or resistance, and so a dissenter's suicide must be 
collaboration, given that it cleanses society of their taint (reflecting Michel 
Foucault's function of the asylum). Consequently, 'ordinary suicide, banal self-
destruction, that is forbidden' (138). In Jean Baudrillard's words, '[d]eath has only 
13 Paul Hegarty, Jean Baudrillard: Live Theory (London and New York: Continuum, 2004), p. 82.
14 Affad: 'Children! you [sic] were born to disappoint your parents as we have all been, for our 
parents built us gilded and padded cages to live happily-ever-after-in – and look what came 
about: exile, bereavement, folly, voyages, despair, ecstasy, illness, love, death' (988).
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given and received meaning, that is to say, it is socialised through exchange'15 
and, accordingly, when a brother dies, 'it is not their own hand that is raised 
against them' (142–43). This suicide-by-proxy restores a meaning to death 'which 
can only be thwarted [by society] by the […] gift of death itself'.16 However, the 
gnostic-suicide is 'actually unanswerable' because society could only reciprocate 
with its own destruction.17 In order to justify its imposed authority over its 
citizens, the State expounds an (ideological) immortality which is implausible 
since, as Akkad notes, death is an ever-present aspect of life (140). It is this 
discrepancy which creates the tension in the individual which is expressed as 
paranoia.
Baudrillard makes the point that '[i]n our culture […] everything is done 
so that death is never done to anybody by someone else, but only by “nature”, as 
an impersonal expiry of the body […] and we end up believing in the biological 
essence of the body, watched over by death which in turn is watched over by 
science.'18 However, the Bomb effectively destroys distinctions between nature 
and science and so society relegates responsibility for death to an Other (nature) 
while claiming that its own science can provide protection against it. 
Consequently, the citizen's death does not implicate the State, even in war, as 
happens to Sam. In The Literary Cold War, Adam Piette draws on René Girard's 
theory of the scapegoat to explain this paradox in its explicitly atomic 
incarnation. Such an individual, he says, 'channels the war's eerie violence so as 
(seemingly) to avert nuclear catastrophe, simultaneously obscuring the uncanny 
truth: that the Cold War is a scapegoating mechanism'.19 The Quintet argues that 
'[t]he myth and ritual that used to free the body from science's supremacy has 
15 Jean Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange and Death, trans. by Iain Hamilton Grant (London: Sage, 
1993), p. 166.
16 Hegarty, p. 41.
17 This is Baudrillard's idea of impossible exchange. See Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange, pp. 36–
37 and Hegarty, p. 146.
18 Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange, p. 166; italics in original.
19 Adam Piette, The Literary Cold War: 1945 to Vietnam (Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2009), p. 14, 
emphasis in original.
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been lost, or has not yet been found' by Western society, but is hidden in the 
desert east of Alexandria.20 
While citizens find themselves legitimate targets of a nuclear-strike on the 
grounds that they have by default accepted the State's protection and so its 
convictions, the gnostics choose to give the sect authority over their lives. 
Socially endorsed death, such as the Bomb, marks the end of time and so is 
timeless, outside time, beyond experience, only approached through metaphor, 
textually.21 The letter which each brother receives notifying them that their time 
is upon them is a declarative text and thereby overrules the speculative text of 
socially endorsed death. This letter is likened to a missile (see below), and 
Baudrillard writes that missiles and simulacra substitute for the lack of death in 
society. This missive brings the event of death within time, allowing the 
individual to prepare for it calmly and rationally. It makes the Otherness of 
death familiar, thereby destroying the binary between life and death on which 
society constructs itself. Death's Otherness impedes the individual's experience 
of life; confident of knowing death before it arrives, the gnostic can experience 
life. Since the instant of death itself remains a secret (like all symbolic violence 
against the system, it cannot be controlled and must be submitted to), the 
gnostics also escape the temporality which rules society (143). Thus free from 
society's dictates, they effectively wield the power to destroy the world as it is 
and, in the words of Oppenheimer, become death.
Those initiated into arcane knowledge and so power over the world 
20 Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange, p. 166.
21 Death – such as the Bomb – ends any narrative one attempts to make sense of it: as Sutcliffe 
says, '[a]ll that we think and write about death is fictitious' (174). Since the Bomb is, 
paradoxically, both beyond words and strictly textual, it might be said that its arrival changed 
only the horror signified. This passage from Constance, describing a moment in occupied 
France, was, of course, written after the invention of the Bomb, but nevertheless suggests that 
the brain's scope for articulating horror is far more limited than its ability to create it.
[Constance was filled] with a weight of apathy and weariness which astonished even 
herself. They were like people living upon the slopes of a volcano, Vesuvius or Etna, 
resigned to the knowledge that one day, nobody knew when, the whole of the world 
they knew would be blown apart by forces beyond their imagining. And yet they 
continued to respect social forms like automata (538).
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remove themselves from civilisation, whether Manhattan or Alexandria, and in 
the desert built a new society operating below the known one (literally so when 
the 1963 limited test-ban treaty forced atomic-testing underground). 
Appropriately, Affad meets the sect's executive in an Alexandrian crypt (1006). 
This place of shelter, prayer and salvation mirrors the nuclear-bunker; both are 
sites in which past cultures fuse to create a society for the future. Such acts 
promise only a 'precarious victory':22 as Akkad says, '[o]ur hopes of stepping 
outside this sepulchre are very faint, but they are there' (141). Baudrillard 
stresses that the horizon of the system remains always unreachable, but we can 
attain a glimpse of what lies beyond to cultivate hope and, within the framework 
of this thesis, escape nuclear-paranoia.
The lines in this battle cut across the East–West divisions of the Cold War 
Durrell knew. Accordingly, comparisons should not be drawn too quickly 
between the Egyptian authorities' crackdown on the self-proclaimed apolitical 
(130) secret sect on suspicion of being a 'subversive political movement' (1146) as 
the Quintet approaches its end and the atomic age dawns (1017) and, for example, 
the 1950s witch-hunt for Western communist sympathisers. The parallel might 
be tempting, especially given that the gnostics have already been explicitly 
identified as early communists (241), but I would argue that the brotherhood 
instead represents a challenge to hegemonic norms. Gordon Bowker notes that, 
while Durrell was critical of capitalism, he was very much anti-communist and 
voiced support for McCarthy's policies.23 The Manichaean gnosticism does not 
square with the Manichaean political philosophy of the era in which it was 
imagined. 
It might be more profitable to equate this brotherhood of initiates to the 
truth fighting a secret war against the forces of darkness with the CIA, members 
of which saw themselves as a modern-day Knights Templar.24 Both constitute an 
22 Hegarty, p. 76.
23 Bowker, pp. 199–201.
24 William Colby, Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA (NY: Simon & Schuster, 1978), quoted in 
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authority in excess to formal government,25 which Gilles Deleuze and Félix 
Guattari term 'the war machine', a heterogeneous, ultimately unregulated 
dynamism which is either orderly society's hired gun or its armageddon. 'The 
war machine is always exterior to the State, even when the state uses it, 
appropriates it. The man of war has an entire becoming that implies multiplicity 
[and] metamorphosis and treason […] secret brotherhoods […] animate the 
battlefields'.26 While the sect would not identify itself on one side or other of the 
Cold War bipolar world, this very declaration of independence casts it as Other 
to both East and West. As Baudrillard argues, the opposite of Good is not Evil; 
instead, it is the symbolic, a central absence within a system which insists that 
all is Good.27 On account of its ambiguity, therefore, the sect is all the more a 
binary opposite of the CIA. This equivalence is most evident in how each 
channels death in their quest to save the world in keeping with their respective 
creeds: the gnostics defect from orthodox reasoning and sacrifice themselves, 
while the CIA sacrifices others.
The desert
The Quintet first enters the desert on the bequest of Akkad, the enigmatic 
Egyptian who invites Bruce, Piers and their friends to a gnostic ritual at a 
remote oasis. As they set out from Alexandria, Bruce notes how the desert sands 
lay siege to this emblem of civilisation and the vestiges which have not been 
swallowed only emphasise the fragility of the human project. The world through 
which they move feels of lesser substance than that of Alexander's time (95), as if 
the propaganda of civilisation has lost its power to deceive. Once in the desert, a 
Frances Stonor Saunders, Who Paid the Piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War (London: 
Granta, 1999), p. 33.
25 Ann Douglas, 'Periodizing the American Century: Modernism, Postmodernism, and 
Postcolonialism in the Cold War Context', Modernism/Modernity, 5 (1998), 71–98 (pp. 76–77).
26 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. 
by Brian Massumi (London: Continuum, 2004), p. 268
27 Hegarty, pp. 81–82.
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different set of rules applies. It is a liminal space between states of reality, 
populated with trees turned to stone (132), suggesting a magical fusion of 
elements through which new meaning might be created. Evoking its age-old 
associations with ascetic prophets (93), the desert is the death not only of sanity 
but also of the authority which pronounces on sanity. Denied a rational 
foundation, any edifice of logic which one might try to build over the desert is 
fated to collapse around itself, a mushroom-shaped fallout signalling the end of 
civilisation. Fittingly, the ritual takes place in the tomb of a holy-man having 'the 
peculiar disorienting effect of churches with no central altar, no point of focus' 
(101). It is less an outright heresy of Western ordering-beliefs than a gnostic 
mutation and, perhaps, all the more unsettling for it.
A later encounter with the desert occurs in Constance. Faced with the 
disintegration of all he values (the Provençal idyll) in the shadow of the coming 
war, Blanford has taken up a job-offer in Egypt, experiences which inform his 
novel, Monsieur. In this way, he echoes the other protagonists examined in this 
thesis. It might, nevertheless, be argued that, for all his sense of alienation from 
the State (579), he is fleeing not so much tension as apathy, seeking not meaning 
but distraction. His textual journey to the desert, however, is an escape from the 
state of war which never breaks, but also never ends, under which he lives. He 
takes a trip on the Nile with Sam and Affad, during which '[t]he desert was a 
metaphor for everything huge and dangerous, yet without so seeming' (650). The 
Sahara thus becomes a simulacrum for the war he has left behind. The atomic 
incarnation it would herald can be approached only through metaphor, and so 
experiencing the scorched sands brings him safely one step closer to the post-
war world.
The friends share their felucca with a couple called Bruno and Sylvaine, 
names which bring to mind Lewis Carroll's Bruno and Sylvie. These latter hear 
of a map on a scale of 1:1 which is abandoned since it prevented the crops from 
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growing,28 a cautionary tale of how man's scientific ingenuity threatens to turn 
society into (the Western construct of) an uninhabitable desert. This evocation 
of curious cartography calls to mind, of course, Borges' map which forms a 
palimpsest over the empire it represents and which, when similarly found to be 
impractical, is allowed to rot away, its vestiges littering the desert.29 Inescapably, 
both tales suggest that the living world is in conflict with the impositions of 
science and that it was mankind's realisation of its folly, rather than any 
inherent resilience on the part of nature, which averted doomsday.
(2) Livia's suicide – the shortcomings of alternative narratives
Before the war and his experiences in Egypt, Blanford is briefly and disastrously 
married to Livia. She runs away to lose herself in Paris' nightspots and then 
Germany's national socialism. For all that she is a law unto herself, belonging to 
nobody (827) – when Blanford slips a ring on her finger, she violently rejects 
what she perceives as the author(ity)'s bid to contain her (463) – Livia is forever 
in search of a greater order which will give the world meaning. She flirts with 
Buddhism (581) and her time exploring fascism also introduces her to a more 
abiding interest in yoga (995). The common element which attracts her to all 
three would appear to be their valorisation of the absence of the ego. When she 
kills herself, Constance reflects that 'nothing that she did or was entered into the 
sphere of rational explanations' (821) and puts her suicide down to 'the failure of 
her central beliefs' (888). As was the case with Livia's spurned lover, Blanford 
and, indeed, the continent burning around him (489), suicide appears to be the 
answer when reality refuses to fit the order one tries to project on it. As with the 
Cold War state, she is tormented by a death-drive created by her internal 
tensions. 
28 Lewis Carroll, Bruno and Sylvie Concluded (New York and London: Macmillan, 1894), chapter 
11 <www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/48795> [accessed 16 September 2015]
29 Jorge Luis Borges, Collected Fictions, trans. by Andrew Hurley (London: Penguin, 1998), p. 325.
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By holding the novels' various triumvirates up to one another, Livia's 
search for meaning in life is equated with the psychological illness of Monsieur's 
Sylvie. As a psychiatrist says, 'the state of schizophrenia is not one of mental 
disorder, but one in which a different sort of order applies' (943): it is not an 
illness but a heresy, testifying to 'the truth of a belief which ran counter to the 
whole structure of an age's thoughts' (458).
The defining authority is, by definition, sane. However, it is also always 
unavoidably self-contradictory. For an individual to be deemed sane, they must 
contain these tensions within themselves and honour the opposition between 
self and Other which is the foundation of society's normative world-view, 
creating in themselves a split-subjecthood. Furthermore, sanity is mandatory 
because, if it were not, their endorsement of the State would be meaningless and 
they could not shoulder their everyday responsibility for the State's ultimate 
victory. However, they are deprived of agency since, in theory, the State acts in 
their interests and, in practice, the political confrontation is conducted above 
their heads.
These social tensions increased in the atomic age, since the Bomb 
collapsed distinctions between protection and threat,30 compelling the Cold War 
citizen to practise a denial of reality in order to live everyday life.31 In light of 
this, the mad can be seen as dissidents who resist the double-think necessary to 
live under a self-contradictory authority. Not only do the mad undermine the 
normative concept of a stable identity; as the text says, '[t]he mad must be people 
without selves' (1130), thereby being a clear manifestation of Durrell's idea that 
'[p]eople are not separate individuals as they think, they are variations on 
themes outside themselves' (948). In Monsieur, the psychologically unstable Pia 
30 Schell, pp. 214–15.
31 'We place our daily doings in one compartment of our lives and the threat to all life in another 
compartment […] Before long, denial of reality becomes a habit', Schell, p. 152. See also Schell, 
p. 8: 'When one tried to face the nuclear predicament, once feels sick, whereas when one 
pushes it out of mind, as apparently one must do most of the time in order to carry on with 
life, one feels well again. But this feeling of well-being is based on a denial of the most 
important reality of our time, and therefore is itself a kind of sickness'.
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identifies with her dolls (220), these simulacra expressing her multiplicity. 
Sutcliffe writes: 'We are born mad […] acquire morality and become stupid and 
unhappy. Then we die' (263). The absolutist values imposed by the hegemony are 
unnatural; nevertheless, it consigns the dissident to social death, removes them 
from the system, by identifying them insane. Monsieur's Sylvie is, like the Third 
World and its sect, regarded as an outright threat.32 Bruce, flying the flag for 
Western empirical science, argues with Piers, who is becoming increasingly 
immersed in Eastern wisdom, about what is in her best-interests, seeking to 
subsume and naturalise her Otherness within their world-views, making her feel 
she is the 'battleground of three selves' (25). 
In truth, such individuals do not oppose the norm but operate across it. 
As Piers says when being initiated into the wisdom of the desert-gnostics, '[t]hen 
there is another kind of sense which is not just nonsense?' (136). In turn, Sylvie 
finds the gnosticism repressively dogmatic, its ideas about Good versus Evil and 
salvation through destruction little different to socially endorsed beliefs. To her, 
it is ultimately 'both boring and somewhat frightening' (158), as was the Bomb, 
the suicidal-logic and logic-defying physics of which is as ungraspable as the 
Prince of Darkness, to many a Cold War citizen. It is outside her narrative.
Similarly, when Constance wonders if Affad might be schizoid, she 
corrects herself: 'what could such formulations possibly mean in the context of a 
reality such as the one he was embracing?' (1017). Nevertheless, she is not far 
wrong, since '[t]he schizoid states are uncrystallised mysticism' (1338), mirroring 
Affad's unorthodox world-view. From an orthodox point of view, Affad is  
mentally abnormal, just like his son, who has been diagnosed with autism. Both 
access a different order of reality: the boy is not taken by the stimuli of the world 
32 As Adam Piette writes, '[d]eviance from this normative pressure is itself psychologically 
controlled by being labelled as neurotic; or more specifically as conspiratorial paranoia' 
(Piette, p. 15). Ann Douglas writes that, '[i]n the mid-1960s, the psychopath label was dropped 
by psychiatrists [in favour of] “borderline,” with its heavier investment in apolitical 
narcissism' (Douglas, note 40). Like the mad, the self-avowedly apolitical gnostic-sect (130) is 
borderline, existing at the margins of society and seeking to advance the border between Good 
and Evil.
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(1034), while his father is not taken in by the meaning it seeks to impose on his 
reason. When Constance finally connects with him emotionally, 'it was as if his 
little psyche had exploded like a bomb and was on the point of disintegration.' 
For him, she is the outside of the system brought within: a singularity, like the 
Bomb.33 Consequently, '[s]he held him tight, as if to hold the shattered fragments 
together against total dispersion' (1042). One of the epigraphs to Livia is a 
Chinese proverb which states that 'five colours mixed make people blind' (298); 
equally, to receive such an excess of reality without an organising narrative 
would make one go mad to oneself. One must choose the myths by which to live 
in the world.34
(3) Affad's suicide-by-proxy and subsequent death
The war which Durrell leads his reader into anticipates both the Bomb which he 
will introduce in the third book, Constance, and the post-Hiroshima world in 
which he was writing. The German officer Smirgel tells Constance how the Nazis 
are moulding nature for their own ends, nurturing it into the perfect weapon 
(807). At one point, what appears to be a natural storm turns out to be the 
explosions from a skirmish (615), suggesting that the force of nature has been 
harnessed.
The Germans are shown to regard themselves as necessarily stooping to 
wrongdoing in order to achieve a greater good, anticipating the Americans' 
rationale in the face of a major land-offensive against Japan in 1945: Smirgel says 
that 'we must first go back and start from the wolf, so to speak. We must become 
specialists in evil until the very distinctions are effaced. Then he will come, the 
new man whom Nietzsche and Wagner divined' (806). Since the Bomb has been 
33 Jean Baudrillard, Impossible Exchange, trans. by Chris Turner (London: Verso, 2001), pp. 130–
31. See also Hegarty, pp. 161–63.
34 Characters voluntarily allow narrative to determine experience, perhaps the most memorable 
example being how the Prince's life in London is framed by Turner's work (519). In this way, 
they choose a myth by which to live in the world, which is how the Cold War subject can live 
free of nuclear-paranoia, if not the Bomb.
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developed by a liberal democracy,35 however, and because its power to destroy the 
world calls to mind the Creator,36 any dissidence is tantamount to heresy.  
In the Quintet, the Bomb is pre-empted by the destruction of the Second 
World War and followed by Affad's impersonal, incidental annihilation by 
similarly mass-produced weapons in the form of Upinal Steel kitchen-knives 
(1074). Furthermore, his experiences bring the Bomb into the narrative more 
explicitly than the references to the bombing of Japan which brings the war to a 
close. A member of the gnostic sect, he, like the protagonists discussed in 
previous chapters, has found in the desert an alternative world-view. Although 
Egyptian, he is not an inappropriate subject for this study because of his 
influence on the (re)formation of identity of two Western characters, one of 
whom travels to the Sahara and one of whom does not: Blanford, whose 
internalisation of Affad manifested as Akkad is the pivotal element in the first 
book of the Quintet, and Constance, whose quest for valid meaning in the world 
becomes the work's primary concern.
His visit to the Canadian research-centre is not integral to the plot, 
although it does enhance the texts' thematic preoccupation with death. Given 
that Durrell did not plan the plot comprehensively in advance of writing,37 he 
might have incorporated the expedition on the basis of topical inspiration: 
Constance was the first volume published after the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan and the announcement of Star Wars which ended the détente. As a 
marginal observer of the political stand-off under which Durrell was writing, 
Affad can perceive the similarity of East and West, what Baudrillard calls the 
bipolar nature of monopolistic authority.38 For example, for him the centre is 
located amid 'vast snowscapes like another inclement Russia' (870).
Nevertheless, the language with which he recounts his visit expresses a 
35 See Schell, pp. xxviii–xxix.
36 Nadel, p. 166.
37 See, for example, Bowker, p. 409.
38 See Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange, p. 69, and Hegarty, p. 106.
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tension between the desire to describe his brush with history and the awareness 
of what he is describing. His experience is imparted through metaphors, as if he 
finds the subject indescribable, like death itself. The laboratory is 'the smithy of 
Haephaestus', which displaces the research from the sphere of contemporary 
warfare while evoking both an antiquity which conveys the fundamental nature 
of the work and an element of the superhuman which gestures towards the 
power in question. When his story comes to the Bomb itself, Affad contains it 
with the diminutive metaphor of 'the Toy' (the device used in the Trinity test was 
nicknamed 'the Gadget'). The weapon is not concerned with war but rather 
'aimed at our bone marrow' (870). As well as disintegrating distinctions between 
military and civilian, combatant and non-combatant, this implicates all of life, 
in the sense both of daily activity and biological existence. Furthermore, since 
Affad's fictional double, Akkad, has previously characterised evil as a new cancer 
in the biological marrow (141), these words associate the Bomb with a literal, 
personifiable – and dissident – idea of immorality.39
Desert Lily
Affad's wife, Lily, has synaesthesia (1021), another way of seeing the world. She 
removes herself even from the society of the asylum to prevent herself 
contaminating it, and so truly commits herself to an asylum-of-the-self.40 The 
head of the monastery who overseas her self-exile greets Affad and then
crossed the room to the wall upon which there was a large framed picture of the oasis 
with the grouping of the buildings clearly marked, thinning away into the desert where 
there were the cells, mere wattle shelters which housed those who had chosen to live as 
solitary anchorites […] He placed his finger on one ofthe star-shaped huts and said, 
'There!' (1021–22).
39 Durrell thus realises a project he conceived at the start of the war to connect the work of 
Einstein with metaphysics (Bowker, p. 121). This ambition provided the core thematic concern 
of his 1963 play 'An Irish Faustus', which forged an analogy between Goethe's alchemist and 
nuclear-science (Bowker, p. 310).
40 See Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason, 
trans. by Richard Howard (London and New York: Routledge, 2001).
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He employs a simulacrum, a metaphor, to make sense of the space between the 
desert and society beyond the monastery, as if the reality outside his door is too 
uncertain to put his finger on. Here, different rules apply: the monk who leads 
Affad to his wife's hovel strides across the sand, while the visitor struggles to 
keep up through this unfamiliar element (1022). In this dawning atomic age, 
nature, formerly neutral, can now be manipulated, just as an abstract idea can be 
twisted into propaganda.
Before arriving at this desert-retreat, Affad thinks of 'the desert. It, too, 
was an abstraction like the idea of death – until the life of the oasis made it a 
brutal reality' (1019). The presence of life creates the possibility of death, as is 
maintained by the gnostic sect (their suicide brings death into society and so 
'recalls the process which initiated it, and therefore also the possibility of its 
non-being').41 It also echoes the logic of the Cold War, by which the threat of 
danger becomes the promise of protection. The symbiotic relationship between 
everyday life and ever-possible death creates a living-death which is reflected in 
the fact that the oasis is neither desert nor society, and so is the place of 
madness. The description of Lily's dwelling as 'one of the remotest cells beyond 
which lay nothing – just the uncompromising sea of sand curling and flowing 
away into the empty sky' (1022) suggests that she is only one step away from 
vanishing into the void like Kit in The Sheltering Sky. The Quintet refers to 
insanity as a 'quasi-death […] almost more cruel really than outright death' (18), 
calling to mind the maxim 'better dead than Red'.42 Since madness is defined as a 
threat to society, it is contained by the asylum, a place not outside society but 
not within it. Lily's self-committal is collaborative suicide. Perhaps this is why 
Affad's thoughts focus on the desert which surrounds the oasis, the home of the 
resistance which decrees his death will be a means to life. 
41 Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange, p. 2, and see Hegarty, p. 41.
42 Schell, p. xxxvii.
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The 'machine which [i]s already launched upon a trajectory'
When he falls in love with Constance, Affad resigns his membership of the 
gnostic fraternity. However, he learns that he has done so too late, because the 
letter which informs him that his death is imminent has already been sent, like 
'a machine which was already launched upon a trajectory' (1118), and this fact 
rekindles his faith in the gnostic cause. When Constance tries to intercept the 
missive, he responds: 'I understand your feeling that things can be prevented 
from happening by an act of resolution...But they can't' (1057), as has been amply 
demonstrated by the outbreak of war. 
Constance's attempt articulates Western society's fear of death: '[t]he 
whole of her training, her science, her practice was dedicated to working against 
this cowardly principle of suicide and abdication' (914). For her, love cannot be 
reconciled with death (118–19). She feels that Affad should have spared her the 
experience of their affair 'since he had known from the beginning that it must all 
come to nothing' (914). Her thoughts continue:
Why did she feel such a keen sense of reproach towards him simply because he was a 
card-holding member, so to speak, of this absurd suicide confraternity with its cowardly 
refusal to face the world as it was? It's because (she thought) Eros demands a false 
reassurance, a promise of immortality, in order to flourish – and 'flourish' simply meant 
to bear a child (914–15).
As Baudrillard says, 'Eros is nothing but an immense detour taken by culture 
towards death, which subordinates everything to its own ends'.43 In other words, 
the false reassurance referenced above is effectively a means for society to 
promote the ostensible immortality of its values. Such means will, in due course, 
include the Bomb, society's sterile creation which perpetuates the culture of 
Thanatos. 
The flip-side of the lovers' disagreement, this clash between Eastern and 
Western viewpoints (914), is that Constance's understanding of the world 
43 Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange, p. 149.
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expands. She has become irradiated with Eastern ideas, leading her to question 
her socially endorsed values like many dissenters before her. Affad explains that
there is a man behind me and a man before, I am part of a chain, a link. Our ambitions in 
a mad sort of way are scientific in the most exact sense of that misused word. We are 
setting up a chain-reaction which we believe could counter the laws of  entropy – the 
irreversibility of process leading always to death, dispersal, disaggregation (1119).
Constance ultimately becomes part of this collective refusal of the world's death-
obsession, the counter-nuclear chain reaction.
Despite her failure to intercept the letter, it fails to reach Affad, which 
creates problems for the brotherhood. (The fact he has become an apostate to a 
heretical belief shows that orthodoxy and heresy are not the only options 
available to the individual: the gnostics' Manichaean creed does not exist in a 
Manichaean world.) Languishing in limbo, Affad returns to Egypt to plead with 
the sect to restore his death.  
The gnostic creed champions two ideals in the bid to defeat Monsieur: 
death and love. The sect's suicide-by-proxy is equated with the natural entropy of 
the universe and, in his interview before the sect's representatives, Affad 
identifies the love he shares with Constance as likewise adhering to Nature and 
so also something which should not be resisted (1009). However, in the eyes of 
his brothers, their practices concerning death take primacy over those 
concerning love, (presumably) because they are engaged in a battle with the 
Prince of Darkness and believe in fighting fire with fire.44  
The individual is unavoidably forced to choose between the self and the 
system because love and death are pitted against one another through Cold War 
technologies. In 1968, research at Harvard's medical faculty relocated the event 
of clinical death from the heart to the brain. Whereas service to the system could 
previously have been coincident with love (for example, sacrificing one's life for 
44 'If the whole sum of human knowledge had to be put to the question then only a prophet of 
wrath, a poet of wrath, could do it, and could carry us with him over the rapids into the new 
country which was, according to our friend [Akkad], waiting to claim us.' (111). 
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one's fellow-man), loyalty now became logical – that is, 'sane' – and quantifiable – 
that is, assessable. A supplementary consequence of this decision was that life 
was lengthened, albeit incrementally. The few seconds during which the brain 
shuts down following the cessation of the heart45 can be equated with the 
duration of an atomic-test, which similarly requires technology in order to be 
captured, studied and understood. Fittingly, therefore, the time which separates 
love from duty is also that which divides the world between the industrial and 
atomic eras, and between everyday life and apocalypse. 
The Bomb is a product of the brain, and now the brain is the Bomb's 
ultimate target: as Jonathan Schell writes of atomic-weapons, '[t]heir target is 
someone's mind'.46 Affad remarks that, '[w]hen man starts to feel with his reason, 
with his intelligence, why, Monsieur is there!' (871, emphasis in original). When a 
society's values come from the heart, the idea of their immortality derives from 
the collective desire for them. When they come from the brain, their immortality 
must be argued for: whence the Bomb, which, of course, is intended to destroy 
the brain. The nuclear-cycle is a closed-system, self-exiled from the world (as 
Affad says, 'nature has lost all interest in us' (870)), like an oasis in a desert.47
When the sect accepts Affad's contrition and restores his ritual-death, 
'[f]or the first time he realised the enormous attraction of death, and the secret 
lust for it which animates human beings. Fear and lust' (1017). The dissident is 
not uncontaminated by the 'death-desiring culture' of the Prince of Darkness and 
45 Horizon Research Foundation, 'The Brain During Cardiac Arrest', Horizon Research 
Foundation: Science at the Horizon of Life <www.horizonresearch.org/for-professionals/the-
brain-during-cardiac-arrest> [accessed 16 September 2015]
46 Schell, p. 222.
47 One character's investment in marital-aids after the war (1150) introduces the modern, 
mechanised simulacra of love, the denial of creative sperm in favour of gold, a simulacrum of 
excrement and decay (139). In an interview following the publication of Quinx, Durrell 
laments the fact that the all-pervasive techno-culture is detracting from such fundamental 
elements of human life:
Our sex lives are enormously compromised. The tabloid which I bought yesterday 
reported Americans have invented some sort of snuff which will prevent conception. And 
there's a dipstick which you can dip in your girlfriend's urine and assure yourself you 
won't get something terrible from her. Marvellous! It's the beginning of the end (Bowker, 
pp. 415–16).
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the Cold War, but can choose how to channel the drive. Like the protagonists 
examined in previous chapters, Affad turns his back on Western values in favour 
of the desert in the hope of restoring death to life and so finding peace. 
That said, in the face of his dissent, the sect has pursued a strategy of 
containment: no system will tolerate an individual professing heterogeneous 
loyalties (1118). For all Akkad's emphasis on the role of ambivalence at the heart 
of the gnostic doctrine, it shows itself effectively to be an inversion of the 
orthodox. Seen in this light, and bearing in mind Baudrillard's assertion that 
hegemonic monopoly is bipolar, it is appropriate that carnival – the traditional, 
and authorised, period when society is turned on its head – is an important time 
for the brotherhood (1007). Ultimately, gnosticism is another narrative which 
falls short of its promise to provide a meaning in life.
As Durrell writes, '[w]hen insight hardens into dogma it goes dead' (1180): 
the gap between the sect's narrative and experience swallows any hope of 
salvation.48 Akkad asserts 'there is a kind of nothing which we can do creatively, 
which will add oxygen instead of diminishing it, which is more fruitful than 
fruitless' (217), but this will only maintain the oxygen-supply to the bunker he 
inhabits. '[Sutcliffe] was right to call it a grubby little suicide academy. It isn't 
even a pessimism of a philosophic kind for that would be the opposite of 
something. It's worse, a sort of ungraduated colourless hopelessness about the 
very fabric and structure of our thought, our universe' (242). Ultimately, the sect 
passively ignores the hegemony it condemns, and thus is bested by it. Even 
pessimistic acknowledgement of the world – that is, creative-despair-in-practice 
(27) – would constitute agency and so raise the possibility of change: after all, 
'[e]verything is conquered by submission, even submission itself, even as matter 
is conquered by entropy, and truth by its opposite' (1124; 928).
48 While Schell makes the point that denial of socio-political reality can be seen positively as a 
refusal of fate, the crux is surely how that refusal is enacted. See Schell, p. 8.
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Affad's murderer, the madman Mnemidis
The Egyptian murderer Mnemidis is confined to the Genevan asylum where 
Constance works, but the psychoanalysis which it practises is inadequate to 
contain his homicidal desires: her colleague Schwarz considers him either 'too 
sane or too mad […] everything he says is true and yet it's all surface' (979–80). 
Constructs such as sanity and insanity become questionable in a world which 
permits the Holocaust and the Bomb. 
Because insanity operates across the defining system, Mnemidis can draw 
on such constructs and uses them to conceptualise his reality. He tells 
Constance: 'even when I was acting, I myself was only acting. Where had I gone? 
My I? My eye?' (985, emphasis in original). His 'I' is his 'eye', since the individual 
draws from their understanding of the environment in order to define 
themselves.49 Mnemidis can be inherently performance, elementally difference. 
Without an I, he has no fixed standpoint; without an eye, he has no stable 
perspective of his own, instead being always simulacra of other things. This 
allows him to turn his environmental signifiers on themselves to expose their 
insubstantiality. This logic is in operation when he swallows Constance's watch 
'to stop the world' (986). Through this act, Mnemidis internalises the dictates of 
the mechanised world which seeks to contain him, becoming its equal and 
negating its authority. 
Being without a stable identity, Mnemidis is ruled by the forces of 
uncertainty (1130). Unlike the Westerners in conflict with atomic-society, he 
thrives in this condition since he is not torn with ambivalence caused by the 
conflict between the hegemony's reassuring narrative and his own experience. 
He does not need to choose a myth by which to live. Instead, he mirrors nature, 
in which '[t]here is no norm, no absolute' (141): 'he was equally ripe for black 
mischief or the felicity of pure godhead. It was all according to how the dice fell 
49 Jacques Lacan, 'The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the I as Revealed in 
Psychoanalytic Experience', in Écrits: A Selection, trans. by Alan Sheridan (London: 
Routledge, 2001), pp. 1–6.
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[…] he recognised that nature itself was completely indifferent' (1130). He is not 
intrinsically good or bad, just as the energy produced by nuclear-fusion is not 
intrinsically productive or destructive, the outcome depending on the situation.
Consequently, in his hands a handbag is 'at once defensive and aggressive' 
(982). This totem is made of 'cheap crocodile skin'; thus associated with the 
Ancient Egyptian signifier of death and sterility, it represents anti-creation. 
However, being a handbag, it is a mere simulacrum of it: the madman's evil is, to 
use Akkad's words, 'untrue but it is real' (116), that is, dangerous. It is his 
strategic-defence initiative; like Reagan's nuclear-deterrent (which, after four 
years of development, was proposed the year that Sebastian, in which this 
episode occurs, was published), it is intended for display without being used: '[i]t 
was probably quite empty, but for him it was a kind of bomb' (982). Later, when 
the asylum-staff search Mnemidis' belongings for Affad's stolen letter, it is not in 
the bag; nevertheless, Constance still fears he might have it. The madman's 
power is unlocatable and enduring and thus a source of paranoia, just like the 
concept of the Bomb irrespective of how many missiles are destroyed as a 
consequence of bilateral de-escalation agreements. Although he trained as a 
magician in his youth (1132), the psychopath's inclination is far from dovelike: 
his sleight-of-hand and mind-games are equal to working a cruise of a very 
different nature. He has conjured up a Schroedinger's catastrophe, and the 
eventual fallout is lethal for Affad.
To effect his escape, Mnemidis disguises himself as a member of staff 
(1085), thereby again appropriating one of the signifiers through which the 
hegemony operates in order to undermine it. This efficient attack on the 
institutional order shows that his insanity is logical, if different.50 As it is, the 
logic of the institution is demonstrated by a 'long and exhausting series of blood-
tests and nerve-tests, of analyses and readings, of cephalograms and cardiograms 
50 Baudrillard writes that the Freudian death-drive fails since it rationalises a phenomenon 
which should remain outside the system (see Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange, pp. 148–51, 
discussed in Hegarty, p. 43). The value of this criticism is evident in the shortcomings of the 
asylum-nurse's attempt to negate the madman's threat.
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[…] the whole rigmarole of quantitative science [which] must have a final outing 
before restoring [Mnemidis] to his world of occasional involuntary murder' 
(1080). Western science, whether Freudian or Manhattan, pursues its 
quantitative goals in isolation from the world it affects.
Seeking revenge on Constance, Mnemidis kills the swaddled figure in her 
bed. Immediately, a 'whole mass of gloom-laden preoccupation seemed at once to 
fall from his shoulders. It was as if his conscience had voided itself like a sack' 
(1132). Having no intrinsic self, he cannot be intrinsically good or evil; having no 
stable viewpoint from which to judge the act, he projects the morality of it on the 
already-vilified other. For him, this self-serving reverse-logic creates meaning. 
Logic is paramount, even, effectively, over the nature which Mnemidis valorises 
since, by adherence to logic, destruction can be read as entropy. Accordingly, the 
Nazi or atomic war-machine can justify wrongdoing in the pursuit of an ultimate 
good.51 
Furthermore, any certification of the death of sanity absolves the 
individual of the responsibility for choice (245). By identifying Mnemidis as 
insane, Freud's fledgling science acquits him of Affad's death. That is not to say 
that responsibility lies with the system since, by definition, it cannot be at fault. 
Logic ascribes the murder to nature. Consequently, death is not exchanged, and 
so remains outside the system: the system is safe. 
When Mnemidis mistakes Affad's sheeted form for that of the doctor, the 
consequent death is arguably the most significant in the Quintet. It is an 
accident, collateral damage in a battle between two opponents with 
irreconcilably different perspectives on the world. The missive decreeing Affad's 
death has been launched and cannot be called back but, in the event, the lethal 
strike is perpetrated blindly, its agent effectively distant from the atrocity he 
wreaks and acting in response to a simulation of the world: Mnemidis might as 
51 See Henry L. Stimson, 'The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb', Harper's Magazine, 194 (1947), 
97–107. Stimson was the US Secretary of State and Secretary of War, 1940–45.
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well be looking at a monitor on the other side of the globe. The mistaken murder 
achieves the same result as the sect's ritual-death (as does an atomic-bomb, 
irrespective of who drops it). However, Affad's death has not been accomplished 
in accordance with gnostic-practices. Contrary to the madman's logic, therefore, 
meaning comes from the agent, not the situation.
(4) Schwarz's suicide – the failure of Western civilisation
Like Mnemidis, the system might be logical but display 'the rationality of 
irrationality'.52 Just as a state would wish to present any nuclear-strike it 
launched as both sensible and inevitable in the circumstances, when Constance's 
colleague, Schwarz, commits suicide it is evident that 'he had been anxious to 
present his decision as reasonable, the act as pardonable because quite logical. 
Nevertheless there was some guilt mixed up in the business, for he had felt the 
need to make a case for himself' (1154). The thinking which equates the 
pardonable and the logical is problematic, since logic does not necessarily imply 
reason or sanity, as the psychiatrists well know. Logic alone might be sufficient 
support for murder committed by a state or an individual, but Schwarz is 
compelled to rationalise his actions to himself and the colleague with whom he 
shares a world-view.
Deserting Lily
Schwarz has received a photograph taken when his wife, Lily, is liberated from a 
Nazi death-camp which shows her 'worn to the skeleton with hunger' (1155): she 
has become death. Like her namesake (Affad's wife), she has lost her mind and 
her husband blames himself. The two men are also united by their wish to 
escape the evil of the world by suicide; the difference is that, for Affad, the evil 
lies without, whereas for Schwarz it lies within, since he abandoned his wife as 
52 Herman Kahn, quoted in Schell, p. 204.
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the Germans advanced on Vienna. Good man or not, he did nothing and evil 
triumphed. He is responsible for the 'hair-raising' (1155) human-monster his wife 
has become which is a metonym for the world which gave birth to the 
concentration camps. However, the photo shows that her hair and teeth have 
fallen out and, when Schwarz speaks to her by telephone, her mouth produces 
only a dry, clicking sound: thus resembling a victim of atomic-fallout,53 Lily is 
also a synecdoche of the world which gave birth to the Bomb. While the Nazi-
machine with its camps and ovens has been dismantled, the Bomb remains, an 
indelible scorch on the planet and psyche, condemning the scientists who 
husbanded it. Lily, similarly, is 'a living, breathing reproach to the man who had 
been responsible' (1156). Although Schwarz's suicide is driven by personal 
remorse, it is reclaimed for the political by the fact it echoes Livia's fatal 
ideological disillusionment. Indeed, even in the moment itself, he recalls a man 
who tried to kill himself but who only shot out his eyes (1157), proving that the 
necessarily unique act of self-slaughter is but a simulacrum of someone else's 
suicide. Furthermore, a famous actor at the ritual in the desert is said to trade 
on 'the stagecraft of suicide' (105), underlining the point that, fundamentally, 
suicide is always fake because death (symbolic violence) is by definition beyond 
control. Suicide is a simulation of death intended to exceed the hegemonic 
simulation of the world, a pre-emptive strike against the authority which would 
claim one's life.
Schwarz's recollection also calls to mind the Japanese soldiers whose eyes 
have dribbled down their cheeks in John Hersey's account of Hiroshima.54 
Fittingly, just as the war is ended by the Bomb it created, Schwarz replaces the 
traditional firearm with the scientific projectile of a lethal injection (1157–58) for 
what Constance considers his 'self-annihilation' (1163). 
53 See John Hersey, Hiroshima (London and New York: Penguin, 1946), pp. 102–03.
54 Hersey, p. 73.
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(5) An over-arching, death-driven machine-culture
The centre-piece of Geneva's celebrations when peace is declared is a lake-front 
spectacle of fireworks and projected simulations of wars throughout history 'in 
the hope that by closing the whole chapter a notion might be launched of some 
change of direction' (1148) . However, '[i]t closed no door upon the past, it opened 
no door upon the future' (1149) because of humanity's perpetual drive for suicide.
Earlier, in Nazi-occupied Avignon, Constance notes that a 'deep-seated 
self-destructiveness was the most one could diagnose about such a state of 
affairs. But it involved everyone. You could not opt out. Even those comfortable 
neutrals up in Geneva, though they thought themselves out of reach, were 
involved in this calamitous historic process – it would reach them in time' (755). 
Her thoughts anticipate not only the danger of radiation, which marks the point 
when natural law is infected by suicidal human nature, but instances such as the 
American bombing of officially neutral Cambodia in 1969, which became public 
knowledge while Durrell was writing Monsieur.
The suicidal-potential of mechanised warfare is already evident when a 
sortie of German tanks, chasing an 'invisible foe', get caught up in a fire-storm of 
their own making and are destroyed: 'And slowly, from two ends of the horizon, 
the world began to burn' (616). Nevertheless, the Nazi command considers this 
misadventure 'only a minor incident in an uninterrupted chain of successful 
actions – they were almost bored with the reiterated signals which told of 
objectives attained' (616). The statistics produced by the military-operation are 
paramount and the unambiguous integers leave no room for failure. In 
Baudrillardian terms, the code of the system excludes death; 'a violent real does 
subsist as a kind of fallout, as “events continue at ground level […] but subtly 
they no longer have any meaning”'.55 This lack of meaning, by which death goes 
unrecognised, goes towards explaining a character's belief that '[t]he will to self-
55 Hegarty, p. 61, the inner quote coming from Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, 
trans. by Sheila Faria Glaser (Ann Arbor: U of Michigan P, 1994), p. 36.
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destruction seems more advanced in the more gifted nations or peoples' (1339), 
that is, where the system is most established. Constance reaches the same 
hypothesis, concluding that the death-wish comes from worldly success, not ruin 
(1035). Little wonder that, when she sees a graffito in the occupied city claiming 
that the end of the world has begun, this message appears, for once, sane (767).
A different suicide-by-proxy: Blanford
In contrast to the other protagonists so far examined in this thesis, Blanford 
recognises that the desert is not beyond the war ('the desert is out of bounds to 
ordinary civilians' (631)). This recognition is complicated, however, by the fact 
that he adopts the military narrative of an army-uniform in order to experience 
the desert as a tourist. By introducing this simulacrum to the desert, he 
accentuates the unreality (that which lies outside the system) of the encounter 
and so, as in The Sheltering Sky, tea in the Sahara heralds death. The site of 
interest he visits turns out to be a militarised zone used for bombing-practice, 
the picnic-spot a simulation of war (657ff). There are no distinctions between 
danger and safety, combatant and citizen. 
The ambivalence of the system which caused the accident cannot be 
acknowledged: it is the excluded abstract which sets up home at the heart of the 
system. This absence becomes the presence of shrapnel within the individual: 
the fallout of modern warfare literally radiates through Blanford. By 
transforming him into 'the man with the iron spine' (282), mechanised conflict 
blurs the distinctions between self and Other, nature and science, creation and 
destruction. For him, the war is neither spatially nor temporally contained. The 
shrapnel makes him a perpetual emblem of mechanised conflict which thus 
mirrors and fuses with the indefinitely deferred horrors of the atomic age. Just 
as every Bomb harks back to 'the Gadget' at Alamogordo and heralds the 
explosion which will annihilate history and the first explosion of any Bomb is 
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also the last explosion, so in the text space and time are collapsed: Blanford's 
flight to the desert shows that removing oneself from the war is not sufficient to 
remove the war from oneself. The incident clouds Blanford's sense of self as his 
cerebral cortex, the mushroom-shaped seat of selfhood, internalises this 
archetypal site of death ('my brain swelled and became full of darkness and sand' 
(660)). He is half-killed by the military-apparatus supposed to protect him but, 
consistent with the concerns of this thesis, his desert-experience pre-empts 
literal annihilation by the State and allows him to pass to a new life. 
Initially, his accident despatches him to the heart of the mechanised 
hegemony, as exemplified by a military hospital. This authority forcibly remodels 
his physical Otherness to make it the same as itself56 by means of a body-brace 
(302) – an excess of the 'real' – which forces a simulation of convention on to his 
contortions, forcing him into the pose of an upright citizen. This would seem to 
condemn the author to hegemonic control; however, given that that which 
removes the body from its purported natural-state brings it into the realm of the 
symbolic,57 Blanford thus acquires agency to exceed the system. The half-death of 
his body now furthers the quasi-death of his non-conformist mind: within the 
regulated practice and spaces of the institution, Blanford comes to play across 
the grain.
A friend arranges for a nurse to care for him in the hospital and she 
initiates sexual relations (667–69). Blanford recalls: 'With her I rose from the 
dead' (669). In the light of this wording, she assumes the role of the goddess Isis 
who gathered the fragments of her lover, Osiris, from the Sahara and similarly 
cared for his body, in that case mummifying him and thus granting him new life 
as the king of reincarnation. In practice, Blanford unites himself through his 
writing, using it to harmonise the contradictions between hegemonic narrative 
and personal experience which society forces him to maintain. He effects an 
56 Hegarty, p. 122.
57 Hegarty, p. 132 note 11, referring to Baudrillard, Télémorphose (Paris: Sens and Tonka, 2001), 
pp. 19–20.
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impossible exchange of the self by inventing a number of writers, contradictory 
variations on himself,58 thus becoming a fusion of subject and object, slipping 
between realities which lack clear distinctions, inviting deliberate defection or 
accidental apostasy. Thus does he naturalise the split-selfhood and accommodate 
the fictional constituents of the world without straining to hold together the 
contradictions of the hegemony. Blanford's characters are not representations 
but simulacra, since they are versions of his friends which precede the reality, 
appearing as they do in the first volume of the Quintet.59 His novel is thus not a 
representation but a copy of his world written in his quest to heal the pain of his 
life and of the age. Through his characters, he brings death and ambiguity within 
the system. Baudrillard argues that death enforces entropy on assemblages (the 
goal of Eros)60 and the coming of the Second World War leads to the 
disintegration of the group of friends in Provence. Blanford, however, writes a 
story in which Piers' death is a means to life, and bring old friends together 
again.
The novelist survives the Quintet alone of Constance's trinity of desert-
adventurers from whom she learns its alternative wisdom. Sam, a soldier, travels 
there as a representative of the Western hegemony, while Affad brings the desert-
perspective to Western society. Both are killed in misunderstandings: both their 
world-views founder when in contact with multiplicitous reality. Despite 
Blanford's devastating experience in the desert, he learns to incorporate it into 
his everyday life and ultimately benefits from it. Being a writer, he is aware that 
all truths and dogmas are mere projections, as illusory as the self-deluding sect-
member Durrell briefly makes him at the close of Monsieur. Just as various 
realities fuse in the Quintet, so do different elements combine in him. 
58 Baudrillard, Impossible Exchange, pp. 77–78. Baudrillard's thoughts expressed in an interview 
in Hegarty pp. 146–47 were also useful in arriving at this idea.
59 Baudrillard, Simulacra, p. 1; this idea is expanded on in Hegarty, pp. 57–58.
60 Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange, p. 150.
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The Quintet repeatedly distinguishes between knowledge and experience 
(142; 292). The gnostics operate on a symbolic level beyond reason which must be 
lived in order to be understood (292): '[i]t was as if Akkad had exhausted all the 
possibilities of language' which shapes society, hems it in (144). The truth is 
unreal (116), hence 'language [is] an obstacle, a clumsy hurdle […] words conceal 
more than they reveal' (253).61  
The importance of ambiguity in the construction of meaning is evident 
when Piers confronts Akkad about the magazine article which suggests that the 
ritual was a tourist-scam (165–66). Piers has already been described as someone 
who will believe anything (104); discussing the article, he says that he 'wouldn't 
want to believe something false' but that he simultaneously 'need[s]' his 
experience in the desert to have been true (161). Piers engages the kind of double-
think demanded by the Cold War state, denying the uncertainties of society (in 
this case, the secret society) and orchestrating his loyalty by subsuming his 
awareness of the truth; a case of faith over facts ('you were able to go on believing 
something which you knew to be untrue' (163, emphasis in original)). This 
incident mirrors, albeit through inversion, certain of the Congress for Cultural 
Freedom's publications which promoted the West at the expense of communism 
during the 1950s and 60s while failing to acknowledge their CIA-sponsorship. 
Just as the sect kills its own while the CIA kills others, Akkad's article (since he 
planted it in order to test the initiate's faith) inspires doubt about itself rather 
than others. The sect wishes to introduce ambivalence, while the Agency 
promotes certainty. This is on account of the different positions the two 
clandestine organisations occupy in relation to orthodox society. Indeed, the 
gnostics' tactic of presenting doubtful evidence in order to garner greater 
credibility recalls the defence of black-listed Americans who cited past 
61 The power of language is evident when the Nazis retreat from Avignon and the citizens hardly 
dare put their liberation into words. However, Sutcliffe's word-games demonstrate how 
language, while so powerful, is insubstantial to the extent that it can be made its opposite 
(1093). Consequently, disorder is always a breath away and it is dangerous to identify oneself 
with any label. Significantly, the sources of meaning which characters seek – political fervour, 
religious conviction, aesthetic or chemical transport, love – all lie beyond language. 
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incidences of secrecy in order to bolster their claims of candour before the 
HUAC.
A different suicide-by-proxy: Constance
After Constance learns of Sam's death in the accident which maimed Blanford, 
the first familiar face she encounters is Sutcliffe (who has stepped out of the 
pages of Blanford's novel). 'She wanted to avoid talking about Sam with half of 
her; with the other half she realised that it might help her to find her way out of 
this temporary numbness, the way back into life' (689). Her melancholia creates 
a split-subjecthood: the person she is now is so much the product of war and its 
integral tensions that, when she considers a time after the conflict, she is 
consumed by restlessness (848). She is not a coherent, stable identity. In this 
sense, the epitome of war is Cold War, which enforces distinctions while 
destroying them (for example, between sense and nonsense),62 and the conflict it 
displaces on to the everyday life of the individual who is ever-conscious that the 
Bomb might drop.
Her conversations with Affad teach her the importance of balancing 
reason and emotion to better negotiate the world's demands on her sense of self. 
As a result, she comes to ask Blanford for every detail of the accident. Since '[t]he 
same people are also others without realising it' (978), by hearing of this past 
event of Sam's death, Constance is facing up to the future event of her own, 
narrativising something which defies narrative, in the same way that the 
Western dissident in the Sahara pre-empts nuclear-apocalypse in order to 
alleviate their tension and reclaim their lives. Constance irradiates herself with 
harmful elements of her loved-one's death, the fusion of their experiences 
generating creative rather than destructive power. 
Affad's subsequent death gives her life for the simple fact that she was the 
62 Nadel, p. 59.
193
intended victim, but it also, like Sam's, gives her life in a qualitative sense. As 
Constance unwraps his body, she recalls his tale of an excavated Egyptian 
mummy which was found to have been stabbed after death (1133). Affad's fresh 
corpse sheds 'surprisingly little blood' as if he, too, was already dead when 
attacked (1135). These allusions to a double-death can be read as ironic inversions 
of Affad's fate, since he has effectively been killed before his death. Equally, 
however, a lack of blood suggests a lesser injury: the attack by what is, after all, 
Constance's enemy has been less than fatal and his target (Constance) will 
survive it. Thus reading Affad as, like Livia, a proxy-suicide for her, Constance 
again mirrors the Western dissident who 'dies' in the desert and thereby escapes 
the nuclear-state's control over their mortality and gains a second life. Her 
reaction to the corpse, after all, is: 'So the future has arrived! Life will be no 
longer a waste of breath!' (1134). Whereas before, she believes there is little point 
in 'trying to pre-empt reality when destiny may well be preparing to make an end 
of us in the next five minutes' (1121), from now on her life is her own.63
As Constance says, death 'revives the whole universe in us at a blow' (1182), 
this inner multiplicity being the selves or themes which are at once smaller and 
larger than the individual.64 Her friends' experiences enable her to pass through 
death to be reborn; their example inspires her, amid all the death, to choose life, 
to choose the myths by which she is to live. Richard Rorty writes that 'self-
knowledge [i]s self-creation'65 and, with her learning, Constance remakes herself 
in accordance with her own desires. Whereas Affad sees himself as a link in a 
chain reaction which will destroy hegemonic norms, only to die without 
contributing to it, Constance is the end-product of another chain reaction, and 
63 This is the moment of her psychic-birth of Chinese philosophy (255).
64 'All the people are parts of larger people or composed of parts of smaller people, enlarged or 
diminished according to need' (1217).
65 Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1989), p. 27, 
quoted in James Gifford, 'Self-Authenticity as Social Resistance: Reading Empiric Approaches 
to Social Identity, Self-Esteem, and Fear in Durrell’s Monsieur', in Culture + the State:  
Alternative Interventions – Critical Works from the Proceedings of the 2003 Conference at the  
University of Alberta, ed. by James Gifford and Gabrielle Zezulka-Mailloux, 4 vols (Edmonton: 
CRC Humanities Studio, 2003), IV, pp. 212–24 (p. 214).
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succeeds where the gnostic dogma fails. In the sect's form of suicide, the proxy 
holds the agency; in her version, the proxy is passive. In other words, she denies 
any system any authority over her while diffusing the threat of the Other 
(whether this system or its alleged opposite) which otherwise dictates how she 
should live her life.
By the end of the Quintet, Constance recognises that no fixed belief-
system fits the world. While society might hold that the desert is the space of 
death (as was indeed the case with Sam), she has learnt that so is society (as 
Affad's experience proved). In the face of a world which demands that truth be 
objective, she can acknowledge that it is an individual achievement. When Sam 
dies, Constance rejects her previous faith in love but, after her experience with 
Affad and his death, she now feels that she is free to love truly (1317). Her love for 
Blanford is the means she chooses in pursuit of self-fulfilment and meaning in 
life. She escapes the quasi-death of the half-life dictated by the state.66
Conclusion: There can be no conclusion
The reader leaves the characters of the Quintet where they were first 
encountered, in Provençe, 'a land which from ancient times had given itself up to 
dreaming, to fabulating, to tale-telling, with the firm belief that stories should 
have no ending' (247). Suicide and sectarian proxy have given way to a different 
sort of quest for meaning: Constance, Blanford and their friends are about to 
enter a cave beneath the arches of the Pont du Gard, where the lost treasure of 
the Knights Templar might be awaiting discovery.67 Both its existence and its 
66 In the final chapter of Monsieur, an older Constance and Blanford are members of the gnostic-
sect, which would undermine the peace she attains at the end of the Quintet. I would suggest 
that these people are not the protagonists of the later four books and that this chapter is a 
transitionary reality between the book-within-a-book, Monsieur, and the 'real' world of the rest 
of the work.
67 This construction of ancient hegemony has been undermined, literally, by the ambitions of 
the Third Reich which stored valuables beneath it, safe in the knowledge that the Allies would 
avoid destroying the historic site, and, more recently, its columns – rising up before falling 
outwards into arches, one stratum billowing above another into the heavens – have been 
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nature are ambiguous, being possibly material wealth or esoteric wisdom (461). 
The overflowing Grail corresponds to the flowering lotus of the yogi, the 
blossoming tree of the Buddha and the fertile Tree of Knowledge of Good and 
Evil. However, when these are caught in Monsieur's mirror, the simulation in the 
glass is the mushroom cloud billowing upwards and falling back to the sterile 
desert. Creation becomes anti-creation. As Blanford says, 'everything is 
obstinately and deliberately turning into its opposite' (1204), which expresses 
the Cold War dynamic of immanent reversal.68 In this way, the unreal-but-true 
gnostic-creed fuses with the rationality of irrationality of the nuclear-
confrontation, the alchemy which turns consciousness into gold (215; 427ff) 
blurring with the quantum-physicists' principle that matter and energy are one 
and the same, confusing Cold War political philosophy and material security.69
This is what Durrell's meditation on mortality simulates. Like Blanford, 
he recognises that the individual can create fiction, that personal experience is 
constructed (and so features characters who are authors) and that the world 
overshadowed by the American mushroom cloud. Additionally, the edifice's soaring layers are 
not above being surmounted for subversive ends, such as when the young friends stage a 
clandestine surveillance of the Prince's hedonistic soirée.
68 Reversibility is a key idea running throughout Baudrillard's work. See Douglas Kellner, 'Jean 
Baudrillard', in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy  
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/baudrillard> [accessed 30 May 2012], particularly section 4, 
'Into the 1990s: From Immanent Reversal to Impossible Exchange'; Douglas Kellner, 'Jean 
Baudrillard (1929–2007): A Critical Overview', in Baudrillard Now: Current Perspectives in  
Baudrillard Studies, ed. by Ryan Bishop (Cambridge and Malden: Polity, 2009), pp. 17–27 (pp. 
23–24); and William Merrin, 'Floral Tributes, Binge-Drinking and the Ikea Riot Considered as 
an Up-Hill Bicycle Race', in Jean Baudrillard: Fatal Theories, ed. by David B. Clarke, Marcus A. 
Doel, William Merrin and Richard G. Smith (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 61–
82 (p. 62). For the idea's persistence in his last major work, see Douglas Kellner, 'Some 
Reflections on Baudrillard's “On Disappearance”', in Baudrillard Now, pp. 154–58 (p. 157).
Schell discusses Cold War reversibility in Schell, p. 201. In 1955, Churchill outlined the 
realpolitik which would safeguard the future thus: 'Safety will be the sturdy child of terror, 
and survival the twin brother of annihilation' (Schell, p. 197), thus articulating the bipolar 
nature of hegemonic monopoly. 
69 If, as the gnostics hold, under the reign of Monsieur thought has become matter – which is a 
simulacra of excrement (139), the true currency of the Prince of Darkness – it seems that their 
own insight is not exempt. However, immanent reversal allows for redemption since, as 
Schwarz tells Constance following his discussions with Affad, 'matter is not excrement but 
thought' (991). It is possible to overcome the materialistic world of the Prince of Darkness 
from within, working across it creatively. It is just a matter of engaging with it rather than 
passively ignoring it.
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(hegemonic narrative) is a fiction (and so reveals that the events of Monsieur are 
not 'real').70 However, he goes further in that he recognises that we, too, are 
fictions, fusions of hegemonic narrative and personal experience. His characters 
are less simulations of himself than like the dolls which Pia arranges around 
herself, all seated on the same level, because he acknowledges the ambivalence of 
the self, rejecting the fiction of the ego, like the Templars, gnostics, Buddhists 
and insane. While Blanford is aware that one's consciousness distorts one's 
understanding of the world (facts do not come from objective reality), it is also 
true that the world distorts one's consciousness (and so neither do facts come 
from narrative). Neither narrative nor experience has precedence, and the 
individual must move rhizomatically between the two, acknowledging each while 
undermining the distinction, drawing on both but never relying exclusively on 
either in a process of immanent reversal. As one of the Quintet's epigraphs asks, 
'[b]etween the completely arbitrary and the completely determined perhaps 
there is a way?' (298). They must become, in the Deleuzian sense, a becoming. 
Blanford is a closed-system and so has nothing against which to define 
himself, which is why he needs to practise impossible exchange. When his 
creations speak back and write their own stories across the official narrative 
(172; 1168), he reacts: 'I am annoyed because my power is not absolute over 
[Sutcliffe] – he is after all my creation; but he can sometimes break loose and 
show traces of free will. My domination is incomplete, damn him […] He 
mutinied. He must be punished!' (901). Even if his interaction with his 
characters leads him to understand the role that (his) fictions play in informing 
his reality, Blanford claims objective authority over them, aided by the fact that 
70 As Akkad says, '[y]ou speak about society […] but your view of it will fundamentally depend 
on what view you take of the human psyche which has formed it, of which it is a reflection' 
(166). Since 'human consciousness distorts in the act of observing' (323; 263–64) and 'each one 
brings a little of himself to what he sees' (128), the amoral, neutral nature which Mnemidis 
aspires to emulate 'can only reproduce the limitations of his understanding, the boundaries of 
his personal vision' (1260). Durrell has his novelist ponder the fact that '[b]y a singular 
paradox (perhaps inherent in all writing?) the passages that he knew would be regarded as 
over-theatrical or unreal (“people don't behave like that”) would be the truth, and the rest 
which rang somehow true, the purest fabrication' (280).
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they acknowledge their fictitiousness.71 Sutcliffe, is conscious of his fictional 
nature and so is what Baudrillard terms a vital illusion.72 The model he 
constructs precedes the reality (since it is the first volume of the Quintet); like 
the sect, he ultimately ignores the world while he tries to generate the real. He is 
what Baudrillard calls an objective illusion, failing to acknowledge anything 
outside himself. Blanford wants to simulate democracy in order to consolidate 
his power, mirroring the spread of democracy which expanded American 
influence over the globe.73 He is a hegemonic authority, denying the viability of 
alternative narratives in order to claim ideological immortality. Similarly, the 
superpowers treated the world as their own creation, theirs to do with as they 
wished (and, in a sense, it was, since they created the Cold War world). Their 
most significant creation was the Other behind the Iron Curtain; as the world, so 
the Quintet: 'Durrell later said, half of the characters existed only in the minds of 
the other half'.74 The fact that Blanford's characters step effortlessly from his 
page to the world demonstrates that, within the Quartet, his writing exists on an 
equal level with the fictions of the hegemony.
Of course, this is precisely Blanford's shortcoming. There is something 
outside himself which he cannot contain, not least the war which has literally 
invaded his physical self. The shrapnel-suffused scribe has shut himself in the 
fall-out shelter of his own fiction, but it is inadequate to protect him from the 
outside. As his own thoughts conclude, '[r]ealising that all truths are equally 
false he becomes a posthumous person' (930), like The Sheltering Sky's Kit 
unmoored, dead to the system. Such are 'the perils […] of absolute freedom' 
71 Consequently, he can safely contemplate a scenario in which his creation 'wrote a book to 
prove that the great Blanford is simply the fiction of one of his fictions'. This is simply a 
fictionalisation of his own hegemony, rather than an acknowledgement that he is a fiction in 
the sense of an incoherent, unstable entity. After all, he advises Sutcliffe that they 'would have 
to make do with reality – it was all they had to work on; it's boring, this question of there 
being several different versions of a self, so to speak, no?' (921), despite the fact that he is 
talking to an unreal version of himself.
72 Baudrillard, The Illusion of the End, trans. by Chris Turner (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1994), p. 
94. Hegarty, pp. 83–84, provides a useful summary of this line of thought.
73 Nadel, p. 7.
74 Bowker, p. 358.
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(1233). The Quintet shows that all systems (Freudian, Nazi, gnostic) fail since 
their narratives ignore the multiplicity of the world.75
Since there is no such thing as truth, hegemonic simulation can only be 
fought through excess.76 The final sentence of the Quintet is as follows: 'It was at 
this precise moment that reality prime rushed to the aid of fiction and the 
totally unpredictable began to take place!' (1367). It brings the '“outside” – the 
symbol of prime reality to a prisoner of any category' (944) – within the 
narrative, highlighting the ambiguity of existence in a world of competing 
truths, the limits of any system. It ushers in a flow of influence which Blanford 
and the Cold War hegemony denies, a fusion which could destroy the system.77 
By moving between objective illusion and vital illusion, writing across the 
horizon of the system to recuperate that which is excluded, the Quintet 
undermines the (literary) orthodoxy.
Bowker argues that the message of the Quintet is the need to accept reality 
and reconcile opposites,78 but I would suggest that the former precludes the 
75 Barbara Fisher Williamson writes in her review of Quinx for The New York Times:
What makes the single volumes most perplexing is that the systems the different 
characters propose to give life meaning […] are described with such conviction and 
passion that they seem sufficient rather than provisional and flawed. Reading the 
theories in any one volume alone, one is tempted to think Mr. Durrell is silly. Reading 
them all, one is convinced he is wise ('Links and Winks', New York Times, 15 September 
1985 <www.nytimes.com/1985/09/15/books/links-and-winks.html> [accessed 13 August 
2012]).
Durrell has created Blanford, who has invented Sutcliffe, who writes the author 
Bloshford into being. Every author(ity) is exposed as a fiction. The four scribes are a set of 
Russian dolls on a Möbius strip, passing in and out of one another by way of quantum 
mechanics. Furthermore, every author(ity)s' creations speak back to them: Sutcliffe to 
Blanford, Blanford to Durrell, Durrell to the Cold War hegemony. The chain reaction of 
dissent reaches beyond the text of the Quintet, exploding the myths of the Cold War and 
ensuring that ambiguity works across both the text and the world.
76 Hegarty, p. 82; as Hegarty writes, 'excessive simulation gets you beyond the simulated world's 
insistence on its own reality' (Hegarty, p. 99). For an example, see Baudrillard, The Gulf War 
Did Not Take Place, trans. by Paul Patton (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1995), p. 39.
77 If the fiction was truly a closed-system, never to be disrupted by reality, the reality would not 
need to come to its aid, much as the US military presence in Guatemala did not have to 
'become real' unless and until the fictitious nature of the insurgency invented by the CIA was 
in danger of being exposed (Nadel, p. 160).
78 Bowker, p. 401.
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latter by recognising that the individual does not need to swear loyalty to one 
side or another but can operate rhizomatically between the two. Such fusion of 
extremes (which remain opposed) is possible since they are equally fictitious, 
immanently their reverse.79 There is ultimately only uncertainty in life (263–64) 
but this is not the problem: certainty is the problem. The individual must choose 
a myth which invests their life with meaning, but be conscious of the 
ambivalence immanent to that choice and so also engage with the world. 
Durrell embraces ambiguity while, fittingly, containing its danger within 
his text. Durrell related his Quintet to an Elizabethan dance called a quincunx,80 
which suggests that through the text he is leading an interweaving chain of self-
destroyers contained within a Möbius strip. A quincunx is also a five-pointed 
symbol resembling pyramid seen from above (a cross in a box, a bombardier's 
target). The antagonists can commit suicide if they wish, but the contained 
explosion will not be able to take the rest of the world – friend or foe, combatant 
or collateral – with them. 
Durrell enacts an impossible exchange not of himself but of holocausts, 
defusing the one he fears with the one he has survived, the original which would 
be rendered mere simulation through atomic excess. Like the Westerner who 
goes to the Sahara, he pre-empts one apocalypse with another. He is always 
moving, rhizomatically, between the Nazi and the nuclear, his pen the waist of an 
hourglass through which pass the ashes of the Aryans' ovens and the sand of the 
apocalyptic wastes, achieving fusion.81 After a nuclear-apocalypse, there will be 
no opportunity for mourning, and he naturalises this fact through the gnostics' 
ritual-suicides, for which no mourning is needed. Durrell's fiction inverts, 
79 As Akkad says, 'what is imagined with enough intensity has a claim to be real enough' (216); 
for example, the German forces fear an invasion on the south coast of France as a result of 
Allied propaganda (814) which, after all, in Guy Debord's words, is ideology become material 
(The Society of the Spectacle, trans. by Donald Nicholson-Smith (New York: Zone, 1994), 
chapter 9 (sections 212–21)). The idea that the physical is a reflection of the mental is espoused 
by the psychotherapist Georg Groddeck, whom Durrell greatly admired (Bowker, p. 247).
80 Bowker p. 358.
81 Durrell emphasises that the Bomb is a Jewish weapon of pure matter (870; 890) and as such is 
a Faustian revenge – and, ultimately, a Pyrrhic victory – for the Holocaust.
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subverts and perverts the atomic world in order to make it habitable once again.
While the gnostic-sect sees ambivalence as a reason for passivity, he 
'believed that it was through personal experimentation and psychological 
wholeness that human happiness was attainable […] practice rather than belief 
[…] If he had a wider solution it was a negative one – against scientific 
rationalism and the depredations of modern technology, against materialism'.82 
This rejection of hegemonic narratives is why there can be no conclusion. There 
is no linear, progressive history towards a single end-point,83 as favoured by the 
hegemony ambitious for ideological immortality. The Templar treasure is still 
out there, hidden. As, indeed, is the sect: invisible, out of the forefront of public 
consciousness like the Bomb at the time Durrell began the Quintet, effectively an 
absence within society, the clandestine presence of death within the system. The 
sect can radiate throughout society, spreading undetected, infecting people 
irrespective of where they officially stand. The ultimate meaning of the Quintet – 
and the world outside – lies within the reader, the weight of its thirteen-hundred-
odd pages pressing on them to shed any passivity, accept the fictitious nature of 
reality in the Cold War and, since the author(ity) does not provide a meaning, 
construct one for themselves.
82 Bowker, p. 430.
83 Hegarty, p. 103.
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Section 3.




Penelope Lively's Moon Tiger (1987)
The protagonist of Penelope Lively's Moon Tiger, the unorthodox historian 
Claudia Hampton, lies in a hospital bed in the late 1980s reflecting on her life 
which has encompassed the Second World War and the Cold War: 'I've grown old 
with the century; there's not much left of either of us'.1 She writes of 'a past that 
is more myth than history and all the better for it' (189). Whereas Claudia's 
words imply that history is factual, and so myth fiction, Ralph Levering writes 
in The Cold War 1945–1987 that 'myth is not defined as something that is 
necessarily false, but rather as a belief that some people live by, often without 
being willing to submit it to critical examination'.2 Furthermore, Jean 
Baudrillard writes that '[h]istory is our lost referential, that is to say our myth'.3 
It can be argued, therefore, that the two are not antithetical, both being beliefs 
which serve their authors' interests. 'As the past has gone,' Keith Jenkins writes 
in Re-thinking History, 'no account can ever be checked against it but only 
against other accounts'.4
Unlike the principal characters of the other novels discussed in this 
thesis, by travelling to the Sahara Claudia is not turning her back on Western 
society. That said, she is nevertheless reacting to its hegemonic dictates 
concerning her gender and it must be noted that she is the only principal female 
protagonist (and Lively the only female author) covered in this research. 
1 Penelope Lively, Moon Tiger (London: Penguin, 1988), p. 66. All subsequent references to the 
novel will appear in the main text in parentheses.
2 Ralph B. Levering, The Cold War 1945–1987 (Arlington Heights: Harlan Davidson, 1988), p. 7.
3 Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, trans. by Sheila Faria Glaser (Ann Arbor: U of 
Michigan P, 1994), p. 43. 
4 Keith Jenkins, Re-thinking History (London: Routledge, 1991), p. 11, quoted in Guðrún 
Valdimarsdóttir, '“Let Me Contemplate Myself Within My Context”: An Analysis of Penelope 
Lively's Moon Tiger as a Work of Historical Fiction and a Commentary on History' 
(unpublished BA dissertation, University of Iceland, 2012), p. 9.
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However, the disconnect between her sense of self and social expectations does 
not purely concern gender norms ('If feminism had been around then I'd have 
taken it up, I suppose; it would have needed me. As it was, I never felt its absence; 
being a woman seemed to me a valuable extra asset. My gender was never an 
impediment' (14)). Instead, it arises from society's attempts to impose fixed 
definitions on all of its citizens. Rather than escaping the West, Claudia hopes to 
understand it better, and it is this wish to fill a blankness in her knowledge 
about society as much as herself ('“You asked,” [Tom] says, “what it is like out 
here. For purposes of your article, I suppose?” […] “No,” she says. “I wanted to 
know for myself”' (101)), which corresponds to those of the other protagonists 
under examination. 
Her attempt to escape the impositions of society is performed through her 
life over the decades which follow, guided by the light of the eponymous 
mosquito-repellent which illuminates her affair in Egypt (to which I will return 
in my conclusion). As I hope to show, having herself been tested out in the 
Sahara – not so much in the manner of an ascetic in the presence of God, and 
more like a casualty in a cradle of war – Claudia's experience of the desert 
generates the geopolitical-awareness (for want of a better word, since gender-
politics also play their part) with which she confronts the Soviet–Western 
tensions which overshadow the rest of her life and reverberate through her final 
testimony. By the time she records her deathbed-memories, she has witnessed 
first-hand the political reconstruction of postwar Europe and brought the 
ideological conflict into her home in the form of the orphaned Hungarian artist, 
Laszlo (a creator of countercultural projections of meaning). She has also 
witnessed the comfortable materialism of Cold War America and wrestled with 
her fear of the Bomb. Her final thoughts are composed in the age of glasnost, 
even if political distinctions have not yet collapsed, and so are refracted through 
her non-conformist and anti-nuke activities. In this way, the atomic age 
reconfigures her construction of the earlier conflict in the desert, which in turn 
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informs her relationship with the Cold War present.
The whitewash of history
As Claudia says, '[a]ll history, of course, is the history of wars' (66). It is, despite 
her distinctions mentioned above, a myth to legitimise the status quo. As Alan 
Nadel says in his study of Cold War society, Containment Culture, '[h]istory is a 
cipher for omission, and the process of representation is never one of 
proportionality but of narrativity'.5 The hegemonic narrative is a story full of 
silence which effaces individuals such as Claudia's lover Tom Southern at the 
moment of their sacrifice which lays the foundation for the status quo. These 
individuals' ambiguity – their perpetration of and contamination by 'death and 
muddle and waste' (152) – transgresses the narrative's legitimating coherency of 
cause and effect. Just as '[a]t Hiroshima, the new technology of death made 
military heroism suddenly old-fashioned and impotent',6 mechanised war turns 
Tom into metaphorical machine, an extension of his tank 'functioning like an 
automaton' (203–04), strips him of human-value and so casts him as a homo 
sacer as described by Giorgio Agamben.7 Consequently, the authorised grand 
narrative replaces the individual with the anonymous normativity of myth (104) 
so that everyone follows the prescribed script written by 'well-fed complacent 
men and women designing the future and re-arranging the past […] as fake as a 
film set' (152). Since their experiences exceed this predictable narrative, these 
people are denied the sacrificial status which would accord their deaths meaning 
5 Alan Nadel, Containment Culture: American Narratives, Postmodernism, and the Atomic Age 
(Durham: Duke UP, 1995), p. 8. Nadel writes that discourse is 'the composite of unrecorded 
activity for which historical records substitute. The substitution claims to capture or 
represent events, but instead replaces them with language' (p. 38).
6 Freeman Dyson, 'Fighting for Freedom with the Technologies of Death', in Values at War:  
Selected Tanner Lectures on the Nuclear Crisis (Salt Lake City: U of Utah P, 1983), pp. 4–24 (p. 
13), quoted in Bryan C. Taylor, 'The Politics of the Nuclear Text: Reading Robert 
Oppenheimer's Letters and Recollections', Quarterly Journal of Speech, 78 (1992), 429–49 (p. 
441).
7 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1998).
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and so are effectively obliterated like the dead of Hiroshima.8
The lack of evidence of Tom's death is neither proof nor disproof that it 
happened.9 His death has already occurred, but not been noticed10 so it can never 
occur and his absence cannot be grieved.11 He is in limbo, just like Claudia as she 
waits for the (purely textual) Bomb, a threat and a protection, present and 
absent, transgressing not merely the unitary logic of normative definitions but 
her own sense of self, forced to continue daily life made meaningless by official 
dictates. Since Claudia knows the time but not the place of Tom's death, he is not 
contained within the axes of narrative and so exists in the unbounded desert of 
her unconscious. Being abstract, he is everywhere. As official narrative denying 
his death has proliferated, so has his death. Tom's denied death remains centre-
stage, interrupting the controlled flow of human life. I will return to the 
narrative's silencing of Tom later in the chapter.
Claudia discovers on the film-set of the adaptation of one of her popular-
history books, however, that the only actors permitted are those devoid of 
individuality; interchangeable, empty signifiers or blank screens for their 
paymasters' projections. She is familiar with the movie-star, Caxton, 'peering out 
of oilskins over the wheel of destroyers, lurking under lamp-posts in fedora and 
belted raincoat, shooting it out in frontier towns – an international cipher of the 
century, known to all and none' (157). Being transparent, devoid of depth or 
texture – 'he is a profoundly uninteresting man. He seldom says anything of any 
8 Nadel, p. 59.
9 Paul Hegarty, Jean Baudrillard: Live Theory (London and New York: Continuum, 2004), p. 102. 
This idea is derived from Baudrillard's discussion of the Holocaust in The Transparency of  
Evil: Essays on Extreme Phenomena, trans. by James Benedict (London: Verso, 1993), p. 91.
10 Elias Canetti's thinking discussed in Hegarty, p. 103. See Baudrillard, The Illusion of the End, 
trans. by Chris Turner (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1994), p. 1.
11 'Culture and memory limit the “reality”of individual death […] they soften or deaden it in the 
realm of the “symbolic.” The only referent that is absolutely real is thus of the scope or 
dimension of an absolute nuclear catastrophe that would irreversibly destroy the entire 
archive and all symbolic capacity'. With regard to Tom's death, the archive has already 
effectively been destroyed since it has no record, and so the fact of his death has not been 
softened for Claudia. Jacques Derrida, 'No Apocalypse, Not Now (Full Speed Ahead, Seven 
Missiles, Seven Missives)', trans. by Catherine Porter and Philip Lewis, Diacritics, 14 (1984), 
20–31 (p. 28).
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note whatsoever' (159) – he uses this constructed multiplicity (which is 
authorised by the hegemony) to create difference against which to define 
himself. In other words, he performs a Baudrillardian impossible exchange.12 The 
film-production, on the other hand, establishes a binary-opposition 'more real 
than real [which, Baudrillard argues,] is how the real is abolished'.13 Just as 
another historical drama Claudia watches is composed of 'expensive fiction […] 
And slotted into this are clips of [news-reel] film, looking in contrast somehow 
amateurish, quaint and not quite real' (50), on location she witnesses the 
celebrated encounter between Cortez and Montezuma in battle which, she notes, 
never occurred, but by which the two actors perform a binary-opposition more 
perfect than the reality. This simulation of competition ensures the continuance 
of a normative status quo, be it the Western sense of self or the bipolar world of 
the Cold War. Since the opposition is constructed, the Other cannot be used to 
define the self authentically and so, Baudrillard concludes, this 'end of all 
competition [is] the end of every original reference'.14 Indeed, the film's artistic 
licence is casually incorporated into historical narrative as 'a bit of conflicting 
evidence. Looks good, doesn't it?' (157).
The desert as the limit of grand narrative
Before she goes to Egypt, Claudia has already experienced the disconnect 
between hegemonic narrative and individual experience on a personal level ('I 
once thought I was myth' (7)). In time, the binary constructions of Claudia's 
childhood, which incorporate ancient ammonites into a personal narrative of 
the self, fragment into ambiguous multiplicity:
12 Jean Baudrillard, Impossible Exchange, trans. by Chris Turner (London: Verso, 2001), pp. 77–78 
and Baudrillard's thoughts expressed in an interview in Hegarty, pp. 146–47.
13 Baudrillard, Simulacra, p. 81.
14 Jean Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange and Death, trans. by Iain Hamilton Grant (London: Sage, 
1993), p. 69.
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In the beginning there was myself; my own body set the frontiers, physical and 
emotional, there was simply me and not-me; the egotism of infancy has grandeur. And 
when I became a child there was Claudia, who was the centre of all things, and there was 
what pertained to Claudia, out at which I looked, the world of others, observed but not 
apprehended, a Berkeleyan landscape which existed only at my whim – when it ceased to 
interest me it no longer existed. And eventually, or so I am claiming, I grew up and saw 
myself in the awful context of time and place; everything and nothing (187).
Society's containment of feminine alterity as the complementing difference of 
the wife, mother and the like reflects and reinforces the containment of 
ideological alterity. Claudia, however, is a whole other story, refusing to be 
spoken for and, by bucking the norms of matrimony, maternity and more she 
presents a dangerous fusion which explodes ostensibly stable distinctions. 
Claudia is a seductress in the Baudrillardian sense, performing roles across the 
narrative in order to allude to her ambiguous alterity, her excess which it cannot 
contain, and thereby undermine it (rather than present a direct challenge, which 
could be used to bolster the status quo).15 While she consciously behaves in 
certain ways to attain her ends – gaining access to the masculine spaces of the 
war ('the desert was no place for women' (118)) through dint of seduction in the 
regular sense (69) – her seductiveness itself is an unchosen performativity since 
it is her nature. She submits to, rather than controls, this expression of her 
authentic self, that is, that which exceeds the repetition of hegemonic dictates, 
beyond any activity valorised by narratives which turn this activity into acts of 
meaning. By shunning perceived feminine traits, Claudia draws on so-called 
masculine characteristics in order to engage with the (masculine) hegemony on 
equal terms. 
This can involve the manipulative performance of femininity for her own 
ends, pursuing relationships with alpha-males who complement and augment 
rather than contain her. First and foremost, there is her brother (and lover) 
Gordon, by whom she defines her own strength: 'We confronted each other like 
15 Hegarty, pp. 70ff.
208
mirrors, flinging back reflections in endless recession. We spoke to each other in 
code' (137). Accordingly, on the subject of history, they are diametrically opposed: 
two days before he dies, Gordon says 'One resents being axed from the narrative, 
apart from anything else. I'd have liked to know the outcome' (184). To counter 
Claudia's assertion that 
'I've always given theory its due. It's just that I have preferred to write about action.' 
'Mad opportunists,' says Gordon. 'Tito. Napoleon. That's not real history. History is grey 
stuff […] It moves slowly. That's why you get impatient with it. You look for spectacle […] 
the spectacle may mislead. What's really happening may be going on elsewhere.' (186).
For him, the overarching narrative has more value since they invest mere 
experience with meaning.
Claudia gains awareness of the geopolitical repercussions of the 
disconnect between the official and the personal through her experience of the 
desert-campaign where she meets Tom, their subsequent time together when he 
is on leave, and when she is awaiting news of him in Cairo. Before exploring her 
geopolitical-awakening, however, I will first turn to the portrayal of the desert-
space in which this occurs. 
That the story she tells of her affair calls to mind the tradition of desert-
romances is perhaps inevitable, given the Western cultural touchstones 
(Valentino, Thesiger, Lawrence of Arabia) regarding the desert. However, while 
all her memories of the desert are constructed on her hospital bed in 1987, her 
encounters with the desert are recounted largely in chronological order and so 
trace the evolution of an awareness which suggests that Moon Tiger's portrait of 
the Sahara is more than a non-Western stage on which Westerners encounter 
exilic revelation. Claudia establishes that she is writing against Western 
conventions of reductive classifications which deny Egypt its own identity and 
agency: 'In my history of the world – this realistic kaleidoscopic history – Egypt 
will have its proper place as this complacent indestructible force that has 
perpetuated itself […] Egypt is not then but now, conditioning the way we look at 
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things' (80). Equally, she does not classify or fix it down as timeless in the 
Orientalist tradition; Egypt is instead ahistorical in the sense that it is always 
present and relevant rather than defined by (and so effectively relegated to) 
specific times past:
when I think of how I am going to invoke Egypt within the story of the world – I have to 
think of it as a continuous phenomenon […] Past and present do not so much co-exist in 
the Nile valley as cease to have any meaning. What is buried under the sand is reflected 
above (80).
By defying normative definitions – '[t]here was no chronology to the place, and 
no logic' (89) – her Egypt reflects her own status as a woman who bucks the 
hegemonic essentialisms of the West: 'The landscape, fusion of antiquity and the 
present, had its counterpart in the brimming life of the city, where all races met, 
all languages were spoken' (88). Mindful of her hegemonic role as historian, 
Claudia steers clear of speaking for it and only alludes to its ambiguous alterity, 
and through this allusion she simultaneously articulates her own.
After all, both the Sahara and she are spoken for by the hegemonic 
narratives of the age, even if Western conceptions of the desert as barren 
establish it in opposition to her femininity and its potential for motherhood. 
Indeed, it is a place of death not only for history – on account of the North 
African campaign and later atomic-tests – but also for Claudia through the 
deaths of Tom and their baby and, arguably, her authentic self (comprised of her 
so-called masculine and feminine sides which both find expression in the love-
affair). 
Remembering her arrival in Cairo, she writes that, '[l]ike anyone else, I 
knew Egypt before ever I went there' (80). Confronted by the reality of the 
country, she sees the landscape through a prism of Western culture: 'it was 
looking like a picture. A Breughel perhaps […] nothing but a backdrop' (72), her 
experience constructed on and interpreted through cultural conventions which 
are part of the West's myth about itself. When she travels into the desert, she 
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again sees familiarity, likening it to 'an infinite sandy rubbish-tip' (82), but it 
subsequently refuses to be descriptively contained, 'evoking another wilderness 
and another time' (84). Nevertheless, the desert still represents a reality, which 
she can report on for her newspaper. As Claudia goes further, however, 'the 
landscape of the last hour, and the one before, repeats itself' (84), contravening 
the unitary dictates of normative discourse, before defying all stable definition, 
being 'both empty and populous' (96). 
As she arrives at the sites of military-engagement ('[t]he Front, that elusive 
shifting goal: a concept rather than a place' (92)) she enters a space of simulation, 
with no connection to reality. Tom describes the campaign to her as 
more like a war fought at sea than on land, a sequence of advances and retreats in which 
the participants related only to each other and barely at all to the landscape across 
which they moved. A war in which there was nothing to get in the way – no towns, no 
villages, no people – and nothing tangible to gain or lose. In which you fought for 
possession of a barely detectable rocky ridge, or a map position. In which there were 
suddenly hundreds of thousands of men where there had been nothing, but still the place 
remained empty. He spoke of the desert as being like the board in some game in which 
opposing sides manoeuvred from square to square (73).
The armies around her are fighting over a simulation of order (96), a human 
construct projected on the desert (allowing a tent to become the 'centre of 
civilisation' (98)), where a former taxi-driver 'navigates by a combination of map-
reading and guesswork […] and treats the desert with contemptuous familiarity, 
as though it were some Alice-in-Wonderland inversion of London topography' 
(83), believing the Knowledge can contain the desert. Indeed, in the dust of 
battle, Tom notes that 'I can't see the map unless I hold it inches from my nose' 
(196), which only blinds him to the reality around him. 
Similarly, in the desert words lose their relation to reality. Their 
referentiality to the world, constructed through consensus and repetition, is 
exposed as an active replacement of the world by the specialist jargon of the 
tank-regiments – 'that lunatic language that lays a smokescreen of fantasy' (67) 
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camouflaging the experience of war with code. Claudia remembers that 'men did 
not die but bought it, were not shot but stopped one' (67). In Letter Bomb, Peter 
Schwenger writes: 'it is through language […] that war's aspect of unmaking is 
removed from the nation's consciousness'.16 Actors are effaced, replaced with 
words and the myth of just cause and effect. 'Death was unmentionable and kept 
at bay with code-words' (90) within the event itself, liberating it for discussion, 
since semantic remove is the only means of constructing distance from it. This 
community language cannot (and is not permitted to) be measured against any 
external objectivity.17 Like the euphemisms which Claudia and Tom use (93), 
however, the jargon's Derridean différance only serves to preserve the excluded 
death as a central absence. Drawing on Baudrillardian theory, Paul Hegarty 
writes that '[t]here is a crucial shift in the status of the event, which occurs 
within the time of its “liberation”, such that as it comes to mean, it loses 
meaning […] cause and effect is lost. In this case, historical events themselves 
also undo history as narrative [because each event] loses its situatedness in 
historical narrative'.18 In this way, the jargonised war mirrors the acronyms and 
MADness of the later nuclear stand-off. Claudia recalls the jargon of the 1940s as 
'a language that seems fossilised now […] Speech regenerates itself like the 
landscape'. At the time of her recollections, it has now become nukespeak (68), 
the extreme propagandisation of language having drastically destabilised the 
semantic and semiotic values of words.19
Being an outsider to the military situation, Claudia is not blinded by its 
jargon and so can see that the real desert is not hostile but neutral: 'it is 
untouched, thinks Claudia. Already the sand is starting to digest the broken 
vehicles, the petrol cans, the tangles of wire; a few more storms and they will
16 Peter Schwenger, Letter Bomb: Nuclear Holocaust and the Exploding Word (Baltimore: John 
Hopkins UP, 1992), p. 51. 
17 Nadel, p. 167.
18 Hegarty, p. 104; see Baudrillard, Illusion p. 11 and p. 32. 
19 Derek C. Maus, Unvarnishing Reality: Subversive Russian and American Cold War Satire  
(Columbia: U of South Carolina P, 2011), p. 2.
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 sink beneath it. In a few years' time they will have vanished' (96).20
On account of her unconventional nature, Claudia has first-hand 
experience of Tom and his duties out in the desert, and so can understand his 
situation without recourse to any substitutes, such as letters he might have 
written home (which would anyway have been censored to replace anything 
which did not conform to the official narrative with silence). By going outside 
society, Claudia sees what lies beyond normative accounts (or at least allusions 
to this beyond), enabling her to appraise them. Consequently, when she returns 
to Cairo and this first-hand experience is replaced by communiqués from the 
front, she occupies a position from which she can see the disconnect between 
narrative and experience and so discern the official simulation of the conflict. 
As a war-correspondent, she tries to represent her experiences, but her 
copy must pass through the military-censor. '[W]ar conditions thought of us and 
them, ours and theirs, good and bad, black and white, no confusing  
uncomfortable indeterminate areas', Tom's diary reflects, 'Except the desert, of  
course, which is neutral' (198, italics in original). Similarly, the wasteland of 
postwar Europe is a place of shifting boundaries creating nomads-by-default, 
such as an old woman Claudia meets 'somewhere on the German–Polish border 
[…] whose given nationality was Polish but who spoke French' (133–34). By 
contrast, '[i]slands do disproportionately well' (134). This insular denial of 
ambiguity and alterity means that, on her return to Britain from Egypt, she 
perceives a disconnect between the victorious nation being projected on to the 
white cliffs and blacked-out windows on the one hand and the people struggling 
to rebuild their lives on the other. London's 'invented landscape' (the 'bomb-sites, 
20 In the face of such absence of meaning, it is necessary to project a narrative on to the world. 
When Tom is on leave, they visit a zoo, an orderly, more-perfect projection of the nature 
beyond society in which they can unconsciously recreate the circumstances of their first 
meeting out in the desert. In contrast, when Claudia and Jasper reluctantly take Lisa to 
London zoo for her birthday, it articulates the restrictions which society imposes on the 
world, including these two free-spirits who happen to have a child. See Hegarty for a 
discussion of zoos and the simulated perfection of the world, particularly p. 124, p. 132 note 17, 
and p. 162.
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and the gutted interior of a house with fireplaces airily exposed and the marks of 
ghostly staircases' (136)) only becomes authentic when Claudia can incorporate it 
into her own narrative of experience. Nevertheless, the official narrative, the 
same which has effaced the ambiguity of Tom's death, then silences this 
disconnect to lay the foundations for the world following the Allied victory in 
which she must live.
Claudia is well aware that 'truth is tied to words, to print, to the testimony 
of the page' (6). Narrative, not some objective reality, is the source of facts, and so 
of reality.21 Ann Douglas notes that the US 'policy makers who authored NSC 68 
[employed language], in their words, to convince “the American people and all 
free peoples that the cold war is in fact a real war”'.22 Authenticity, that is, 
coherent meaning, is constructed through narrative: 'Only with hindsight are we 
wise about cause and effect' (28), '[t]he rest of us grow old and tell each other 
what really happened; [those who died], of course, will never know, just as they 
never knew at the time' (104). Official narrative uses facts to legitimate itself and 
discredit alternative narratives, while relying on potentially disruptive personal 
narrative both to establish facts and disseminate the official line.23
Therefore, the disconnect between narrative and experience authorises 
alternative accounts, which thus legitimise alternative facts.24 As Lawrence 
Durrell shows, heresy is not the opposite of orthodoxy. Returning, disillusioned, 
to the UK at the dawn of the atomic age, Claudia abandons attempts to represent 
experience and turns to writing popular histories, which are her own conscious 
constructions of the past which resist being incorporated into the orthodox 
account. Aware of the death of authorised grand narrative, Claudia has the 
21 Nadel, p. 202.
22 Ann Douglas, 'Periodizing the American Century: Modernism, Postmodernism, and 
Postcolonialism in the Cold War Context', Modernism/Modernity, 5 (1998), 71–98 (p. 76). NSC 
68 was the top-secret document endorsed by the National Security Council in 1950 which 
outlined the plan to further militarise the Cold War.
23 Nadel, p. 3. For example, Claudia tells a plausible but incomplete narrative of her war-
experiences, which effaces Tom's death: '“I was a war correspondent during the war. That 
rather put me off reporting on the present.” Caxton nods' (161), but an alternative version of 
events would be equally authentic. 
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postmodern recognition that 'history is not the enemy but the accomplice of the 
artist, who sees writing not as recording or recollecting history but as creating 
it. Postmodern writers, in other words, realize they have complete control over 
history and no control whatsoever over events'.25 Claudia deconstructs the 
constituent strata of authorised history to build her own, appropriating a fossil 
for a paperweight (94) to fix down an alternative account of the multiplicitous 
world. By thus turning nature into culture, she echoes the way that the brain 
transforms stimuli of its environment into meaning by interpreting it with the 
aid of previous learning, fusing the 'confection of fact and fantasy that is how we 
know the world' (62). In contrast, normative discourse seeks to fix nature and 
culture, or self and Other, as separate so that it can dictate a coherent, unitary 
meaning of experience.
As a journalist, Claudia tries 'to reduce to words what she has seen and 
thought' (86), believing that 'I control the world so long as I can name it' (51). 
However, words' referentiality is undermined by Claudia on her deathbed: 'Today 
language abandoned me. I could not find the word for a simple object – a 
commonplace familiar furnishing. For an instant, I stared into the void. 
Language tethers us to the world' (41)). It is revealed as mere consensus founded 
on ambiguity.26 Normative language does not correlate to objective reality, but 
instead shows that objective reality is created by shared language.27 As Lively 
says, words are manipulative but necessary, being the foundational strata of any 
resistance to hegemonic projections of meaning.28 Indeed, Claudia relishes the 
ambiguity of the world which words cannot contain while, as the above quote 
shows, using words as a necessary means to construct meaning. Words acquire 
24 Nadel, p. 38, p. 44 and p. 49.
25 Nadel, p. 39.
26 This is also exploded by Lisa in infancy: '“But if there is a word dragon,” she said, “then once 
there must have been dragons”' (9). The consensus is suspended between the two voids of 
childhood and senility.
27 Nadel, p. 168.
28 'Penelope Lively – Moon Tiger', World Book Club, BBC World Service, 4 December 2011 
<www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p00lw91x> [accessed 3 September 2012]
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confirmation through dissemination, but excessive repetition erodes their power 
in the same way that excessive nuclear-propaganda creates not conformity but 
dissent. 
Consequently, narratives which allow for ambiguity are better able to 
accommodate the world than those which do not. 
Beliefs are relative. Our connection with reality is always tenuous […] I am by nature 
sceptical – a questioner, a doubter, an instinctive agnostic. In the frozen stone of the 
cathedrals of Europe there co-exist the Apostles, Christ and Mary, lambs, fish, gryphons, 
dragons, sea-serpents and the faces of men with leaves for hair. I approve of that liberality 
of mind (8–9).
Baudrillard argues that ambivalence is natural, since we can never capture 
reality,29 an attitude which Claudia endorses in her characteristically strident 
way: 'Argument, of course, is the whole point of history. Disagreement; my word 
against yours; this evidence against that. If there were such a thing as absolute 
truth the debate would lose its lustre. I, for one, would no longer be interested' 
(14). Her popular histories appear to go against convention in their form as well 
as their content: 
My readers know the story, of course. They know the general tendency. They know how it 
goes. [Likewise, for my final history] I shall omit the narrative. What I shall do is flesh it 
out; give it life and colour, add the screams and the rhetoric. Oh, I shan't spare them a 
thing. The question is, shall it or shall it not be linear history? I've always thought a 
kaleidoscopic view might be an interesting heresy. Shake the tube and see what comes 
out (2).
This attitude places Claudia in the ranks of the first generation of artists 
following the Second World War who, 'faced with the psychotic behavior and 
elaborately systematic deceit of the cold war era, were nerved to fresh acts of 
resistance and self-expression [which were] desperately creative acts of heroic 
subjectivity […] designed to declassify every kind of information for 
29 Hegarty, p. 27; see Jean Baudrillard, For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign, trans. 
by Charles Levin (St Louis: Telos, 1981).
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revolutionary political and artistic ends'.30 Claudia's kaleidoscopic, non-linear 
history recounts events repeated times, thereby undermining the authority of 
normative discourse which is founded on its (repeated) insistence that events 
occur once31 and notions such as self and Other are distinct. Her history 
emphasises the excess of experience which cannot be contained in narrative. 
Although she is a product of meaning she both has consumed and created – 'the 
confection of fact and fantasy' – the elderly Claudia is aware that she lives more 
by myth (projecting meaning on to events) than history (receiving the meaning 
of events). As Nadel notes, personal narrative oscillates situationally between 
identification with and alienation from a historical order.32 
When she is with Tom, Claudia feels the need to orient her experiences 
within the official narrative of the campaign composed safely behind the lines 
which demands that he return to his post – 
'On Wednesday morning you'll be in the desert again.'
'You aren't supposed to think of that.'
'I have to', says Claudia. 'In order to keep a grip on things.'
For there are moments, out here in this place and at this time, when she feels that she is 
untethered, no longer hitched to past or future or to a known universe but adrift in the 
cosmos (90).
With hindsight, however, she writes: 'The collective past, curiously, provides 
[knowledge]. It is public property, but it is also deeply private. We all look 
differently at it' (2). Claudia's understanding of her experiences is culturally 
informed but independent: 'Some of us are less conditioned than others, or 
would like to be' (110). Writing about the Cold War, Douglas argues that
most people have something like a truth instinct, for lack of a better phrase, a steering 
and self-defining device that goes far deeper than conscience or convention. This motive 
force is the hope of establishing an accurate and meaningful narrative, an authentic form 
30 Douglas, p. 84.
31 Nadel, p. 175.
32 Nadel, pp. 3–4.
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for the self and the world it inhabits. Its representation and dynamic are, of course, 
culturally inflected; the modes change over time, but increased violations of this truth 
instinct, whether by individual behavior or national policy, are felt.33
The citizen is a fusion of the self and Other on which the Cold War world-view is 
founded: defined, but excessive; culturally informed, but always more. Claudia 
reflects on the accounts of the war which she has read: 'they seem to have little 
to do with anything I remember' (70), 'what I know of war seems most vivid in 
the head' (66). The simulated pilgrims' village she visits in the United States, and 
the consequent history it implies, are an official myth she chooses not to believe 
and she uses the occasion to undermine the myth that we can trust that the 
steady march of progress has led from the imperfect past to the more-perfect 
present, holding the decidedly Baudrillardian view that 'by the time we have 
reduced everything to entertainment we shall find that it was no joke after all' 
(51). The screen of stories and secrets disseminated by the State is negotiated by 
narrativising the scant information obtainable. The value of these replacement-
narratives lies in the alternative story they present, their imperfect doubling of 
the concealed event (and the State's duplicity) which allows it to be known of 
(alluded to through simulation), if not known (represented). Lively encourages a 
negotiated and tactical reading by withholding key facts in order to create a 
mystery (who was this man in Claudia's life who has died?). In doing so, she uses 
the tactics of the State (which are in turn borrowed from story-telling) when it 
wishes to create a secret, but ones not intended to invite curiosity. As I shall 
discuss in relation to Tom's war-time diary, Claudia also narrativises the scant 
information obtainable from the State-machinery to serve her own interests. 
Since hegemonic discourse is founded on personal narrative, Claudia can 
appropriate constituent parts of the official story (as she does the fossil) to build 
her own. Such resistance 'does not attack the system, but recalls the process 
which initiated it, and therefore also the possibility of its non-being'.34 Cause and 
33 Douglas, p. 82, emphasis in original.
34 Hegarty, p. 41.
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effect, lost in the duplicitous operations of the hegemony, are recreations of the 
official narrative which follows. As Claudia says, '[c]hronology irritates me. There 
is no chronology inside my head. I am composed of a myriad of Claudias who 
spin and mix and part like sparks of sunlight on water' (2). While cause and 
effect can be constructed in Claudia's life-story, the important point is that one 
should always be aware that there is another story to be told. She is writing 
against any progressive history in which ends (the status quo) justify the means 
(silencing Tom). As Nadel says, the atomic age 'alters our understanding of time 
and space, cause and effect' and reveals that causes are rhetorical functions 
which rationalise and classify events, for example through the random nature of 
Hiroshima's deaths.35 Similarly, MAD and pre-emptive strikes also undermine 
the State's insistence on causality. Since, as Jasper says, '[t]he world's much too 
interesting a place to let oneself get stuck with one aspect of it' (19), Claudia has 
faith that '[m]ythology is much better than stuff history. It has form; logic; a 
message' (7). It helps her in her attempts to find meaning in her life throughout 
the decades of global-hostility following her experience of the desert-campaign 
when all accounts and explanations have become suspect.
The Claudian Cold War
By effacing Tom's death, the authorised account has denied Claudia a narrative 
of grief and healing. The numbing stasis of melancholia is doubled in the Cold 
War stand-off around her, since both are products of the same narrative. By not 
relinquishing her attachment to the absent Tom, Claudia has created a central 
absence in her life, an ambiguity which she cannot incorporate since it remains 
unincorporated by the official narrative which informs her life (although not 
dictating it outright). Melancholic, she is dislocated from the axes of space and 
time.36 In this way, she is an incomplete narrative herself; while her dead brother 
35 Nadel, p. 58. The rhetorical nature of cause is noted on p. 167 and the quote about how the 
Bomb alters the notion of cause and effect is from p. 54. 
36 See Jessica Dubow, 'A Therapeutics of Exile: Isaiah Berlin, Liberal Pluralism and the Psyche of 
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Gordon 'is complete; he has a beginning and end' (187) Claudia is deprived of a 
coherent (that is, authentic) narrative necessary to live in the duplicitous world 
of the Cold War. When she returns to Egypt as a tourist in the 1960s, she says 
that, 'confronted at last with the mirage – with the shining phantom of that 
other time – I was surprised to find that it was myself that was the poignant 
presence. Not him – not Tom. It was in other ways that Tom was there' (88). It is 
her authentic self whom she has lost and so her history is an elegy for her own 
absence. While she says that '[y]ou keep the dead with you for ever and deny the 
possibility of your own annihilation' (14), because of hegemonic dictates Claudia 
has not been able to keep Tom ('He is nowhere now' (128)) and so is not able to 
escape the annihilation which these dictates construct.
Throughout these years of nuclear-confrontation, Claudia is engaged in 
her own, personal war between the event of Tom's death, an experience of central 
importance in her life, and the non-event of the triumphalist narrative which 
justifies the status quo but silences his death.37 'This dispassionate sequence [of 
authorised history] explains – or purports to explain – why the war happened 
and how it evolved and what its effects have been. Your experience – raw and 
untreated – does not seem to contribute to any of that. It is on a different plane' 
(207). Memory is radioactive, lingering long after we have departed the material 
conditions of the experience, encoding identity at an essential level. For Claudia, 
'events continue at ground level […] but subtly they no longer have any 
meaning'.38 She detaches herself from the specific place and time of the present, 
dissentingly dreaming of an alternative world.39 The disconnect between 
narrative and experience, the erosion of cause and effect and of sacrifice which 
she experienced in Egypt, is perpetuated through the Cold War split-selfhood 
Assimilation', Environment and Planning A, 44 (2012), 2463–76 (p. 2473).
37 Hegarty, p. 146. Baudrillard characterises war as the opposition between event and non-event. 
See Baudrillard, Simulacra, pp. 37–38 and In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities, trans. by 
Paul Foss, John Johnston, Paul Patton and Stuart Kendall (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2007), 
pp. 111ff.
38 Hegarty, p. 61; see Baudrillard, Simulacra, p. 36.
39 This idea is derived from Dubow, p. 2473.
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induced by paranoia of the reportedly imminent but absent Bomb and the 
individual's responsibility for hegemonic victory while, as Claudia knows, the 
hegemony has no responsibility to include the individual in that history. Both 
Tom and the Bomb are Baudrillardian singularities (experiences which cannot 
be incorporated into normative discourse), abstract and so inevitable.40 However, 
while Nadel argues that the Bomb cannot be historicised since it will not leave 
anyone to write about it,41 it is circumscribed in narrative by being labelled 
ahistorical. In this way, the hegemony replaces the ambiguity of death with the 
Soviet threat which can only be contained by individual conformity to its 
narrative: 'Nuclear critics generally agree that, while the potential consequences 
of nuclear weapons defy discourse, it is only through discourse that the weapons 
acquire their value and utility'.42
It is in this way that the Cold War forces the geopolitical back into 
Claudia's life, which is otherwise occupied by producing popular histories and 
the odd 'attack on the latest work of a leading academic historian' (151). She says 
that
I waited for the Bomb to drop. As the world lurched from Korea to Laos to Cuba to 
Vietnam I was simply sitting it out […] I marched and demonstrated when I felt it 
appropriate. I kept to myself that curdling of the stomach I felt during the nine days of 
Cuba, and at a dozen other times over the years. On some days I could not turn on the 
radio or pick up the newspaper, as though ignorance might insulate me from reality (182). 
This insulation is a myth to help her go on living, and the fact that she chooses 
to believe it is all the more significant given her experience of waiting for news of 
Tom exposes it for the fiction that it is:
40 Bryan C. Taylor, 'Nuclear Pictures and Metapictures', American Literary History, 9 (1997), 567–
97 (p. 571).
41 Nadel, p. 39.
42 Taylor, 'Nuclear Pictures', p. 568.
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First there is disbelief, resolute disbelief. No, it is not possible. Not him. Others but not 
him. And then there is hope because wounded does not necessarily mean killed, missing 
men turn up – wounded, taken prisoner. Or they walk in out of the desert days later, 
unscathed; Cairo is full of such tales (127).
Accordingly, 'I no longer shrink from newspapers', she continues. 'The world is 
no safer than it was twenty years ago. But we are still here; the monster has been 
contained, so far – with every year that passes the hope grows that it might 
continue to be contained, somehow; daily expectation of calamity is too 
exhausting to sustain' (183). In the face of a constant textual threat, the brain's 
confirmation-bias takes control, drawing on the fact that there is no apocalypse 
in evidence. 
However, containment of paranoia is not enough since this denial sets her 
in opposition to the State, which can then incorporate her as its legitimating 
Other.43 She is still beholden to its dictates: her insulation is really self-
containment of her political ambiguity, preventing her paranoia from becoming 
dissent. This is evident in how, despite the fact that Claudia refuses to be 
maternal towards Lisa, she still fears for her daughter: 'I never expected to see 
Lisa grow up. For years, when she was a child, I waited for the Bomb to drop […] 
What might happen to the whole of humanity became concentrated on Lisa's 
small limbs, the unknowing eyes, her blithe aspirations' (182).44 While she has 
never been contained by social definitions, she is nevertheless paranoid, so needs 
to find an alternative (geopolitical) meaning by which to live. In this way, 
Claudia mirrors Kit in The Sheltering Sky. If she is to succeed where Kit fails, she 
must neutralise the discourse of paranoia by aligning herself with an alterity 
outside the hegemonic system analogous to the desert or death. Comparison 
with Bowles' novel suggests that Claudia mirrors Kit's husband in her refusal to 
be a passive consumer of Western dictates, but she does not unquestioningly 
follow Western constructs in her quest for a space outside hegemonic dictates. 
43 Hegarty, p. 55.
44 See Adam Piette, The Literary Cold War: 1945 to Vietnam (Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2009), p. 
107 for further discussion of the Bomb as an attack on motherhood.
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Claudia perceives the disparity between officially and individually created 
narratives which actively define political identity.
Accordingly, I will now consider her final work and particularly the form 
she adopts for it.
'I hear the babble of voices': Claudia's 'realistic kaleidoscopic 
history' of the world
On her deathbed, Claudia is composing a final history with herself at its centre – 
'The Life and Times of Claudia H.' – to resist the hegemonic narrative on its own 
level.
The voice of history, of course, is composite. Many voices; all the voices that have 
managed to get themselves heard. Some louder than others, naturally. My story is tangled 
with the stories of others – Mother, Gordon, Jasper, Lisa, and one other person above all; 
their voices must be heard also, thus shall I abide by the conventions of history. I shall 
respect the laws of evidence (5–6).
Previous critics appear to take these words at face-value. Guðrún 
Valdimarsdottir considers her to be writing an ultimately orthodox history and 
Debrah Raschke, while arguing that Claudia's account works both within and 
against hegemonic discourse, believes with Ayfer Onan that the text allows 
characters besides Claudia to speak directly to the reader.45 This present reading, 
however, interprets the lines quoted above as a signal to be wary of the text's 
apparently heterogeneous constitution because, as the novel suggests time and 
again, history is conventionally told by one hegemonic voice. Accordingly, this 
chapter suggests not only that Claudia's final history flies in the face of 
convention (as her popular histories have already done) but furthermore reads 
all the other characters' voices in the text as part of this work. This includes not 
45 Valdimarsdóttir, p. 4. Debrah Raschke, 'Penelope Lively's Moon Tiger: Re-envisioning a 
“History of the World”', ARIEL: A Review of International English Literature, 26 (1995), 115–32 
(p. 116). Ayfer Onan, 'A Fictional Analysis of Penelope Lively's Moon Tiger and Adalet 
A ao lu's ğ ğ Ölmeye Yatmak', Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Buca E itim Fakültesi Dergisiğ , 16 (2004), 
98–102 (p. 99).
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only the different perspectives on past events in Claudia's life, but also her time 
in the hospital ('What he brings is in my head, not his' (65)), the doctors in the 
corridor outside her room (whose conversation she would not be able to hear) 
and Lisa's present inner-life concerning her opinion of her mother and her 
extramarital affair (which, in making her more like her mother, becomes an act 
of reparation on Claudia's part; patronising, indeed, but entirely in keeping with 
the chronicler's prerogative). 
Being her creation alone, her final history is not heterogeneous or 
democratic, unavoidably speaking for – silencing – those who feature in it. 
However, since she herself has experience of resisting normative social 
definitions, Claudia is aware of the self-serving nature of her narrative but 
recognises that her irresistible authoritarianism is necessary if she is to erode 
the self-professed primacy of society's authorised narrative. Her work is a 'mirror 
of the mind' (154) in which she seeks an authentic self in the face of hegemonic 
duplicity. However, as Abigail Solomon-Godeau says, 'the problem confronting 
any genuinely radical cultural production is not simply a matter of transforming 
existing forms through the insertion of some new politicized content or subject 
matter, but rather to intervene on the level of the forms themselves, to disrupt 
what the forms put in place'.46 If Claudia were simply to replicate the hegemony's 
strategies, she would construct herself as its legitimating Other and so she must 
therefore evade being thus incorporated into its narrative.
I had a nightmare. In which I now realise I was present at one of the more gruesome 
moments of the early sixteenth century. The flight of the Spaniards from the Aztec 
capital of Tlacopan. [I] was going to be gashed, blown apart, sliced open, stabbed, impaled 
at any moment. I was fighting for my life. But was I a Spaniard or an Aztec? (153–54)
Claudia's nightmare reflects the fact that the history we know is a fantasy, but it 
also successfully alludes to the alterity of those who are normally spoken for. 
Like her popular histories, the nightmare (re)creates the multiplicitous stimuli 
46 Abigail Solomon-Godeau, Photography at the Dock: Essays on Photographic History,  
Institutions, and Practices (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1991) p. 189, quoted in Bryan C. 
Taylor, 'Nuclear Pictures', p. 591.
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of the experience of the event's participants unadorned with the orderly cause 
and effect constructed from the objective distance of her orthodox fellow-
historians (or, say, the bomber aboard the Enola Gay). Instead, Claudia is aware 
that the kaleidoscope at her eye gives her not the Apollonian gaze of a spy-plane 
but the contingent view of an informant, meaning that whatever she reports of 
others will likely also implicate herself.
That said, Claudia knows that she cannot report on these people's 
experiences since, she says, 'I cannot shed my skin and put on yours, cannot 
strip my mind of its knowledge and its prejudices, cannot look cleanly at the 
world with the eyes of a child, am as imprisoned by my time as you were by 
yours' (31). As Nadel says, '[h]istory is the gallery of reproductions for which there 
exist no originals. It produces only reproductions because it necessarily divides 
itself temporally from the site it (re)produces'.47 Claudia recognises the necessity 
of imposing meaning on the world, but remains alert to the fact that it is 
constructed.48 Her popular histories, like her nightmare, 'omit the narrative […] 
give it life and colour, add the screams' (2) and so perform something akin to a 
Deleuzian becoming-other, the acknowledgement that the world exceeds 
normative definitions, including those imposed by the self.
Even so, aware that she cannot give a voice to those silenced by authorised 
accounts, and rather than replicate hegemonic strategies to speak for them – to 
try to contain their alterity as difference49 – Claudia seeks to create a space for 
them, to allude to the horizon of their alterity. Its kaleidoscopic nature means 
that her work can, in Nadel's words, 'perpetually recontextualize situations from 
absolute and relative perspectives that ultimately present […] “history” […] as 
47 Nadel, p. 42.
48 When Claudia returns to Egypt as a pampered tourist, she necessarily understands her 
surroundings by means of a narrative of her own construction: 'I was left alone [on the coach] 
with the tinted glass though which I saw my own images, the distant but vivid shapes and 
colours of another time' (87): she appropriates Pharaohtours' constructed theatricalities as a 
screen on which to project her own narrative. 
49 Hegarty, p. 119.
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an expression of power caught in an infinite play of difference'.50 As discussed 
above, Claudia the historian is living through the height of the Cold War. In her 
work, narrative and experience meet and binaries fuse and fragment to 
'destabilise the authority of official nuclear images and narratives by contrasting 
them with their unofficial counterparts'.51 The chronicled stimuli of experience, 
Bryan Taylor argues,
reject nuclear certainty by asserting its formal opposite: reflexive images that evoke and 
critique through their multistable forms the oppressive discourses of the nuclear age. 
Through the contrast created by their forms, these images suggest how these discourses 
have historically effaced their own contingency and distorted the authentic expression of 
collective nuclear experience. The open-endedness of these images jars their viewers into 
new levels of participation in – and responsibility for – discursive closure of the nuclear 
future.52 
In this way, they decentre the hegemonic Cold War narrative spatially and 
temporally, depriving the status quo of a stable base of binary-oppositions. Being 
her work alone, Claudia's history cannot be dialogic, but its immediate, first-
person oral-narrative style reflects the need to speak with – rather than issue a 
command – thereby breaking down the barriers of space and time and the 
inequality between creator and consumer of history. In so doing, it demands the 
reader's acknowledgement of shared responsibility in constructing meaning, 
encouraging a collaborative (feminine) effort in contrast to a passive acceptance 
of the totalising (masculine) myths disseminated by the State. 
Thus far, this section has concerned the fact that this historian is 
unavoidably responsible for the representation of others. I now turn to the 
consequences of the elderly Claudia more specifically (re)creating the others who 
feature in her own life-story, namely her family, acquaintances, the hospital staff 
and her own younger selves. Whether her recollections are understood as being 
merely in her head or whether these passages are seen as the text of her final 
50 Nadel, p. 67.
51 Taylor, 'Nuclear Pictures', p. 571.
52 Taylor, 'Nuclear Pictures', p. 591, emphasis in original.
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history (an idea which some critics have approached, see below), the reader is 
confronted with the voices and perspectives of many different characters.
In addition to her manner of writing history, or her vivid nightmares, 
Claudia's destabilising of self/Other oppositions is perpetuated through her 
assertion that 'one's previous selves are unreachable' (113) but can be enlisted to 
playfully perform her uncontained, multiplicitous nature in the face of the 
State's reductive dictates which fix life free of change or ambiguity. While critics 
such as Raschke write that the reader 'is split between a multitude of 
perspectives and voices and between a multitude of Claudias',53 the key point is 
rather that these incarnations are simultaneously fused together in the 
originating bed-bound Claudia,54 her consciousness disseminated across a 
multiplicity of selves, which disrupts normative, unitary discourse further.
While concern for her daughter increases her nuclear-paranoia, by cloning 
herself textually Claudia counters the death which the hegemony holds over 
her.55 Ranged against the missiles of the opposing narrative, Claudia is likewise 
simultaneously a protection and a threat. She contains this duplicity textually, 
thus articulating her multiplicity on the same level as hegemonic discourse.
More than a mere rhetorical device, this self-proliferation mirrors the 
individual's lived-experience of others, which resists fixed definitions. For 
example, when Claudia apologises for being a bad mother, Lisa tries to brush 
away this awkward display of emotion with 'Well, you were who you were' (182), 
thus simultaneously blaming Claudia, distancing her from her past acts, and 
remaining neutral. Claudia, on the other hand, recalls Lisa as
this small unreachable alien creature locked in her amoral preliterate condition with no 
knowledge of past or future, free of everything, in a state of grace. I wanted to know how 
it felt. I would question her, craftily, with adult sophistry, with the backing of Freud and 
53 Raschke, p. 125.
54 This does not introduce any sense of progress, since Claudia is as ignorant of the 
circumstances of Tom's death as her 1942-self.
55 For a discussion of Baudrillard's thoughts on cloning, from which I developed this idea, see 
Hegarty, p. 122.
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Jung and centuries of perception and opinion. And she would slip away from me, 
impervious, equipped with her own powers of evasion, with Indian lore, with techniques 
of camouflage (43).
Life is experienced at the distance between the received stimuli and the brain's 
interpretation, and so Claudia is aware that she can only ever understand her 
daughter 'up to a point, insofar as it is possible for another person to do so' (56). 
She is aware that Lisa is as ambiguous as the Aztecs and has her own opinions of 
her mother. 
Cyndy Hendershot writes that 'Freudian theory forces the individual to 
resign himself or herself to a constant inner war between id and superego 
[which] causes the individual to accept things as they are'.56 Claudia's own 
disunified unconscious, however, is not subject to this conflict and so is in a 
position to resist. Her totalitarian superego, authoring her life-story in 1987, is in 
cahoots with her seductive, slippery ego manifest across her many incarnations 
which articulates her dissent while evading the hegemonic witch-hunters. Both 
are in sympathy with her id, which is all the while buried in the Egyptian desert 
of 1942 – the space of the unconscious – and not beholden to the dictates of the 
superego, either her own or that of the State. In short, her very nature fragments 
the id/superego binary-opposition. Just as 'the sand has no boundaries, no 
frontiers, no perimeters' (96), Claudia knows 'that nothing is ever lost, that 
everything can be retrieved […] That, inside the head, everything happens at 
once' (68), despite the dictate of the hegemony which strives to control the 
course of a single, linear narrative leading to a determined outcome.
The distinctions of time break down in her hospital bed as she relives her 
life. She loses track of the days as she lies dying, an end of narrative before the 
end of experience. However, although words begin to escape her, Claudia keeps 
hold of narrative, meaning, and her sense of self. Nevertheless, a disconnect 
between coherent articulation and her own subjectivity arises from her now 
56 Cyndy Hendershot, I Was a Cold War Monster: Horror Films, Eroticism, and the Cold War  
Imagination (Bowling Green: Bowling Green U Popular P, 2001), p. 94, quoted in Piette, p. 15.
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needing to sleep for long periods and at irregular times. As a consequence, 
Claudia requires an anchor in the world if she is to effectively resist the 
hegemonic narrative on its own level. She finds one in the form of Tom's diary.
Tom's diary 
The penultimate chapter of Moon Tiger is mostly comprised of a transcription of 
Tom's diary of his desert-experiences, which Claudia says she received from the 
sister whom he mentioned. It is set off from the rest of the novel by being 
italicised and as such – even if one reads all Claudia's past and present 
experiences and the different perspectives on those experiences given in the 
novel as filtered through Claudia's subjectivity, whether merely in her head or on 
the pages of her final history – it appears as an independent voice with which 
Claudia converses. However, again rejecting existing criticism, I want to suggest 
that the sister's letter and the diary are her creation. I will briefly note the 
textual evidence to support this idea before examining the consequences that 
this interpretation has on the novel as a challenge to the Bomb.
During their first encounter in the desert, Claudia and Tom talk about life 
on the battlefield. '“I keep a diary,” says Tom. “Nicely cryptic, of course, in case I 
get put in the bag”' (93). When the reader sees the diary, however, it is not 
cryptic.57 Additionally, whereas Tom's words clearly suggest that he has started 
his diary before he meets Claudia, in the diary she reads she is front-and-centre 
from the first entry (and neither the sister's letter nor Claudia's introduction 
suggest that the quoted pages are only the excerpted parts of the diary which 
concern her).
Claudia's authorship can also perhaps be perceived in the extent to which 
the diary reflects her views rather than Tom's. Whereas in the desert Tom tells 
her that he is keeping a diary because 'one of these days one may want to 
57 It might be argued that the recorded conversation is itself a fabrication, but this would not 
suggest that the diary was written by Tom.
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remember what all this was like' (93), which arguably accords with his 
(masculine) postivist normativity ('history is true and that unfortunately you are 
a part of it' (103)), the diary expresses a hitherto absent degree of ambiguity ('At 
some point I shall want to make sense of it – if there is sense to be made' (204, 
italics in original)) closer to Claudia's own response to the diary that 'it is all 
clearer to me than any chronicle of events but I cannot make sense of it, perhaps 
because there is none to be made' (206). It also appears that Tom still holds faith 
in objective space and time. As noted above, he consults his maps when they 
have lost him in the desert. His assertion that the desert 'does lunatic things 
with time. An hour can seem like a day or a day like an hour' (101) can be read to 
suggest that he still maintains that there is such a thing as an empirically 
measurable hour, despite his experiences. In contrast, the diary begins with the 
words 'This written God knows where, on a day in 1942' (194, italics in original), 
discarding any faith in the human measurements of days and hours and so 
replacing the desert with an atemporal space ('Time is not time any more, in any  
proper sense. Becomes simply the hands on one's watch' (195, italics in original)).
In the diary the desert has become a place of stimuli experienced without 
a narrative of meaning: 'I couldn't say now what came before what, where we were  
when, how this happened or that, in the mind it's not a sequence just a single  
event without beginning or end in any proper sense simply a continuity' (196, 
italics in original), which mirrors Claudia's belief that 'there is no sequence, 
everything happens at once' (2) and 'that nothing is ever lost, that everything can 
be retrieved, that a lifetime is not linear but instant. That, inside the head, 
everything happens at once' (68). While Tom's words in the desert (such as the 
quote from page 103 above) suggest that he believes in the grand narrative of 
history and the value of keeping a diary, the diary itself articulates Claudia's 
view that narrative's axes of space and time do not contain all of life and that 
these factors are ultimately meaningless: 'So I make myself move backwards and 
forwards, lying there huddled in the sleeping-bag on the cold sand – backwards to  
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other places, to childhood […] ' (201, italics in original). Following the 
transcription of the diary, when Claudia meditates on the role it has in her life, 
its author's identity is incorporated within her own (unlike those of the figures 
in her popular histories and nightmare, or her daughter): 'you are also, now, a 
part of me, as immediate and as close as my own other selves, all the Claudias of 
whom I am composed; I talk to you almost as I would talk to myself […] you are 
in my head' (206).
The diary is of crucial importance to Claudia if she is to live authentically 
in the duplicitous age following the death of grand narrative: 'I need it' (207), she 
says. If it did not exist, she would have to invent it. While her work as a historian 
– and, as I have argued, her recollections of her past experiences which compose 
her final history – has already alluded to the alterity of experience which 
exceeds hegemonic discourse, her construction of meaning in this last testimony 
has thus far been explicitly grounded within the narrative of her own 
subjectivity. The diary now provides an external reference-point which allows 
the history to be a fusion of the personal and the political, a dialogue between 
her experience of something outside herself and her own previous learning. It 
allows her to locate, orient and define herself free from the shadow of the Bomb. 
Seemingly paradoxically, this function of the diary is not compromised if 
its independent existence is only a myth she chooses to believe. After all, the 
referential nature of the words with which she constructs her history is equally 
a myth enlisted in the service of her interests. Since she is now losing her grasp 
on this myth ('Today language abandoned me. I could not find the word for a 
simple object' (41)), she needs to reach for another. 
Claudia describes the diary as 'a light green exercise book with CAHIER 
on the front in black letters. Ruled paper, rough and grainy' (194). If it is indeed 
an object, it is not merely several pages of italicised text in her final history, 
meaning that while the authenticity or meaningfulness of words is dependent on 
her interpretative faculties, the diary is not. It will continue to be something 
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which she can literally cling on to. Furthermore, the more she loses her grasp on 
the world, the more the diary will become for her Tom's authentic voice. The 
author of the diary is 'as close as my own other selves' and so as distant. As these 
other selves become victims to her forgetfulness, so will 'he'. The diary is thus 
what Baudrillard calls a radical illusion, an originary construction which resists 
being incorporated into the system of simulation and which, in hindsight, is 
seen to grant the possibility of truth.58
Like Claudia's nightmare, the fragmented nature of the diary shuns the 
ostensibly objective distance of hindsight to mirror the excessive stimuli of 
actual experience: on the battle-field, Tom feels 'as though one existed on 
different planes: that of sight […] and that of sound' (197, paralleled on 204, 
italics in original). If the narrative of history is a synaesthetic simulation which 
embraces all the senses, annulling them as individual instances,59 Tom's 
fragmented perception suggests that this narrative does not fit experience. The 
removal of the temporal axis precludes narrative, which is why, when Claudia 
hears of Tom's death, she hopes that it was instant (128) since its narrative would 
be of pain, its meaning only negative. Tom's diary notes a moment when he 
wistfully contemplates a desert-gazelle, 'carefree […] that I envied for a moment'. 
It continues: 'but the gazelle has no story, that is the difference. Pinned down and  
shit-scared, I have a story, which makes me a man' (201, italics in original). The 
gazelle is sand-coloured, without demarcations, reflecting how it can move 
across the unbounded desert, while Tom's body is demarcated ('He is so 
sunburned that the parts that have not been exposed seem unnaturally pale […] 
The colour changes at his navel – above is brown, below is another man' (109)), 
mirroring his fate to be clearly defined, his multiplicity of aspects prescribed 
into one social self. The function of the gazelle in the diary is analogous to the 
function of the diary in Claudia's final history: an alterity smuggled within. By 
demonstrating that the axes of her narrative cannot contain all of the 
58 Hegarty, p. 46 note 10.
59 Hegarty, p. 57.
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experience, Claudia draws on the 'possibility that excessive simulation gets you 
beyond the simulated world's insistence on its own reality'60 and so avoids 
replicating (and extending) hegemonic rule.
The transcription of Tom's diary is italicised and does not appear to be 
part of her history, making it seem more a recording of real experience. History 
replaces the past in response to a present melancholic nostalgia for meaning.61 
By filling an absence in both her knowledge and the pages of her history, the text 
of the diary satisfies Claudia's need to real-ise her myth while preserving that 
myth's status as what Baudrillard calls a singularity. As a singularity, Tom's 
death is always already and is always yet to occur, and so is 'utterly closed yet 
infinitely becoming itself. The subject never actually comes to be, although we 
devise a linear conception of time to combat the horror of the eternal return' by 
which the individual repeats every moment infinitely.62 As Michel de Certeau 
writes, 'chronology becomes the alibi of time […] a way of banishing from the 
realm of knowledge the principle of death'.63 But Claudia is aware that death is 
ever-present and her non-chronological history subverts this attempt to banish 
Tom's death from narrative. Her kaleidoscopic style, which repeats events, 
reflects the experience of the Eternal Return (in opposition to the normative 
idea that events are unitary). Tom's death appears to be alterity outside the 
system of simulation, but it is an absence within it, attained both by accident 
and by fate.64 Just as the Bomb is historicised by being labelled ahistorical, Tom's 
non-existent death can be located temporally; singularity is not timeless but of 
time (within simulation, but eluding it) and, as Hegarty elucidates, comes from 
trying to understand the challenge of the present moment, and then challenge it 
60 Hegarty, p. 57 and p. 82. See Baudrillard, The Gulf War Did Not Take Place, trans. by Paul 
Patton (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1995), p. 39.
61 See Baudrillard, Simulacra, p. 6.
62 Hegarty, p. 163. See Baudrillard, Impossible Exchange, p. 131, and Friedrich Nietzsche, Will to 
Power, trans. by Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage, 1968), pp. 544ff.
63 Michel de Certeau, Heterologies: Discourse on the Other, trans. by Brian Massumi (Minneapolis 
and London: U of Minnesota P, 1986), p. 216, quoted in Nadel, p. 42.
64 See Jean Baudrillard, D'un Fragment l'Autre: Entretiens avec François L'Yonnet (Paris: Albin 
Michel, 2001), p. 129. 
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back.65
While Tom's experience remains a central absence, since it still has to be 
spoken for, Claudia's creation of his final days takes precedence because it 
satisfies the brain's confirmation-bias by providing a coherent explanation as to 
why he is no longer here. From a Baudrillardian perspective, by replacing (not 
representing) the absent event, the model generates the event66 and so Claudia's 
allusion to reality has primacy.
The event of Tom's death itself, however, is absent from the diary. This fact 
both adheres to simulation (in that Tom could not have written it after his 
death) and writes against it (since the ambiguity of his death is not safely 
incorporated into narrative): the diary is seductive, writing across the official 
narrative, evading not opposing it, smuggling excess inside in order to explode it. 
When the Bomb is labelled ahistorical, it is circumscribed narratively but 
preserves the excess which causes fear. Claudia enacts the same logic by 
replacing Tom's death with words (whose meanings are agreed by common 
consensus, thereby installing it on the same level as the hegemony's discourse) 
while preserving the excess which is its alterity. While the hegemonic narrative 
omits Tom's death because it would introduce ambiguity, Claudia's history omits 
the actual event of Tom's death precisely to preserve this ambiguity. This 
ambiguity 'has been systematically excluded in order to found the unitary logic 
that is the attribution of value and binary opposition',67 and so when it is 
brought back in, the hegemonic narrative fragments. Tellingly, this narrative is 
not coherent in itself, and other information must be incorporated in order to 
make it meaningful: just as a duplicitous State might co-opt false and 
contradictory testimony in order to maintain its official line (for example, the 
US following the Bay of Pigs fiasco), the reader is told that '[b]elow the last entry 
Jennifer Southern has written, in now faded ink, “My brother was killed in an 
65 Hegarty, p. 163.
66 Hegarty, pp. 57–58. See Baudrillard, Simulacra, p. 1.  
67 Hegarty, p. 42.
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enemy air attack […]”' (205). Claudia thus creates a myth larger than herself or 
any narrative framework. 
The diary thus performs a 'play of absence and presence that establishes 
and undermines the apparent solidity of the “proper” (propre), this being 
identity in the shape of the self, the same or the truth'68 which Claudia resists. 
She says, '[w]hat is buried under the sand is reflected above' (80); just as the 
devastating effect of an underground atomic-test is not visible on the surface and 
can only be seen in representations (such as maps), the reverberations of Tom's 
death are only evident in the fractures of her final work. By going beyond the 
hegemonic narrative to bring ambiguity back within it, 'on the one hand, [she] 
has been with the dead, and is now back; on the other, this means that the dead 
are accessible, and have a vital role in initiating the start of (adult) life',69 
allowing Claudia to relinquish her attachment to Tom ('You are left behind, in 
another place and another time' (206)). In this way, she mirrors the other 
protagonists studied in this thesis who travel into the Sahara – the archetypal 
place of death – and bring their experience of the desert within their culturally 
informed understanding of the world.
Just as cause and effect are lost in the atomic age, so they are in the 
challenge Claudia presents to the hegemony, which Baudrillard would identify as 
acts of terrorism.70 Consequently, by writing the diary, Claudia retrospectively 
locates herself in the world again. The diary is a successful alternative to the 
tank-regiment's misguided maps, since it can successfully guide her out of her 
desert of melancholia distant from society. As well as operating retrospectively, 
the diary's function is also tautological: Claudia incorporates the melancholic 
loss of Tom by writing it but, as she effaces herself from the event of its creation, 
it is as if Tom is thinking of her, thereby confirming that she is alive.
68 Hegarty, p. 75, italics in original.
69 Hegarty, p. 43.
70 Hegarty draws from a number of Baudrillard's works to summarise his definition of terrorism, 
see pp. 95–97.
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A tormenting thought: as of a certain point, history was no longer real. Without noticing 
it, all mankind suddenly left reality; everything happening since then was supposedly not 
true; but we supposedly didn't notice. Our task would now be to find that point, and as
long as we didn't have it, we would be forced to abide in our present destruction.71
Through restoring Tom to the narrative, Claudia reverses her own destruction. 
The diary meaningfully incorporates Tom as a coherent constituent in the Allied 
sacrifice within the narrative of the present. Whereas Claudia felt: 'He is not 
lying there any more. He is nowhere now' (128), his being abstract making him a 
ubiquitous absence and so generating her melancholia, she can now say: 'You are 
left behind, in another place and another time […] you are also, now, a part of me 
[…] Death is total absence, you said. Yes and no. You are not absent so long as 
you are in my head' (206). Because Tom's death has now already happened, 
Claudia's life since then is now retrospectively freed of the official dictates which 
have denied him (because silenced) death and her (overshadowed by the Bomb) 
life. His death gives her life once she has constructed her own edifice of belief 
situated between the orthodox ('St George's Pro-Cathedral, Cairo […] The rituals 
of the Church of England are observed […] Claudia makes her own silent isolated 
squirming intercession […] Let him not be dead' (57–58)) and the alterity beyond 
(she 'crosses the road to be alone […] This is a land ridden by gods, she thinks. A 
god for every need. She adds, now, some further prayers. She casts her prayers to 
the dry desert wind, indiscriminately' (59)). She no longer needs to deny what the 
newspaper says (or reassure herself that it is wrong) since she can replace it with 
an alternative narrative which legitimates alternative facts and so does not end 
with the Bomb, thereby freeing her from her nuclear-paranoia. While the 
goddess Isis, so the myth goes, searched the desert for the pieces of her slain 
lover Osiris to enable his rebirth as the king of the dead, by composing 'a past 
that is more myth than history and all the better for it' (189) Claudia reunites the 
fragments of herself, a Russian doll of many selves, her authentic core hidden 
from the eyes of the surveillance-state.
71 Elias Canetti, The Human Province, trans. by Joachim Neugroschel (London: Deutsch, 1985), p. 
69, quoted in Hegarty, p. 157.
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Paradoxically, if the diary is written by Claudia, it is more successful than 
if it had been written by Tom. Tom's real diary has been lost or silenced by the 
military-censor and cannot help her. If she has created it to serve her interests 
and then distanced herself from its authorship, her history is freed from 
pursuing 'truth as something arrived at through the interaction of social and 
rhetorical contract' and becomes a statement which 'presumes an external 
authority for truth; its rhetoric reveals the Truth [that is, it alludes to alterity], 
doing so in such a way as to exempt the speech from judgment and present the 
speaker not as peer but as paragon'.72 In this way, her work resists being 
incorporated into normative discourse. As such, Claudia's history is an example 
of what Nadel calls spiritual testimony in contrast to the forensic testimony 
which the McCarthyite hearings twisted for their own ends.
By restoring Tom to narrative in this way, Claudia also restores ambiguity 
to him, recuperating him from the normative account of his life he tells her for 
one which is not beholden to hegemonic dictates. For all that, like her, he rejects 
a fixed social-identity, his account of his life is 'not very personal' (79), as if he 
interprets his experiences through the hegemonic narrative of history, which he 
perceives is opposed by fantasy (103) rather than personal experience. Tellingly, 
when he weaves his story of their future domesticity, Claudia is distracted by a 
bird-of-prey which shares his totalising view (121–22). By recuperating him, she 
succeeds where Kit in The Sheltering Sky failed. Whereas Bowles' creation 
needed to define herself by (a) society, Claudia reflects that 'unless I am a part of 
everything I am nothing' (207). She is not beholden to any one version, her 
interpretation instead drawing on nature and nurture, personal and political, 
history and myth in her construction of meaning. Claudia is arguably what 
might be called a Nietzschean Überfrau, accepting all the good and bad of the 
Eternal Return: I 'saw myself in the awful context of time and place; everything 
and nothing' (187). Her understanding of the world is non-linear ('History is 
disorder' (152)) and rejects the interpretation of the Eternal Return as an 
72 Nadel, p. 83.
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Apollonian view, a narrative of order and progress (if not actually progressive) in 
favour of regarding it as repetition without reference to an external authority. 
While normative, unitary discourse perceives value in uniqueness, Claudia is 
aware that discourse itself gains authority through repetition within society. 
Tom's death, in which she places such value, is in truth neither unitary nor 
instant (which would make it effaceable and meaningless); instead, it is a 
singularity which she has always carried with her and is always mythically re-
living. The fact that she accepts that the hegemonic narrative is a product of its 
time (thereby displaying a 'Nietzschean “strength to forget the past” – in 
preparation for the mutation of the superman to come – […] redeployed as a 
property of storytelling itself')73 enables her to see beyond the paranoia it seeks 
to impose. 
Claudia's last words
The novel ends with the image of Claudia's death in hospital as life continues 
oblivious outside her window. Raschke emphasises the indifference of the world 
towards Claudia's death ('no one will pay much mind to Claudia's death; the 
world will simply go calmly on. So even what this text most affirms dissolves'),74 
and Mary Hurley Moran considers the unobserved death as ultimately 
insignificant (only granting that 'although Claudia herself is extinguished at the 
end of her novel, she too will continue to exist in the form of words').75 Like Tom, 
73 Fredric Jameson, 'Foreword', in The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, by Jean-
François Lyotard, trans. by Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: U of 
Minnesota P, 1984), pp. vii–xxi (p. xii, emphasis in original).
74 Raschke, p. 130.
75 Mary Hurley Moran, Penelope Lively (New York: Twayne, 1993), p. 125, quoted in Raschke, p. 
130. Moran's pessimistic interpretation of the death-scene inevitably finds it problematic for 
the novel. 'As we have seen, Moon Tiger comes close to endorsing solipsism, with its 
suggestion that the universe is contained inside Claudia's head. This suggestion seems to be 
vindicated by the novel's ending, in which Claudia dies and, first, an eerie void suddenly 
replaces the rich human consciousness that had filled the room and, next, the radio time 
signal clicks on and a mechanical voice begins reading the news to an empty, 
uncomprehending room, reciting events that are meaningless apart from a human mind 
reflecting upon them'. However, I would suggest that this reading unwittingly replicates the 
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therefore, Claudia dies within the State-machinery and the world does not 
notice. In contrast, this thesis reads the final pages as Claudia's version of the 
event: she has already acknowledged that she will probably be 'appallingly 
misrepresented' once she is gone (125), so now composes an end to suit her own 
ends. Her authoring of her (future) death is the other side of the coin to her 
continuous reconstruction of her past love-affair in the pre-atomic desert which 
has sustained her through her years of CND-activism and fears of the Bomb. 
Read this way, in contrast to existing criticisms' interpretations, Moon Tiger 
itself can be seen as the final work Claudia is writing on her deathbed. Moran 
considers Claudia to be only contemplating the writing of her final history, and 
says that 'Penelope Lively has given us, in the form of Moon Tiger, the kind of 
subversive history of the world that Claudia would find most authentic […] This 
is precisely the strategy Claudia herself wants to use in her history of the world'. 
Stacy Burton also interprets Lively's novel as the type of history which Claudia 
would have imagined, but appears to consider the fact that she did not write it 
down to be considered a failing. Raschke associates Lively's and Claudia's works 
more definitely, but again decides that Claudia has only imagined what she 
wants to write.76
The diary has rewritten the narrative spanning the textual poles of Tom's 
death (event narrativised as non-event) and the Bomb (non-event narrativised as 
ever-present event); the death-scene now rewrites that defined by the 
experiential poles of her birth and death, which she connects to the ultimate 
birth ('My beginnings; the universal beginning' (3); 'In the beginning there was 
solipsism it criticises because it locates the construction of meaning in Claudia's head alone, 
and not in the world which continues to turn outside her window. See her 'The Novels of 
Penelope Lively: A Case for the Continuity of the Experimental Impulse in Postwar British 
Fiction', South Atlantic Review, 62 (1997), 101–20 (p. 114).
76 These critics generally stop short of seeing the goings-on around Claudia in the hospital or the 
death-scene as also parts of her final history. See Mary Hurley Moran, 'Penelope Lively's Moon 
Tiger: A Feminist “History of the World”', Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies, 11 (1990), 89–
95 (p. 91). Stacy Burton, 'Bakhtin, Temporality and Modern Narrative: Writing the “Whole 
Triumphant Murderous Unstoppable Chute”', Comparative Literature, 48 (1996), 39–64 (p. 59). 
Raschke, p. 116.
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myself' (187)) and, by extension, her death to the ultimate death of the Bomb 
(when 'history will indeed come to an end' (13)). 
Claudia's authorship of her own death wrestles back authority over it from 
the nuclear-state. Jacques Derrida writes that the Bomb will end discourse,77 but 
here Claudia demonstrates that she has pre-emptive capabilities. By defining her 
own death, Claudia replaces the experience with an alternative narrative which 
defuses the Bomb hanging over her. Drawing on Bataille's The Accursed Share, 
Baudrillard's thinking casts Claudia's death (and Tom's absent death) as an 
unanswerable resistance to the hegemonic narrative: 'the challenge […] must 
take the form of death, as only in the sacrifice of death can the slowly 
administered death [that is, living under the threat of the Bomb] be disrupted or 
annulled'. It has value in 'not demanding anything other than the recognition of 
the challenge itself'.78 As Bataille argues, gift-giving (in this case, of the challenge) 
has the virtue of surpassing the subject who gives but, in exchange for the 
ambiguity given, the subject appropriates the surpassing79 and in this way 
Claudia creates a myth larger than her own or the hegemony's narrative. 
Claudia's description of her death focuses on the inanimate objects of her 
hospital room. The novel has already examined how words give one agency over 
the world, and so this inventory can be interpreted as investing her with control: 
'The power of the bomb is ruled by the power of the word, and only by continual 
de-construction of the world will we avoid the destruction of the world'.80 
However, she also feels tension with that control, most obviously in how it 
constructs meaning. Instead, by naming her environment, Claudia might be 
drawing on words' referentiality ('bed, chair, table, picture, vase, cupboard, 
window, curtain' (41)) to create a space for the alterity which they cannot 
77 Derrida, p. 26.
78 Hegarty, p. 42. See Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange, p. 39.
79 Hegarty, p. 39. See Georges Bataille, The Accursed Share: An Essay on General Economy, trans. 
by Robert Hurley, 3 vols (New York: Zone, 1991), I, p. 69.
80 David Dowling, Fictions of Nuclear Disaster (Iowa City: U of Iowa P, 1987), p. 208.
240
contain: the central absence, her uncontainable excess of meaning.81 'And within 
the room a change has taken place. It is empty. Void. It has the stillness of a place 
in which there are only inanimate objects: metal, wood, glass, plastic. No life' 
(207–08).
Critics argue that Claudia's final history is ultimately conservative82 and it 
might be claimed that, for all that she challenges the official narrative, her 
textual containment of death for her own ends ultimately mirrors the nuclear-
state's attempt to contain and employ its citizens' fear of apocalypse. Indeed, as 
Douglas writes, 'as long as life is chronological, in other words, as long as we all 
die […] history will in some way honor narrative and even metanarrative'.83 
However, the referential function of the words Claudia uses (see quote from page 
41 above) means that we must accept responsibility for the effect we have on the 
world84 and recognise that it does not exist purely in the service of our own ends, 
as the Cold Warriors regarded everything from the sub-atomic to the interstellar. 
The final scene serves to reinforce this idea when it is read as Claudia's creation, 
since the description of the world outside her window continuing to turn after 
her death then asserts that the axes of any narrative do not contain that which 
makes life meaningful.85 The real story goes on beyond the limits of history, 
beyond the community of the campfire which illuminates the storyteller within 
each listener's mind. The raindrops on the window distort her view of the world 
outside, but she is aware that there is an outside and does not try to project her 
81 In this way, Claudia becomes a truly postmodern writer. Jean-François Lyotard considered 
the function of the postmodern was to create 'allusions to the conceivable which cannot be 
presented' (Lyotard, p. 81).
82 See Valdimarsdóttir, p. 4.
83 Douglas, p. 74.
84 Terry Gifford, Pastoral (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 149. See also Leonard M. Scigaj, 
'Contemporary Ecological and Environmental Poetry: Différance or Référance?', 
Interdisciplinary Studies in Literature and Environment, 3 (1996), 1–25 (p. 6).
85 Shortly before he dies of cancer, Claudia's brother Gordon 'talks of events that have not yet 
come about and sees light and texture, the kaleidoscope of fruit outside a greengrocer […] 
And all this will go on, he thinks. And on, and on.' (186). Although this appears to mirror 
Claudia's death-scene, Gordon views these practices as incidents within a grand narrative. 
Claudia, on the other hand, thinks about the spectacle (not in the Baudrillardian sense, but in 
the common, Big-Top sense), the multiplicity of different stories yet to be told.
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own images on to it. '[A]s the sun comes out it catches the drops and they flash 
with colour […] Claudia gazes at this; it is as though the spectacle has been laid 
on for her pleasure and she is filled with elation, a surge of joy, of well-being, of 
wonder' (207). This distortion is what makes the world as brilliant and endlessly 
interesting as a kaleidoscope. She asserts the presence of the world over the 
absence of absence:
within the room a change has taken place. It is empty. Void. It has the stillness of a place 
in which there are only inanimate objects: metal, wood, glass, plastic. No life […] Beyond 
the window a car starts up, an aeroplane passes overhead. The world moves on (207–08).
Try as the State might, she is determined that speculative nuclear-armageddon is 
not going to ruin anyone's day.
By thus acknowledging the world around her, Claudia replaces the definite 
endpoint of a single, linear narrative favoured by hegemonic discourse with a 
diffusion of equal stories, 'the present in all its open-endedness'.86 As Miss World 
says, destiny is what you make of it (171). Claudia is the product and producer of 
history, acting like a refracting-lens on which the multiplicity of (past) events 
falls and is directed onwards as one of a multiplicity of (possible) narratives. She, 
the chronicler, is like the multiplicity which radiates from the medallion on a 
seafarer's map, which is always placed where the authority's knowledge ends. By 
denying closure, she denies the closure which the nuclear-state arrogates over 
her life, and compels the reader to question the construction of meaning. Her 
final history is the final history: history ends, but life endures, and myth will 
always make it meaningful.
If the final pages are Claudia's authoring of her own death, it prompts the 
question whether the history is written at all. If it exists only in her head, her 
final testimony would, paradoxically, from a Baudrillardian perspective be a 
more-effective challenge to the hegemonic system, since it would evade all risk of 
86 Mikhail Bakhtin, 'Epic and Novel: Toward a Methodology for the Study of the Novel', in The 
Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, trans. by Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin: U 
of Texas P, 1981), p. 7.
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being incorporated into the authorised narrative as evidence against her (for 
example, as the ramblings of an 'ungodly foulmouthed old woman with a 
bloodcurdling record of adultery and blasphemy' (30)).  
Speaking of herself in the third-person, she seemingly adheres to the 
hegemonic discourse but, since it is she who is speaking of herself in this way, 
she simultaneously speaks across it, distancing herself from imposed identity 
(like Stencil in Pynchon's V.), preventing the hegemonic narrative from imposing 
its sentence on her. In this way, she escapes paranoia about the (merely textual) 
Bomb. Furthermore, if she is replacing her death-scene with words in the event 
itself – as Michael Ondaatje's English patient says, 'Death means you are in the 
third person'87 – she truly has attained alterity outside normative dictates, 
exceeding the alterity of the diary (which adheres to the logic that Tom cannot 
compose his own death-scene after the event). The ambiguity (of whether she is 
dead and of her death) is a further denial of closure which compels the reader to 
question imposed narratives of the self. This possibility makes her testimony a 
myth the reader cannot but choose to believe. In short, if Claudia did not exist, 
Lively would have to invent her.  
 
Conclusion: Moon tiger, burning bright
Moon Tiger traces Claudia's active production of meaning in the face of the 
expected passive consumption on which the myths of the global confrontation 
were founded forty years earlier. Her account of her life negotiates what Taylor 
calls 'the tension between cultural forgetting and the uncontrollable, dreamlike 
eruptions of lived nuclear history'88 but, by rewriting history to fragment 
constructed binary-oppositions into multiplicities, she articulates a capacity to 
simultaneously honour and forget historical knowledge in order to construct a 
meaning for life. Only allusion to that which lies beyond the system has the 
87 Michael Ondaatje, The English Patient (London: Bloomsbury, 1992), p. 247.
88 Taylor, 'Nuclear Pictures', p. 573.
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potential to free us from imposed narratives and enable us to desert society. 
While, according to Baudrillard, this leaves us with nothing but illusion, 
Claudia's history is a vital illusion,89 one that is aware of its own fiction and 
which she nevertheless chooses to believe, forever being drawn back to it for a 
light by which to navigate the otherwise meaningless world. As she says to the 
Tom in her head, '[y]our voice is louder now than the narrative I know – or think 
that I know' (206). It speaks over the hegemonic narrative's previous silencing of 
its disruptive reality, the flame of the moon tiger shines brighter than the fire of 
the Bomb.
'The Moon Tiger is a green coil that slowly burns all night, repelling 
mosquitoes, dropping away into lengths of grey ash, its glowing red eye a 
companion of the hot insect-rasping darkness' (75). Like the glow of the flame, 
Claudia is never fixed, being instead a point moving across a reflexive spectrum, 
progressing but not beholden to the myth of progress, 'a necklace of moments' 
(139). A moon/tiger herself, she embodies traits deemed both feminine and 
masculine which were only truly balanced in the crucible of the desert. Her 
memories, her sense of self, forever circle the kaleidoscopic lens which captures 
a freeze-frame projection of a truth she chooses to believe, a map by which she 
navigates the life which, seen from her deathbed, 'is not linear but instant' (68). 
Existing outside temporal narrative, it thus cuts across the nuclear-fuse running 
from the end of grand narrative, which prohibits Tom a meaningful death, to the 
end of history, which precludes meaning for all.
89 Hegarty, pp. 83–84.
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Conclusion.
Michael Ondaatje's The English Patient (1992) 
and Deserting the Desert in the Shadow of New Threats
The Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, leaving the United States as the world's only 
superpower and spelling an end to the stand-off which had spawned such 
paranoia in the societies of both East and West. Moscow had already declared a 
moratorium on atomic-testing the previous year, and Washington was to follow 
in 1992. That year also saw the publication of Michael Ondaatje's The English  
Patient, another story of a Westerner seeking to escape their home-society for 
the potential of the Sahara. Although published after the Cold War, the novel had 
taken six years to write1 and, I suggest, reflects the uncertainty and upheavals of 
this time of political thaw and fragmentation. In a similar manner to Moon 
Tiger's portrayal of the Second World War, this text looks back to the end of that 
conflict in order to acquire a perspective on the shifts and easing of tensions 
which accompanied Gorbachev's leadership and pursuit of glasnost. However, 
while Penelope Lively shows how her historian can transcend the forces which 
try to contain her, The English Patient presents both another historian and the 
writer striving but ultimately failing to flee the shadow of the status quo.
Determined to make a home away from the nation-states he so despises, 
the title character Almásy tries to ignore the flames of the world war licking at 
the edges of his desert. Even before the conflagration overruns the Sahara, the 
small, self-avowedly apolitical international community whose fringes he 
inhabits betrays political loyalties. Indeed, his most important work – locating a 
site of antiquity – is dependent on the use of an aeroplane which turns out to be 
the property of British intelligence. Contrary to much existing criticism, my 
analysis of the novel reads Almásy's supranationalism not as an apolitical 
1 Willem Dafoe, 'Michael Ondaatje', BOMB – Artists in Conversation, Winter 1997 
<http://bombmagazine.org/article/2029/michael-ondaatje> [accessed 2 September 2015]
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humanism but Eurocentric supremacism, based primarily on a canon of 
Classical narratives of self and Other. As Qadri Ismail has pointed out, the texts 
he frequently cites on his sick-bed, such as The Last of the Mohicans and Kim, 'are 
directly implicated in the justification of Western imperialism and divisive 
nationalist discourses',2 while his principal touchstone for engaging with the 
world is The Histories by Herodotus, which Rebecca Stefoff classifies as a key 
element of the Ancient Greek suprastate project.3 Furthermore, his edition of 
Herodotus is an English production, a translation from 1890 and so a 
contemporary of the war against the Boers who contested British imperial 
certainties (it was also the first war in which journalists were embedded with 
troops, created a new way of writing history). In other words, it is not so 
removed from the world of modern nation-states and their political battles as it 
might appear. These texts are as much what Lilijana Burcar calls 'ideological 
platforms' as are nation-states, as much what Bryan Taylor terms 'performances 
of nationalist resolve' as are nuclear-weapons.4 It is through such discourse that 
Almásy constructs his own fixed narrative to contain the world around him. In 
the case of the Herodotus, his notes written in its margins are literally 
circumscribed by its accepted authority. 
In Almásy's world-view, meaning is fixed at the moment of production 
rather than reception ('you must read Kipling slowly. Watch carefully where the 
commas fall so you can discover the natural pauses […] Your eye is too quick and 
2 Qadri Ismail, 'Discipline and Colony: The English Patient and the Crow's Nest of Post 
Coloniality', Postcolonial Studies, 12 (1999), 403–36, described in Lilijana Burcar, 'Re-Mapping 
Nation, Body and Gender in Michael Ondaatje's The English Patient', in The Flesh Made Text  
Made Flesh: Cultural and Theoretical Returns to the Body, ed. by Zoe Detsi-Diamanti, Katerina 
Kitsi-Mitakou and Effie Yiannopoulou (New York: Peter Lang: 2007), pp. 99–110 (p. 102). This is 
also examined in Stephanie M. Hilger, 'Ondaatje's The English Patient and Rewriting History', 
CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture, 6 (2004), 1–9 (p. 2) 
<http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1246&context=clcweb> [accessed 21 
February 2012].
3 Rebecca Stefoff, The British Library Companion to Maps and Mapmaking (London: British 
Library, 1995), p. 27.
4 Burcar, p. 102; Bryan C. Taylor, 'Nuclear Pictures and Metapictures', American Literary 
History, 9 (1997), 567–97 (p. 567).
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North American. Think about the speed of his pen')5 and this is no less the case 
with regard to his burnt body erased of all identifying features. His wealth of 
references all arrive at the same conclusion, and its ostensible heterogeneity is 
only a strategy to extend his power, just as the US' promotion of democracy 
around the world aided the expansion of its influence during the Cold War.6
The story which revolves around this figure is a contest between 
authoritarian dictates and dialogic experience. In Almásy, Ondaatje crafts a 
character striving to cling on to history as its demise licks at the edges of his 
writing-desk, while the other displaced people sharing the Tuscan convent look 
to the future.7 Of these, Caravaggio alone can see past the patient's words since 
he was in Egypt at the time of the recounted events. He does not contradict the 
other's narrative, but instead identifies the speaker as Almásy, thereby 
connecting the awe-inspiring Nazi-collaborator with the dying scholar in their 
midst. In this way, Caravaggio brings death into and so undermines the invalid's 
formidable system of control. Pulled down from his Apollonian heights, the 
historian becomes a mere man with limits, the site at which others can meet and 
relate to him on equal terms. In Baudrillardian fashion, Caravaggio does not 
seek to accomplish anything more. 
The younger generation, represented by Hana and Kip, have no 
comparable power to counter the patient's prescription. For all Ondaatje's 
postcolonial credentials, the contest he sets out 'between old-age humanism – 
the patient – and the new age of Kip[,] a historical moment that remapped the 
world, when the balance shifted from colonialism',8 itself topples over under the 
5 Michael Ondaatje, The English Patient (London: Bloomsbury, 1992), p. 94. All subsequent 
references to the novel will appear in the text in parentheses.
6 Alan Nadel, Containment Culture: American Narratives, Postmodernism, and the Atomic Age  
(Durham: Duke UP, 1995), p. 7.
7 For the sense of futurity expressed in literature following the Cold War, see Daniel Grausam, 
'“It is Only a Statement of the Power of What Comes After”: Atomic Nostalgia and the Ends of 
Postmodernism', American Literary History, 24 (2012), 308–36 
8 Maya Jaggi, 'The Soul of a Migrant', Guardian, 29 April 2000 
<www.guardian.co.uk/books/2000/apr/29/fiction.features> [accessed 10 March 2012]
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weight of a problem which is exposed by the glare of Hiroshima's destruction.
Three years before the Enola Gay took off on her historic mission, Almásy 
bails out of a malfunctioning aircraft over the desert. He survives, but is 
grievously burnt, which effectively compounds the desired erasure of his 
Hungarian national identity. In its final pages, the novel catches up with Little 
Boy, a weapon that does not sit on the historical continuum of conflict which the 
scholar commands so effectively (contrary to the boiling oil proposed by German 
officers which makes the campaign of 1943–44 '[t]he last mediaeval war […] 
fought in Italy' (69)). The reverberations of the blast can be read back through the 
novel, tinting preceding events with the atomic dawn. The inhabitants of the 
Tuscan shelter do not survive unscathed, as Caravaggio's deformities, Hana's 
miscarriage and Kip's experience of being chalked as a new recruit (as if he 
himself were one of the ordnances he is being trained to defuse) all acquire a 
nuclear-dimension. The patient, of course, becomes a victim of the Bomb, a 
living corpse, forever burning, caught eternally in the moment of the explosion, 
as Robert Lifton and Greg Mitchell describe the survivors of Hiroshima.9 
However, the cultural-imperialist is more than a victim: forever falling from his 
aeroplane, he is also the perpetrator of the suffering. After all, the only foliage 
which can survive in his presence are the murals in his room, already flattened 
yet also idealised like the atomic-future which promised to contain the public of 
the 1950s as safely as a convent's walls. The burnt man is a denotation of 
detonation like an image of a mushroom cloud, irradiating his audience with a 
sense of awed respect and consequent compliance. It is for this reason that 
Almásy must be identified and buried if the new age Ondaatje promotes is to 
have its day. However, he continues to contaminate the world, and the totalising 
narratives of his age persist in this time of uncertainty. 
9 Referred to in Taylor, p. 578. For how paranoia collapses past and future into an all-
consuming, self-aware present, creating the desire for both multiplicity and stability, see 
Stephen O'Donnell, Latent Destinies: Cultural Paranoia and Contemporary US Narrative  
(Durham and London: Duke UP, 2000).
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The young Indian, Kirpal, is fragmented and re-coordinated as Kip by the 
British military, and particularly the paternal Lord Suffolk, to become a dutiful 
son maintaining the hegemonic status quo. As a character, he is the product of 
institutions of received Western power-knowledge, being formed by the 
regimented training of the army and then birthed into the novel through the 
broken wall of the library in Tuscany (the home of the Renaissance which 
ultimately produces Almásy). The damage has been caused by a mortar-shell, the 
practical application of this same wisdom, its narrative of violence embodied in 
the tomes along the walls and so literally circumscribing the natural world 
which can be glimpsed through the hole. In contrast to the interior stillness of 
this Western cultural space, the brown man's active life is affiliated with the 
outdoor elements of mud, water and air. While the patient is the author of his 
history of transcendent art and love and so can stand above it, Kip's experiences 
are grounded in the spatial and temporal coordinates of scientific military 
manoeuvres. 
Equipped with a field-radio, it is Kip who relays to his companions the 
reports of the 'tremor[s] of Western wisdom' (284) which have levelled two 
Eastern cities, Ondaatje's wording calling to mind John Hersey's aside in 
Hiroshima that, 'in the first moment of the atomic age, a human being was 
crushed by books'.10 Similarly, it is through Kip's vivid thoughts that the reader 
learns the news. 'If he closes his eyes he sees the streets of Asia full of fire. It rolls 
across cities like a burst map, the hurricane of heat withering bodies as it meets 
them, the shadow of humans suddenly in the air' (284): his imagining of the 
experience, which becomes the reader's, removes the geographic and 
technological detachment (even if, significantly, it is the European who suffers 
from the flames). Kip confronts the learned Westerner, demanding to know 
where humanity lies in this desolation: 'American, French, I don't care. When 
you start bombing the brown races of the world, you're an Englishman' (286). The 
assault on Japan has exposed Almásy's supranational but totalising and self-
10 John Hersey, Hiroshima (London and New York: Penguin, 1946), p. 31.
249
interested authority which many critics read as anti-authoritarianism.11 The 
patient offers no response and, indeed, after this moment he is not ascribed 
direct speech for the rest of the novel. Confronted with the annihilation of the 
Oriental Other, the only suitable response is his own death. 
Kip departs, wondering if the brother who has fought British imperial rule 
has not been right all along. However, a motorcycle accident throws him from the 
metalled road and into a river, reconnecting him to the elements to which he has 
so long been billeted and reverting him to his acceptable identity and the foot of 
his mentor (and not, say, his Canadian lover Hana). 
Around three a.m. [the patient] feels a presence in the room. He sees, for a pulse of a 
moment, a figure at the foot of his bed, against the wall or painted onto it perhaps, not 
quite discernible in the darkness of foliage beyond the candlelight. He mutters 
something, something he had wanted to say, but there is silence and the slight brown 
figure, which could be just a night shadow, does not move […] And he would not be so 
lucky, he thinks, to speak to the young sapper again.
He stays awake in any case this night, to see if the figure moves towards him […] If the 
figure turns around there will be paint on his back, where he slammed in grief against 
the mural of trees. When the candle dies out he will be able to see this.
His hand reaches out slowly and touches his book and returns to his dark chest. Nothing 
else moves in the room (298).
Told from the patient's perspective, the scene literally paints Kip as an exotic 
simulation at the edges of the story. The dreamlike nature of the homecoming 
removes all context and consequences, but perhaps this is the only way to 
sustain a belief in the possibility of people from different parts of the world 
forging a community in the face of the West's destruction of that world. 
11 Nicola Renger acknowledges the tensions between the two men but does not really seize on 
their source. She does say that '[t]he imaginary homeland [Kip] has built for himself is 
destroyed in the nuclear explosion and, in response, Kip attacks the representative of this 
betrayal, Almásy' but then defuses the confrontation she sets up by stressing the two men's 
similarity that, '[a]s migrants, Almásy and Kip have cut their filiative bonds to redefine 
themselves, but, because the world has no place for “international bastards,” they face 
betrayal' by the status quo. See 'Cartography, Historiography, and Identity in Michael 
Ondaatje's The English Patient,' in Being/s in Transit: Travelling, Migration, Dislocation, ed. 
by Liselotte Glage (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2000), pp. 111–24 (pp. 121–22).
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Most commentators do not address this reconciliation. Lesley Higgins and 
Marie-Christine Leps, for example, discuss the preceding scene but skip over it 
entirely to look at the epilogue. Ahmad Abu Baker limits his discussion of the 
events following the news from Japan to the observation that the atrocities 
committed by the Nazis pale in comparison to the crimes of imperialism and the 
A-bomb, which is problematic given the novel's cautious optimism in the 
postwar world-order centred on America and the decolonised nations, 
personified in Hana and Kip. Alice Brittan does examine it and concludes that it 
disrupts the spatial binary of the A-bomb and thereby champions the precedence 
of interpersonal connections. However, this does not approach Kip's apparent 
conformism. Indeed, the ultimate legacy of his decision seems to be, from a 
reading of her article, the perfect synchronisation of Hana and Kip's falling 
kitchenware on separate continents thirteen years later which – even when the 
table-knives are read as mass-produced weapons plummeting to earth – perhaps 
takes the maxim that the personal is political a step too far.12 
Josef Pesch is one of the few critics who acknowledges that the scene is 
problematic and that the cultural divide cannot be bridged. However, his 
conclusion that '[c]ulture and rationality may not be an ideal basis for mutual 
exchange and understanding, but without them attempts at negotiating with the 
foreign and the other are even less promising'13 seems to overlook a number of 
points. The novel has already noted that there is 'no reason' or rationality in this 
time of war (50), while the construct of the Other would seem to preclude any 
such connection on these bases, and also take the argument back to the binaries 
which the novel is seeking to dismantle. 
12 Lesley Higgins and Marie-Christine Leps, '"Passport, Please": Legal, Literary, and Critical 
Fictions of Identity', College Literature, 25 (1998), 94–138 (pp. 122–23); Ahmad M. S. Abu Baker, 
'Maps in Michael Ondaatje’s The English Patient', Nebula: A Journal of Multidisciplinary  
Scholarship, 5 (2008), 98–109 (p. 107) <www.nobleworld.biz/images/Abu_Baker3.pdf> [accessed 
3 March 2012]; Alice Brittan, 'War and the Book: The Diarist, the Cryptographer, and The 
English Patient', PMLA, 121 (2006), 200–13 (p. 210).
13 Josef Pesch, 'Cultural Clashes?: East Meets West in Michael Ondaatje's Novels', in Across the 
Lines: Intertextuality and Transcultural Communication in the New Literatures in English , 
ed. by Wolfgang Kloos (Amsterdam: Adopi, 1998), pp. 65–76 (p. 73).
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Of course, this reading argues that the novel tries to achieve this by 
making the Oriental Other the same as the Occidental self. Kip's return restores 
the status quo and endorses the European's supremacy. The 'presence in the 
room' might be a figment of the patient's (guilty? slighted?) imagination, but it is 
perceived from his perspective – and Kip remains passive – and so this 
distinction is ultimately irrelevant. The scene maintains the ambiguity crucial to 
imperial power. It comes to an end as the English patient's 'hand reaches out 
slowly and touches his book and returns to his dark chest' (298):14 the Western 
narrative of both the book and the dying cultural-imperialist who here identifies 
with it maintains the ambivalence inherent to the interracial encounter at the 
end of the colonial age. Irrespective of how Ondaatje describes the novel ('a 
debate that remapped the world, when the balance shifted from colonialism'), the 
climactic rapprochement reads more as complicity with Western authority, 
instruction rather than conversation, this hierarchic community having been 
forged and now being renewed through a European world-view.
Consequently, the character of Kip, the embodiment of the new, post-
imperialist age, is no more than lip-service to a heterogeneous world. It is 
because of a personal relationship with a Westerner that he kindles a faith in 
books; in the light of the A-bomb which drops into his world, he sees that this 
relationship is predicated on Western power-knowledge, and severs it. He then 
returns to the relationship because of the Western narrative, although he has 
faith in this only on account of this relationship. His loyalty to the Western 
project is a closed system. Constructed on logic without reason, it is self-
justifying and so self-negating in the manner of the MAD doctrine of the Cold 
War. The proud status of being an 'international bastard' (176) is just a fairy-tale 
if you return to claim your father's legacy; you must walk away from the texts 
14 It is not explicit whether the book is The Histories or Kim (or another text). I imagine it is the 
Kipling, given that this has been the textual bridge between the two men. Abu Baker suggests 
that it is Herodotus on the grounds of J. J. Clarke's reflection (although he attributes it to 
Stephen Batchelor) that Herodotus encapsulates the origin of the enmity between East and 
West (p. 101, referring to J. J. Clarke, Oriental Enlightenment: The Encounter Between Asian 
and Western Thought (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), p. 4).
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you have inherited from the old order to build your own community. 
For all that the members of the younger generation regard truth to be 
relational (writing their own meanings of the patient's body against his wishes, 
Hana finding a surrogate father, Kip another mentor), the old dictates shape 
their engagement with the world and one another. Although Hana's last recorded 
words to Kip give a name to the thread which connects them ('Love is so small it 
can tear itself through the eye of a needle' (288)), she is only repeating what she 
has learned from her bedridden pedagogue. Their failure to escape the dictates of 
the war-ravaged world is evident in the final paragraphs of the novel, which 
portrays Hana and Kip as prescribed by the moral-geographic dictates of the 
British Commonwealth. In Stephanie Hilger's words, this situation comprises 'a 
new kind of imprisonment [which] make[s] Caravaggio's earlier statement that 
“the trouble with all of us is we are where we shouldn't be” (122) appear as a dark 
prophecy'.15 While Hilger ultimately sees this conclusion to the novel in a 
positive light,16 by accepting unproblematically Ondaatje's narratival leap from 
1945 to 1958 (which glosses over the horrors of Partition to present a harmonious 
moral geography of a relatively peaceful moment in Nehru's push for a South 
Asian socialism) the ambivalence which her article proposes promotes a 
hegemonic status quo rather than the interests of the individual. The younger 
generation has surmounted the restrictions of the nation-state only to find itself 
identified by a model received ready-defined by the former imperialists rather 
than developed through dialogic, collaborative experience. By superseding 
(regional, ethnic, cultural) self-determination, this supranational community 
reinforces the ideological essentialisms of the Cold War world, and the thread 
which connects the couple is hardly a grounds for practical change.
While thus conforming to the Western narrative tradition which has 
15 Hilger, p. 8.
16 '[I]t provides the reader with the possibility to participate in the writing of history and 
therefore also in the shaping of the future […] Binaries establish oppositions which 
eventually give way to the ambivalence of the historical process, thereby undermining any 
rigidly established barrier', Hilger, p. 8.
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served the model of the nation-state, Ondaatje makes a gesture of departure by 
now stepping into the text to acknowledge that the author is not omniscient. He 
grants Hana freedom with the reflection that '[s]he is a woman I don't know well 
enough to hold in my wing, if writers have wings, to harbour for the rest of my 
life' (301). With this intrusion, Ondaatje reveals that he is subscribing to a 
framework which is inadequate to contain the world since it does not take into 
account the multiplicitous world. In this way, he is like his title character, and 
both fail where Penelope Lively succeeds, if Moon Tiger is read as Claudia's 
history. Speaking from beyond 1945, the writer here comprises the real or, in 
Alan Nadel's words, spiritual authority which gives his hypothesis of hope its 
worth.17 However, given his confessed limitations, this authority is unstable, a 
fact which brings a lack or death into his narrative system. The novel cannot 
provide a unifying frame for all the testimonies and truths he presents: it is 
another master narrative which fragments in the age of the Bomb. This would 
not be a problem if he embraced the uncertainty of the new age but, for all that 
Ondaatje lets Hana fly his page, he circumscribes her with the political status 
quo around it by entrusting her to the Commonwealth. Again mirroring Almásy, 
the semblance of democracy Ondaatje presents is really its opposite, and his 
profession of powerlessness mirrors the ambiguity which welcomes Kip back to 
the fold. The author is melancholic for a stable authority; like his scholar, he 
wants meaning to be fixed at the moment of production.
While Ondaatje shows that individuals can dialogically engage with 
received narratives despite the intentions of the producing authority, they 
remain circumscribed by its power. Furthermore, he acknowledges the limits of 
(his own) authority. Taken together, these two points seem to destabilise both 
the postwar world in which individuals live and its hegemonic narrative of Cold 
War. The fact that the author ultimately conforms to narrative tradition, 
however, gives rise to the question of whether this state of uncertainty is not just 
another story pasted on to the world, in reality as authoritarian as the powers it 
17 See Nadel, pp. 60ff.
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disavows. Consequently, it would be a mistake to dismiss the political hegemony 
operating through totalising narratives as a rambling, broken man dying in an 
abandoned institution, since the new community on the terrace outside is still 
dancing to his tune.
☼
The tensions in The English Patient and the other texts analysed signal what 
Daniel Grausam has called 'the multiple and incomplete ends of the Cold War'18 
which, I suggest, occurred for the individual before 1991 no less than they have 
seemed illusory for political states since then. After all, the effective and widely 
accepted end of the Cold War came when the Soviet Union disbanded, thereby 
conceding defeat, meaning that it ultimately played out in convention with 
traditional, rather than atomic, warfare.19 However, while the Cold War did not 
spell the end of humanity, neither did it bring an end to war.
Indeed, it was the bilateral fear of 'unprecedented threats and […] risks to 
our security' owing to a new state of war which heralded what can arguably be 
considered the official end to the confrontation. Following the attacks on New 
York's World Trade Center and the Pentagon, a summit between NATO and the 
Russian Federation in May 2002 thus declared 'a new page in [their] relations' 
which would allow them to strengthen their 'ability to work together in areas of 
common interest and to stand together against common threats'.20 
The fears and tropes which have arisen from the events of 11th September 
2001 are strikingly similar to those which grew out of the Western public-
awareness of the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Just as, in Suzanne 
Clark's words, 'news of the nuclear aftermath entered everyday life not as a 
18 Grausam, p. 311.
19 Jonathan Schell, The Fate of the Earth and The Abolition (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2000), pp. vi–
vii.
20 NATO Office of Information and Press, NATO–Russia Council Rome Summit 2002 
<www.nato.int/docu/comm/2002/0205-rome/rome-eng.pdf> [accessed 2 September 2015] The 
quotes come from the summit declaration, p. 2. See also 'Address by Costas Simitis, Prime 
Minister of Greece', p. 33: 'Today marks the formal ending of the Cold War'.
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thoughtful reflection on national responsibility[...], but as a threat to American 
futures',21 the danger of another attack on Western interests has been perceived 
to be clear and present for much of the last fourteen years, for all that it is 
nebulous. In his study of literature's response to the global Cold War, Andrew 
Hammond underlines the analogies between the two eras explicitly:
[i]n many ways, the crises, inquiries and concerns […] between 1945 and 1989 are those of 
our own times, particularly after '9/11' […]. In the post-CW era, the resurgent 
neoliberalism, the Manichean worldview, the continual conflict abroad, the 
militarization of public life and the crushing of dissent, […] have altered little since the 
1980s, and although the terminology may have changed – from 'interventionism' to 
'regime change', from 'red threat' to 'global terror' – the political landscape remains the 
same. The sense of helplessness […] remains, with no 'third way' clearly emerging 
between the forces of an American-led West and the entity it chooses to confront.22
While the danger is not exclusively atomic, the threat remains. A 
pervasive menace is the terrorist group armed with a biological or nuclear-
weapon. While commentators claim it is highly unlikely that a terrorist group 
will acquire the Bomb,23 the huge consequences of this slim possibility means 
that it nevertheless consumes people's thoughts and produces their paranoia. If 
such an instance were to occur, the common rational restraint on which the 
21 Suzanne Clark, Cold Warriors: Manliness on Trial in the Rhetoric of the West (Carbondale, 
Southern Illinois U, 2000), p. 98. In By the Bomb's Early Light: American Thought and Culture  
at the Dawn of the Atomic Age, Paul Boyer details how even the first hours and days of victory 
over Japan were shot through with the consciousness that it was only a matter of time before 
another country – in all likelihood Russia – acquired the technology to build a Bomb and 
direct it against the United States (Chapel Hill and London: U of North Carolina P, 1994).
22 Andrew Hammond, 'From Rhetoric to Rollback: Introductory Thoughts on Cold War Writing', 
in Cold War Literature: Writing the Global Conflict, ed. by Andrew Hammond (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2006), pp. 1–14 (pp. 11–12). Seen in this light, the Cold War and the War on Terror 
appear as simulations of peril which control society and the individual through fear and 
paranoia. There are of course limits to the parallels which can constructively be drawn, as 
Daniel Grausam has pointed out. His article 'Atomic Nostalgia' is a good introduction to the 
links and disjoints between the Cold War and the War on Terror.
23 Jason Burke, '“There is No Silver Bullet”: Isis, al-Qaida and the Myths of Terrorism', Guardian, 
19 August 2015 <www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/19/isis-al-qaida-myths-terrorism-war-
mistakes-9-11> [accessed 19 August 2015] Documents released by Wikileaks – itself a reminder 
of the continuing fight to control the narrative – quote the concerns of Russia's Foreign 
Ministry regarding the very real possibility of this happening in Pakistan. Warren Buffett, 
arguably the most successful analyst in history, believes that a nuclear-strike on a US city is 
'inevitable'.
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Cold War superpowers relied to avoid catastrophe could not be counted on. The 
same mindset is often ascribed to 'rogue' states reporting advances in atomic-
technology, such as North Korea and Iran. Alongside and at times entangled with 
this, conventional Cold War militarism persists. Arguably more than at any time 
since 1991, the front pages are reporting tensions and violations of non-
proliferation or disarmament agreements between the West and Russia and 
hosting the fight to control the narrative. 
Such concerns are cited as reasons against nuclear-abolition or even 
further disarmament, and the statements from the five official nuclear-powers at 
a United Nations' non-proliferation treaty review-conference in April–May 2015 
were as non-committal as they have ever been. Thus, with the recent seventieth 
anniversary of the Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki marking seventy years 
of calls for the abolition of atomic-weapons, while the likelihood of a global 
holocaust has decreased, the world remains closer to Ground Zero than 'zero 
nuke'.24
The authors of annihilation in the Western popular imagination of the 
early twenty-first century are less identifiable than they were during the late-
twentieth, a symptom of an unprecedented proliferation of narratives of self and 
Other. Their agents are more diverse – not necessarily nuclear – and so the fear 
24 Regarding the idea that the threat of human extinction has receded, see Grausam, p. 332 note 
7. Nevertheless, apart from during the most-intense period of thermonuclear-testing on both 
sides of the Iron Curtain in the early 1950s, the doomsday clock is closer to midnight than 
ever, although it does take into account factors such as global warming and accidents at 
weapons-sites and power stations. Eric Schlosser has reported extensively on numerous 
instances which have come close to causing inadvertent armageddon in the belief that we are 
aware of the horror but do not appreciate the danger. He persuasively contends that, as the 
Nuclear Club expands, such a disaster is increasingly probable (see his Command and 
Control: Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Accident, and the Illusion of Safety (New York: 
Penguin, 2013) and Gods of Metal (New York: Penguin, 2015)). That said, he is ultimately 
optimistic about humanity's survival, unlike Jonathan Schell, author of The Fate of the Earth, 
who believed that, with the genie out of the bottle, it is only a matter of time before it wreaks 
havoc. Accidents and misunderstandings between nuclear-states were two of the reasons to 
abolish nuclear-weapons presented by the 2014 'Vienna Pledge' which was signed by over a 
hundred countries. In the first months of his presidency, Barack Obama called for renewed 
global-effort to rid the world of the Bomb, but openly admitted that he did not expect this to 
be achieved in his lifetime.
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they induce is further abstracted from any psychologically containable menace. 
As a consequence, any study of how Western culture and the individual negotiate 
paranoia is surely as pertinent as ever, and it is hoped that this thesis has 
provided some useful suggestions as to how this might be undertaken. The Bomb 
has been deposed as the principal threat to society, or at least has to share this 
distinction with other terrors, and the specifically nuclear-tinge of public 
paranoia has faded, the existence of atomic-weapons normalised, to produce a 
complacency comparable to that pertaining to 'flu.25 The danger of the Bomb, so 
long hanging over the public, has fallen from the popular imagination.
What does occupy the popular imagination, however, is the North African 
world with which the thesis has concerned itself. As much as ever, this arid 
sector is a site of destruction and salvation, a source of paranoia and potential 
freedom in the Western mind, its challenges and resources equally contested by 
today's neo-imperialist superpowers. Continuing unrest – both sympathetic and 
hostile to the West – across the Sahara consolidates its identity as a node on an 
axis of troubled and troubling desert-regions across Africa and the Middle East26 
which is increasingly both ensnaring Westerners – those who have escaped their 
25 As mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, when a nuclear-warhead is detonated off the 
Miami waterfront in the 1994 American film True Lies (dir. by James Cameron (20th Century 
Fox, 1994)) – that year's third-highest grossing film both in the US and worldwide – it is not 
even accorded centre-stage and is little more than a cymbal-sting for comedic effect. See Box 
Office Mojo, '1994 Domestic Grosses' <www.boxofficemojo.com/yearly/chart/?yr=1994&p=.htm> 
[accessed 11 September 2015]; Box Office Mojo, '1994 Worldwide Grosses' 
<www.boxofficemojo.com/yearly/chart/?view2=worldwide&yr=1994&p=.htm> [accessed 11 
September 2015] More significantly, when Baltimore is obliterated in The Sum of All Fears (dir. 
by Phil Alden Robinson (Paramount Pictures, 2002)), there are no radiation-effects, and 
certainly no bodies, which takes the presentation of a nuclear-attack back to the principles 
delimiting American reports of the devastation of Hiroshima. Furthermore, the principal 
consequence of this – again – marginal event is a bright new era of East–West concord.
26 Significantly, all the countries named by Eisenhower's Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in 
his definition of the Middle East ('the area lying between and including Libya on the west 
and Pakistan on the east, Syria and Iraq on the North and the Arabian peninsula to the south, 
plus the Sudan and Ethiopia') are currently experiencing conflict or have witnessed it since 
2001, let alone 1991. Quoted in Roderic H. Davison, 'Where is the Middle East?', Foreign 
Affairs 38 (1960), 665–75 (p. 665). At the time of writing (September 2015), it is increasingly 
evident that Syria has become a 'hot' battleground on which the West and Russia are each 
seeking to prove their continuing global influence.
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home-societies for a two-week beach-holiday or to wage holy war alike – and 
haemorrhaging refugees and other migrants into Europe.
The fact that the West can be surprised by this quarter in which it has 
long involved itself suggests that it needs to consider the region and its own 
perception of it from new angles if it is to understand the protagonists, ideas and 
phenomena it is producing and their effects on the rest of the world. To begin 
with, it would do well to recognise that the limits of its understanding of the 
Sahara – the frontier of paranoia – are bound up with the limits of its 
understanding and paranoia about itself. If it does not, it risks condemning itself 
to wandering in the desert. 
The Sahara is thus as culturally relevant to the West as at any time during 
the colonial or Cold War eras. English-language fiction-writers continue to draw 
on the canvas the desert offers to work through the problems they perceive in 
society and express their ambivalence without necessarily reconciling their 
tensions. In Ahdaf Soueif's The Map of Love (1999), for example, the Egyptian 
wilderness is the crucible for postcolonial revisionism. The desert – this time 
that of ancient Judea – is once again the site of ambiguous spiritual insight in 
Quarantine (1997) by Jim Crace, while a trip – in both senses – involving the 
American wastes reiterates the potent association with other types of revelation 
in Douglas Coupland's 'In the Desert' (published in Life After God (1994)). 
Staying on this continent, Don DeLillo's Underworld (1997) takes us to a 
decommissioned airbase in remotest Nevada for a tantalising episode (a mirage?) 
at the edge of a narrative very much tied to the lingering vestiges of the Cold 
War. More recently, neighbouring Arizona provides a perspective on 11th 
September in Once in a Promised Land by Laila Halaby (2007). Kamila Shamsie 
circles the same concern – among many others – in Burnt Shadows (2009), which 
moves between the wastelands of Nagasaki and Manhattan after 9/11 via the 
deserts of Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation. Lastly, I should 
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acknowledge A Hologram for the King (2012), Dave Eggers' venture into the Saudi 
desert of global capitalism.27
As is evident from this brief overview, the Sahara and other deserts have 
not been abundantly cultivated by recent English literature, despite their tropic 
potential and cultural relevance to the West's concerns, either during the 
approach to the millennium or in the early twenty-first century. It might be 
precisely because so many of the West's fears and uncertainties are every day 
seen to be associated with desert-spaces (unlike during the Cold War) that its 
writers have gone elsewhere. Perhaps the textual desert seems too literal a 
simulation – that is, too confusable with the world beyond literature – to allow a 
constructive exploration of their ambivalence and life's ambiguities. However, 
the desert has long existed at the heart of the stories which society tells itself to 
make sense of and deal with its fears about the world. While it might be 
banished to the margins today, its sands will doubtless seep back and fuse with 
the very nucleus of the West again.
27 Ahdaf Soueif, The Map of Love (London: Bloomsbury, 1999); Jim Crace, Quarantine (London: 
Penguin, 1997); Douglas Coupland, 'In the Desert', in Life After God, by Douglas Coupland 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), pp. 159–214; Don DeLillo, Underworld (New York: 
Scribner 1997); Laila Halaby, Once in a Promised Land (Boston: Beacon Press, 2007); Kamila 
Shamsie, Burnt Shadows (London: Bloomsbury, 2009); Dave Eggers, A Hologram for the King 
(San Francisco: McSweeney's, 2012).
260
Bibliography
Abu Baker, Ahmad M. S., 'Maps in Michael Ondaatje’s The English Patient', 
Nebula: A Journal of Multidisciplinary Scholarship, 5 (2008), 98–109 
<www.nobleworld.biz/images/Abu_Baker3.pdf> [accessed 3 March 2012]
Agamben, Giorgio, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford: 
Stanford UP, 1998)
Abbey, Edward, Desert Solitaire: A Season in the Wilderness (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 1990)
Abel, Elie, The Missiles of October: The Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis 1962 
(London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1966)
Aberley, Doug, Boundaries of Home: Mapping for Local Empowerment  
(Vancouver: New Society, 1993)
Abernethy, Peter L., 'Entropy in Pynchon's The Crying of Lot 49', Critique:  
Studies in Modern Fiction, 14 (1972), 18–33 
Ahmed, Samira, 'How the Bomb Changed Everything', BBC Worldwide 
<www.bbc.com/culture/story/20150702-how-the-bomb-changed-everything> 
[accessed 13AUG15]
Arendt, Hannah, 'On the Nature of Totalitarianism', in Arendt: Essays in  
Understanding 1930–1954 – Uncollected and Unpublished Works by Hannah  
Arendt, ed. by Jerome Kohn (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1994), pp. 328–60 
Aquarius.net – Next Generation Mapping, 'Miller Cylindrical Projection'
<www.mgaqua.net/AquaDoc/Projections/img/Miller%20Cylindrical.jpg> 
[accessed 10 February 2012] 
Bailey, Jeffrey, 'The Art of Fiction LXVII: Paul Bowles', in Conversations with  
Paul Bowles, ed. by Gena Dagel Caponi (Jackson: UP of Mississippi, 1993), pp. 111–
34 
Bakhtin, Mikhail, 'Epic and Novel: Toward a Methodology for the Study of the 
Novel', in The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, trans. by Caryl Emerson and 
Michael Holquist (Austin: U of Texas P, 1981)
Baldwin, James, No Name in the Street (New York: Dial Press, 1972)
261
Bataille, Georges, The Accursed Share: An Essay on General Economy, trans. by 
Robert Hurley, 3 vols (New York: Zone, 1991)
Baudrillard, Jean, 'On Disappearance', in Jean Baudrillard: Fatal Theories, ed. by 
David B. Clarke, Marcus A. Doel, William Merrin and Richard G. Smith (London 
and New York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 24–29
–– In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities, trans. by Paul Foss, John Johnston, 
Paul Patton and Stuart Kendall (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2007)
–– The Intelligence of Evil or the Lucidity Pact, trans. by Chris Turner (Oxford: 
Berg, 2005)
–– D'un Fragment l'Autre: Entretiens avec François L'Yonnet (Paris: Albin Michel, 
2001)
–– Impossible Exchange, trans. by Chris Turner (London: Verso, 2001)
–– Télémorphose (Paris: Sens and Tonka, 2001)
–– Fatal Strategies (London: Pluto, 1999)
–– The Gulf War Did Not Take Place, trans. by Paul Patton (Bloomington: Indiana 
UP, 1995)
–– The Illusion of the End, trans. by Chris Turner (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1994)
–– Simulacra and Simulation, trans. by Sheila Faria Glaser (Ann Arbor: U of 
Michigan P, 1994)
–– Symbolic Exchange and Death, trans. by Iain Hamilton Grant (London: Sage, 
1993)
–– The Transparency of Evil: Essays on Extreme Phenomena, trans. by James 
Benedict (London: Verso, 1993)
–– America (London and New York: Verso, 1988)
–– Simulations, trans. by Paul Foss, Paul Patton and Philip Beitchman (New 
York: Semiotext(e), 1983)
–– For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign, trans. by Charles Levin (St 
Louis: Telos, 1981)
262
Bauman, Zygmunt, 'From Pilgrim to Tourist – or a Short History of Identity', in 
Questions of Cultural Identity, ed. by Stuart Hall and Paul du Gay (London: Sage, 
1996), pp. 18–36 
Belletto, Steven, No Accident, Comrade: Chance and Design in Cold War  
American Narratives (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2012)
–– and Daniel Grausam, 'Introduction: Culture and Cold Conflict', in American 
Literature and Culture in an Age of Cold War: A Critical Reassessment, ed. by 
Steven Belletto and Daniel Grausam (Iowa City: U of Iowa P, 2012), pp. 1–14
Bellow, Saul, Henderson the Rain King (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1959)
Benjamin, Walter, 'The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction', in 
Illuminations, trans. by Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken, 2007), pp. 217–51
Berressem, Hanjo, 'V. in Love – From the “Other Scene” to the “New Scene”', 
Pynchon Notes, 18–19 (1986), 5–28
<www.ham.miamioh.edu/krafftjm/pn/pn018.pdf> [accessed 10 November, 2014]
Bertens, Johannes Willem, The Fiction of Paul Bowles (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1979)
Bishop, Ryan, 'Baudrillard, Death and Cold War Theory', in Baudrillard Now:  
Current Perspectives in Baudrillard Studies, ed. by Ryan Bishop (Cambridge and 
Malden: Polity, 2009), pp. 47–71 
Borges, Jorge Luis, Collected Fictions, trans. by Andrew Hurley (London: 
Penguin, 1998)
Bowker, Gordon, Through the Dark Labyrinth: A Biography of Lawrence Durrell 
(London: Pimlico, 1998)
Bowles, Paul, 'Baptism of Solitude', in Their Heads are Green and Their Hands  
are Blue: Scenes from the Non-Christian World, by Paul Bowles (New York and 
London: HarperCollins, 2006), pp. 133–48
–– The Sheltering Sky (London: Penguin, 2000)
–– 'Bowles et Choukri: Le Temps de la Polémique', Les Nouvelles du Nord, 28 
February 1997, pp. 6–7
Box Office Mojo, '1994 Domestic Grosses' <www.boxofficemojo.com/yearly/chart/?
yr=1994&p=.htm> [accessed 11 September 2015]
263
Box Office Mojo, '1994 Worldwide Grosses' 
<www.boxofficemojo.com/yearly/chart/?view2=worldwide&yr=1994&p=.htm> 
[accessed 11 September 2015] 
Boyer, Paul, By the Bomb's Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the  
Dawn of the Atomic Age (Chapel Hill and London: U of North Carolina P, 1994)
Brittan, Alice, 'War and the Book: The Diarist, the Cryptographer, and The 
English Patient', PMLA, 121 (2006), 200–13
Burcar, Lilijana, 'Re-Mapping Nation, Body and Gender in Michael Ondaatje's 
The English Patient', in The Flesh Made Text Made Flesh: Cultural and 
Theoretical Returns to the Body, ed. by Zoe Detsi-Diamanti, Katerina Kitsi-
Mitakou and Effie Yiannopoulou (New York: Peter Lang: 2007), pp. 99–110 
Burke, Jason, '“There is No Silver Bullet”: Isis, al-Qaida and the Myths of 
Terrorism', Guardian, 19 August 2015
<www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/19/isis-al-qaida-myths-terrorism-war-
mistakes-9-11> [accessed 19 August 2015] 
Burton, Stacy, 'Bakhtin, Temporality and Modern Narrative: Writing the “Whole 
Triumphant Murderous Unstoppable Chute”', Comparative Literature, 48 (1996), 
39–64
Butler, Judith, 'Imitation and Gender Insubordination', in The Lesbian and Gay 
Studies Reader, ed. by Henry Abelove, Michèle Aina Barale and David M. 
Halperin (New York and London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 307–20 
Campbell, Elizabeth A., 'Metaphor and V.: Metaphysics in the Mirror', Pynchon 
Notes, 22–23 (1988), 57–69 <www.ham.miamioh.edu/krafftjm/pn/pn022.pdf> 
[accessed 10 November 2014]
Campbell, Joseph, The Hero With a Thousand Faces (Princeton: Princeton UP, 
1968)
Canetti, Elias, The Human Province, trans. by Joachim Neugroschel (London: 
Deutsch, 1985)
Carroll, Lewis, Bruno and Sylvie Concluded (New York and London: Macmillan, 
1894) <www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/48795> [accessed 16 September 2015]
Chomsky, Noam, 'Why National Security Has Nothing to Do With Security', 
TomDispatch.com, 5 August 2014 <www.tomdispatch.com/blog/175877> [accessed 
15 February 2015]
264
Ciuba, Gary M., 'Review of An Invisible Spectator: A Biography of Paul Bowles by 
Christopher Sawyer-Lauçanno', American Literature, 62 (1990), 358–59
Clark, Suzanne, Cold Warriors: Manliness on Trial in the Rhetoric of the West  
(Carbondale, Southern Illinois U, 2000)
Clarke, J. J., Oriental Enlightenment: The Encounter Between Asian and Western  
Thought (London and New York: Routledge, 1997)
Cleckley, Hervey M., American Handbook of Psychiatry, 2 vols (New York: Basic 
Books, 1959)
Erik Cohen, '“Authenticity” in Tourism Studies: Aprés la Lutte', in Critical 
Debates in Tourism, ed. by Tej Vir Singh (Bristol, Buffalo and Toronto: Channel 
View Publications, 2012), pp. 250–61
–– 'Authenticity and Commodization in Tourism', Annals of Tourism Research, 15 
(1988), 371–86 
Colby, William, Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA (NY: Simon & Schuster, 1978)
Cooley, Ronald W., 'The Hothouse or the Street: Imperialism and Narrative in 
Pynchon's V.', Modern Fiction Studies, 39 (1993), 307–25 
Daniel Cordle, States of Suspense: The Nuclear Age, Postmodernism and United  
States Fiction and Prose (Manchester: Manchester UP, 2008)
–– 'Beyond the Apocalypse of Closure: Nuclear Anxiety in Postmodern Literature 
of the United States', in Cold War Literature: Writing the Global Conflict, ed. by 
Andrew Hammond (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), 63–77
Cornis-Pope, Marcel, Narrative Innovation and Cultural Rewriting in the Cold  
War and After (New York: Palgrave, 2001)
Coupland, Douglas, 'In the Desert', in Life After God, by Douglas Coupland (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), pp. 159–214
Cowart, David, Thomas Pynchon: The Art of Allusion (Carbondale: Southern 
Illinois UP, 1980)
Crace, Jim, Quarantine (London: Penguin, 1997)
Dafoe, Willem, 'Michael Ondaatje', BOMB – Artists in Conversation, Winter 1997 
265
<http://bombmagazine.org/article/2029/michael-ondaatje> [accessed 2 
September 2015]
Davison, Roderic H., 'Where is the Middle East?', Foreign Affairs 38 (1960), 665–75
Debord, Guy, The Society of the Spectacle, trans. by Donald Nicholson-Smith (New 
York: Zone, 1994)
de Certeau, Michel, Heterologies: Discourse on the Other, trans. by Brian Massumi 
(Minneapolis and London: U of Minnesota P, 1986) 
Decino, Denchu Jose, 'Brief Overview of the Sartrean Notion of Authenticity', in 
Sartre Online <www.oocities.org/sartresite/articles_ethics_1.html> [accessed 14 
September 2015]
Deleuze, Gilles and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, trans. by Brian Massumi (London: Continuum, 2004)
Delillo, Don, Underworld (New York: Scribner 1997)
Derrida, Jacques, 'No Apocalypse, Not Now (Full Speed Ahead, Seven Missiles, 
Seven Missives)', trans. by Catherine Porter and Philip Lewis, Diacritics, 14 
(1984), 20–31
Dewey, Joseph, In a Dark Time: The Apocalyptic Temper in the American Novel of  
the Nuclear Age (West Lafayette: Purdue Research Foundation, 1990)
Dorling, Daniel and David Fairbairn, Mapping: Ways of Representing the World  
(Harlow: Pearson Education, 1997)
Douglas, Ann, 'Periodizing the American Century: Modernism, Postmodernism, 
and Postcolonialism in the Cold War Context', Modernism/Modernity, 5 (1998), 
71–98
Dowling, David, Fictions of Nuclear Disaster (Iowa City: U of Iowa P, 1987)
Dubow, Jessica, 'A Therapeutics of Exile: Isaiah Berlin, Liberal Pluralism and the 
Psyche of Assimilation', Environment and Planning A, 44 (2012), 2463–76
Dyson, Freeman, 'Fighting for Freedom with the Technologies of Death', in 
Values at War: Selected Tanner Lectures on the Nuclear Crisis (Salt Lake City: U 
of Utah P, 1983), pp. 4–24
Edwards, Brian T., 'Sheltering Screens: Paul Bowles and Foreign Relations', 
266
American Literary History, 17 (2005), 307–34 
Eggers, Dave, A Hologram for the King (San Francisco: McSweeney's, 2012)
Field, Douglas, 'Introduction', in American Cold War Culture, ed. by Douglas 
Field (Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2005), pp. 1–13
Finlayson, Iain, Tangier: City of the Dream (London: Flamingo, 1993)
Foucault, Michel, Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of  
Reason, trans. by Richard Howard (London and New York: Routledge, 2001)
Frame, Paul, 'Radiation Warning Symbol (Trefoil)', Oak Ridge Associated 
Universities <www.orau.org/ptp/articlesstories/radwarnsymbstory.htm> 
[accessed 20 December 2015]
Freud, Sigmund, Civilization and its Discontents, trans. by Joan Riviere (London: 
Hogarth Press, 1972)
–– 'Fetishism (1927)', Miscellaneous Papers, 1888–1938, 5 vols (London: Hogarth, 
1950), V, pp. 198–204 
<http://portfolio.newschool.edu/thisisnotanobject/files/2015/03/Freud-
Fetishism-1927-2b52v1u.pdf> [accessed 7 June 2015]
Fromm, Erich, To Have or to Be? (London: Jonathan Cape, 1978).
–– Escape from Freedom (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1941)
Garfield, Simon, On the Map: Why the World Looks the Way It Does (London: 
Profile, 2012)
Gawande, Atul, 'The Itch', New Yorker, 30 June 2008 
<www.newyorker.com/magazine/2008/06/30/the-itch> [accessed 23 July 2013]
Gifford, James, 'Self-Authenticity as Social Resistance: Reading Empiric 
Approaches to Social Identity, Self-Esteem, and Fear in Durrell’s Monsieur', in 
Culture + the State: Alternative Interventions – Critical Works from the  
Proceedings of the 2003 Conference at the University of Alberta, ed. by James 
Gifford and Gabrielle Zezulka-Mailloux, 4 vols (Edmonton: CRC Humanities 
Studio, 2003), IV, pp. 212–24
Gifford, Terry, Pastoral (London: Routledge, 1999)
Gilmore, Timothy, '“How Pleasant to Watch Nothing”: Narrativity and Desire in 
V.', Orbit: Writing Around Pynchon, 1 (2012), 1–27 
267
<www.pynchon.net/owap/article/view/14> [accessed 20 August 2014]
Golden, Robert E., 'Mass Man and Modernism: Violence in Pynchon's V.',  
Critique: Studies in Modern Fiction, 14 (1972), 5–17
Goldstone, Richard H., 'Aspects of Self: A Bowles Collage', Twentieth Century 
Literature, 32 (1986), 274–79 
Grant, J. Kerry, A Companion to V. (Athens, GA: U of Georgia P, 2001)
Grausam, Daniel, '“It is Only a Statement of the Power of What Comes After”: 
Atomic Nostalgia and the Ends of Postmodernism', American Literary History, 
24 (2012), 308–36
–– 'Games People Play: Metafiction, Defense Strategy, and the Cultures of 
Simulation', ELH, 78 (2011), 507–32
–– On Endings: American Postmodern Fiction and the Cold War (Charlottesville: 
U of Virginia P, 2011)
Halaby, Laila, Once in a Promised Land (Boston: Beacon Press, 2007) 
Hales, Peter B., 'The Atomic Sublime', American Studies, 32 (1991), 5–31 
Halpern, Daniel, 'Interview with Paul Bowles', in Conversations with Paul Bowles, 
ed. by Gena Dagel Caponi (Jackson: UP of Mississippi, 1993), pp. 86–101 
Hammond, Andrew, 'From Rhetoric to Rollback: Introductory Thoughts on Cold 
War Writing', in Cold War Literature: Writing the Global Conflict, ed. by Andrew 
Hammond (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), pp. 1–14
Harley, J. B., 'Silences and Secrecy: The Hidden Agenda of Cartography in Early 
Modern Europe', Imago Mundi, 40 (1988), 57–76 
Hegarty, Paul, Jean Baudrillard: Live Theory (London and New York: 
Continuum, 2004)
Hendershot, Cyndy, I Was a Cold War Monster: Horror Films, Eroticism, and the  
Cold War Imagination (Bowling Green: Bowling Green U Popular P, 2001)
Hersey, John, Hiroshima (London and New York: Penguin, 1946)
Higgins, Lesley and Marie-Christine Leps, '"Passport, Please": Legal, Literary, and 
Critical Fictions of Identity', College Literature, 25 (1998), 94–138
268
Hilger, Stephanie M., 'Ondaatje's The English Patient and Rewriting History', 
CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture, 6 (2004), 1–9 
<http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1246&context=clcweb> 
[accessed 21 February 2012]
Hofmann, Michael, 'Introduction', in The Sheltering Sky, by Paul Bowles (London: 
Penguin, 2000), pp. vii–xiv
Horizon Research Foundation, 'The Brain During Cardiac Arrest', Horizon 
Research Foundation: Science at the Horizon of Life 
<www.horizonresearch.org/for-professionals/the-brain-during-cardiac-arrest> 
[accessed 16 September 2015]
Huggan, Graham, 'Decolonizing the Map: Postcolonialism, Poststructuralism and 
the Cartographic Connection', in Interdisciplinary Measures: Literature and the  
Future of Postcolonial Studies, by Graham Huggan (Liverpool: Liverpool UP, 
2008), pp. 21–33
Ismail, Qadri, 'Discipline and Colony: The English Patient and the Crow's Nest of 
Post Coloniality', Postcolonial Studies, 12 (1999), 403–36
Jaggi, Maya, 'The Soul of a Migrant', Guardian, 29 April 2000 
<www.guardian.co.uk/books/2000/apr/29/fiction.features> [accessed 10 March 
2012]
James, Clair, 'Book Reviews', Configurations, 2 (1994), 367–71
Jameson, Frederic, 'Foreword', in The Postmodern Condition: A Report on 
Knowledge, by Jean-François Lyotard, trans. by Geoff Bennington and Brian 
Massumi (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1984), pp. vii–xxi
Jenkins, Keith, Re-thinking History (London: Routledge, 1991)
Kellner, Douglas, 'Jean Baudrillard (1929–2007): A Critical Overview', in 
Baudrillard Now: Current Perspectives in Baudrillard Studies, ed. by Ryan 
Bishop (Cambridge and Malden: Polity, 2009), pp. 17–27 
–– 'Some Reflections on Baudrillard's “On Disappearance”', in Baudrillard Now: 
Current Perspectives in Baudrillard Studies, ed. by Ryan Bishop (Cambridge and 
Malden: Polity, 2009), pp. 154–58 
–– 'Jean Baudrillard', in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy  
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/baudrillard> [accessed 30 May 2012]
269
Kerensky, Oleg, 'Aspects of Self: A Bowles Collage', Twentieth Century Literature, 
32 (1986), 259–300 
Kermode, Frank, The Sense of an Ending: Studies in the Theory of Fiction with a  
New Epilogue (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1967)
Kiernan, Robert F., Saul Bellow (New York: Continuum, 1989)
Kim, Jodi, Ends of Empire: Asian American Critique and the Cold War  
(Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2010)
Kinston, Warren and Rachel Rosser, 'Disaster: Effects on Mental and Physical 
State', Journal of Psychosomatic Research, 18 (1974), 437–56
Klein, Christina, Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination,  
1945–61 (Berkeley: U of California P, 2003)
Kubalek, Paul, 'The Tourist Gaze', Chelsea College of Arts and Design MA Graphic 
Design Communications 2008, 1 <www.kubalek.at/download/KubalekPaul-
MAGDC-TheTouristGazeEssay_end.pdf> [accessed 30 May 2012]
Kupsch, Kenneth, 'Finding V.', Twentieth Century Literature: A Scholarly and 
Critical Journal, 44 (1998), 428–46 
Koolhaas, Rem, 'Junkspace', October, 100 (2002), 175–90 
Lacan, Jacques, 'The Signification of the Phallus', in Écrits, trans. by Bruce Fink 
(New York and London: Norton, 2006), pp. 582–83
–– 'The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the I as Revealed in 
Psychoanalytic Experience', in Écrits: A Selection, trans. by Alan Sheridan 
(London: Routledge, 2001), pp. 1–6
Lawrence, T. E. Seven Pillars of Wisdom (New York: Vintage, 2008)
Laing, R. D., The Divided Self (Baltimore: Penguin, 1965)
Levering, Ralph B., The Cold War 1945–1987 (Arlington Heights: Harlan Davidson, 
1988)
Lewis, Martin W. and Kären E. Wigen, The Myth of Continents: A Critique of  
Metageography (Oakland: U of California P, 1997)
Lifton, Robert Jay, 'The Image of "The End of the World": A Psychohistorical 
View', Michigan Quarterly Review, 24 (1985), 70–90
270
–– and Richard A. Falk, Indefensible Weapons: The Political and Psychological  
Case Against Nuclearism (New York: Basic Books, 1982)
Lively, Penelope, Moon Tiger (London: Penguin, 1988)
Lyotard, Jean-François, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, 
trans. by Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 
1984)
MacCannell, Dean, The Tourist: A New Theory of the Leisure Class (London: 
Macmillan, 1976)
Macdonald, Dwight, 'America! America!', Dissent, 5 (1958), 313–23 
Mailer, Norman, Advertisements for Myself (New York: G. P. Putnam’s and Sons, 
1959)
Malin, Irving, 'Aspects of Self: A Bowles Collage', Twentieth Century Literature, 
32 (1986), 293–300
Martino, Andrew, 'The Vanishing Point: The Dis-Integration of Female Identity in 
Paul Bowles's The Sheltering Sky', South Atlantic Review, 71 (2006), 87–114 
Mattessich, Stefan, Lines of Flight: Discursive Time and Countercultural Desire  
in the Work of Thomas Pynchon (Durham and London: Duke UP, 2002)
Maus, Derek C., Unvarnishing Reality: Subversive Russian and American Cold  
War Satire (Columbia: U of South Carolina P, 2011)
May, Todd, Gilles Deleuze: An Introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2005)
Merrin, William, 'Floral Tributes, Binge-Drinking and the Ikea Riot Considered 
as an Up-Hill Bicycle Race', in Jean Baudrillard: Fatal Theories, ed. by David B. 
Clarke, Marcus A. Doel, William Merrin and Richard G. Smith (London and New 
York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 61–82
Michaud, Jon, 'Updike, J.F.K., and the Umbrella Man', New Yorker, 22 November 
2011 <www.newyorker.com/books/double-take/updike-j-f-k-and-the-umbrella-
man> [accessed 30 August 2014]
Michelson, Bruce, 'The Idea of Henderson', Twentieth Century Literature, 27 
(1981), 209–24
Miniotaite, Daina, 'Human Quest in Saul Bellow's Novels Henderson the Rain 
271
King and The Adventures of Augie March', Eger Journal of English Studies, 5 
(2005), 111–19
Montrose, Louis, The Purpose of Playing: Shakespeare and the Cultural Politics  
of the Elizabethan Theatre (Chicago and London: U of Chicago P, 1996)
Moran, Mary Hurley, 'The Novels of Penelope Lively: A Case for the Continuity of 
the Experimental Impulse in Postwar British Fiction', South Atlantic Review, 62 
(1997), 101–20
–– Penelope Lively (New York: Twayne, 1993)
–– 'Penelope Lively's Moon Tiger: A Feminist “History of the World”', Frontiers: A 
Journal of Women Studies, 11 (1990), 89–95
Myers, John Bernard, 'Aspects of Self: A Bowles Collage', Twentieth Century 
Literature, 32 (1986), 284–86 
Alan Nadel, 'Fiction and the Cold War', in The Cambridge Companion to  
American Fiction After 1945, ed. by John N. Duvall (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 
2012), pp. 167–80
–– 'Paranoia, Terrorism, and the Fictional Condition of Knowledge', 
Contemporary Literature, 43 (2002), 406–21 
–– Containment Culture: American Narratives, Postmodernism, and the Atomic  
Age (Durham: Duke UP, 1995)
Nash, Roderick, Wilderness and the American Mind (New Haven: Yale UP, 2001)
NATO Office of Information and Press, NATO–Russia Council Rome Summit 2002 
<www.nato.int/docu/comm/2002/0205-rome/rome-eng.pdf> [accessed 2 
September 2015] 
Nietzsche, Friedrich, Will to Power, trans. by Walter Kaufmann and R. J. 
Hollingdale (New York: Vintage, 1968)
O'Donnell, Stephen, Latent Destinies: Cultural Paranoia and Contemporary US  
Narrative (Durham and London: Duke UP, 2000)
Olderman, Raymond M., Beyond the Waste Land: A Study of the American Novel  
in the Nineteen-Sixties (New Haven: Yale UP, 1972)
272
Olsen, Kjell, 'Staged Authenticity: A Grande Idée?', in Critical Debates in  
Tourism, ed. by Tej Vir Singh (Bristol, Buffalo and Toronto: Channel View 
Publications, 2012), pp. 261–65
Onan, Ayfer, 'A Fictional Analysis of Penelope Lively's Moon Tiger and Adalet 
A ao lu's ğ ğ Ölmeye Yatmak', Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Buca E itim ğ Fakültesi 
Dergisi, 16 (2004), 98–102
Ondaatje, Michael, The English Patient (London: Bloomsbury, 1992)
Osborne, Peter D., Travelling Light: Photography, Travel and Visual Culture  
(Manchester: Manchester UP, 2000)
O'Shea, Michael, The Brain: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2005)
Park, Yeo Sun, 'Modernity and the Politics of Place-Experience in D. H. 
Lawrence’s Novels With Parallel Readings of Arnold Bennett, Giovanni Verga, 
Patrick White and Gregorio López y Fuentes' (unpublished doctoral thesis, 
University of Sheffield, 2012)
'Penelope Lively – Moon Tiger', World Book Club, BBC World Service, 4 December 
2011 <www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p00lw91x> [accessed 3 September 2012]
Pesch, Josef, 'Cultural Clashes?: East Meets West in Michael Ondaatje's Novels', in 
Across the Lines: Intertextuality and Transcultural Communication in the New  
Literatures in English, ed. by Wolfgang Kloos (Amsterdam: Adopi, 1998), pp. 65–
76
Peterseil, Markus, 'A Game Theoretical Approach to the Early Fiction of Thomas 
R. Pynchon' (unpublished MA dissertation, University of Vienna, 2010)
Phillips, John, 'Humanity's End', in Baudrillard Now: Current Perspectives in  
Baudrillard Studies, ed. by Ryan Bishop (Cambridge and Malden: Polity, 2009), 
pp. 159–71
Piette, Adam, The Literary Cold War: 1945 to Vietnam (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
UP, 2009)
–– Imagination at War: British Fiction and Poetry 1939–1945 (London and 
Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995)
Pietz, William, 'The “Postcolonialism” of Cold War discourse', Social Text, 19/20 
(1988), 55–75
273
Prescott, Orville, 'Books of the Times', New York Times, 23 February 1959 
<www.nytimes.com/books/97/05/25/reviews/bellow-henderson.html> [accessed 
20 July 2012]
Pynchon, Thomas, Slow Learner: Early Stories (London: Jonathan Cape, 1985)
–– V. (London: Picador, 1975)
Rand, Richard, ed., Futures: Of Jacques Derrida (Stanford: Standford UP, 2001) 
Raschke, Debrah, 'Penelope Lively's Moon Tiger: Re-envisioning a “History of the 
World”', ARIEL: A Review of International English Literature, 26 (1995), 115–32
Redding, Arthur, Turncoats, Traitors and Fellow Travelers: Culture and Politics  
of the Early Cold War (Jackson: UP of Mississippi, 2008)
Renger, Nicola, 'Cartography, Historiography, and Identity in Michael Ondaatje's 
The English Patient,' in Being/s in Transit: Travelling, Migration, Dislocation, 
ed. by Liselotte Glage (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2000), pp. 111–24 
Rodrigues, Eusebio L., 'Bellow's Africa', American Literature, 43 (1971), 242–56
Rolls, Albert, 'The Two V.s of Thomas Pynchon, Or From Lippincott to Jonathan 
Cape and Beyond', Orbit: Writing Around Pynchon, 1 (2012) 
<www.pynchon.net/articles/10.7766/orbit.v1.1.33> [accessed 18 August 2014]
Rorty, Richard, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 
1989)
Rosenthal, Peggy, 'The Nuclear Mushroom Cloud as Cultural Image', American 
Literary History, 3 (1991), 63–92
Said, Edward, Orientalism: Western Perceptions of the Orient (New Delhi: 
Penguin, 2001)
Schaub, Thomas Hill, American Fiction in the Cold War (Madison and London: U 
of Wisconsin P, 1991)
Schell, Jonathan, The Fate of the Earth and The Abolition (Stanford: Stanford UP, 
2000)
Schlesinger, Jr, Arthur, The Vital Center: The Politics of Freedom (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1949)
274
Eric Schlosser, Gods of Metal (New York: Penguin, 2015)
–– Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Accident, and the  
Illusion of Safety (New York: Penguin, 2013) 
Schwenger, Peter, Letter Bomb: Nuclear Holocaust and the Exploding Word 
(Baltimore: John Hopkins UP, 1992)
Scigaj, Leonard M., 'Contemporary Ecological and Environmental Poetry: 
Différance or Référance?', Interdisciplinary Studies in Literature and 
Environment, 3 (1996), 1–25 
Shamsie, Kamila, Burnt Shadows (London: Bloomsbury, 2009)
Shepard, Paul, Man in the Landscape: A Historical View of the Esthetics of  
Nature (College Station: Texas A&M UP, 1991)
Sherman, Paul, 'Radioactive Symbol Page', WPClipart 
<www.wpclipart.com/page_frames/full_page_signs/radioactive_symbol_page.pn
g.html> [accessed 10 November 2014]
Singh, Nikhil Pal, 'Cold War Redux: On the “New Totalitarianism”', Radical  
History Review, 85 (2003), 171–81
Singh, Tej Vir 'Introduction', in Critical Debates in Tourism, ed. by Tej Vir Singh 
(Bristol, Buffalo and Toronto: Channel View Publications, 2012), pp. 1–26 
Solomon-Godeau, Abigail, Photography at the Dock: Essays on Photographic  
History, Institutions, and Practices (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1991) 
Soueif, Ahdaf, The Map of Love (London: Bloomsbury, 1999)
Spindler, Michael, 'The Prism of Estrangement: Placing the Fiction of Paul 
Bowles', Australasian Journal of American Studies, 8 (1989), 35–45 
Stefoff, Rebecca, The British Library Companion to Maps and Mapmaking  
(London: British Library, 1995)
Stevenson, David. L., 'The Activists', Daedalus, 92 (1963), 238–49
Stimson, Henry L., 'The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb', Harper's Magazine, 
194 (1947), 97–107
Stonor Saunders, Frances, Who Paid the Piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold  
275
War (London: Granta, 1999)
Strand, Eric, 'Lighting Out For the Global Territory: Postwar Revisions of 
Cultural Anthropology and Jewish American Identity in Bellow’s Henderson the  
Rain King', ELH, 80 (2013), 287–316
The Sum of All Fears, dir. by Phil Alden Robinson (Paramount Pictures, 2002)
Tanner, Tony, Thomas Pynchon (London and New York: Methuen, 1982)
–– 'V. and V-2', in Pynchon: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. by Edward 
Mendelson (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1978), pp. 16–55
–– 'Patterns and Paranoia or Caries and Cabals', Salmagundi, 15 (1971), 78–99
Tate, J. O., 'A Note on “Convergence”', Pynchon Notes, 15 (1984), 80–82 
<www.ham.miamioh.edu/krafftjm/pn/pn015.pdf> [accessed 10 November 2014]
Taylor, Bryan C., 'Nuclear Pictures and Metapictures', American Literary History, 
9 (1997), 567–97
–– 'The Politics of the Nuclear Text: Reading Robert Oppenheimer's Letters and 
Recollections', Quarterly Journal of Speech, 78 (1992), 429–49
True Lies, dir. by James Cameron (20th Century Fox, 1994)
Updike, John, 'The Talk of the Town', New Yorker, 9 December 1967, p. 51
Urry, John, The Tourist Gaze (London: Sage, 1990)
Vaknin, Sam, Mental Health and Psychology Dictionary  
<http://samvak.tripod.com/mentalhealthdictionary.html> [accessed 13 
September 2015]
Valdimarsdóttir, Guðrún, '“Let Me Contemplate Myself Within My Context”: An 
Analysis of Penelope Lively's Moon Tiger as a Work of Historical Fiction and a 
Commentary on History' (unpublished BA dissertation, University of Iceland, 
2012)
Wagner, Linda W., 'Paul Bowles and the Characterization of Women', Critique:  
Studies in Contemporary Fiction, 27 (1985), 15–24 
Weik von Mossner, Alexa, 'Encountering the Sahara: Embodiment, Emotion and 
Material Agency in Paul Bowles' The Sheltering Sky', Interdisciplinary Studies in  
276
Literature and Environment, 20 (2013), 219–38
Weinreich, Regina, 'Aspects of Self: A Bowles Collage', Twentieth Century 
Literature, 32 (1986), 267–74 
Whitfield, Stephen J., The Culture of the Cold War (Baltimore: John Hopkins UP, 
1991)
Williamson, Barbara Fisher, 'Links and Winks', New York Times, 15 September 
1985 <www.nytimes.com/1985/09/15/books/links-and-winks.html> [accessed 13 
August 2012]
Wolfson, Robert and John Laver, Years of Change: Europe 1890–1945 (London: 
Hodder and Stoughton, 1996)
Žižek, Slavoj, The Metastases of Enjoyment: On Women and Causality (London 
and New York: Verso, 2005)
277
